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SUMMARY
SUMMARY
This thesis is about the way aesthetic thought changed or developed in 
Germany in the years immediately after the publication of Immanuel Kant’s third 
critique -  A Critique o f  the Power o f Judgement. Besides many comparatively minor 
developments, it identifies three important changes in aesthetic thinking after Kant. 
Firstly, there was an increased emphasis on the integrated and interdependent nature 
of the human thinking that Kant had been more concerned to classify and analyse. 
Secondly, the change in aesthetics marks the change from Enlightenment classicism 
to Early German Romanticism. Thirdly, the role of aesthetics itself changed, from 
attempting to define the concept of beauty and explain how we perceive it, to 
claiming that aesthetics is concerned with humanity’s search for meaning in the work 
of art. This last development amounts to a suggestion that the hermeneutic strand in 
philosophy grew out of early post-Kantian aesthetics.
Three thinkers have been selected as a means of showing these changes. They 
are Friedrich Schiller, the poet and dramatist, Friedrich Holderlin, the poet, and 
Friedrich Schlegel, the literary theorist and essayist. Chronologically, our period 
begins in 1793 and ends about 1800, just before the death of Kant (1804), the death of 
Schiller (1805), the mental collapse of Holderlin (1806), and with the final editions of 
Schlegel’s literary journal, Athenaum (1800). This timespan allows a fairly close 
study of Schiller’s influential series of essays on philosophical aesthetics, which he 
wrote in direct response to the Third Critique, re-examining Kant’s claim that the 
judgement of taste is subjective, and expanding Kant’s account of how it is possible to 
create works of art; and also of Friedrich Holderlin’s and Friedrich Schlegel’s most 
productive years, when both worked out aesthetic theories that moved onwards from 
Schiller, but nevertheless remained indebted to Kant in several respects.
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Introduction
INTRODUCTION 
The world that responded to Kant’s Critique o f the Power o f Judgement
This thesis examines the philosophical ideas of Friedrich Schiller (1759 - 1805), 
Friedrich Hdlderlin (1770 - 1843) and Friedrich Schlegel (1772 - 1829), three writers 
active in the German states during the 1790s. The intention is to set out the way in 
which they contributed to a major change that we shall see took place in aesthetics in 
the ten years following the publication of Kant’s Third C ritiq u e as Enlightenment 
classicism gave way to Romanticism. This is done by analysing a selection of texts 
from each writer. While giving an exposition of these three men’s ideas, we shall also 
be drawing attention to the ideas they shared with Kant or with one another, and to the 
extent to which they departed from or modified ideas expressed in the Third Critique. It 
will be on this basis that we shall reach our conclusion that they changed the aesthetic 
criteria for producing and evaluating the arts. Instead of trying to identify or analyse 
how we perceive beauty, they began to encourage us to find meaning in the work of art.
None of our writers was a professional academic philosopher, though all three 
had an educated philosophical background. In the philosophical canon they are thus 
minor figures. However, together they provide a good illustration of what happened in 
the intellectual world during the last decade of the eighteenth century. The 1790s were 
years during which university towns, such as Gottingen, in the biological sciences;
Jena, in Philosophy and Literature; and Berlin, in Philosophy, Geography and the 
sciences were centres of progressive and original research. In Konigsberg Kant
1 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, (ed.) Heine F. Klemme and Piero Giordanetti, Hamburg: Felix 
Meiner Verlag, 2001.
Translated as: Immanuel Kant, Critique o f  the Power o f  Judgement, (ed.) Paul Guyer, trans. Paul Guyer 
and Eric Matthews, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. The Third Critique was first 
published in 1790, with a second edition in 1791.
2 Richards, Robert J., The Romantic Conception o f  Life: Science and Philosophy in the age o f  Goethe, 
Chicago; London: University o f Chicago Press, 2002,
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continued his work, which was disseminated constantly around the German speaking 
states.3 Politically, Germany shared the mixed feelings of the rest of Europe concerning 
the French Revolution. In the intellectual circles in which Schiller, Holderlin and 
Schlegel moved, the revolution was seen as a hope for bourgeois enfranchisement and 
fuller participation in political life. At varying rates this enthusiasm dimmed, as a result 
of the Terror, as a result of the French invasion of Mainz in 1797, and as it became 
clear that Napoleon’s ambitions were both despotic and expansionist.
Three figures have been selected for study, but the choice of possible subjects 
was wide. Kant, Reinhold, Jacobi, Mendelssohn, Fichte, Hegel, Schelling, Novalis, 
Niethammer, Schleiermacher all contributed significantly to the philosophy of this 
decade and beyond; without doubt, a moment’s extra thought could add more names to 
the list. Not only the number of serious philosophers active during the period is 
surprising, but also, given the fragmentary political condition of Germany in the 
1790s,4 the extent to which these people kept in contact with one another and sustained 
an academic dialogue is impressive.5 Strict decisions therefore had to be taken in order 
to limit the material covered in this thesis. To chart the mesh of contemporary 
influences at work on any single thinker would risk an impossibly unwieldy, expanding 
regress.6 Of the thinkers mentioned above, Schelling and Hegel are generally thought of
3 As Friedrich Schlegel notes in Athenaums-Fragmente, 104.
4 Walter M. Simon, ‘Variations in Nationalism during the great Reform Period in Prussia’, in The 
American Historical Review , vol. 59, no.2, Jan. 1954, p.306. Available at: 
<http://links.istor.org/sici?sici:=0002-
8762% 28195401%2959%3A2%3C305%3AVINDTG%3E2.0.CQ%3B2-%23> (accessed 11.06.07).
P.H. Gaskill, ‘HOlderlin and revolution’, in Forum fo r  Modern Language Studies, vol.XII, 1976, pp. 118-  
136.
5 Dieter Henrich, ‘Holderlin on Judgement and Being: A study in the history o f the origins o f  Idealism’ in 
(ed.) Eckart FOrster, The Course o f  Remembrance and other Essays, Stanford CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1997, p.71.
6 Dieter Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel, (ed.) David S. Pacini, Cambridge MA; London, Harvard 
University Press, 2003, p.77, offers a concise and useful diagram, similar to a genealogical tree, that goes 
some way to addressing this question.
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as having contributed significantly to the development of European aesthetics, and it 
may at first sight seem surprising that they have not been included in this survey. 
However, Hegel was still concentrating on his theological studies during the 1790s, and 
had not yet turned to aesthetics or other areas of philosophy. Our neglect of Schelling 
needs a little more explanation. He and Friedrich Holderlin discussed issues that were 
central to Hdlderlin’s work throughout the 1790s and the very early 1800s, but 
Schelling was establishing himself as an academic idealist philosopher, whereas 
Holderlin’s engagement with philosophy consistently fed into his aesthetic and poetic 
work. Schelling’s work on aesthetics also comes just slightly later in his career after 
1800,7 and there is a possibility that it was his close association with the literary circle 
of the Schlegel brothers in Jena that eventually encouraged him to examine the place of 
aesthetics in his philosophical system. Because choices have had to be made, the focus 
of the thesis is therefore on three writers with similar motivations and background, in 
that all were philosophically aware literary practitioners.
Having selected the three thinkers who are to be studied, it has been necessary 
to decide on a field of their work on which to concentrate. Each had a slightly different 
range of interests, developed in a slightly different context and for slightly different 
reasons. All three, however, were interested in radical politics and in aesthetics. 
Following the publication of Kant’s Third Critique in 1790, aesthetics presented 
problems to be resolved, and they each provided a new approach in response to this. It 
happens that all three also foresaw or hoped for political consequences to result from
7 F. W. J. Schelling, System o f  Transcendental Idealism , appeared in 1800. F. W. J. Schelling, The 
Philosophy o f  Art, was written 1804-5, F. W. J. Schelling, Concerning the relation o f  the plastic arts to 
nature, in 1807.
8 The only book that has also selected these same three writers, so far as I know, is (ed.) J.M. Bernstein, 
Classical and Romantic German Aesthetics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. The book is 
an English language anthology o f  extracts from writings taken from a rather longer period than we have 
chosen. Several writers are briefly represented there, but Bernstein’s own introduction focuses on 
Schiller, Holderlin and F. Schlegel, because they exemplify the development from classical to Romantic. 
We, too, shall make this claim.
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these innovations, but this is one point at which a, possibly arbitrary, line has been 
drawn, beyond which this thesis does not extend. The richness of their aesthetic thought 
unfortunately precludes the additional pursuit of any political implications. The impact 
of their aesthetics on the world of literature alone, admittedly a small area of artistic 
and cultural activity, was substantial, and will furnish this thesis with more than enough 
interesting and thought-provoking content in its own right.9
At the start of the decade Schiller was already a highly respected and popular 
poet and dramatist. Holderlin and Schlegel were still students, Holderlin training as a 
pastor at the Tiibinger Stift, Schlegel a law student at the Universities of Gottingen and 
then Leipzig. Thus, even though these three writers were working during approximately 
the same timescale, there is a generational difference between Schiller and the two 
others. The move from the Third Critique, their earliest trigger for thought, to their final 
writings in the eighteenth century is also a move from one cultural world to another. It 
follows and contributes to the shift from Enlightenment to Romanticism, or from 
Classicism to Romanticism. It is important to give some kind of overview of what these 
terms mean, and how they are characterised, but this will be done fairly briefly at this 
point, because it is hoped that in the course of the thesis, the reader will gradually 
become aware of how the parameters of aesthetics were changing. Schiller will be seen 
to have the closest connections with the classicism of the Enlightenment, in search of 
perfection, though acknowledging that aesthetic perfection is different from logical 
perfection per se. Holderlin used an identifiable and in some ways prescriptive
framework for his aesthetics, but tried to make it more flexible for the creative artist to
9 1 feel this is a necessary decision, though I acknowledge it may appear to under-value the seriousness 
with which these writers regarded their social mission. See, for instance, Andrew Bowie, Aesthetics and  
Subjectivity: from Kant to Nietzsche, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990, p.87.
Here, Bowie tells us how HOlderlin’s letters point to the danger that art will become socially irrelevant or 
incomprehensible to the public, if we allow ‘a growing alienation o f advanced aesthetic production from 
any effective social role.’ He further adds that Holderlin him self fell into this trap -  though this is 
possibly debatable -  and that it is a problem against which modem art now also has to struggle.
7
Introduction
apply, and to integrate it more fully into a general philosophy. Most radically, Schlegel 
attempted to dispense with frameworks and guidelines altogether, because the old 
values of completion and perfection no longer seemed to make sense. Open-ended 
change was ineluctable, and might just as well become a virtue in aesthetics as in any 
other sphere.
Classicism, neo-classicism and the Enlightenment
Through most of the eighteenth century, Enlightenment values of rational 
enquiry, analysis and justification were accepted in the German-speaking intellectual 
community as a means of discovering the truth about the world. To speak in sweeping 
terms, the Enlightenment presumed that these were the means by which mankind would 
progress, making an increasingly better world, accumulating knowledge and finally 
coming to the point at which humanity would understand all about the world and how it 
worked, and would therefore be able ultimately to optimise political, economic and 
social arrangements permanently. The so-called Enlightenment project was thus 
enormous, but finite. Classicism in the arts and aesthetics was the counterpart in 
creative culture of this conviction. Classicism was not the only cultural movement 
associated with the Enlightenment. The years up until the late 1750s were dominated by 
neoclassicism. While the relationship between these two schools is somewhat 
problematic, it illustrates the kinds of change encouraged by Enlightenment thinking.10 
Scholarly archaeological and historical research into the classical civilisations of 
Greece and particularly Rome revealed such beautiful and skilful paintings and 
sculptures, and such complexly structured literature that these were taken as models for
10 Paul H. Fry, ‘Classical standards in the period’, in (ed.) Marshall Brown, The Cambridge History o f  
Literary Criticism, Volume V, Romanticism , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.8.
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composition initially in France, and thence throughout western Europe. This was 
neoclassicism, fostered as a standard of taste in Germany mainly by Gottsched.11
Advances in historical studies, and the active role of German antiquaries in 
publicising the archaeological remains of Greece, greatly extended the range of ancient 
classical resources. From this came Classicism, a better informed view of what Ancient 
Greece was like, interpreted with the benefit, not only of new resources, but the 
perspective of a new generation, offering a supposedly authentic interpretation of 
antiquity, in preference to the stale, French influenced imitations perpetuated by
•  1Jneoclassicism. Baumgarten and Winckelmann were the proponents of Classical 
theory, Baumgarten providing the word ‘aesthetics’, or ‘perfection in perception’, and 
generalising from the practice of ancient writers to establish standards of composition 
for German poets;13 and Winckelmann analysing the achievements of Greek painting 
and sculpture, while also attempting to set these works in their perceived cultural 
context.14 Chronologically, and because of his admiration for the Roman poet, Horace, 
Baumgarten is perhaps a neoclassicist rather than a Classicist, but the boundaries are 
not firm, and he exerted a strong influence throughout the century. In any case, 
Classicism was itself not a unanimous school. While Winckelmann praised the lofty 
serenity of the Greeks, exemplified in the statue of Laocoon,
11 Paul H. Fry, ‘Classical standards in the period’, in (ed.) Marshall Brown, The Cambridge History o f  
Literary Criticism, Volume V, Romanticism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.8.
12 Paul H. Fry, ‘Classical standards in the period’, in (ed.) Marshall Brown, The Cambridge History o f  
Literary Criticism, Volume V, Romanticism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
13 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis adpoem a pertinentibus, 
Halle: 1735.
14 Johann Joachim Winckelmann, Gedanken iiber die Nachahmung der griechischen Werke in der 
Malerei und Bildhauerkunst, (Text der 2. Auflage von 1756), available online at Projekt Gutenberg-DE: 
http://gutenberg.spiegel.de/?id=5&xid=3142&kapitel=l#gb_found [accessed 19.05.08]
Even given the increased knowledge o f Greek life available to Winckelmann, it is still worth noting that 
some o f  his assessment, for instance, o f the beauty o f  the Greek people, their dress and their standards o f  
taste are based on artefacts such as a single coin from a particular site. The breadth and depth o f  his 
evidence perhaps did not strictly justify the confidence with which he interpreted the culture.
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Diese Seele schildert sich in dem Gesichte des Laocoons... Der Schmerz... 
aufiert sich dennoch mit keiner Wut in dem Gesichte und in der ganze Stellung. 
...Der Ausdruck einer so grofien Seele gehet weit iiber die Bildung der schonen 
Natur.15
Lessing challenged this view, saying that the decisive factor was not the strength and 
serenity o f Laocoon’s own character when faced by pain. The unknown sculptor was 
responsible for choosing the moment depicted in the sculpture, and on aesthetic 
grounds, must have decided that it was not only more attractive to show Laocoon just 
before he completely lost control and screamed out with pain, but further, that by 
showing the audience a moment from the prolonged period leading up to a final crisis 
of unendurable pain, the sculptor obliged the audience to call on their own emotions, 
imagining all the more horribly the course of Laocoon’s dreadful suffering.16 Later in 
the thesis we shall see that Schlegel regarded Lessing as a man ahead of his time, a 
thinker who had freed himself of the classical norms around him. Both Winckelmann 
and Lessing agreed, however, that the sculptor had found the perfect moment of 
balance, so that beauty could be appreciated and the emotions satisfied. Laocoon and 
other Greek artefacts remained the ideal for contemporary artists to emulate. However, 
although the classical tradition tended to concentrate on the appreciation of calm, 
measured beauty, as supposedly exemplified in the ancient classical world, the 
Enlightenment aesthetics of Burke and Kant also recognised the paradox of natural 
sublimity. The sense of awe we experience in the presence of the enormous and
15 Johann Joachim Winckelmann, Gedanken iiber die Nachahmung der griechischen Werke in der 
Malerei und Bildhauerkunst, (Text der 2. Auflage von 1756), §3. available online at Projekt Gutenberg- 
DE:
http://gutenberg.spiegel.de/?id=5&xid=3142&kapitel=l#gb_found [accessed 19.05.08]
This soul is portrayed in the face o f  the LaocoOn statue... Pain... is nevertheless not manifested with any 
fury in the face and the overall bearing... The expression o f  such a great soul goes far beyond the 
representation o f beautiful nature.
16Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Laocoon, Ch. 3. available online at Projekt Gutenberg-DE: 
http://gutenberg.spiegel.de/?id= 12&xid= 1617&kapitel=4&cHash=fldedc427f2 [accessed 22.05.08]
see also: Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, LaocoOn: ‘An essay on the limits o f  painting and poetry’, in (ed.) 
Charles Harrison, Paul Wood and Jason Gaiger, Art in Theory 1648 - 1815, Malden MA; Oxford UK; 
Carlton Aus: Blackwell, 2000, p.483.
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potentially destructive majesty of nature is also an aesthetic experience.17 Kant’s 
position as a proponent of classicism is a natural corollary of his general philosophy, 
which analysed human thought as a relatively static and universal process. Thus, in 
aesthetics he argued that good taste was a universal, shared perception and that, by 
contemplation, we can recognise beauty, the true end of all artistic endeavour. Many of 
his examples of beauty are drawn from the world of painting and interior design, areas 
which flourished at a time when commissions from the aristocracy or from royal
1 fipatrons dominated the artist’s portfolio. This itself illustrates the extent to which the 
world of art changed in the 1790s. By the opening years of the nineteenth century, 
Friedrich Holderlin was considering the problem of how the poet can secure himself an 
independent bourgeois way of life. No expectation here that the demands of aristocratic 
taste will coincide with the creativity of the true artist.19
Kant’s Third Critique showed how the aesthetic response could be reconciled 
with a rational theory of knowledge and perception, while accepting, contrary to 
Baumgarten, that it was not itself an activity of the pure reason.20 However, while not a 
rational activity, the appreciation of beauty was also not wholly sensuous, as Burke’s 
empirical theory had suggested. In the final section in this introduction, below, we
17 Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin o f  our Ideas o f  the Sublime and Beautiful, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 124.
18 Immanuel Kant, Critique o f  the Power ofJudgem ent, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, 
5:229, §16, p.l 14.
This social pattern in itself created a problem for Kant. In §43 o f  the Third Critique, his distinction 
between craft and fine art obliges him to admit that, while it is clear that a smith is a tradesman or 
craftsman, there are problem areas, such as whether a watchmaker is rightly a craftsman or an artist. 
While he suggested the difference between them was one o f  talent, we might be tempted to see the 
difference as one o f  market niche, ie. the watchmaker produced a luxury item for those who also 
commissioned fine art, whereas the smith did not.
19 Friedrich Holderlin, ‘ Anmerkungen zum Oedipus’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Theoretische Schriften, 
Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.94. This essay was dated to the years 1802 -04.
20 Two editions were published, in 1790 and in 1793.
21 Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin o f  our Ideas o f  the Sublime and Beautiful, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.
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summarise Kant's arguments and some key themes that recur, sometimes in an altered 
form, throughout the thesis, as Schiller, Holderlin and Friedrich Schlegel responded to 
him. Sometimes they barely seem to have Kant in mind when they touch on these 
themes, or challenge his conceptions, but they simply find themselves obligated to the 
Third Critique as the book that established the terms of their discourse, and the issues 
they must address.
The move to Romanticism
This thesis shows how Kant's thought acted as a philosophical starting point for 
the major cultural change that took place during the 1790s in German aesthetics. Our 
three chosen writers do not emerge as iconoclastic rebels, purposely rejecting all that 
had preceded them. Impressed by the work of Kant, Schiller tried to adjust Kantian 
theory to take into account the experience of the creative writer and the propensity of 
the human mind for development, education and individual variation. He remained a 
product o f the Enlightenment, in that he believed each person could find a condition of 
personal balance, in which we would be optimally susceptible to the appreciation of 
beauty, whether it be relaxing beauty - which seems to have been an equivalent for 
beauty in Kant’s sense - or energetic beauty - which may have been an equivalent for 
sublimity in Kant.22 In literature, he thought, we should continue to admire the ancients, 
and accept Winckelmann’s characterisation of the strong, calm beauty of their artefacts, 
but, additionally, we should also have the confidence to produce our own, far more self­
consciously constructed work, that was ultimately capable of equalling or surpassing
22 R.D. Miller, Schiller and the ideal offreedom: a study o f  Schiller’s philosophical works with chapters 
on Kant, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970, p.l 15.
Beiser believes Schiller simply never dealt with ‘energetic beauty’, as his project developed in other 
directions. See Frederick C. Beiser, Schiller as Philosopher: a re-examination, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005, p. 149.
Hammermeister thinks Schiller was satisfied that beauty worked in two ways, and that this was important 
to him, but he does not comment on Schiller’s incomplete analysis o f  the two kinds o f  beauty. See 
Hammermeister, Kai, The German Aesthetic Tradition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, 
p.53.
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the work of the ancients. Once again, despite his desire to progress beyond the 
achievements of the classical world, he could be said to have remained largely classical 
in outlook, because of this belief in the perfectibility of literature, as if the late 
eighteenth century was capable of representing the pinnacle of human capability. His 
essay from 1795, Ueber die nothwendigen Grenzen beim Gebrauch schoner Formen 
(1795), in particular, warns against Begeisterung.23 Enthusiasm misleads people, 
particularly the young, about the true extent of their talent, and leads to superficial 
work. They need first to learn, engage their understanding, study in depth and think 
about the form and content of what they are trying to create. The extent to which 
Schiller believes young sculptors, for example, should have studied anatomy, including 
dissection, carries an echo of Reynolds' classical emphasis on a very practical
• \A
apprenticeship for the painter.
From Schiller we move on to consider Holderlin. His admiration for the ancient 
world was possibly even greater than Schiller’s; classical and mythological themes and 
allusions fill his poetic works. However, he also rejected the common tendency to 
imitate ancient writers slavishly. Not explored in this thesis, due to its strictly technical, 
linguistic nature, is the extent also to which he used ancient literary models to structure 
his own poems. His ‘odes’ and ‘hymns’ used the metre and strophal structure of, for 
instance, Pindar. In terms of self-consciousness, however, he believed the ancient poets 
had been as vividly conscious of what they were trying to achieve, and of how they 
were trying to achieve it, as any so-called modem writer. Most significant in Holderlin,
23 Friedrich Schiller, Ueber die nothwendigen Grenzen beim Gebrauch schoner Formen (die Horen,
1795) www.Gutenberg.SDiegel.de/schiller/grformen/Druckversion grformen.htm
One cannot help hoping that this passage was not written with the young Schlegel in mind, whose early 
brilliance and ambition was perhaps lost in his misguided attempts to replace philosophy with poetry, and 
finished works o f art or scholarship with fragments and sometimes one-sided collaborations.
24 Joshua Reynolds, Seven Discourses on Art, London: Cassell, 1901, accessed as Project Gutenberg e- 
text #2176, May, 2000.
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however, is the near impossibility of separating the aesthetic from the epistemological 
or metaphysical. Schiller had introduced the idea of an internal balance in the mind of 
man that simultaneously used all the faculties that Kant had presented as fulfilling 
specialised functions. Holderlin further integrated every aspect of human thought and 
action into a holistic worldview, whereby we and the world are one. The effect of this 
was that aesthetic experience is just one of the ways in which we find out about the 
reality in which we live; and the creative life is just another way of expressing and 
exploring this awareness, and bringing it to the attention of other people. Since all that 
is, is one, we and the artist are clearly faced here with an overwhelming task of 
comprehension and communication. Kant’s notions both of the sublime and the 
purposiveness of nature thus have some relevance to Holderlin’s idea of what we are 
seeking or appreciating in an aesthetic experience. However, Holderlin himself most 
often urges us towards the appreciation of beauty, of which the beauties of nature are 
the most powerful. Once we have read Holderlin, the patterns of foliage on Kantian 
wallpaper25 seem like very trivial and insignificant examples of beauty, though it is 
undeniable that they illustrate the beautiful oneness of the world no less, for example, 
than a river in full flood. Thus, Schiller challenged classicism by providing a model of 
mankind that was changeable and variable, even if perfectible. Holderlin portrayed a 
perfectible humanity capable finally of using art to help it recognise its unity with all 
that exists, but made up of many more irreconcilable but harmoniously balanced 
elements than Schiller had considered.
If we describe these two writers in these terms, Friedrich Schlegel then 
undoubtedly represents the writer who moved furthest from both Kant and classicism. 
Even he, however, was an enthusiastic student of the classical world, and was keen to
25 Immanuel Kant, Critique o f  the Power o f  Judgement, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, 
5:229, §16, p .l 14.
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find a place in the canon of literary excellence for the ancient writers whom he 
considered most talented. Schlegel differed from both Schiller and Holderlin in that he 
doubted we would ever find any point of perfect balance. Despite his occasional 
references to the One and All, he was less committed to Holderlin’s conviction that the 
apparent contradictions of life are ultimately reconcilable, and specifically ridiculed the 
views of most historicist theorists who not only believed in the possibility of historical 
progress, but tended to believe that the present day represented the stable point towards 
which all past change had been tending. The personal animosity between Schiller and 
the Schlegel brothers, and particularly Friedrich Schlegel, should not obscure the 
continuities in his work, however.26 He too was influenced by Kant, by Herder and by 
Fichte, as were Schiller and Holderlin; and he was influenced by Schiller, Jakobi, 
Spinoza, Plato and Fichte, as was Holderlin. After 1796,27 he advocated fragmentation, 
lack of formality, richness of content, confusion, experimentation, authorial irony and 
even the grotesque in literature, as ways of giving life to a work and communicating 
liveliness to a reader. Life in the work of art, and the ongoing ability of a reader to 
interpret and reinterpret the work of literature as his or her life experiences change were 
the two key factors in aesthetic evaluation, according to Schlegel. Literary technicalities 
and conventions had thus come to occupy a very subsidiary instrumental role. These 
criteria are very much those Schlegel himself chose to refer to as ‘Romantic’, and are
26 (ed.) Hans Eichner, Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe, zweiter Band, Charakteristiken und 
Kritiken I (1796-1801), Mtinchen; Paderbom; Wien: Verlag Ferdinand SchOningh, ZQrich: Thomas- 
Verlag, ‘Einleitung: Der Streit mit Schiller’, p.XII.
Josef KOmer, Romantiker und Klassiker: D ie Briider Schlegel in ihren Beziehungen zu Schiller und 
Goethe, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1971, p.33.
27 A.O. Lovejoy, ,On the Meaning o f  „Romantic“ in Early German Romanticism, Part II’, in Modern 
Language Notes, vol. 32, No 2, February 1917, p.67.
Raimond Belgardt, ‘’’Romantische Poesie” in Friedrich Schlegels Aufsatz Uber das Studium der 
griechischen Poesie’ in The German Quarterly, vol. 40, No. 2, March 1967, pp. 165 - 185, however, 
contests the significance o f  this date, plausibly arguing that these were qualities in the Romance literature 
o f the Middle Ages and early modem period that Schlegel consistently admired, even before 1796.
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typical of the group of writers and thinkers known as the Early Romantics. Thus, the 
move from Schiller to Friedrich Schlegel also illustrates the move from Classicism to 
Romanticism. In our final chapter we examine some relevant extracts from Schlegel’s 
critical work that indicate what he meant by ‘Romantic’.
We can also characterise the changes we see emerging in this decade as 
responses to the problems arising from the pull to either fragmentation or unity. The 
classical world of the Enlightenment sought foundationalist unity, but offered, in the 
critical philosophy of Kant, an analytical approach that, while providing a 
comprehensive philosophical explanation for perception, morality and aesthetics, the 
physical sciences, religion and biology, appeared also to compartmentalise, and thus 
fragment, human thought. The increased and apparently excessive specialisation 
associated with the rapid expansion of academic research and economic diversity was 
already recognised in Germany as a potentially divisive social force. Schiller himself 
refers to this. It is therefore not surprising that Schiller’s aesthetics not only requires 
the participation of all the human faculties in the appreciation of art, but ascribes to art 
the remedial mission of creating whole, fully functioning people. In Holderlin this drive 
for unity is taken further; foundationalist system, of the kind that could lead to Kantian 
divisions or Schillerian dichotomies, is condemned in favour of a pantheistic holism in 
which all aspects of human knowledge and natural reality inter-mesh and explain one 
another reciprocally, despite their apparent opposition.
Using a similar range of background influences, Schlegel, by contrast, 
emphasises the drive to fragmentation, in that he chooses to highlight contradictions, 
and ironical regresses, and claim them as evidence of aesthetic value. As is often the
28Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: in a series o f  letters, (ed.) (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson and L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982 (parallel text English / German 
edition),
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case with Schlegel, however, his attitude towards fragmentation is ambivalent. 
Foundationalism, he says, is at fault for leading to the infinite regress of knowledge and 
to global scepticism; furthermore, global scepticism tacitly provides its own 
presumption that the sceptic knows what the ‘right answer’ would look like. His 
alternative is that we should aim for piecemeal coherence, group co-operation in 
creative work, Symphilosophie, Sympoesie, all poetry becoming science and all science 
becoming art. Thus, not only should the individual be integrated within him or herself 
and with the world, but individuals should be integrated among themselves, united by 
love and working together. Academic disciplines should be breaking down barriers, 
learning from one another and using one another’s methods to communicate their truths 
to a wider public. Thus, although it is tempting to imagine the horror of the well- 
tempered, polite society of 1790 if confronted with the abundant confusion of 1800 
Jena Romanticism, we must also admit that, despite the speed at which changes had 
happened, the tendency of the decade had been developmental, not revolutionary. 
Kantian and Fichtean methods of criticism, and Enlightenment habits of reform and 
improvement produced the changed attitudes and the change in aesthetics that then 
went on to dominate at least the creative arts during the first half of the nineteenth 
century.
Perhaps from this description of the differences between Classicism and Early 
Romanticism it may appear that this thesis accepts the view of Ernst Behler and others, 
that was for many years orthodox, that Romanticism was essentially a literary 
phenomenon, relevant only by extension to other areas of culture and philosophy.30 In
29 Lyceums-Fragmente, No 115.
AthenQums-Fragmente, No.93.
30 Frederick C. Beiser, The Romantic Imperative, Cambridge MA; London: Harvard University Press, 
2003, Preface, p.x.
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fact there is no intention of endorsing this view, despite a focus on literature. The
intention has been to look at a change in aesthetic theory, without precluding the
likelihood that these changes were part of a larger, interdependent process of change.
Three literary figures have been chosen only for the convenience of illustrating one
thread of the changes taking place in the 1790s. Indeed, as we have already commented,
while Schiller situated his aesthetic theory largely, though not entirely, within a Kantian
philosophy, Holderlin and Schlegel had philosophical positions of their own, from
which, as we shall see, their aesthetic derived. With Beiser, I would emphasise the
point raised above, that
They [ie. the Early German Romantics] defined the highest good not as 
aesthetic contemplation but as human self-realization, the development of 
humanity.31
This made art worthwhile and justified the intellectual effort of the aesthetician and the 
creative effort of the artist. It is an opinion shared by all three of our subjects, even 
though Schiller remained close to classicism in other respects. This was a distinctive 
feature introduced into the theory of art in the 1790s, and, looking back at the 
eighteenth century from our eventual endpoint in the very early 1800s, we might be 
inclined to conclude that, by ignoring how life as a whole involves the whole human 
being in the appreciation of art or literature, and vice versa, the Enlightenment values of 
classicism had reduced all art to the unsatisfactory level of what Kant called, so 
disparagingly, ‘ornament’.32
Elizabeth Mill&n-Zaibert, Friedrich Schlegel and the Emergence o f  Romantic Philosophy, Albany: 
SUNY Press, 2007, p.7. She is clear about the extent to which an understanding o f philosophy was 
essential to the work o f  the more literary members o f  the Early Romantic circle in Jena, and rejects 
Behler’s view very convincingly.
31 Frederick C. Beiser, The Romantic Imperative, Cambridge MA; London: Harvard University Press, 
2003, Preface, p.xi.
32Immanuel Kant, Critique o f  the Power ofJudgem ent, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, 
5:226, §14, p.110.
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The search for beauty and the search for meaning
We have just noted how the writers studied in this thesis introduced changes 
that had direct implications for art. However, these were changes that also had wider 
philosophical importance. Whereas in Kant aesthetics links in with the rest of his 
epistemology, and particularly with his theory of perception, in Holderlin and Schlegel 
we begin to approach the new discipline of hermeneutics. In Kallias oder iiber die 
Schdnheit, we see that Schiller was caught up in the same search for perfect beauty 
that runs through the work of, for instance, Baumgarten, Hogarth, Reynolds, Hume, 
Burke and Kant. Their problem had been how to establish the extent to which beauty 
could be an identifiable quality in an object, and also to decide how our ability to 
perceive this quality could be integrated into a general theory of perception; hence the 
association of most of these eighteenth century investigations with the epistemological 
rationalist / empiricist divide. By the time Schiller wrote the On the Aesthetic 
Education o f Man: in a series o f letters34 and On the Naive and Sentimental in 
Literature, however, the mechanics, if we may so call them, of perception seemed less 
important. Our judgement of beauty had become, in addition, the fullest possible way 
of relating to the world around us. Schiller’s conception of aesthetic Schein demands a 
complex double evaluation of what we are experiencing, ie. the full acceptance of a 
pleasing illusion that we are not tempted to claim as reality. Knowing this, the writer or 
artist aims to encourage this response and, if successful, convinces without deceiving. 
To be able to do this, he or she must take cultural expectations and experiences into
33 Friedrich Schiller, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam 
jun, 1999, written 25.01.1793 - 28.02.1793. Hereafter referred to in the text as the Kallias Letters.
34 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: in a series o f  letters, (ed.) (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson and L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982. Hereafter referred to in the text 
as the Aesthetic Letters.
35 Friedrich Schiller, On the Naive and Sentimental in Literature, trans. Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly, 
Manchester: Carcanet New Press Ltd, 1981. Hereafter referred to in the text as Naive and Sentimental.
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account, and sometimes be prepared to challenge them. While presuming that he is 
giving a fuller account of aesthetic perfection and the nature of beauty, Schiller is in 
fact introducing an increasing number of variable factors, but he is nevertheless 
confident that they can eventually be balanced in a fairly regular, static and enduring 
world.
Holderlin’s position is different from that of Schiller, but, we shall see, could 
also be described as resisting that of Friedrich Schlegel. Holderlin wanted to produce 
beautiful poetry. He wanted us to appreciate the beauty in nature. He used beauty as his 
ultimate criterion for success in art. In this he agreed with all his predecessors. Indeed, 
more conservatively than Schiller, he offered a ‘theory of tones’ to guide the poet 
towards the attainment of this ideal, which he also associated with a point of perfect 
balance. Admittedly he introduced even more variables into the equation than Schiller, 
but he agreed with him about the fact that they would balance. The breadth of his 
conception of beauty, however, differed considerably from his predecessors. In defining 
beauty and the task of the poet, he takes us through an entire metaphysics. It is as if 
Hdlderlin, who had an ambivalent and obsessive relationship with philosophy,36 wanted 
to know ‘the meaning of life’, and he found it in beauty. The nature of his metaphysics 
is such that beauty can be found in the most surprising or even distressing places, 
because, provided we are viewing the world in the right way, beauty is coincident with 
Being itself. This proviso, that we must choose the way we interpret the world, life and 
artistic artefacts, shifts the results of Holderlin’s aesthetics very far from any past 
conception that art and beauty are static, though elusive, givens. Instead, they are seen
36 One illustration o f  this is found in a letter he wrote to his brother, 13.10.1796.
Beck, Adolf, (ed.), Friedrich Holderlin, Samtliche Werke, Vol. 6, Part I Briefe, Stuttgart: W. 
Kohlhammer Verlag, J.G. Cottasche Buchhandlung Nachfolger, 1954, p.218, quoted in Dieter Henrich, 
‘Hfilderlin in Jena’ in (ed.) Eckart FOrster, The Course o f  Remembrance and other Essays, Stanford CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1997, p.l 18.
20
Introduction
as moments in an unceasing cycle of becoming, change, decay and regeneration.
Schiller could hardly have foreseen this in Naive and Sentimental, when he encouraged 
artists to give us a fresh and slightly dissociated view of their subject matter.37
In his 1795 Studium-Aufsatz, Friedrich Schlegel also recommended the search 
for and re-establishment of beauty as the chief criterion for excellence in artistic work. 
His theme is the decline in aesthetic standards in modem times. However, he also 
praises characteristics besides beauty, such as inner life, richness of content and 
original ways of achieving unity of structure. His later work extends the meaning of 
‘beauty’ to encompass these and other features of art. Like Holderlin he came to accept 
the very widest definition of the word, but effectively, he then substituted terms such as 
poetisch, romantisch, and inneres Leben for ‘beauty’. This is what Holderlin had been 
resisting. He believed in beauty, but thought we had been overlooking it. Schlegel, 
however, picked up ideas that had been hinted at in Schiller and which were central to 
Holderlin, of fully understanding or deeply engaging with the world around us. He used 
these ideas in order to move away from the notion of beauty. The best literature and the 
best painting consist in work of which we never tire, to which we return again and 
again. For an artist to achieve this success, the work must have inner life, now art’s 
main criterion for assessment, and the audience or reader must have attained a 
sufficient level of cultural education to be able to interpret and reinterpret the material 
repeatedly, in the light of their changed level of thought and life experience.
Holderlin knew mankind was searching for meaning and truth. He warns against 
the less effective methods for doing this:
37 Friedrich Schiller, Ober naive und sentimentalische Dichtung, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Stuttgart: 
Philipp Reclam jun., 2005, p.76.
...der sentimentalische wird immer, auf einige Augenblicke, filr das wirkliche Leben verstimmen.
Friedrich Schiller, On the Naive and Sentimental in Literature, (tr.) Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly,
Manchester: Carcanet New Press Ltd, 1981, p.67.
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die Kinder ftihren alles zum Munde hinein, wir alles zum Verstande, und ich 
fange an zu glauben, daB eines so naiv ist, als das andre.38
but he believed we can rightly find meaning and truth only in beauty, and further, that 
by recognising beauty we have found the meaning and truth of the cosmos. This is the 
sense in which he resisted Schlegel’s conclusion that the shifting and manifold nature 
of so-called beauty is actually superseded by an equally shifting and irresolvable 
process of interpretation, re-interpretation, learning and personal development. As 
human beings we are looking for meaning, and that is therefore what we unavoidably 
and in fact look for in art.
It is to be hoped that concentrating on our chosen authors and texts will provide 
some useful insights into intellectual developments during the 1790s, but avoiding 
some common pitfalls. For instance, our discussion of Schiller, Holderlin and Schlegel 
will, most importantly, establish what they said. While this may seem a superficial and 
obvious task, we are examining a hectic decade, during which both everyday life and 
the academic world was changing quickly. For Schiller, especially, this methodology 
has proved to be a little problematic, since, with each new publication, he set out a 
slightly new and somewhat elliptically expressed philosophical position. That he did so 
reflects the enthusiastic drive to publish, disseminate and discuss new ideas that 
prevailed in 1790s Germany. We have therefore not always relied solely on the letter of 
what these thinkers wrote, but have drawn out some of the implications of what they 
seem to have believed, taking some care in reconstructing their general philosophical 
position, and showing how it was compatible with their aesthetic theory. We have also 
cross-referenced among the writers themselves, and pointed out plausible links between
38Friedrich Holderlin, ‘II. Vorstufen und spate Fragmente: EntwUrfe zur endgUltigen Fassung’, in (ed.) 
Michael Knaupp, Erlduterungen undDokumente: Friedrich Holderlin, »Hyperion«, Stuttgart: Philipp 
Reclam jun., 1997, p. 196.
Children put everything into their mouths, we [put everything] into our understanding, and I am 
beginning to believe that the one is just as naTve as the other.
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their ways of thinking and those of Kant, in order to supply some cultural context for 
their work, and create some impression of the influences and mindset of the period. The 
comments made in our conclusion suggest affinities between developments in 
aesthetics during the 1790s, and nineteenth and twentieth century hermeneutics, literary 
criticism and art theory, and have, as far as possible, been drawn from our material, 
rather than being read into these eighteenth century works as a result of some prior 
preconception. That I feel it necessary to make these preliminary comments itself 
demonstrates the extent to which I have implicitly accepted and applied the lessons that 
I hope will be learned from all three writers in the course of reading this thesis. 
Progressively they introduced the idea that there is an element of cultural determination 
in aesthetics, and sought to achieve some balance between the social and universal 
factors that they believed attend all aesthetic judgements.
At the end of this study we suggest that their opinions supported or encouraged 
the hermeneutical approach that grew from the contemporary German culture of 
philology and biblical exegesis. Hermeneutics became one of the enduring strands of 
German and continental philosophy. Therefore, it appears that, in witnessing the shift 
exemplified in the aesthetic writings of our three chosen writers, the shift from 
attempting to define beauty and towards a search for meaning, we observe the most 
significant and influential change that followed on the aesthetics of Kant’s Third 
Critique.
39 Quentin Skinner, ‘Meaning and understanding in the history o f  ideas’, in (ed.) James Tully, Meaning 
and Context: Quentin Skinner and his critics, Cambridge; Oxford: Polity Press Blackwell, 1988, pp.30, 
32.
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KANT’S PHILOSOPHY AND THE CRITIQUE OF THE POWER OF
JUDGEMENT
The aesthetics of Schiller, Holderlin and Friedrich Schlegel primarily built on 
and developed aspects of Kant’s Third Critique. However, in common with most of 
their contemporaries, they were also familiar with Kant's other works, some of whose 
key ideas were widely accepted. In particular, we shall see this in our chapters on 
Schiller. Kallias oder tiber die Schdnheit, his first serious attempt to engage with 
Kant’s aesthetic theory, uses the theory of perception presented by Kant in the 
Critique o f  Pure Reason. His next work, Anmut und Wurde, the first he published on 
aesthetics, adapts Kant’s moral theory, from the Groundwork for a Metaphysic o f  
Morals and the Critique o f Practical Reason}
These works constituted the main corpus of the ‘critical philosophy’, the term 
used at the time to refer to Kantianism and its successors. The First Critique set out 
the necessary conditions that make objective knowledge possible. These conditions, 
although applied to empirical data, are not empirical or acquired through experience; 
they are ‘transcendental’ -  independent of experience. In the Groundwork and the 
Second Critique Kant identified comparable conditions in relation to practical 
activity, specifically morality, and the Third Critique did the same for aesthetics and 
nature. The Third Critique reflected increasing public interest in aesthetics and 
biological research, and also completed Kant's metaphysical system. By metaphysical, 
Kant meant that, while not justifiable by reference to experience, his position 
nevertheless provided a consistent and reliable way of structuring and justifying our
1 These two works are included in: Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, (ed.), trans., Mary J. Gregor, 
Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. They are referred to hereafter as the 
Groundwork and the Second Critique. The Groundwork was published in 1785, the Second Critique in 
1788.
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judgements. This chapter will summarise these works, indicating some ways in 
which they were interdependent.
The First Critique: A Critique o f Pure Reason
We need to summarise the basic ideas in the First Critique as a starting point 
for understanding the extent to which Schiller, Holderlin and Schlegel expected 
aesthetic judgements to resemble or differ from other types of knowledge. Kant 
identified two kinds of judgement: those made a posteriori, or ‘after the fact’ on the 
basis o f empirical experience, and those made a priori, independently of experience. 
In order to be considered a priori, a judgement must be thought as being both 
universal and necessary, which is to say it must be impossible to conceive differently, 
and must be held to be always and everywhere the case. Kant also distinguished 
between synthetic and analytic judgements.3 All a posteriori judgements are 
synthetic, in that the predicate of any proposition that expresses an empirical 
judgement is external to the subject, and is known to be true only because we have 
experience of an association between this subject and predicate.
Some a priori judgements are analytic, others are synthetic. Analytic a priori 
judgements are expressed using propositions in which the idea of the predicate is 
contained within the subject, thus making them true by definition, and all analytic 
judgements are of this kind. Synthetic a priori judgements are those which are 
necessary and universal, while also expressing knowledge of the world. They are 
judgements about experience that do not rely only on experience as in, for example, 
the proposition, 'Each change has a cause'. By definition the notion of a cause
2Immanuel Kant, A Critique o f  Pure Reason, (ed.) trans. F. Max Milller, Garden City NY: Anchor 
Doubleday, 1966, Aviii, p.xxiii.
3 ibid., A 7/B 11, pp.7-12.
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presupposes the notion of an effect.4 This constitutes necessity. Furthermore, the 
principle of causality is applied universally, making connections among completely 
separate events or objects, independently of the way they are defined or of their 
intrinsic structure. Causality thus exemplifies a form of reasoning about the world that 
has objective validity and does not depend entirely on subjective empirical 
experience. This further means that we do not simply have or accumulate experiences. 
Independently of experience, we possess concepts with which to organise it; in other 
words, by the application of which we gain knowledge.
Our minds thus form experiences from the raw material -  or manifold of 
perception - that our ‘sensibility’, the capacity to be affected by external objects, 
derives from our sensory encounters with the physical world. We order our 
sensations, gain intuitions and form representations of what Kant calls an 'appearance' 
- the external world as it presents itself to the sensibility. From these intuitions our 
minds then form concepts that can be applied to representations so that we can refer to 
objects. All appearances have content and form.5 The content, or matter, of perceived 
appearance is given to us a posteriori, but the ability to form a representation is 
present a priori in our mind, in our pure sensibility, and thus does not originate in 
sensation. The pure intuitions of space and time enable us to represent objects to our 
mind. Space must always be presupposed whenever we think of objects, that is, 
extended bodies that occupy space; and time is a necessary condition of our even 
thinking of any object, since we can only experience our intuitions and organise our 
experiences either simultaneously or sequentially.6
4 ibid., B5, p.4.
5 ibid., A18/B32, p.21.
6 ibid. A33/B49, pp.23-31.
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Our intuition of space is not derived from experience, since it is a prerequisite 
for the formation of experience. Time is the a priori precondition of even the 
possibility of our mind’s having any representations of things as existing, or of our 
being able to say the mind exists. Both are therefore pure intuitions belonging to the 
perceiving subject’s own mind, a sign that we have some kind of receptivity in virtue 
of which we intuit any particular objects. Yet space and time also have empirical 
reality, because we can think of or experience objects only in time and space. Their 
application gives our outer experiences objective reality. However, this objective 
knowledge concerns the way things appear to us. It is knowledge of appearances, or 
phenomena.
Things ‘in themselves’, or noumena, cannot be known.8 Kant’s philosophy 
thus centres on the structure of subjectivity that makes it possible for thinking or 
perceiving subjects to synthesise matter drawn from the manifold of perception with 
the forms of time and space. Kant did not intend us to question whether appearances 
falsely led us to believe external things existed, only to recognise that we knew them 
as appearances. Since the forms of space and time are also appearances that ‘appear’ 
and operate within our own sensibility, an appearance is nothing deceptive or illusory.
Humans do not acquire empirical knowledge, however, until the 
understanding has also fulfilled its role. ‘Thoughts without content are empty, 
intuitions without concepts are blind.’9 Standing alone, the senses and sensibility 
cannot think or conceptualise, and similarly, without the senses first giving us the raw 
material o f the manifold of experience, the understanding would have no content to 
think about and could not make judgements. The understanding applies the concepts
7 ibid., A18/B32, p.22.
8 ibid., A30/B45, p.28.
9 ibid., A51/B75, p.45.
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acquired from experience and also the a priori categories to the representations 
received from the sensibility, and according to the rules of thinking -  which Kant 
terms ‘pure general logic’ -  it connects different representations to one another and 
sets out the criteria of truth. These are not universal truth criteria for the sense content 
of a representation, but the formal framework of logic within which representations 
can be combined or sequenced. The mind can also reflect on the nature, scope and 
validity of the rules used by the understanding. Kant calls this, ‘transcendental 
knowledge’. Thus, we can study the concepts present in our understanding, 
independently of any representations of appearances.
The sensibility passively receives sensations, and involuntarily applies 
concepts to the manifold, synthesising it and forming intuitions, but the understanding 
is active and spontaneous. It unites many individual representations together under 
one concept, and orders relationships among the concepts it has already applied, thus 
unifying concepts in a 'higher representation'.10 Regardless of the content of the 
representations it orders, the understanding judges in four ways, according to quantity 
(unity, plurality, totality), quality (reality, negation, limitation), relations (substance, 
causality, community) and modality (possibility, existence, necessity). The 
understanding applies these a priori rules or categories to synthesise both the 
intuitions presented by the sensibility and also concepts. This is how both empirical 
and a priori knowledge are constituted. For instance, if we are to perceive objects 
from among the undifferentiated flow of the manifold of perception, we must be able 
to judge whether objects are one or many, whether they stand in a causal relationship 
to one another, whether they are real or not and what is necessary to their existence.
10 ibid., A70/B94, p.56.
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To guarantee the objectivity of knowledge gained from subjective empirical
experiences, the application to representations of the a priori conditions found in the
understanding must be justifiable independently of experience. Thus, firstly, the
formation of our particular representations presupposes the ability to think of an
object in general. We cannot otherwise think of any object of experience. From this
Kant claims that, 'The objective validity of the categories, as being such concepts a
priori, rests on this very fact that by them alone, so far as the form of thought is
concerned, experience becomes possible,'11 a fact which, as Kant says, illustrates,
though it does not prove, their objective validity.12
Kant's proof of their validity refers back to the way we combine
representations into another higher representation. In such acts of synthesis, we can
only combine representations that we ourselves have already combined; combination
(or connection) itself, however, is the only representation we can have which has not
11been given by objects. The act of synthesis is thus not empirical in origin, and must 
be a priori. Since synthesis is a spontaneous act, this further means it must be the 
action of an agent of some kind, not a passive operation of the sensibility. Kant 
identifies this agent as the thinking subject. Synthesis is a 'self-activity of the subject'. 
Not only does the subject combine representations into higher representations, but it is 
defined by its ability to do so.14
Furthermore, combination itself presupposes the possibility of higher order 
representations, which indicates that the way the manifold of experience is combined 
prior to conceptualisation or the application of the categories cannot itself be derived
11 ibid., A 93/B 126, p.73.
12 ibid., A94/B126, p.73
,3 ibid., B 130, p.76.
14 ibid. B131,p.77.
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from experience. Ultimately, the unity which is added to and unifies our 
representations is the unity of the thinking subject, the necessary precondition of all 
representations, without which it is impossible to ascribe any of 'my' representations 
to 'me'. Yet this subject itself is not learned of empirically, since it is the essential 
precondition of any experience at all. Kant calls it 'pure self-consciousness'.15 It 
generates the unified representation, 'I think', but is not itself a representation. It is not 
an individuated person, but rather the structure that makes it possible for us even to 
think of the existence of individual persons.16 The transcendental subject is the 
precondition and source of all a priori knowledge, and, being itself a unity, makes it 
possible for us to unify the a priori forms of experience (i.e. the pure intuitions of 
time and space that form our empirical intuitions) and the pure concepts of the 
understanding (i.e. the categories that order and combine our representations). Every 
element in our response to empirical experience is thus unified in the transcendental 
subject. Therefore, transcendental self-consciousness guarantees the objectivity of our 
knowledge, because it is the precondition of the possibility of all knowledge of 
experience. Kant's First Critique thus not only provides us with an account of how 
humanity experiences and perceives the world, but gives rational grounds for 
accepting that we can trust the human interpretation of the world. Although we 
ourselves order and form our perceptions, we thereby form objective knowledge in 
accordance with a priori principles.
The epistemology of the Third Critique was fundamental for the thinkers 
whom we go on to study in this thesis. For instance, we shall see in the Kallias Letters 
how Kant's claim that we gain objective knowledge through the application of
15 ibid., B132, B135, pp.78, 79.
16 Peter Sedgwick, Descartes to Derrida, Oxford UK; Malden MA: Blackwell, 2001, p.44.
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concepts to our empirical experience limited Schiller's options as he tried to argue the 
case for an objective aesthetics, and we later see how the Aesthetic Letters introduced 
its revised aesthetic theory by reference, though in a different terminology, to the 
transcendental subjectivity that is presupposed in the existence and activity of any 
individual subject or person. Holderlin, however, diverges from Kant's account in his 
explanation of the way time enables experience, and in his claims that some 
knowledge of reality is not structured by subjectivity and often does not rely on 
conceptualisation.
The Groundwork of the Metaphysics o f Morals and the Second Critique: A 
Critique o f  Practical Reason
The Second Critique and the Groundwork establish the extent to which moral 
obligation and freedom rest on a priori principles of reason.17 In empirical 
knowledge, reason applies itself to something given from some source other than 
itself. However, reason guides us to make choices based on the moral law that it 
makes for itself, and we thereby make the moral law real. In this sense, then, reason 
makes its own objects. Kant is not attempting to deduce actual moral guidelines from 
these principles, since the a priori conditions that make morality possible should be 
free of references to contingent human nature or moral codes.18
Kant identifies practical reason with the will in that practical reason moves the 
will by means of the moral imperative, but also distinguishes between them, in that 
the will is a rational power rather than a blind drive.19 The good will is good without 
reference to any other end or likely consequences, such as happiness, and is thus
17 Peter Sedgwick, 'Kant, Immanuel (1724-1804)', in Andrew Edgar & Peter Sedgwick, Cultural 
Theory: The Key Thinkers, London:Routledge, 2002, p. 100.
18 Frederick Copleston, A History o f  Philosophy, vol. VI, Wolff to Kant, London: Bums and Oates, 1964, 
p.314.
19 ibid., p.310.
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intrinsically good in itself, since, for instance, I can will to do good, even if prevented 
in some way from doing so.20 To be good, a will must will from duty, not simply 
conforming to duty, but willing for the sake of duty. The idea of duty itself suggests 
we must sometimes overcome obstacles within ourselves, or external pressures. If we 
already feel inclined to behave in a way that conforms with duty, and do so only 
because it suits our inclination, our action has no particular moral value. Only if, for 
the sake of fulfilling our moral obligations, we continue to conform with duty, even 
when our inclination has faded, do we demonstrate the working of a good will. 
However, it is not through our submission to the law that we ascribe dignity and 
sublimity to the person who fulfils all his duties, but because of the extent to which he 
also makes that law.21
Kant defines duty thus: 'Duty is the necessity of acting out of reverence for the
99 • •law1. For Kant the main characteristic of natural and moral law is that it is universal, 
without exceptions. We unconsciously and necessarily conform to natural laws, but it 
is as rational beings that we can conform to the idea of law. To make moral decisions,
9^we tend to act on maxims - subjective principles of volition that guide what we do. 
Kant says that to have moral worth our maxims must conform to law in general, and 
be capable of being universalised without exception, according to the idea of law.24 
This idea of law, expressed as the Categorical Imperative, then commands our 
obedience, and is fulfilled by the good will when we do our duty. The obedience of 
our will is not a matter of necessary determination, although the will should and can
20 Groundwork, 4:393,4:394, pp.49, 50.
21 ibid., 4:440, p.88.
22 ibid., 4:400, p.55.
23 Second Critique, 5:20, p. 154.
24 Groundwork, 4:402, p.57.
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7Sobey. Thus, the pure practical reason commands, and our duty is to overcome any 
conflicting desires, and obey. At least two formulations of the Categorical 
Imperative are given, 'Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time 
will that it should become a universal law,' and, 'Act is if the maxim of thy action
77were to become by thy will a Umversal Law of Nature'. The Categorical Imperative 
is distinguished from hypothetical imperatives, which may or may not be moral but 
which are characterised in terms of their commanding a course of action in order to 
achieve a given end. On Kant's view no hypothetical imperative, not even the hedonic 
pursuit of happiness or Aristotle's eudaimonia, can act as the supreme principle of 
morality, since all such imperatives are justified by reference to human nature, 
desirability or some other end. Only the categorical imperative 'declares an action to 
be objectively necessary in itself, without reference to any purpose, that is, without 
any end'.28
Kant postulates that mankind (indeed any rational being) is an end in itself, 
and therefore also formulates the Categorical Imperative as, 'So act as to treat 
humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end
70withal, never as means only'. All imperatives conditioned by desire, inclination or 
interest are hypothetical imperatives. Only the Categorical Imperative is 
unconditioned. The good will that obeys the Categorical Imperative also acts 
independently of interest or inclination, and thus too is unconditioned and 
autonomous, acting for itself, and so too, capable of legislating for itself,
25 ibid., 4:413, p.66.
26 Frederick Copleston, op.cit., p.321.
27 Groundwork , 4:421, p.73.
28 ibid., 4:415, p.68.
29 ibid., 4:429, p.80.
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unconstrained by external influences. Thus, the will can 'regard itself at the same time 
as making universal law through its own maxim'.30 Even obeying the will of God or 
the commands of religion first requires our good will to recognise that obedience to 
God is a duty.31
If mankind were only an autonomous, rational will, it would be superfluous 
for practical reason to make the moral law and command us to obey the Categorical 
Imperative. Only because mankind is also an animal creature, subject to desires, 
inclinations and the laws of nature does the will makes the moral law that physical 
humanity ought to obey.32 The Categorical Imperative is a synthetic a priori 
proposition. It cannot be discovered by analysing the rational will, and is therefore not 
analytic; but it is unconditioned and necessarily obliges obedience from the will. The 
notion of obedience always suggests we have the option of choosing not to obey, 
despite the necessity of the Categorical Imperative. This therefore leads Kant to say 
that practical reason or the will of a rational being 'must regard itself as free; that is, 
the will o f such a being cannot be a will of its own except under the idea of 
freedom'. The idea of freedom is thus practically necessary and is a necessary 
condition of morality. The will thus has a role analogous to that of causality.34 
Naturally, however, it differs from causality, because it is not directed towards 
extending our empirical knowledge of the external world, but towards the 
performance of certain kinds of action. The moral law thus stands in the same relation 
to rational beings as causal laws to the natural world.
30 Second Critique, 5:30, p. 164.
31 Frederick Copleston, op.cit., p.330.
32 ibid., p .3 3 1. Copleston discerns the influence on Kant o f  Rousseau's contrast between the general and 
private w ills in this distinction.
33 Groundwork, 5:448, p.96.
34 ibid., 4:446, p.94.
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One should note here that Kant refers to the 'idea' of freedom. He says that we 
cannot 'prove' freedom. Freedom is an idea of reason, a matter of the noumenal 
sphere, into which we have no intuitive insight, rather than of the phenomenal sphere 
with which we become acquainted in empirical knowledge. Any attempt to prove 
freedom would bring us up against the limitations of mankind's theoretical 
knowledge. However, equally it cannot be shown that freedom is impossible, and, in 
addition, the moral law requires us to assume it. This helps explain why it is by 
obeying the moral law, rather than simply by exercising a choice about whether or not 
to obey, that we demonstrate our freedom. As in Kant's claim that it is only if I feel 
disinclined to exercise a good will, and yet do so nevertheless, that I demonstrate my 
good will, an otherwise unknowable moral principle becomes practically manifest. 
Only in its practical application do we have evidence either that a person is 
conforming to the moral law, or that he or she can be free.
Kant then must reconcile the difficulty that all our actions, whether internal or 
external, are subject to the conditions of time and space. This means moral actions are 
determined in the empirical world, but also free. His solution is to point out that we 
are aware of ourselves both as part of mechanical nature and as a thing in itself. We 
think we are determinable only through self-given laws, and thus that we are free.35 
The working of conscience illustrates this. In terms of their determining causal factors 
and external constraints, past misdemeanours have ceased to be. Yet my conscience 
refuses to recognise that these events are past and still feels guilty. This indicates that 
the noumenal, transcendental self is outside time. Actions belong to that self, 
regardless of the time-scale within which they occurred.
35 Second Critique, 5:97, p .218.
36 Frederick Copleston, op.cit., p.336.
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Kant also has a conception of the summum bonum, towards which the 
Categorical Imperative will lead us. Although the limits of human understanding 
prevent us from knowing exactly what the ultimate good for mankind consists in, 
since it is a supersensible object of the practical reason, by obeying the categorical 
imperative and doing our duty we ultimately achieve both virtue and true happiness. 
Although we cannot be moral simply by aping virtue or by seeking happiness, the 
moral law commands us to make ourselves worthy of happiness, the totality of which 
may include a world beyond our present, sensible world. The summum bonum, Kant 
says, requires the agency of a God who both desires that his creatures should be happy 
and has the power to confer happiness on them. Thus, through religion, as an indirect 
consequence of applying the a priori principle of the Categorical Imperative, mankind 
has a hope of happiness.
In our discussion of Schiller's essay, Anmut und Wurde below, we shall see 
that he seems to have interpreted the argument of the Groundwork and the Second 
Critique not as a search for the a priori principles of moral reasoning, but as the 
foundation for a rigid, joyless and rather inhumane moral code. Schiller emphasises 
Kant's suggestion that the rational will subordinates inclination through the 
Categorical Imperative, an interpretation that he counters with his demonstration that 
duty and inclination create a moral aesthetic when brought into agreement with each 
other.
The Third Critique: A Critique of the Power o f  Judgement
Kant's Third Critique conducts an exercise similar to that carried out in the 
first two Critiques. It sets out the rational principles for our judgements of aesthetic 
taste in the sphere of the beautiful and the sublime in art and nature, and also for the
37 Second Critique, 5:130, p.244.
36
Introduction: KANT’S PHILOSOPHY AND THE CRITIQUE OF THE POWER OF JUDGEMENT
judgements whereby we ascribe purpose to organic nature. Kant believed these two 
kinds of judgement were closely related. In aesthetics our judgements of the beautiful 
and the sublime are subjective matters of personal taste, and yet we expect that other 
people should also assent to them. As he had done before, Kant reconciled this 
apparent anomaly by reference to the synthetic a priori. In the world of organic nature 
Kant recognised that mechanistic processes were at work, and that mankind was 
subject to them in just the same way as any other natural object. He acknowledged 
also, however, that human reason, in recognising humanity as an end in itself, obliges 
us to think of nature, too, as a system of means and purposes.38
The Third Critique also brought together the conclusions reached in the First 
and Second Critiques.39 The First Critique set out the conditions under which we 
perceive and accept the nature of natural phenomena as they are, according to the 
rules governing our understanding. The Second Critique set out the conditions of 
human freedom that enable us to act upon the world around us through our moral 
choices. They showed that the theoretically necessary principles that apply to 
phenomena are compatible with the practically necessary principles that refer to 
noumena. The Third Critique discusses the extent to which the laws of nature, 
discovered by means of the mind's a priori structures, apparently harmonise with the 
possibility that nature can be affected by the free moral activities of mankind.40 Thus 
pure theoretical reason and pure practical reason are actually one, although applied 
differently.
38 Third Critique, §§82, 83, 84, 5:425-5:436, pp.293-303.
39 See especially ibid., §§59, 5:351-5:354, pp.225-228; §§76-78, 5:401-415, pp.271-284.
§59 is discussed below, but §§76 - 79 are less relevant to the aesthetic concerns o f  this thesis.
40 Lewis White Beck, Kant: Selections, New York: Macmillan, 1988, p.331.
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Reason recognises that nature seems explicable not only by the so-called 
causal laws of nature, as identified by our understanding, but to at least some extent 
too by analogy and by reference to purpose. For instance, we are able to classify 
organic forms into genera and species. In theory, nature might have been too 
complicated for us to identify any useful explanatory patterns in its make up. In 
practice, it seems almost to have been designed so that minds like ours could 
comprehend it.41 Kant called nature's apparent amenability to being interpreted in 
terms of teleological purpose, 'the formal purposiveness of nature'.
In biology for instance, nature could be investigated both through mechanistic 
causal laws and by thinking of ends and purposes or drawing upon analogy. For 
instance, the heart can be understood both mechanically, as a pump, an explanation 
that itself makes an analogy between a humanly manufactured machine and a living 
organ, and as having the purpose of moving blood around the body, or, more 
generally, of sustaining the life of an organism.
Like the rest of natural creation we are governed by natural mechanisms. 
However, unlike the rest of nature we have reason, itself a gift of nature whereby we 
identify higher ends and purposes. The aesthetic aspects of the Third Critique thus 
arise, not as the main purpose of Kant's argument, but in the course of his attempt to 
reconcile nature and freedom. Our creative activity in the arts and sciences can be 
seen as a way in which our own nature prepares us as humans for overcoming our 
animal nature.42 We can thereby achieve the uniquely human, superior condition in 
which we become dominated by our reason, and thus free and rational - able to obey 
the moral law.
41 Third Critique, Introduction, V, 5:184, p.71.
42 ibid., §§82-84, 5:425-5:436, pp.293-303.
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To explain how understanding, by means of which we come to know the 
natural law, and the practical reason, that gives us moral law, form a single system, 
Kant introduces a third cognitive faculty of the mind, the faculty of judgement, that 
may also possess its own a priori principles. He notes that, besides the cognitive 
faculties, there are also three general mental faculties, namely, cognition, desire and 
feeling. Cognition and the understanding relate to each other, practical reason relates 
to desire, and Kant suggests that the faculty of judgement relates to the feelings of 
pleasure and pain, thus possibly giving feeling its own a priori principles.43
Judgement in general is the ability to relate universals to particulars. In 
reflective judgement thought moves from a given particular to discover the universal, 
or law, under which it can be subsumed. Kant contrasts the reflective judgement with 
the determinant judgement, whereby a given universal is applied to a particular, as 
explained in the First Critique.*4 Although the understanding applies concepts, it 
cannot justify our ability to group varied empirical scientific data together and 
discover universal laws. This is what happens when we make a reflective judgement. 
The apparent purposiveness of nature is thus an a priori regulative idea. We do not 
and cannot know that nature genuinely has purpose, but our assumption that it does 
seems to be successful in making its operations intelligible to us, leading to new 
scientific discoveries.45
Kant then analyses the nature of pleasurable experiences, and distinguishes 
between the judgement of the agreeable and the judgement of taste. Judgements of the 
agreeable are subjective, as when objects only seem to be pleasant, because they meet
43 ibid., Introduction, III, 5:176-5:179, pp.64-68.
44 ibid., Introduction, IV, 5:179-5:181, pp.66-68.
45 ibid., Introduction, V, 5:181-5:186, pp.68-73.
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some personal need, desire or preference.46 In aesthetics, specifically, we gain 
pleasure from simply perceiving a natural object or a work of art that seems somehow 
to fit or suit our perceptual abilities. This form of pleasure is expressed in an aesthetic 
judgement of taste.47 Anyone making a judgement of taste expects that there should 
be universal assent to their judgement.48 This distinction parallels the difference 
between our merely subjective judgements of perception, when we claim that 
something 'seems' to be so, and the objective knowledge we hold once the 
understanding has applied a concept to a representation.
The main difference between the pleasure gained from beauty and the pleasure 
of gratifying the senses is the presence or absence of interest. Judging an object as 
beautiful gives a disinterested pleasure. Since doing so does not engage subjective, 
personal preferences, it can claim to be a universally valid judgement. This is what 
qualifies it to be a judgement of taste.49 Furthermore, objects that are judged to be 
beautiful are perceived to be purposive, as if they have a purpose, or been designed by 
an artist, even though they do not serve any particular purpose. They have 
'purposiveness without purpose': 'beauty is the form of the purposiveness of an object, 
insofar as it is perceived in it without representation of an end.'50
In a simplification of the theory of perception in the First Critique, Kant says 
this pleasure is created by the harmonious free play between our imagination and 
understanding. The word, 'imagination', is a kind of shorthand for the cluster of 
activities that the First Critique analyses as sensing and forming our sensible
46 ibid., §§1-5, 5:203-5:211, pp.89-96.
47 ibid., Introduction, VI, 5:186-5:188, pp.73-75.
48 ibid., §6, 5:211, p.96.
49 ibid., §§6-9, 5:211-5:219, pp.96-104.
50 ibid., §17,5:236, p.120.
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intuitions. It thus covers the sensibility and the formative activity that organises the 
manifold of perception into intuitions that can be represented to the understanding.
The object pleases us by being so well adapted to the free play of our cognitive 
faculties that it is perceived as if it had been designed to promote this mental 
activity.51 Since these cognitive faculties make it possible for human beings to 
communicate among themselves and share knowledge, Kant refers to them 
collectively as the sensus communis. All human beings should therefore agree when 
making a judgement of taste. The satisfaction we feel is a necessary pleasure that 
should also be felt necessarily by anyone else who perceives the same object.52 If this 
does not always happen, it is because we so rarely make a truly pure judgement of 
taste. Other factors often interfere with the operation of the pure a priori conditions of 
the judgement of taste.53
To clarify his account of aesthetic judgements of taste Kant also compares 
judgements of taste with empirical judgements. Although there is a parallel between 
the universality of claims to knowledge and aesthetic judgements, the judgement of 
taste is not a claim to objective knowledge. In the aesthetic judgement of taste the 
understanding does not apply its concepts. In fact, it withholds its concepts so that the 
mind as a whole can enjoy the free play between the imagination and understanding. 
According to the First Critique, it is through the application of concepts to these 
representations that the understanding forms objective knowledge. Thus, by 
definition, the aesthetic judgement, whereby we come to call an object beautiful, 
although claiming to be universal, cannot be objective.
51 ibid., §§10-17, 5:220-5:236, pp.105-120.
52 ibid., §§ 18-22, 5:236-5:244, pp. 121 -127.
53 ibid., and also §§36-38, 5:289-5:291, pp.168-171.
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From our mind's failure to apply concepts three conclusions follow. Firstly, 
judgements of beauty are unlike judgements of agreeableness, in which concepts tend 
to set functional ends for objects, and determine how they will benefit and affect 
specific individuals in their own subjective, contingent circumstances.54 Secondly, 
beautiful things can be regarded disinterestedly. Once we apply concepts, we become 
distracted by many material features of the object's content that tell us, for example, 
whether we can obtain personal advantage or sensuous pleasure from its exploitation 
or enjoyment; we also discover whether or not it even exists in reality, and can then 
form opinions about its existence, and we cease to be disinterested.55 Thirdly, we are 
able to enjoy the free beauty of the object. In applying a concept to an object, we set it 
limits and assign function to it. We then unavoidably judge whether or not it is good 
of its kind. This Kant calls, 'adherent beauty', an inferior form of beauty, which can be 
related to technical perfection, but not to the pleasure that derives from the free 
interplay of our unrestrained cognitive faculties that constitutes free beauty.56 Beauty 
is discerned in things without reference to their content. Thus the distinction between 
form and content, or matter, that Kant makes in the First Critique gains significance 
here also. Everyone perceives the form, but the content is 'private to each'. This 
supports Kant's claim that the aesthetic judgement is universal.
Kant then moves on to discuss the notion of the sublime, which he regarded as 
constituting all the remaining cases covered by aesthetic judgements of taste. The 
relationship between beauty and sublimity is that 'the beautiful seems to be taken as 
the presentation of an indeterminate concept of the understanding, but the sublime as
54 ibid., §5,5:210, p.95.
55 ibid., §§2, 3, 5:205, 5:206, pp.90, 91.
56 ibid., §16,5:229,5:230, p. 114.
57 S. KOmer, Kant, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977, p. 184.
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that of a similar concept of reason.' Beautiful objects give pleasure in perception 
because their form immediately pleases our cognitive faculties. Sublime things, 
usually natural objects, overwhelm our cognitive abilities by either their size or 
power. In this case, the mind seems to lack any adequate concept that it could apply to 
the object in question. The sublime is therefore also an example of disinterested 
perception. Such objects threaten our powers of understanding and possibly also our 
personal wellbeing. As a superior rational being, however, a human being can 
overcome his sense that the object poses a threat, and experience a pleasurable awe.
As with beauty, the response of the human mind to the object is in fact what 
constitutes sublimity, but we tend to transfer that characteristic to the object, and call 
the object, rather than the mind or its response, 'sublime'.59
It is in the fine arts rather than the merely pleasing arts that we make a 
judgement of taste. Our experience of objects of fine art is like an experience of 
natural beauty, but the beautiful artefact is produced through the workings of genius, a 
natural gift possessed by some people that is capable of both creating something 
original and giving the rule to art. Even this gift, however, must still be subject to the 
judgement of taste, or it risks producing 'original nonsense'.60 The artist's genius often 
manifests itself in a work of art as 'spirit', and Kant's examples show how spirit 
influences our judgement that something is beautiful. '[I]n an aesthetic significance, 
[spirit] means the animating principle in the mind.' It enlivens our mind by choosing 
material that 'purposively sets the mental powers in motion, i.e., into a play that is 
self-maintaining...'61 Furthermore, spirit is 'the faculty for the presentation of aesthetic
58 Third Critique, §23, 5:244, p. 128.
59 ibid., §23,5:245, p.129.
60 ibid., §§46-48, 5:307-5:313, pp.186-191.
61 ibid., §49, 5:313, pp.191,192.
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ideas1.62 An aesthetic idea is 'that representation of the imagination that occasions 
much thinking though without it being possible for any determinate thought, i.e., 
concept, to be adequate to it.' In this, it is a 'counterpart' to ideas of reason, i.e., 
concepts to which no intuition representable by the imagination can be adequate. This, 
then, is how the imagination, as a productive cognitive faculty, is 'very powerful in 
creating, as it were, another nature out of the material which the real one gives it.' 
Another of Kant's scarce, and therefore famous examples follows, as Jupiter's eagle, 
with lightning in its claws, and Juno's peacock are cited as yielding aesthetic ideas 
that represent certain aesthetic attributes, namely, the power of the king of heaven and 
the splendour of its queen. Genius in art can then be summed up as the union of 
imagination and understanding not, as when we acquire empirical knowledge, through 
the subordination of the imagination to the concepts of the understanding, but in a 
relationship in which the imagination is free, and able 'to express what is 
unnameable... and to make it universally communicable...without the constraint of 
rules'.64 If we add to this Kant's comment that 'genius really consists in the happy 
relation, which no science can teach and no diligence learn...',65 the analysis of 
aesthetic appreciation and artistic creativity in this part of the Third Critique may 
seem slightly vague. However, other thinkers found them useful, as later chapters of 
this thesis will show.
Continuing the task of integrating the Third Critique with his previously 
published thought, Kant discerns an affinity between the aesthetic, especially in our 
recognition of sublimity, and the moral. Beauty is the symbol of the morally good.
62 ibid., §49,5:314, p.192.
63 ibid., §49,5:315, p. 193.
64 ibid., §49,5:317, p.195.
65 ibid., §49, 5:317, p. 194.
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For Kant, a symbol is the way in which concepts that can be thought, but which have 
no adequate sensible intuitions, are ascribed intuitions that the power of judgement 
treats, not in terms of their content, but formally, drawing out the forms of the 
reflection that correspond to the concepts, 'as mere expressions of concepts'.66 Thus, 
just as beauty pleases us immediately as a sensuous intuition, morality gives us 
pleasure in its very concept. More obviously the two are comparable in that both 
please us without any interest. Thirdly, both demonstrate freedom, beauty in the free 
agreement of the imagination and understanding, morality in the free agreement of the 
will with the universal law of reason. Finally, the subjective principle forjudging the 
presence o f beauty is represented as being universal, valid for everyone, though not 
knowable by any universal concept. Analogous to this is the universal moral law,
A*7valid for everyone, but knowable by means of a universal concept. The parallels that 
can be drawn among the various ways in which our conceptual, moral and aesthetic 
thinking works suggest that morals and taste depend on a common noumenal 
condition. Being supersensible, any such condition is unknowable, but our faculty of 
judgement provides us with a way of reconciling all these strands that satisfies the 
human mind.
The second half of the Third Critique deals with teleological judgement. 
Although its content is less directly relevant to our discussions of aesthetics, the 
debate affected the way Kant's contemporaries regarded biological investigations and 
nature in general. It is also the source of the notion of intellectual intuition, used by 
Friedrich Holderlin and others. Kant tells us that the reflective judgement also makes 
judgements about objects by reference to their teleological purpose. He here seeks to
66 ibid., §59, 5:351, 5:352, pp.225, 226.
67 ibid., §59, 5:354, pp.227, 228.
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demonstrate how we can be justified in using both mechanistic, causal explanations, 
established in the First Critique as one of our main kinds of objective knowledge, and
/ O
also teleological explanations. In doing so, Kant aims to reconcile the causal 
necessities explained in the First Critique with the freedom asserted in the Second 
Critique and the Groundwork. Kant distinguishes between the things humans have 
made for their own identifiable purposes, and organisms. He calls organisms 'natural 
purposes', characterised by the fact that they reproduce, grow, repair themselves and 
are made up of mutually dependent parts. In living things, each part is reciprocally 
means and end for the other parts of the same whole, and parts are understood with 
reference to their functioning within the whole.69 Regarding a methodology for the 
biological sciences, Kant says we feel obliged to search for mechanical explanations 
for the way organs and organisms work, and are not satisfied until we have done so. 
However, our motivation for pursuing this investigation is unavoidably guided by our 
interest in the teleology of the organism. The two kinds of explanation are 
complementary.70 Whereas causality extends human knowledge by building up 
increasingly generalised explanations on the basis of partial discoveries, teleological 
explanations refer to the concept of the whole as a determining factor in the nature of 
the parts under investigation, i.e. their function. Effectively, then, our presupposition 
that parts have a purpose within the organic whole arises because of the unavoidable 
limitations of human cognition. If we were a hypothetical kind of creature who did 
not need to apply concepts to sensation in order to obtain knowledge, then our
68 ibid., §70, 5:386-5:388, pp.258-260.
69 ibid., §§64 -66, 5:370-5:377, pp.242-249.
70 ibid., §§71, 75, 5:388-5:400, pp.260-271.
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intellects would be able to intuit the existence and nature of objects immediately, 
simply through thought, or intellectual intuition.71
Thus, the principle of the harmony between nature and our mental capacities 
works 'as if an understanding (though not ours) had given them for our faculties of 
cognition, in order to make possible a system of experience in accordance with special 
laws of nature',72 and is thus 'a principle of looking for laws, although merely a 
subjective one.'73 It is a heuristic principle that makes it possible for mankind to 
engage in any kind of scientific investigation. This, as we shall see, was the rather 
cautious and qualified claim that Holderlin wished to show was knowable as a 
definite truth.
This overview of Kant's work has introduced Kantian terms and ideas that will 
reappear through the rest of the thesis, though rarely supported explicitly by the kinds 
of argument that Kant employed to justify their introduction. This indication of how 
Kant intended them to fit together, however, should enable the reader to follow their 
subsequent history, and see how they were sometimes presumed, sometimes used, and 
sometimes modified in the course of the 1790s by Friedrich Schiller, Friedrich 
Holderin and Friedrich Schlegel.
71 ibid., §77, 5:406, p.275.
Lewis White Beck, op. cit., p.339. Beck tells us that this is the kind o f nature that some past accounts 
had ascribed to God.
72 Third Critique, Introduction IV, 5:181, p.68.
73 ibid., Introduction III, 5:177, p.64.
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CHAPTER 1
AN INTRODUCTION TO KALLIAS ODER UBER DIE SCHONHEIT, AND ITS 
PLACE IN SCHILLER’S THEORETICAL WRITING
The so-called Kallias Letters that Schiller wrote to his friend, Christian 
Gottfried Komer were a direct response to Kant’s Third Critique, and thus the best 
text with which to start our survey. He intended to write his own sensuous-objective 
analytic o f the beautiful to challenge Kant’s rational-subjective account and to reveal 
the recognisable features in an object that lead us to call it beautiful. This would be 
part of the objective element in his project. Baumgarten had already attempted 
something of this kind, but mistakenly believed that the logical perfection of the 
object, as it appeals to the rational faculties of our minds, constituted its beauty.1 
Schiller wished to claim instead that the response to beauty is sensuous, arising, as 
Burke and others had thought, through feeling rather than reason, but not, as they had 
said, merely subjective and personal.
This series of letters was not published in Schiller’s lifetime, though its 
existence was well known, and Schiller recalled copies of individual letters from 
Komer to help him with his subsequent theoretical writing. He regarded the Kallias 
Letters as an unsuccessful and incomplete argument, and he never created a list of 
criteria by which to assess beauty of completed his analytic of beauty. Later criticisms 
include the fact that he never fully justified using his initial and enduring definition,
1 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, Reflections on poetry  : Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten’s 
Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis adpoem a pertinentibus, (ed.), (tr.) with the original text, an 
introduction, and notes, Karl Aschenbrenner & William B. Holther, Berkeley: University o f  California 
Press, 1954.
2 Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin o f  our Ideas o f the Sublime and Beautiful, 
(ed.) Adam Phillips, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.
In the Aesthetic Letters Schiller refers again to the inadequacy o f Burke’s empirical approach:
Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, .XV: §5, fh. p. 103.
3 Friedrich Schiller, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Stuttgart: Philipp 
Reclam jun, 1999, fn. p. 140. Letter: Schiller to KOmer, 10.12.1793.
49
SECTION 1: Friedrich Schiller Chapter 1
‘freedom in appearance’4 as a synonym for ‘beauty’. 5 He has also generated debate 
among subsequent commentators about what he meant by his claim that beauty is ‘the 
form of a form’.6 The Kallias Letters were successful, though, in establishing an 
alternative to Kant’s account of how the mind can appreciate beauty. The letters 
would reward close textual analysis, but, in our context, will be discussed fairly 
briefly, simply to enable the reader to understand the Kantian origin of Schiller’s 
aesthetics and, thus ultimately, the extent to which his final position was very much 
his own.
We are now almost in a position to summarise Schiller’s attempt at a 
sensuous-objective theory. One more comment about Schiller’s philosophical starting 
point needs to be made, however. Karl Leonhard Reinhold was the populariser, and 
first amender o f Kant, and knew Schiller.7 Although Kant admittedly refers to the 
sensuous intuitions as ‘content’, which is then ‘formed’ by the schemata of space and
4 Friedrich Schiller, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Stuttgart: Philipp 
Reclam jun, 1999, p. 18, 08.02.1793.
‘Freiheit in der Erscheinung.’
5 Frederick C. Beiser, Schiller as Philosopher: a re-examination , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005, p.74.
6 Friedrich Schiller, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Stuttgart: Philipp 
Reclam jun, 1999, p.7, 25.01.1793.
The following three authors offer interpretations:
Eva Schaper, Studies in Kant's Aesthetics, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1979, Ch.5, 
'Schiller's Kant: a chapter in the history o f  creative misunderstanding', p.99ff.
Siegbert Latzel, ,D ie Aethetische Vemunft: Bermerkungen zu Schillers »Kallias«’, in 
Liter aturwissenschaftliches Jahrbuch, 1961.
Frederick C. Beiser, Schiller as Philosopher: a re-examination, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
This last interpretation seems the most plausible, see Beiser, op.cit. p.56.
‘Beauty is the form o f a form, the form o f  perfection, because it consists not only in order, regularity 
and proportion, but in the inner necessity o f  order, regularity and proportion as it derives from the inner 
nature o f  a thing... it consists in the manner in which the form o f  an object derives from the object 
itself.’ - based on Schiller’s letter o f 28.02.1793.
7 Sabine Roehr, ‘Zum Einflufi K.L. Reinholds auf Schillers Kant Rezeption’, in (ed.) Martin Bondeli 
and Wolfgang H. Schrader, Die Philosophic Karl Leonhard Reinholds, (Fichte Studien Supplementa 
Band 16), Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2003, pp. 105-121, even suggests that Schiller’s knowledge o f  Kant 
depended at least as much on his conversations with Reinhold, as on a reading o f  Kant’s work.
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time,8 Reinhold gives greater prominence to the notions of both form and content in 
his account of perception. In his search for a more fundamental principle - the 
principle of consciousness - upon which he recommended that a revised Kantian 
philosophy should be grounded, he stated that the principle he required was one that 
would necessarily be available as a ready formed material content, but not as synthetic 
a priori knowledge, which presupposes the action of schemata and understanding.9 As 
we shall see shortly, this claim that any entity could have ready-formed content has an 
echo in Schiller’s attempted analytic of the beautiful in the Kallias Letters.
8 Immanuel Kant, A Critique o f  Pure Reason, (ed.) (tr.) F. Max Mtlller, New York: Doubleday, 1966, 
A: 20 - 23; B: 3 4 -3 8 ;  §2, p.23.
9 Martin B on d eli,,Reinholds Kant-Kritik in der Phase der Elementarphilosophie’, in (ed.) Martin 
Bondeli & Wolfgang H. Schrader, Die Philosophie Karl Leonhard Reinholds, Amsterdam; New York: 
Rodopi, 2003, p.23.
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Schiller’s argument in the Kallias Letters
Given this philosophical background, Schiller, as a practising creative artist, 
felt that the problem now facing writers and other artists was that the theories of Kant 
and his predecessors had fastened on to one small part of what it meant for something 
to be beautiful, and presented it as if it were the whole answer.10 His basic objection 
was that he was unable to apply their theory in his own work. Kant had resolved many 
issues; but even the Third Critique was inadequate:
Und geschadet hat sie [die Kritik] mir in der Tat, denn die Kiihnheit, die 
lebendige Glut, die ich hatte, eh mir noch eine Regel bekannt war, vermisse 
ich noch seit mehreren Jahren. Ich sehe mich jetzt erschaffen und bilden, ich 
beobachte das Spiel der Begeisterung, und meine Einbildungskraft betragt sich 
mit minder Freiheit, seitdem sie sich nicht mehr ohne Zeugen weiB.11
A correctly framed theory would not impede artistic production. However, since 
argument was the most powerful weapon of the Kantians he was probably just about 
to offend, Schiller needed more than empirical, or rule-of-thumb, guidelines,
Alsdann kann Dich ein Kantianer immer noch mit der Frage in die Enge
I Otreiben, nach welchem Prinzip der Erkenntms der Geschmack verfahre?
Thus, he needed to establish some kind of relevant concept a priori. Throughout
Schiller's writings on aesthetic theory, he tries to adhere to this method. While
common sense is not enough to prove that any philosophical theory is true, and is no
substitute for careful argument, the most reliable conclusions are nevertheless those
10Friedrich Schiller, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Stuttgart, Philipp 
Reclam jun., 1999, p.6. letter, 25.01.1793.
11 Letter to KOmer, 25.05.1792., in (ed.) Jiirgen Bolten, Schillers Briefe iiber die asthetische Erziehung, 
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1984, p.93.
And it [the Critique] has in fact damaged me, because for several years I have been lacking the 
boldness, the inner fire I had before I knew o f any rule. 1 can actually see myself now, creating  and 
forming', I observe inspiration at play and my imagination conducts itself with less freedom, since it has 
realised that it is no longer without witnesses.
12 Friedrich Schiller, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Stuttgart, Philipp 
Reclam jun., 1999, p. 11. letter, 08.02.1793.
Thereupon the Kantians can always drive you into a comer with the question, Tn accordance with what 
principle o f  the understanding does taste proceed?’
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that, however abstruse the reasoning that has led to them, seem ultimately to be most 
plausible and agree best with common sense.13
Schiller challenged Kant’s view about the subjective nature of aesthetics, but 
nevertheless agreed with much of what Kant said. He observed that there were two 
points at issue here. Firstly, whether an object can please us by means of a concept, 
and secondly, whether it can be judged by means of one. He agreed with Kant in 
answering, 'No,' to the question of how the object pleases us, it does so without our 
needing to refer it to a concept; but he disagreed about how we come to judge the 
object. He found it unsatisfactory to claim our feeling as the only valid criterion for 
such a judgement, and thought it should be possible to identify some kind of objective 
principle that enables us to judge.14 As a step towards this, Schiller analysed for 
himself what he thought happens when we appreciate a beautiful object. What we 
might call ‘normal perception’ takes place just as Kant said. But every so often, some 
material, some collection of intuitions, which the imagination might otherwise have 
been expected to submit to the schemata, resists. Their own nature has formed them 
already, and not, it would seem, by any external means. As Schiller says, being free 
and being determined by itself / oneself, from the inside outwards, is the same thing.15
13 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: in a series o f  letters, (ed.) (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson and L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XXVIII: §4, fh. p. 127.
14 Siegbert Latzel, 'Die Asthetische Vemunft: Bemerkungen zu Schiller's "Kallias"', in 
Literaturwissenschaftliches Jahrbuch, 1961, vol. 2, pp. 31 - 4 0 .
15 Friedrich Schiller, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Stuttgart, Philipp 
Reclam jun., 1999, p.35. letter, 19.2.1793.
Frei sein und durch sich selbst bestimmtsein, von innen heraus bestimmt sein, ist eins.
[translator’s note: In context, Schiller intends ‘sich selbst’ to be understood indifferently as ‘itse lf or 
‘on eself. His point is that self-determination is the key, whether we are referring to animate or 
inanimate entities.]
Schiller is not clear about how far he wishes us to abandon or adapt the Kantian view o f  freedom. 
Despite R.D. Miller’s classic book on Schiller and freedom, which interprets him sympathetically, this 
seems to be a continuing point o f unresolved tension.
See R.D. Miller, Schiller and the ideal offreedom: a study o f  Schiller’s philosophical works with 
chapters on Kant, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970.
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Therefore the object appears to be autonomous. Content and natural form match so 
well already, that the human mind is surprised16 and accepts that it has no further 
work to do in this respect. Thus, by the time this example is presented to the 
understanding, as happens automatically by the nature of the perceptual process, one 
of the formative preparative preliminaries to conceptualisation is unnecessary, or 
inappropriate. Indeed, as the senses receive a ready-formed sensible intuition, the 
understanding does not even recognise the aspect of the representation that we call 
beautiful as requiring conceptualisation, and applies no concepts to it.
However, this is where Schiller believes the practical reason becomes relevant. 
The practical reason and the will work together, more or less as one in the Kantian
1 7philosophy. A good, free will is self-determined, which means it is not formed by
external influences.
Man drtickt sich... richtiger aus, wenn man diejenigem Vorstellungen, welche 
nicht durch theoretische Vemunft sind und doch mit ihrer Form 
ubereinstimmen, Nachahmungen von Begriffen, diejenigen Handlungen, 
welche nicht durch prakt. Vemunft sind und doch mit ihrer Form 
ubereinstimmen, Nachahmungen freier Handlungen; kurz, wenn man beide1 ftArten Nachahmungen (Analoga) der Vemunft nennt.
Thus, the practical reason is capable of recognising that free acts of will performed by
conscious beings conform with itself.19 A mechanical effect, by contrast, that follows
16 Friedrich Schiller, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Stuttgart: Philipp 
Reclam jun, 1999, p. 13, 08.02.1793.
17 Friedrich Schiller, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Stuttgart: Philipp 
Reclam jun, 1999, p. 15.
‘Praktische Vemunft und Willensbestimmung aus bloBer Vemunft sind eins’
However, in the Aesthetic Letters, XIX, §10, the will is less closely aligned with the practical reason.
18 Friedrich Schiller, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Stuttgart: Philipp 
Reclam jun, 1999, p. 14,08.02.1793.
We express ourselves more correctly, if  we call those ideas (or representations) that do not exist 
through the exercise o f the theoretical reason, and yet agree with its form, imitations o f  concepts, and 
those actions that do not come about through the exercise o f  the practical reason, and yet agree with its 
form, imitations o f  free actions; in short, if  we call both kinds imitations (or Analogues) o f reason.
19 Friedrich Schiller, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Stuttgart: Philipp 
Reclam jun, 1999, p. 16, 08.02.1793.
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the law of nature, can in fact never act freely, but if intuitions appear to have done so, 
and have form of their own, this unity of form and content, this representation 
(Erscheinung) becomes analogous to the freely acting individual. It is as though the 
‘thing’, that is admittedly not yet an object in Kant's usual sense, has acted of its own 
free will; and this is one sense in which Schiller can describe beauty as 'objective'. For 
the practical reason, therefore, such a unity is ‘freedom in appearance’. Beiser points 
out that there are some similarities here between Schiller’s conception of the apparent 
autonomy of the beautiful object in which form and content naturally conform,20 and 
Kant’s notion of natural purpose, which seems to be self-organising, generating and 
developing from within as if by a natural necessity.21 Schiller was probably familiar 
with this passage, and he was certainly familiar, as we have said, with Reinhold’s 
search for the ready formed proposition. Taken together, these suggested the model 
for Schiller’s analysis of beautiful objects.
Now we shall see how Schiller is able to call the apparently unconceptualised 
beautiful ‘object’ an object. The understanding identifies and handles a beautiful 
object like any other object. When we outlined Kant’s theory, there was some kind of 
momentary interruption in the perceptual operation of the mind, while the faculties 
engaged in free play and contemplated the beauty of a beautiful object. We now see 
that, on Schiller’s analysis, this will not happen. In beautiful objects, in addition to the 
usual objective qualities to which concepts are applied, an additional attribute or an 
apparent regularity and conformity to rules is present, which is not among the 
concepts of the understanding. At this point an ‘as i f  enters the theory. Although the 
object’s form and content harmonise coincidentally, the practical reason treats the
20 Frederick C. Beiser, Schiller as Philosopher: a re-examination, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005, p.73.
21 Immanuel Kant, (ed.) Paul Guyer, (tr.) Paul Guyer & Eric Matthews, Critique o f  the pow er o f  
judgem ent, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, §65, 5:374, p.245.
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object ‘as i f  it were free. Schiller tells us that the practical reason makes an analogy 
between autonomous creatures or actions on one hand, and the harmoniously self­
formed object on the other. As we saw in our summary of Kant, the reason is 
accustomed to making analogies, as it attempts to give suitable expression to the 
aesthetic ideas, so this is a legitimate Kantian function of the practical reason. The 
application of the practical reason to autonomous beings and actions is moral; its 
application to objects is aesthetic.22
The understanding therefore does not perceive the beauty in beautiful objects, 
but, with the senses, fulfils its normal perceptual role in conceptualising size, colour, 
functional name and so on. It is as if two streams of mental perception are at work 
simultaneously, the understanding scanning the representations of the imagination for 
inanimate objects, the practical reason scanning the manifold of perception and 
sensible intuitions for moral actions plus either coincidently or artistically ready- 
formed content. Although Schaper views the involvement of the practical reason as a 
connection between the object and the noumenal world,23 the account given above 
shows we are not obliged to agree with her that, by saying that the perceiving subject 
could be hinweggedacht, Schiller was working with a Baumgartian definition of 
objectivity that committed him to situating beauty in any equivalent of the thing-in- 
itself.24 Beiser believes it would be equally permissible to speak of ‘thinking the
22 Friedrich Schiller, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit and Ober Anmut und Wiirde, (ed.) Klaus L. 
Berghahn, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1999, p. 18, 8.2.93.
23 Eva Schaper, Studies in Kant's Aesthetics, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1979, Ch.5, 
p.l 13.
24 Schaper’s opinion rests on this comment:
Friedrich Schiller, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam 
jun, 1999, p.44, 23.2.1793.
Du wirst auch mit mir dartlber einig sein, dafi diese Natur, und diese Heautonomie objektive 
Beschaffenheiten der Gegenstande sind, denen ich sie zuschreibe; denn sie bleiben ihnen, auch wenn 
das vorstellende Subjekt ganz hinweggedacht wird.
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representing subject away’, even for properties that Kant himself recognised as being
7 ^objective. Schaper’s point is that anything the will freely acknowledges beyond the 
limits of understanding would become 'objective'. Therefore, if Schiller could claim 
that mankind applies freedom beyond the moral realm, to sensuous material, he would 
be able to discover that some experiences are unlimited by the categories of the 
understanding. Experiences of beauty could be 'experiences of the real freely 
appearing'.26 However, the claims Schiller makes in these letters are actually less 
ambitious, and rule this possibility out:
... weil diese Freiheit dem Objekte von der Vemunft nur geliehen wird, da
nichts frei sein kann als das Ubersinnliche, und Freiheit nie als solche in die
97Sinne fallen kann... daB ein Gegenstand frei erscheme, nicht wirklich ist...
The final point mentioned in our introductory survey of Kant’s aesthetics, and
for which we have not yet considered Schiller’s response, is Kant’s distinction 
between free and dependent beauty. Kant described these two kinds of beauty because 
of a difficulty faced by both rationalists and sensationalists: how to distinguish the 
logically good from the beautiful. Baumgarten's version of perfection, for instance, 
cannot theoretically be distinguished from the technically perfect, or the fit for 
purpose. Schiller was puzzled, however, by Kant's claim that dependent beauty is not 
pure. Precisely because Kant recognised the logical / aesthetic distinction, Schiller
You will also agree with me that this nature and this heautonomy are objective qualities o f the objects 
to which 1 ascribe them; for they retain them, even when the representing subject has been completely 
imagined away.
25 Frederick C. Beiser, Schiller as Philosopher: a re-examination , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005, p.55.
26Eva Schaper, Studies in Kant's Aesthetics, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1979, Ch.5, p.l 13.
27 Friedrich Schiller, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Stuttgart: Philipp 
Reclam jun, 1999, p. 17, 08.02.1793.
... because this freedom is only lent to the object by the reason, since nothing can be free but the
suprasensible, and freedom as such can never come under the senses that an object appears to be
free, but is not really...
By contrast, when we later come to study the theoretical writings o f Friedrich HGlderlin, a case could 
arguably be made for saying that Schaper’s interpretation o f  Schiller comes quite close to describing 
HOlderlin’s conception o f beauty. See chapter 9 below.
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would have expected him to have been able to accept that dependent beauty is 
nevertheless beautiful; for, as Schiller points out, most of the things we find beautiful, 
including all works of art, and most of the beauties of nature, are in practice
Oftdependent, referred to the kinds of things they are. According to Kant, this makes 
them conditioned, impure and thus inferior. Schiller’s theory, however, allows us to 
perceive both perfection and beauty simultaneously and alongside each other. As he 
says, beauty is at its most dazzling when it overpowers the logical constitution of the
OQobject; and how can it overpower if not faced with resistance? Thus, once Schiller 
has set up a scheme in which separate faculties of the mind deal concomitantly with 
the logical and the aesthetic, Kant’s free / adherent distinction loses its force, and 
confirms Schiller’s belief that previous thinkers had missed the fact that beauty goes 
beyond logic, as when, for instance, something is not merely perfect, but also 
beautiful.
28 Friedrich Schiller, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Stuttgart: Philipp 
Reclam jun, 1999, p .6 ,25.01.1793.
29 Friedrich Schiller, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Stuttgart: Philipp 
Reclam jun, 1999, p .7 ,25.01.1793.
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Implications of the Kallias Letters
We stated at the outset of this chapter that Kallias Letters was a starting point 
for Schiller’s later thought. What have we established? Diagram l)30 is intended to 
represent in schematic form the standard Kantian processes of perception and the 
power of judgement. The practical reason and the expression of aesthetic ideas is 
indicated, but we should note that the practical reason plays no part in perception as 
such. Diagram 2)31 represents what Schiller has told us in these letters. The mind’s 
operations are recognisably Kantian, but with one or two modifications. Perception by 
means of schemata and concepts remains unchanged, except for the fact that the 
understanding no longer has the task of somehow - but without applying any concepts 
- using a power of judgement to recognise when it has been confronted by a beautiful 
object, shutting down the doors on its store of concepts (Kant’s word is ‘withhold’), 
and permitting the schemata to enjoy free play with the sensible intuitions. Instead, 
perception continues as an uninterrupted process, but the beauty of the object is 
appreciated by the use of the practical reason, which is, as in Kant, in any case 
constantly at work engaging with the moral side of life.
What is the significance of this? We shall focus on the positive results. Firstly, 
although it is true that great beauty can bring us up short and interrupt our thoughts, it 
seems more plausible to accept a theory that allows us to apply concepts and yet 
recognise other aspects of the object at the same time. Schiller does not need to 
accommodate any additional faculty, the power of judgement, into the operation of 
the human mind. As his theory stood, Kant did not really explain why we were even 
entitled to call the beautiful object an object, until we had finished contemplating its
30 see Appendix.
31 see Appendix.
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beauty. Secondly, Kant himself accepts that beauty can be a symbol of morality.32 
Schiller’s theory suggests some means for how we might make sense of this claim. 
Kant had actually complicated this task, by specifically excluding the practical reason 
from an aesthetic role. The practical reason has an interest in its object, whether as 
being useful, or as being good.33 Thirdly, Schiller re-positions harmony and balance, 
still closely associated with the aesthetic, in the beautiful object, not the human mind, 
though with qualifications. We shall see these ideas re-emerge as mental phenomena 
in Anmut und Wiirde, however. In Kallias Letters the term ‘play’ is no longer as 
significant as it was with Kant, though it too will re-emerge, this time in the Aesthetic 
Letters.
For Schiller’s later aesthetics, several key elements are relevant. While his 
view of freedom is closely related to the Kantian meaning: autonomously determined 
by the moral law, Schiller begins to broaden his use of the word in this essay. He 
associates the condition of not being externally determined (in objects) with freedom. 
This prepares us for the rather wider meaning of freedom in the Aesthetic Letters: 
either self-determined, or undetermined. Together with the analogy between morality 
and beauty, this gives beauty more than mere contemplative, Kantian value. Perhaps 
even more importantly for our understanding of the Aesthetic Letters, is the fact that 
the understanding and practical reason are now part of a ‘family’.34 They are not 
completely isolated faculties of the mind, carrying out unconnected functions. Kant 
probably never meant us to think of the faculties as separately as this, but it is possible
32Immanuel Kant, (ed.) Paul Guyer, (tr.) Paul Guyer & Eric Matthews, Critique o f  the pow er o f  
judgem ent, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, §59, 5:353, p.225.
33 Frederick C. Beiser, Schiller as Philosopher: a re-examination, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005, p,60. He gives two references to Kant: 5:221, §11 & 5:222, §12. (p. 106, in Guyer / Matthews 
edition)
34 Friedrich Schiller, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Stuttgart: Philipp 
Reclam jun, 1999, p. 15, 8.2.93.
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Schiller did so.35 In the Aesthetic Letters, he warns us of the difficulties, once we 
analyse anything into parts, of then recreating it as a whole.36 Understanding and 
practical reason work together and simultaneously. They are similar in that they 
belong to the transcendental reason, and they are similar in having a practical role. By 
the time he wrote the Aesthetic Letters, Schiller appears to have decided that the 
similarities between the practical and theoretical reason were greater than their 
differences, as they constituted a single stream of mental activity, and he placed them 
together on the side of the form drive. However, he still needed to clarify how there 
could be a direct link between the noumenal side of rationality, in the practical reason, 
and something that is objectively present, ie. beauty, as Schaper has pointed out.
LatzePs article comments that beauty deceives the understanding, tricking it 
into thinking it has already completed part of its task, and further tricking the practical 
reason into accepting it. However, although reason happily ascribes freedom to the 
beautiful object, as it apparently agrees with the activity of the practical reason, 
Schiller avoids connotations of deception by his use of the word, ‘analogy’. By 
making an analogy, the practical reason has abstracted from the beautiful object, and 
made a conscious comparison with autonomy. There is an ambivalent awareness in 
the mind of the beholder that objects are the kinds of thing usually neatly categorised 
by the understanding, dependent and inanimate things, fully determined in all 
respects, and incapable of exercising autonomy in their own right.
Overall, the Kallias Letters provide a first step towards showing the extent to 
which the faculties of the mind interact. If every part of the mind is fully occupied in 
the integrated task of human living, it will be impossible for one element to create
35 Eva Schaper, Studies in Kant's Aesthetics, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1979, Ch.5, p.99.
36 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: in a series o f  letters, (ed.) (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson and L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XVIII, §4, fn. p. 127.
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awkward self-consciousness in another as it scrutinises its work. And possibly, as a 
result, Schiller will be able to resume his creative activities.
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CHAPTER 2
ANMUT UND WURDE: GRACE, DIGNITY, AND THEIR PLACE IN 
AESTHETICS AND MORALITY
The Kallias Letters involve the practical reason in the perception of beauty, 
and show how we can perceive beauty alongside our perception of all the qualities of 
objects identified by the theoretical reason, or understanding. Anmut und Wiirde 
shows how the perception of beauty relates to the main activity of the practical 
reason, morality. The Kallias Letters relate beauty to our sensuous and phenomenal 
life; Anmut und Wiirde relates one kind of beauty, moral beauty, to the transcendental. 
Thus, by the time Schiller went on to write the Aesthetic Letters, he already had a 
clear idea of the central and unifying position occupied by aesthetics in his conception 
of humanity. This extended Kant’s achievement in the Third Critique, which linked 
the understanding and practical reason through the power of reflective judgement. 
Unlike Kant, however, Schiller tried to integrate the capacities of the human mind 
into aesthetic activity, rather than create bridges among them.
Whereas the Kallias Letters tried to show the objective nature of beauty, 
Anmut und Wiirde explores both the subjective conditions of grace and dignity, and 
their objective appearance to the eyes of others. Grace is typically a 'movable beauty',
i
that can come and go, and is not ‘fixed’ or essential to its subject.1 Moral dignity, 
Schiller says, can be sublime. According to what we have read in the Kallias Letters, 
he should be showing us that they are objectively present properties, but Schiller does 
not clarify the issue of objectivity any further. This, Beiser rightly suggests, is 
problematic:
1 Friedrich Schiller, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit und Anmut und Wiirde, 
Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1994, p.70.
Anmut ist eine bewegliche Schdnheit... Dadurch unterscheidet sie sich von derfixen  Schdnheit...
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It therefore presupposes the general aesthetic theory Schiller had already 
outlined in his Kallias Briefe. It is indeed simply an application of that theory 
to human actions. Since, however, Schiller never completed that theory,
Anmut und Wiirde is a house without a foundation, or at best without a firm 
and finished one.2
Berghahn’s explanation is that in the Kallias Letters and Anmut und Wiirde Schiller 
was engaged in two different tasks. In the latter essay he was doing something 
comparable to what Kant was doing in the Third Critique, namely, examining the 
subjective conditions for the perception of beauty. In the former he was investigating 
the nature of beauty itself. Therefore Anmut und Wiirde is bound to share more 
similarities with Kant's writing. However, when Schiller examines our subjective 
experience of behaving beautifully he is looking at the subject's experience of 
something that is also perceptible to outsiders. Therefore, we still cannot claim that 
Schiller accepted what Kant wrote regarding subjective aesthetic judgements. He 
dealt with the subjective experience of moral beauty, only once he had provided a 
partial explanation of how beauty in general could relate to the objective. His 
reference to the Analytic of the Beautiful,4 the writing of which was adumbrated at 
the end of the Kallias Letters,5 promises to explain elsewhere the relationship between 
the objective properties of a thing, and the way in which they fit it to stand as the 
symbol o f an idea, but he never wro^e this analytic. Schiller is admittedly 
investigating the aesthetic aspects of moral conduct, not aesthetics per se, but central 
to both was his expectation that beauty was a sensuous / objective property,
2 Frederick C. Beiser, Schiller as Philosopher: a re-examination, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005, p.80. Beiser thinks Schiller still presupposed, but did not repeat, the unpublished general position 
set out in the Kallias Letters.
3 Friedrich Schiller, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit und Anmut und Wiirde, 
Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1994, ‘Nachwort’, p. 164.
4 Friedrich Schiller, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit und Anmut und Wiirde, 
Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1994, p.80.
5 Friedrich Schiller, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit und Anmut und Wiirde, 
Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1994, p.56.
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recognised by the practical reason. Things have all kinds of appearances quite apart 
from beauty, and it is sometimes immaterial whether we can analyse exactly what 
gives them that appearance. For whatever reason, Schiller focuses in Anmut und 
Wiirde, not on objectivity, but on the involvement of the practical reason in aesthetics.
In the Kallias Letters Schiller made an analogy between the moral autonomy 
of the human subject and the apparent autonomy of some objects. It was an 
appearance, and possibly an illusion, created by a naturally occurring agreement 
between form and content. To explain the presence of moral beauty or sublimity, 
Schiller then refers this version of freedom back again to the human subject. Morally, 
the human subject is already autonomous, as Kant assumed and Schiller accepted at 
the outset o f the Kallias Letters. Anmut und Wiirde, however, now draws attention to 
the possibility that this other, newly identified kind of freedom can naturally occur in 
mankind also, as an agreement between form -  or moral reasoning -  and content -  or 
human action. Once again, as in the Kallias Letters, an ‘as i f  is present. Moral grace 
and sublimity are exhibited in actions that apparently take place through the 
spontaneous agreement of desire and duty, rather than by the imposition of moral law, 
though they will, in fact, always agree with morality. Thus the connection between 
beauty and freedom, previously identified in the Kallias Letters, is now applied to 
human beings, their appearance and their behaviour. In the letters Schiller discussed 
only 'objects'. Schiller’s original idea of freedom originated in Kant, a view that 
acknowledges human beings as capable of setting a law for themselves. If they are 
capable o f doing so, we can presuppose that they were capable of doing so, even 
before the instant in which they actually did so. At that point, however, they were not 
yet determined by the moral law, they were natural beings, but capable of self- 
determination and conformity to the moral law. Perhaps from this Schiller derives his
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conception of freedom as a state of harmonious indetermination, which can apparently 
be present naturally. In this way, Anmut und Wiirde and the Aesthetic Letters rest on 
views of freedom first given in the Kallias Letters.6 The concepts of both Kantian 
freedom and freedom as the undetermined continue to be used through Schiller’s 
theoretical works, though without being either explicitly reconciled or sharply 
distinguished.
As in the Kallias Letters, it is worth considering how much of the Kantian
system survived here, since Schiller still wanted to silence anti-Kantian 'heretics'.7
Once again we note the continued importance of the dichotomy between form and
content, or matter, in our evaluation of beauty:
Daher hat auch die Schdnheit des Baues, als blofies Naturprodukt, ihre 
bestimmten Perioden der Bluthe, der Reife und des Verfalles, die das Spiel 
zwar beschleunigen, aber niemals verzogem kann; und ihr gewohnliches Ende 
ist, dab die Masse allmahlich iiber die Form Meister wird und der lebendige 
Bildungstrieb in dem aufgespeicherten Stoff sich sein eigenes Grab bereitet.8
The direct reference here is to the way physical beauty declines into corpulent middle 
age, but the contrast between mere accumulated, passive matter and the shaping 
activity of the form drive is referred to in more general terms in the Aesthetic Letters, 
as a stage in the development of mankind. Form and matter emerge in that work as 
two of Schiller’s most significant terms in the polarised conflict between reason and 
sensation. In the Kallias Letters it is still possible, as we have said, to locate form and 
content fairly easily in the framework of a Kantian perceptual scheme. In Anmut und
6Berghahn also believes they can be understood only against that background. See:
Friedrich Schiller, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit und Anmut und Wiirde, 
Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1994, ‘Anmerkungen’, p. 146, also ‘Nachwort’, p. 160.
7 Friedrich Schiller, Anmut und Wiirde, (ed.) Berghahn, ‘Nachwort’, p. 164.
8 Anmut und Wiirde, p.97.
Hence the beauty o f the human build, as a mere product o f  nature, has its periods o f bloom, ripeness 
and decay, which luck might delay, but can never avoid; and its usual end is that mass gradually 
becomes master o fform, and the living formative drive prepares its own grave for itself, as mere stored 
up substance.
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Wiirde, however, Kant’s perceptual theory is less visible. Schiller concentrates on the 
side of the practical reason, and on the interaction between beauty and the will. He 
portrays the will as operating in the mind of a sensuous-rational creature such as the 
human being on the unformed or raw content of both animal passion and perception, 
and forming them in a moral context. Later, in the Aesthetic Letters, much of the 
Kantian structure of perception per se is not only ignored, but perhaps effectively 
abandoned. In both perception and aesthetics the conflict between the sense and form 
drives becomes the sole explanation for how formed material content comes into 
being.
Material content, in both Anmut und Wiirde and the Aesthetic Letters, is 
passive. The claim is that we suffer or undergo our perceptions, emotions and 
passions.9 Because of the activity of the will, however, we need never be the victims 
of these natural capacities, which we share with all other animals. The will, by 
applying itself to our animal instincts, forms them. Thus, thought and all forms of 
reason are active faculties. The morally good person may sometimes act in 
accordance with the initial inclination of his animal nature, but does so only on the 
authority o f his will, which all his faculties respect, if he shows Wiirde, and which he 
or she loves, in the case of Anmut}0 Any base passions will have been modified, 
controlled or subdued by the will, unless they happen already to be ‘formed’ and 
reconciled with them. Thus, the practical reason can be said to actively mould or form 
the raw content of experience into something distinctively fitted to the human being.11
9 Friedrich Schiller, Anmut und Wiirde, (ed.) Berghahn, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit und Anmut 
und Wiirde, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1994, p. 122.
10 Friedrich Schiller, (ed.) Berghahn, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit und Anmut und Wiirde, Stuttgart: 
Philipp Reclam, 1994, p. 126.
11 Friedrich Schiller, Anmut und Wiirde, (ed.) Berghahn, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit und Anmut 
und Wiirde, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1994, p.l 19.
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1 0Yet passivity has a place in beautiful action. Humans can sometimes be 
relaxed or weary, or slack. Grace itself can be of two kinds, the calming and the 
enlivening.13 Thus, tense, overwrought, or excessively analytical people can be 
calmed and brought into harmony by social contact with those possessing the quality 
of calming grace; the weary or lazy can be encouraged to exert their mental faculties, 
and also their power of doing good, by increased contact with those active people 
whose life exhibits enlivening grace. Those who show a true moral beauty that goes 
beyond a reluctantly self-enforced adherence to the Categorical Imperative, whose 
whole life radiates an enjoyment in doing good, and whose animal instincts have been 
trained into an easy dispositional conformity with the standards set by the will, are 
indeed relaxed. It is this relaxation that gives them their grace, and permits their 
movements to be graceful, rather than restrained or well-trained. By claiming that 
there are these two sorts of grace, Schiller foreshadows the distinction he begins to 
make, though does not develop, in the Aesthetic Letters14 between energetic and 
relaxing beauty.
From the previous paragraph we can see that Anmut und Wiirde occupies an 
intermediate position between the Kallias Letters and the Aesthetic Letters, not just 
chronologically, but also in terms of the development of Schiller's thought. The 
occasional appearance of the idea of two conflicting drives takes us forwards to the 
Aesthetic Letters, where drives are central to Schiller’s account of human nature.15
12 Friedrich Schiller, Anmut und Wiirde, (ed.) Berghahn, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit und Anmut 
und Wiirde, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1994, pp. 131, 132.
13 Friedrich Schiller, Anmut und Wiirde, (ed.) Berghahn, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit und Anmut 
und Wiirde, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1994, p. 131.
Es gibt eine belebende und eine beruhigende Grazie.
14Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: in a series o f  letters, (ed.) (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson and L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XVI: §§2, 3, pp.l 12,113.
15 Friedrich Schiller, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit und Anmut und Wiirde, 
Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1994, p. 116.
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Wiirde represents the state of balance usual in a good man between natural or animal 
drive and the activity of the will. For a person to exhibit Wiirde, he needs strength, so 
that the animal passions can be controlled.16 In the Aesthetic Letters this condition 
appears as one stage through which an individual or society could pass, or in which it 
could exist. In the case of Anmut, animal drive and will are in natural, unforced 
harmony. To achieve Anmut, love and softness are needed. This is a condition related 
to the effects of calming beauty that Schiller later admired as an antidote to the 
rational tensions of educated life. Anmut and Wiirde are each appropriate in their own
17 1 ftspheres, and can therefore subsist in the same person, and would ideally do so.
Such a suggestion had been developed further by the time Schiller wrote the Aesthetic 
Letters, so that the full, aesthetically capable person depends both on an apparently 
unforced harmony, and, just as much, on the existence of a healthy tension between 
the inner drives. To refer back to the Kallias Letters, however, the person Schiller is 
describing in Anmut und Wiirde achieves both inner and outer beauty in a way 
comparable to the way in which an object is beautiful.19 Whereas the practical reason 
recognises the intrinsic and coincidental harmony of form and content in a beautiful
16 Friedrich Schiller, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit und Anmut und Wiirde, 
Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1994, p.l 18.
17 Friedrich Schiller, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit und Anmut und Wiirde, 
Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1994, p. 126.
18 Friedrich Schiller, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit und Anmut und Wiirde, 
Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1994, p.l 10.
Die menschliche Natur ist ein verbundeneres Ganze in der Wirklichkeit, als es dem Philosophen... 
erlaubt ist sie erscheinen zu lassen.
Human nature is a more closely bound whole in reality than philosophers ...can allow it to appear.
19 Friedrich Schiller, (ed.) Berghahn, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit und Anmut und Wiirde, Stuttgart: 
Philipp Reclam, 1994, p.83.
...was in dem Reiche der Vemunft harmonisch ist, wird sich durch keinen Mifiklang in der Sinnenwelt 
offenbaren.
...whatever is harmonious in the realm o f reason will never manifest itself as anything discordant in the 
world o f the senses.
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object, often with surprise, and delight, the beautiful person, or soul, is not only 
recognised as such by an observer, as his or her inner freedom becomes visible in the 
phenomenal world, but his or her inner life is itself an experience of this harmony. 
Grace is the result. The person who epitomises the Kantian exemplar of morality, the 
person likely to exhibit worth or dignity, has a closer aesthetic affinity with sublimity 
than with beauty.21
Nevertheless, by means of the concept of Wiirde, Schiller still makes it 
possible for us to accord the highest respect to people who overcome great personal 
distaste in order to do what they regard as their duty, or for us to admire the 
passionate individual who resists enormous temptations and does his duty 
nevertheless. At the same time Schiller stresses that respect from outsiders, is of 
comparatively minor importance compared to what is already taking place within the 
person. The true respect associated with dignity is the respect that the passions are 
compelled to show for the moral law, or will. The concept of Wiirde also shows how 
we can sometimes justify saying, 'He is a good man, he has done the right thing, but I 
don't find him very likeable.' At its greatest, however, Wiirde exemplifies the
20 Friedrich Schiller, (ed.) Berghahn, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit und Anmut und Wiirde, Stuttgart: 
Philipp Reclam, 1994, p. 128.
In der Anmut... wie in der Schdnheit Uberhaupt, sieht die Vemunft ihre Forderung in der Sinnlichkeit 
erfilllt, und Uberraschend tritt ihr eine ihrer Ideen in der Erscheinung entgegen. Diese unerwartete 
Zusammenstimmung des Zuf&lligen der Natur mit dem Notwendigen der Vemunft erweckt ein Geftlhl 
frohen Beifalls ( Wohlgefallen)... Liebe; ein Geftlhl, das von Anmut und Schdnheit unzertrennlich ist.
In grace, as in any kind o f beauty, reason see its demands fulfilled in the sensuous world, and 
amazingly, one o f its own ideas steps forward towards it in the phenomenal world. This unexpected 
consonance o f  the contingency o f  nature and the necessity o f  reason awakens a feeling o f  happy 
approval {pleasure) ... love; a feeling that is inseparable from grace and beauty.
21 Friedrich Schiller, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit und Anmut und Wiirde, 
Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1994, p. 122.
22 Friedrich Schiller, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit und Anmut und Wiirde, 
Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1994, p. 128.
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sublime. It is awe-inspiring, admirable, impressive, unforgettable, terrifying, though 
perhaps also uncomfortable, horrifying or tragic. It forces us to look within ourselves, 
and cast our eyes down in respect.24 Grace we simply love; it expresses and creates an 
unequivocal ambience of joy and ease, and someone achieving grace is beautiful, with 
an active beauty that grace lends - like Venus’s belt - even to the most ugly. Usually, 
according to Schiller, we demand simultaneously that the performance of virtue 
should be graceful, and that those acting from inclination should do so with dignity, or 
moral worth. Grace and dignity thus each ensure that certain traits are developed, and 
others controlled, so that the law of morality actually requires a balance between 
will and our more primitive dnves.
Schiller’s view of grace, dignity and the ability to act morally enabled him to 
bring something extra to the Kantian conception of morality, namely, the relevance of
9 7virtue. He agreed with Aristotle's view that virtue is a disposition to do good.
Schiller recognised that this is what has developed within the human subject who 
displays Anmut, and it is epitomised in the schdne Seele}% which is human
23 Friedrich Schiller, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit und Anmut und Wiirde, 
Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1994, p.l 13.
So wie die Anmut der Ausdruck einer schdnen Seele ist, so ist Wiirde der Ausdruck einer erhabenen 
Gesinnung.
Just as grace is the expression o f a beautiful soul, so dignity is the expression o f a sublime disposition.
24 Friedrich Schiller, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit und Anmut und Wiirde, 
Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1994, p. 132.
25 Friedrich Schiller, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit und Anmut und Wiirde, 
Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1994, p. 124.
26 Friedrich Schiller, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit und Anmut und Wiirde, 
Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1994, p. 123.
27 Friedrich Schiller, (ed.) Berghahn, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit und Anmut und Wiirde, Stuttgart: 
Philipp Reclam, 1994, p. 106.
...Tugend ist nichts anders »als eine Neigung zu der Pflicht«.
...Virtue is nothing other “than an inclination to duty”.
28 Friedrich Schiller, (ed.) Berghahn, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit und Anmut und Wiirde, Stuttgart: 
Philipp Reclam, 1994, p.l 11.
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perfection,29 someone who loves virtue. Because the animal instincts do not conflict 
with the rules of reason, as enacted by the will, the faculty of the practical reason in 
the graceful person need not be strong. Despite Schiller’s sometimes contentious way 
of aligning grace and dignity with generalisations about the intrinsic nature of the 
sexes, we can at least credit him with having noticed that human beings are made up
A
of varying mixes of sensuousness and rationality. On Schiller's reading, Kant's 
moral philosophy neglects the sensuous element; it weights rationality too heavily, 
and in doing so apparently misrepresents much of the inner debate that accompanies
T 1moral decision making. It also ignores the individual's motivations for behaving 
morally, along with some of the most familiar grounds on which we might approve or 
admire a philanthropist, reformer or saint. The addition of an awareness of virtue to 
the Kantian account was important for the direction taken by Schiller’s later writing.
If morality is a purely rational process, as Kant seemed to suggest, moral reasoning 
might very well be an inborn, fixed ability, arbitrarily strong or weak in the individual 
case. If, however, morality also has a virtuous component, there is a possibility that 
some aspects of moral judgement can be trained, encouraged or developed. Although
In einer schOner Seele ist es also, wo Sinnlichkeit und Vemunft, Pflicht und Neigung harmonieren, und 
Grazie ist ihr Ausdruck in der Erscheinung.
So it is in a beautiful soul that sensibility and reason, duty and inclination harmonise, and grace is their 
expression in outward appearance.
29 Friedrich Schiller, (ed.) Berghahn, Kallias oder uber die Schdnheit und Anmut und Wfirde, Stuttgart: 
Philipp Reclam, 1994, p.l 10.
Das Siegel der vollendeten Menschheit... was man unter schdner Seele verstehet.
The stamp o f  perfect humanity... what we understand by ,beautiful soul’.
30 Friedrich Schiller, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Kallias oder fiber die Schdnheit und Anmut und Wfirde, 
Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1994, pp.55, 113.
31 Friedrich Schiller, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Kallias oder fiber die Schdnheit und Anmut und Wfirde, 
Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1994, p. 107.
In der Kantischen Moralphilosophie ist die Idee der Pflicht mit einer Harte vorgetragen, die alle 
Grazien davon zurUckschreckt...
In the Kantian moral philosophy the idea o f duty is presented with a rigidity that scares off all the 
graces...
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he sees Anmut as a gift, or talent, Schiller’s belief that contact with the right kind of
TOpeople can help us improve our moral disposition shows that it was a talent that
could be nurtured, and that it was already important to him that this should be
possible. The Aesthetic Letters could make no sense, unless Schiller could claim that
humankind is capable of moral and aesthetic improvement.
Besides the light these comments throw on the concept of Anmut, they also
indicate the way Schiller believed reason relates to its objects. The reason’s
recognition of the ready-formed sensible object is referred to as ‘love’, by which
Schiller did not mean that love is the driving force behind either morality or
aesthetics, or that it is the key relationship among people who show grace. ‘Love’
accounted for the reason’s pleasure at seeing its ideas exemplified in the sensible
world. However, it was also the term that Holderlin later adopted to help explain
what holds the world together as a unity. Schiller’s comments on grace, beauty and
love need only minor modifications to fit equally well into the pantheism of
Holderlin’s Hyperion.
Es ist das GroBe selbst, was in der Anmut und Schonheit sich nachgeahmt und 
in der Sittlichkeit sich befriedigt findet, es ist der Gesetzgeber selbst, der Gott 
in uns, der mit seinem eigenen Bilde in der Sinnenwelt spielt. Daher ist das 
Gemtit aufgelost in der Liebe...34
32 Friedrich Schiller, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit und Anmut und JViirde, 
Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1994, p. 132.
33 Frederick C. Beiser, Schiller as philosopher: A re-examination, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005, p.84.
See chapter 8 below.
34 Friedrich Schiller, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit und Anmut und Wiirde, 
Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1994, p. 130.
It is greatness itself that sees itself imitated in grace and beauty and finds its satisfaction in morality; it 
is the lawgiver Himself (or itself), the God  in us, that plays with His (its) own image in the world o f  the 
senses. Thus, the mind is dissolved in love...
[A note on translation: Note that the , lawgiver’ in this quotation is the human will / practical reason. 
Schiller is drawing an analogy between the will and God here. Having a will is like each o f us having 
an internal, individualised god o f our own. Perhaps there is a slight ambiguity in both the German and 
the English. Hfllderlin’s version would have identified ‘lawgiver’ only with God.]
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Both Schiller and Holderlin were aware of the Platonic antecedents of this term, but
or
Holderlin chose to give love a more powerful metaphysical role. Schiller further 
says that the man conscious of his own guilt constantly fears that, in the sensuous 
world, he will meet his inner lawgiver, his enemy. While not strictly agreeing with 
what Holderlin would go on to say, this statement could certainly provide the germ of 
Holderlin’s belief that, unless we embrace the beauty of the world with love, we shall 
have to live as fearful victims of a fate that will ultimately destroy us.36 Thus, Anmut 
und Wiirde not only gives us pointers towards the later development of Schiller’s own 
thought, but, despite the fact that Schiller had recognised the selfish, immoral aspects 
of love too,37 these few pages in Anmut und Wiirde ‘had let the genie out of the bottle’ 
and encouraged the Romantic movement’s elevation of the philosophical and 
aesthetic status of love.38
Anmut und Wiirde continued using the ideas of form and content from the 
First Critique. From the Third Critique it took the topic of beauty and an adapted 
version of the notion of the aesthetic ideas, both of which Schiller first considered in 
the Kallias Letters. It goes well beyond the Kallias Letters by linking the newly 
discovered, aesthetic role of the practical reason into the moral theory of the Second 
Critique. Thus, Schiller has called upon various aspects of Kant’s work and, with 
some modification, applied them to his own aesthetics. The effect of these
35 Frederick Beiser, German Idealism: the struggle against subjectivism , Cambridge MA; London, 
Harvard University Press, 2002, pp.382, 383 & 403.
36 Friedrich Schiller, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit und Anmut und Wiirde, 
Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1994, p. 130.
37 Friedrich Schiller, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit und Anmut und Wiirde, 
Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1994, p. 130.
Die Liebe ist zugleich das Grofimtitigste und das Selbstsilchtigste in der Natur...
Love is at once the most magnanimous and the most selfish thing in nature...
38 Frederick C. Beiser, Schiller as philosopher: A re-examination, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005, p.85.
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modifications is that the Kallias Letters and Anmut und Wiirde together develop a 
stronger awareness than Kant of the interdependence of the human faculties, which, in 
some contexts, exert a combined influence. Schiller reintroduced, but did not 
demonstrate, the idea that beauty might be objective. In the same spirit he brought the 
non-rational, emotional or physical elements in the human being back to prominence 
in morality. While Schiller is regarded as one of the great proponents of classicism in 
German literary thought, and hence also as being committed to Enlightenment 
rationality, he himself has blurred some boundaries in this respect, and, to make an 
extremely sweeping claim, has already opened a way for the increased respect for the 
sensuous and emotional in art that we find slightly later, in the work of the Romantics. 
The further aesthetic implications of the philosophical approach that Schiller began to 
work out in his published texts will not be reviewed at this point. Instead, we shall 
move on to examine the philosophical position set out in his next publication, The 
Aesthetic Letters, which was published soon after Anmut und Wiirde. Once the 
philosophical basis for Schiller’s arguments in that book have also been outlined, we 
shall be in a good position to consider the aesthetic theory that emerges from both 
works, assessing them in our final chapter on Schiller, alongside Naive and 
Sentimental, the last of his theoretical works, and the one that relates most directly to 
artistic and literary issues.
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CHAPTER 3
LETTERS ON THE AESTHETIC EDUCATION OF MANKIND'-. POSSIBLE 
WAYS OF EXPLAINING SCHILLER’S GENERAL PHILOSOPHICAL
POSITION2
Schiller’s third significant theoretical work, The Aesthetic Letters, is a difficult 
book to summarise. This is so, even if, as indicated in the introductory chapter to this 
thesis, we do not consider its political dimensions, but concentrate only on Schiller’s 
general philosophy and aesthetics. We shall approach this problem by considering the 
work from three angles. This chapter establishes his general philosophical position. 
The next deals with the aesthetic theory that rests on that philosophy, and the final 
chapter on Schiller looks at the implications we can draw from this for art and the 
artist, and integrates the discussion with relevant material from Anmut und Wiirde and 
Naive and Sentimental. At least some aspects of this analytical task have been 
attempted before, and in some detail, for instance by P.T. Murray,4 and Frederick 
Beiser.5 With some help from their work, we shall show that, in the Aesthetic Letters, 
Kant’s philosophy is no longer fully recognisable, though its influence can be 
detected alongside features from Reinhold and Fichte. Schiller now held a 
philosophical position that was largely his own. However, he no longer referred to his 
earlier search for an objective definition of beauty.6 Instead, he devised a model of 
humanity that he hoped could account for both the possibility of generalising about
1 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: in a series o f  letters, (ed.), (trans.) Elizabeth 
M. Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982.
2 see also figures 1 - 5 in appendix.
3 Friedrich Schiller, Uber naive und sentimentalische Dichtung, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Stuttgart: 
Philipp Reclam jun., 2005. (based on the Schiller Nationalausgabe, 1962.)
4 Patrick T. Murray, The development o f  German aesthetic theory from  Kant to Schiller: a 
philosophical commentary on Schiller’s ‘Aesthetic Education o f  Man ’ (1795), Lewiston N Y ; Lampeter: 
Edwin Mellen, 1994.
5 Frederick C. Beiser, Schiller as Philosopher: a re-examination, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005.
6 Frederick C. Beiser, Schiller as Philosopher: a re-examination, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005, p.75.
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aesthetic judgements and the presence of individual variations in people’s aesthetic 
responses. Some of the ideas Schiller used as he moved away from the Kantian 
philosophy and aesthetics reappear in the thought of Holderlin and Schlegel, who 
figure in our later chapters. This is so, even though Schiller saw himself and was 
accepted as a proponent of classicism, rather than of the Romantic school that 
emerged among the younger generation. He thus forms a kind of intermediary point 
between Kantian aesthetics and the Romantics.
In the Aesthetic Letters Schiller’s consistent theme is the two-fold, yet unified, 
nature of the human being. Three main lines of argument take him towards his desired 
conclusion, but he did not indicate which of these was intended to be decisive. The 
first argument combines the historical and cultural,7 the second is analytical, probably
•  ftfollowing Fichte, and the third, for which Schiller is probably best known, is further 
adapted from the version of Kant’s theory of the faculties that he used in the Kallias 
Letters and Anmut und Wiirde.9 The rest of this chapter outlines the philosophy 
represented by these three strands, before moving on to look at the aesthetic it 
underpinned. Some of this discussion may appear inconclusive, or even slightly 
tangential to questions of aesthetics, but it represents an attempt to follow Schiller, 
who believed it was important to establish a philosophical basis for his aesthetics.
The book starts with the historical / cultural argument that modem eighteenth 
century society is fragmented and over-specialised, to the detriment of social 
cohesion. People forced to live in this way are degraded and undeveloped, because
?Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, Letters III - VI; XXIV.
The influences here were probably Rousseau and Herder, rather than Kant.
8 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: in a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XI, p.73.
9 first introduced in Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: in a series o f  letters, (ed.), 
(tr.) Elizabeth M. Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XII, p.79.
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social demands compel them to develop only one aspect of their inner self at the 
expense of any other. Mankind has progressed to this point from solitary, bestial, hut- 
dwelling savagery in ancient times. In that era mankind was, effectively, subhuman, 
but once the bonds of society formed, humans enjoyed a simple but fulfilling way of 
life, making use of all their abilities, though at a lower level of civilisation than 
eighteenth century Europe.10 Schiller had read Rousseau and Herder before becoming 
interested in the critical philosophy. From Rousseau came the idea of a harmonious, 
almost utopian society derived from theoretical historical principles, and from Herder 
a more scholarly, empirically based awareness of historical generalisation and 
progress.11 The challenge Schiller presents here is how to continue these historical 
changes so that, instead of our present one-sided development, full human potentiality 
can be encouraged, to the general benefit of humanity and society. We shall see this 
fear that over-specialisation will lead to social fragmentation and individual 
inadequacy repeated in the work of both Holderlin and Schlegel.12 They, like Schiller, 
tended to blame these problems on the over-valuation of rationality, and the neglect of 
sensuous and practical abilities. All three believed that a developed aesthetic 
awareness could correct this imbalance.
Having outlined these social shortcomings, Schiller explains his first theory of 
1 ^the self. It is a rather Fichtean analysis, that defines a human being, both logically 
and practically, by the interaction of the conditioned and unconditioned aspects of the
10 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: in a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, II - III, pp.7-15.
11 The influence o f  Rousseau and Herder has not been followed up in this thesis. We have concentrated 
on the aesthetic influences o f Kant and the critical philosophy.
12 See chapters 6 and 10 below.
13 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: in a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XI, p.73ff.
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individual subject.14 His analysis is apparently intended to demonstrate that beauty is 
a necessary condition of being human,15 though arguably, he does not do so.16 He 
perhaps presumes that the ‘aesthetic condition’ of balance and harmony, and of 
content-packed indeterminacy, that we encounter subsequently,17 is equivalent to 
beauty, and thus demonstrates his point. The argument begins by stating that human 
beings are made up of Person (Person), our unchanging part, and condition (Zustand), 
which constantly changes. Person is eternal and unchanging. It is a potentiality;18 
undetermined, unlimited and infinite. However, mankind cannot be infinite, and yet 
existent in time and space - only a godhead can be so19 - therefore Person is the 
unconditioned aspect of a finite being, such as man, who, if not located in time, would 
be nothing more than a potential for pure, eternal intelligence. Condition provides 
time, place, results, the succession of events and becoming; it enables the succession
9ftof perceptions by means of which, just as with Fichte’s Ich /  Nicht-Ich dichotomy, 
the enduring 'I' of the person becomes aware of itself as a phenomenon (Erscheinung),
14 see, for example, J.C. Fichte, ‘Lectures concerning the scholar’s vocation, 1794’, in (ed.) trans. 
Daniel Breazeale, Early Philosophical Writings, Ithaca NY; London, Cornell University Press, 1993, 
p. 147.
15 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: in a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, X, §7, p.69.
16 Anthony Savile, Aesthetic Reconstructions, Oxford: Blackwell, 1987, p. 198.
17 see chapter 4 below.
18 A little later in the thesis we shall need to consider what Schiller might have meant by a 
‘potentiality’.
19 Once again, Fichte expresses a similar proviso regarding the possibility o f  reconciling or conceiving 
o f  the absolute Ich independently o f any empirical determination. See:
J.C. Fichte, ‘Lectures concerning the scholar’s vocation, 1794’, in (ed.) trans. Daniel Breazeale, Early 
Philosophical Writings, Ithaca NY; London, Cornell University Press, 1993, p. 150.
20 F.C. Copleston, A History o f  Philosophy, Vol. VII, Fichte to Nietzsche, London: Search Press, 1975, 
p.53.
Patrick T. Murray, The development o f  German aesthetic theory from Kant to Schiller: a philosophical 
commentary on Schiller’s ‘Aesthetic Education o f  Man ’ (1795), Lewiston NY; Lampeter: Edwin 
Mellen, 1994, p.97.
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91 99and thus of its own existence. Condition is Person, existing in time. In more 
Kantian terms, this interdependent Person / condition distinction adapts the notions of 
transcendental and empirical ego. By comparison with much of Schiller’s writing, the 
argument is curiously abstract. However, it provided an analysis of human nature and 
the human subject that permitted him to define freedom as indeterminacy, or the 
undetermined, alongside the traditional Kantian idea of freedom as conformity to the 
moral law. The usefulness of this became clear when he turned directly to the topic of 
aesthetic appreciation.23
Letters XII and XIII then introduce the model of reciprocally interacting 
drives, which is distinctive to the Aesthetic Letters. Schiller later combined this with 
the theory of the unity of Person and condition to create a new aesthetic theory. Like 
Fichte’s philosophy, the theory of drives involves the notion of reciprocal and 
formative interaction between two elements. The human mind is dominated by two 
competing and interacting drives, the sense drive and the form drive. The sense drive
21 Patrick T. Murray, The development o f  German aesthetic theory from  Kant to Schiller: a 
philosophical commentary on Schiller’s ‘Aesthetic Education o f  Man ’ (1795), Lewiston N Y ; Lampeter: 
Edwin Mellen, 1994, p.96.
Murray points out that individual sentences in Letter XI: §3 and Letter XIII are very close to Fichte's 
Science o f  Knowledge (1784).
i
see also: Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: in a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) 
Elizabeth M. Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XX, §2, p. 139. 
Here the individual becomes a person.
However, Patrick T. Murray, The development o f  German aesthetic theory from Kant to Schiller: a 
philosophical commentary on Schiller’s ‘A esthetic Education o f  Man ’ (1795), Lewiston N Y ; Lampeter: 
Edwin Mellen, 1994, p.96. Murray claims that Schiller uses the words ‘se lf , ‘Person’ and ‘Ich' 
interchangeably, although, strictly speaking, Person cannot be instantiated unless situated in Zustand. 
There is also a sense in which Schiller is advocating the development o f a better kind o f  ‘s e lf  through 
the combined sensory and rational input o f the aesthetic education, so this is a contentious claim on 
Murray’s part.
22 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: in a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XIII, §3, p.87.
Since the World is extension in time, ie. change, the perfection o f that faculty which connects man with 
the world will have to consist in maximum changeability and maximum extensity. Since the Person is 
persistence within change, the perfection o f that faculty which is to oppose change will have to be 
maximum autonomy and maximum intensivity.
23 see chapter 4 below.
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has affinity with inanimate material nature, and also with sensation and appetite. The 
form drive reasons, reflects, analyses, theorises and makes moral judgements. When 
these two drives are fully developed and in balance, mankind can fulfil its true 
potential and operate at a level of excellence. The link between the Person / condition 
dichotomy and the theory of the drives is that Person is related to or subsumed into 
the form drive, condition into the sense drive.24
Schiller has thus departed considerably from the Kantian view given in the 
Kallias Letters. He does not relate the sense drive to any Kantian entity, but to 
condition. Similarly, Person is aligned with the formal drive. The function of 
condition in this dichotomy is slightly surprising, given that it represents time, which, 
in Kant, is represented by the schemata. One might have expected Schiller to place the 
schemata on the side of the form drive, the analytical and organisational force in 
mankind. But the schemata are never mentioned, and seem to have no role according 
to the Aesthetic Letters. Applying our knowledge of Kant seemed to help our 
understanding of the Kallias Letters, but now we must reinterpret all the features of 
the Kantian system in terms of reciprocally interacting drives. Schiller related the 
sensuous side of mankind not just to the mind, but also to the external world, in that 
the sense drive has to ‘turn him into matter’. As an aspect of the human mind the 
sense drive is passive and receptive; but it also ‘is’ world, in the sense that it is what 
we use as our evidence of the phenomenal world. On the other hand, it is not, and 
does not in itself provide any empirical knowledge, because it has not been formed by
24 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: in a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XII, §1, p.79.
“The business o f the sensuous drive: to set man within the limits o f time, and to turn him into matter. 
Not to provide him with matter, because that would presuppose free activity of Person... By matter in 
this context we understand nothing more than change, or reality that occupies time... This state, which 
is nothing but time occupied by content, is called sensation, and it is through this alone that physical 
existence makes itself known.”
25 This is mentioned again in my section on ways o f explaining the drives.
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'y/r
the formal drive, which, in turn, corresponds to Person. This is a curious mixture of 
Kant and Fichte, in which something rather like the relationship between the Kantian 
faculties co-exists with a Fichtean belief that reciprocal determination constitutes our 
determination in time, and that the outside world is equivalent to resistance to the Ich, 
or Person.
Fichte’s brief mentions of aesthetics altered the relationship Kant had 
identified between aesthetic and conceptual perception.27 For Fichte aesthetic 
appreciation was not an anomaly, it was mankind’s motivation for engaging with the 
surrounding world in the first place. The aesthetic response was therefore logically 
prior to any other kind of perception; without it, we would not bother to apply 
concepts, name objects or become aware of the spatial relationships between objects 
or of the configuration of their parts in relation to one another. Schiller may have been 
scathing about Fichte’s ignorance of the creative process,28 but found the notion of a 
drive useful to explain our motivations. One of its drawbacks, however, is that, by 
enticing the reader to visualise and make analogies, it complicates any attempts to 
map the extent of Schiller’s agreement or disagreement with Kant or Fichte. On the 
other hand, it enabled Schiller to promote an alternative view of the human mind and 
its response to externally present beauty.
26 Schiller develops this point further in Letter XIII.
27 Fichte’s work on aesthetics was more or less confined to the essays based on his course o f  popular 
lectures in Jena, already referred to, ie. ‘On the Spirit and the Letter in Philosophy’ and ‘Lectures 
concerning the Scholar’s Vocation’.
28 J.C Fichte, ‘Letter to Schiller, 27.06.1795’, in (ed.) Daniel Breazeale, Fichte: Early Philsophical 
Writings, New York: Cornell, University Press, 1988, p.393.
In this letter Fichte expressed his dismay that Schiller could not understand why he had apparently 
blurred the distinction between the philosophical spirit and the aesthetic spirit, and had rejected his 
article for the Horen. Fichte later made his belief, which Schiller found so objectionable, that the work 
o f scholar and artist can be equivalent, completely explicit. See his essay:
‘On the Nature o f  the Scholar, and his manifestations in the sphere o f freedom, 1805’, in (ed.) (tr.) 
David Simpson, German aesthetic and literary criticism: Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Schopenhauer,
Hegel, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, p.99.
‘The point where the scholar passes into the free artist is the perfecting o f the scholar.’
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Schiller’s human subject is not constituted solely by the operation of the
drives. Somewhat belatedly, he tells us that the drives are present in the subject,
because the human being has a two-fold nature.29 The drives are 'active in him'.30
What does this mean? We seem to have returned to the world of Kant’s transcendental
ego. He states, firstly, that the drives are part of a finite mind, which is, in itself,
neither matter nor form. This we can presumably amplify as Person operating within
condition. But does this mean that separate drives operate within the unity of
themselves? This is just about possible, but somewhat paradoxical. Secondly,
Each of these two primary drives... strives inevitably and according to its 
nature towards satisfaction; but just because both are necessary, and yet strive 
towards opposite ends, these two compulsions cancel each other out, and the 
will maintains a perfect freedom between them. It is, then, the will which acts 
as a power (power being the ground of all reality) vis-a-vis both drives... but 
neither of these can act as a power against the other.
In terms o f the bi-fold structure that Schiller has already described, this seems to place 
the will in a rather ambiguous position. It is presented in this quotation as an 
independent entity, possibly occupying the middle ground which we shall later see 
him identify with the play drive.33 Yet, also, being familiar with Kant, we associate 
the will with the operation of the practical reason; and, as we have stated, Schiller has 
placed the mental operations that are equivalent to the practical reason quite definitely
i
in the form drive, which covers our ability to think and decide morally. This 
suggestion seems to be confirmed further, in that it seems reasonable for the will to
29 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: in a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XI; § 1.
30 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: in a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XX; § 2. Ill; § 2.
31 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: in a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XIX, §10.
32 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: in a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XIX, §10, p. 135.
33 see chapter 4 below.
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belong on the side of pure Person, free and undetermined as we would expect it to be. 
Person, as we have seen, however, belongs with the form drive.
Now, in the quotation given above, Schiller appears to be assigning the will 
some kind of superior, co-ordinating role. Perhaps Schiller means us to understand 
that there is some way in which the form drive can assess the extent to which the 
drives are balanced or unbalanced. Certainly the sense drive, by definition, would be 
unable to perform this task. Once a person has achieved a point of equilibrium 
between the drives, perhaps the form drive, or that aspect of it that we call the will, 
would be conscious of the existence of a point of balance, and could strive to maintain 
it by seeking out new sensuous experiences, reflecting upon them and analysing them, 
thus keeping the drives healthy and strong. However, we have also been told that the 
drives compete, and Schiller is scathing about those people who are dominated by an 
over-developed form drive.34 The form drive clearly cannot be trusted to fulfil an 
adjudicating role in the mental activities of mankind. Worries such as this, regarding 
the exact way in which we should be interpreting Schiller’s model have probably
-1C
underlain the doubts expressed by writers, such as Murray and Schaper, about either 
the coherency of Schiller’s thought, or the extent to which he has understood Kant.
t
However, Schiller relied on Reinhold for much of his knowledge of Kant,36 
and his comments about the will seem to be compatible with Reinhold’s conception of
34 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: in a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XIII, §5, p.91; XXIV, §§5, 6, 
p. 177.
35 Eva Schaper, Studies in Kant's Aesthetics, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1979.
36 Sabine ROhr, ‘Zum Einflufi K.L. Reinholds auf Schillers Kant Rezeption’, in (eds.) Martin Bondeli 
and Wolfgang H. Schrader, Die Philosophie Karl Leonhard Reinholds, (Fichte Studien Supplementa 
Band 16), Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2003, p.l 10.
Sabine Rbhr, ‘Freedom and Autonomy in Schiller’, in Journal o f  the History o f  Ideas Vol. 64, no. 1, 
January 2003, p. 126.
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T7the three-fold activity of the human will. Despite Kant’s belief in the freedom of the 
will, he dealt in detail only with the Good Will, which is virtually synonymous with 
the practical reason. Reinhold, however, believed the will itself to be neutral, not to be 
identified exclusively with the practical reason. The ‘something’ in which Schiller 
says the drives are active is probably that neutral ‘Will’ that is independent of either 
drive.38 This overarching Will unifies the thought processes of the individual. 
Schiller’s drives very loosely correspond to Reinhold’s other two functions of the 
will, Willkur, ie. the will to selfishness and sensation, and the will to morality and 
rationality.39 Free will consists in the ability of the individual’s will to operate on a 
higher level, and decide with which of these kinds of representation it will align itself. 
The individual faculties of the mind that respectively handle sensation and reason are 
incapable of restraint or reflection in fulfilling their inherent functions; they simply 
strive to fulfil their natural functions.40
In addition to having situated the two drives within the operation of the will, 
Schiller tells us that each drive supposedly has its own Subject that in turn has an 
effect on the whole mind (Gemiit).41 Again, we can explain this by relating Schiller’s
37 (Ed.) George de Giavanni & H.S. Harris, Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development o f  
Posrt-Kantian Idealism, Indianapolis / Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company Inc., 2000, p. 101, 
fii64.
38 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: in a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XIX: §10, p. 135.
39 (Ed.) George de Giavanni & H.S. Harris, Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development o f  
Post-Kantian Idealism, Indianapolis / Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company Inc., 2000, p. 102.
40 Deric Regin, Freedom and Dignity: the historical and philosophical thought o f  Schiller, The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1965, part I, ch. 3, minimises the influence o f  Reinhold and stresses the time and 
effort Schiller expended in grappling with Kant’s original texts. ROhr, op. cit., however, fairly 
convincingly explains the role o f Reinhold in providing much o f Schiller’s knowledge o f  Kant.
41 Patrick T. Murray, The development o f  German aesthetic theory from Kant to Schiller: a 
philosophical commentary on Schiller's ‘Aesthetic Education o f  Man ’ (1795), Lewiston NY; Lampeter: 
Edwin Mellen, 1994, p. 140.
Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: in a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson &  L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XIV, §5, p.97.
The word Gemiit is first used in this section according to Murray.
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position to Reinhold, since Schiller’s view of the whole person places the Will, 
metaphorically speaking, above both drives. Overall, therefore, it is probably more 
straightforward to compare the role Schiller gave the Will and the drives with 
Reinhold’s ideas, rather than trying to preserve Kant’s conception of the reason 
(Vernunft), uniting faculties of the subject, since reason, or rationality, supposedly 
belongs within the operations of the form drive. However, although we can speculate 
on how he agrees with or differs from Kant, Reinhold or Fichte, in fact, the 
throwaway reference to the Will in Letter XIX: §10 that we have just discussed 
provides no real indication of how Schiller’s mention of the Will or its freedom 
should fit into the overall scheme.
Thus far we have more or less been able to uphold the likely coherence of 
Schiller’s position in the Aesthetic Letters. What is already coming through clearly in 
these paragraphs is that Schiller abandoned Kant’s view of the human subject as a 
static and ready-made entity. One effect of the theory of the drives is that human 
beings are always 'becoming', for better or worse. If undetermined in time or space, 
Person is an aspect of being human about which no existing human being, as an 
embodied, empirical creature can discover anything more. Its role is comparable to 
Kant’s transcendental ego, in that it makes experience possible. However, rather than 
simply being a theoretical way of enabling us to make sense of the notion of human 
identity, Person also seems intended to encourage us to envisage mankind as an 
infinity o f possible experiences, and may therefore be part of Schiller’s answer to the 
problem of how to reconcile the empirical evidence about what human beings are like 
with his conviction that they could be better; not just that they could, in individual 
cases, decide rationally to behave in a morally better way, but that, like the ‘graceful’ 
or ‘dignified’ person, they could desire and foster the apparently natural habit of
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leading a more effective moral and aesthetic life, that would include physical activity
as well as thought and perception.42
Comparing the theory of drives with Kant’s model
The following paragraphs will now try to interpret Schiller’s model of two­
fold human nature in enough detail to confirm the extent to which Schiller has moved 
away from Kantianism in this work. If the Kallias Letters, in which theoretical and 
practical reason worked together to perceive beauty, is taken as Schiller’s starting 
point, the Aesthetic Letters adapted Kant’s model even further, and subsumed both 
kinds of reason -  ie. understanding and practical reason - under the form drive. 
Diagram 143 shows that, in Kant, the practical reason had no place in either perception 
or the enjoyment of beauty. Diagram 2,44 referring to the Kallias Letters, shows how 
Schiller structured his conviction that man’s normal perceptual processes must work 
concurrently with the enjoyment of beauty. By the time of the Aesthetic Letters, the 
whole person is involved in every aspect of human thought and behaviour. Practical 
reason, sensation and conceptual analysis participate in perception, and also in 
morality, morally graceful or worthy behaviour and aesthetic appreciation.45 As 
Murray says, Schiller might be accused of over-simplification, in that everything is 
described in terms of the interaction of sense and form drives,46 but Table 1 shows 
that Schiller was still aware of the many strands that were represented in these drives,
42Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: in a series o f letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XXVII, § 3, p.209. Here he 
states that physical activity is an integral part o f aesthetic freedom.
43 see Appendix.
44 see Appendix.
45 Their part in aesthetic appreciation is discussed below, in chapter 4.
46 Patrick T. Murray, The development o f  German aesthetic theory from Kant to Schiller: a 
philosophical commentary on Schiller’s ‘Aesthetic Education o f  Man ’ (1795), Lewiston NY; Lampeter: 
Edwin Mellen, 1994, p. 122.
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and he still sometimes used Kantian terms in order to refer to them.47 Table 1. shows 
the various paired terms he associated with the sense / form dichotomy in the course 
of the Aesthetic Letters. Sometimes he used more than one of these pairings alongside 
each other interchangeably.48 
Table 1.
sense, or sensuous drive form, or formal drive
concrete abstract
bodily / material mental
passive active
sensuous spiritual
diversity (manifold) unity / unification
content, matter form
feeling reason / rationality
condition Person
perceptual conceptual
Kant’s familiar dichotomy between the objective and the subjective has not 
been included above. It does not correspond with the contrasts made in table 1. Some 
of these pairs contrast aspects of the mind, such as feeling and reason, whilst others
47 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: in a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XIII; fh. p.85. We can see here 
that Schiller uses the feeling / reason, and world of appearances / form dichotomies interchangeably.
Either this shows some confusion, as Murray says, or some more detailed explanation is required.
48 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: in a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, eg. XVII; § 4, p. 119. - reason / 
feeling; mental / physical;
Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: in a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XVIII; § 2, p. 123. - material 
world / form; active / passive.
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contrast the experience of being a person with the perceived, externally existing, 
material world. Each dichotomy tends to be accompanied by an assumption that the 
first of each pair, corresponding with the sense drive, precedes the second in a 
developmental sense,49 though Schiller never regards physical matter as an obstacle to 
using reason and recognising necessary truths.50 We are indeed rational beings with 
bodies, as Kant also said, so animal inclinations always have to be taken into account, 
although, as Schiller said in Anmut und Wiirde, we should leave objects and animals 
to do what they are best at, and concentrate on what humans do best.51
How Schiller is able to claim that the sense drive is both developmentally 
lower than the form drive and equally important is illustrated as follows: In an animal, 
or in the uncultivated and savage man, or in the very young baby, perception is raw, 
manifold and unformed, and the creature has no sense of self. It is unable to 
distinguish between itself and its perceptions, or between itself and the outside world. 
Gradually, however, the form drive comes into action. This holds with reference to 
living creation as a hierarchy of increasingly complex organisms, and also to the 
changes taking place in a human lifetime. Earlier in life, the sensuous drive is stronger 
than the form drive, because sensation precedes consciousness. But the growth of the
t
form drive makes consciousness and reflection possible, and forms the individual into
49 Although Schiller takes constant pains to assure us that mankind is essentially an amalgam o f sense 
and reason, hence the importance o f striking the right balance, see letter XXVI which portrays the 
development o f the form drive as a progressive developmental step in mankind, and letter XXVII, §11, 
which mentions the usefulness o f beauty in covering up the more distasteful aspects o f  physical 
existence.
50 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: in a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XIII; fh. §2, p.89.
51 Friedrich Schiller, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit and Anmut und Wiirde, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, 
Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1994, p.76.
52 see also Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: in a series o f letters, (ed.), (tr.) 
Elizabeth M. Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XVII; § 4. reason 
/ feeling; mental /  physical; & XVIII; § 2. material world / form; active / passive.
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a complete, conscious person, a (Kantian) subject. Thus, the sense drive is not only 
lower, but also more fundamental, and, thus, just as important as the form drive.
In the opening paragraphs of this chapter we saw that analysis of how 
individuals are composed of Person and Zustand came after a stylised historical and 
anthropological account of the origins of modem society. Table 2. below summarises 
the main ways in which Schiller observed sense and form drives at work.
Table 2.
method of I sense drive exhibits itself as 
analysis i form drive exhibits itself as
anthropological savage society civilised society
historical~ primitive, ancient humanity modem human society
psychological* uneducated individual educated individual
developmental baby adult
metaphysical condition (ie. the conditioned, determined)
Person (ie. the unconditioned, 
undetermined)
analytical 
.  .  . . .  . . . .
raw material of perception conceptualisation
Thus, in Schiller’s historical account of the nature of mankind and the theory 
of the drives, both cultural and personal improvement takes place while folk 
groupings move from savagery to civilisation. However, the same process also takes 
place continuously in any given society, because, side by side, some people are more 
savage, others more civilised than the rest; more importantly, with the right 
encouragement, even the savages can improve and gradually develop their form drive. 
However, Schiller did not explain why parallel developments occur within the 
individual and in society, and which, if either explanation takes precedence. He 
appears to presume that his micro and macro explanations interact and confirm each
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other. A little later in the century this kind of presupposition would be examined more 
carefully, for instance, as Holderlin devised his integrated, more organic metaphysical 
model of mankind’s place in the cosmos, and as Friedrich Schlegel celebrated the 
piecemeal patterns of reality that typified the human environment and were largely 
manifested in historical change.54
Despite the loose ends that unavoidably remain, the conception of human 
drives possibly improves on Kant in two ways. The first is that it resolves Schiller’s 
doubts about Kant’s notion of the Gemeinsinn, by accounting for both social 
generalisation and individual uniqueness. The second relates to a question that had 
troubled the philosophical world in general, including both Reinhold and Fichte, 
namely, the wish to avoid an infinite regress. They sought a more fundamental 
groundwork for the transcendental deduction, because Kant supposedly did not 
explain how his theory could motivate or co-ordinate the workings of the human 
being. However, the theory of sustained, self-generated, opposing drives, as Schiller 
conceived them, structures, creates, develops and improves the human being, simply 
by repeated and constant action, while accommodating variations between one person 
and another.55 By finding some core explanation that accepted diversity and change,
I
Schiller avoided these problems, and even accounted for the fact that not all human 
adaptations appear to be good.
At the same time, Schiller’s use of the concept of the neutral will shows that 
he still believed there to be a unified self present independently of the additional 
unifying effects that our next chapter shows are produced by an aesthetic education. 
Schiller’s general philosophy mainly emphasised how to improve and complete
53 see chapters 6 - 9 .
54 see chapters 1 0 -1 2 .
55 eg. Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: in a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth 
M. Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, V, §5, p.27.
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human beings who do not use all their abilities. The Aesthetic Letters advocates ways 
of developing people, whose nature is well-balanced between physical and intellectual 
capabilities, who can make judgements of taste, recognise and appreciate beauty, or 
have an aesthetic sense, and this is what we shall now go on to examine. Schiller 
claimed that Kantian principles were the foundation of his work,56 and, while this was 
true, this chapter has demonstrated that, by the time he wrote the Aesthetic Letters, he 
had already set up a theory that was largely independent of Kant’s original position.
56 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: in a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982,1; §3, p.3.
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CHAPTER 4
THE THEORY OF AESTHETICS THAT SCHILLER BASED ON HIS
GENERAL PHILOSOPHY
The previous chapter set out Schiller’s theory of human nature and the 
individual mind. This chapter will show how, from this, he developed a new aesthetic 
theory that considerably adapted his surviving connection with Kant, and tried to 
combine a confident belief in our ability to recognise true beauty with an acceptance 
of ongoing change and variation. First, we show the relevance of Schiller’s theory of 
drives to this aesthetic theory. The second half of the chapter considers how helpful 
Kant is for understanding Schiller’s aesthetics in the Aesthetics Letters. Readers will 
probably conclude that Schiller was now working within his own framework, 
although Kant still had significant ‘historical’ importance.
Things are perceived when the form drive takes content from the sense drive 
and forcibly shapes and organises it.1 From Schiller’s account of how individuals 
develop, we could infer that a baby, for example, experiences only unstructured 
sensations during its earliest days. As the form drive develops, it becomes strong 
enough to overcome the resistance of the child’s sense drive, take these sensations, 
and form them into perceived objects. It then becomes strong enough for the child to 
recognise and remember connections and patterns among objects, and so on, until the 
child whose form drive has become extremely strong is eventually, at maturity, able 
to manipulate complex abstract mathematical formulae that may or may not have 
practical applications in the physical world. Now we shall see how this progression 
relates to aesthetic appreciation.
1 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XIX: §§2, 3, p. 129.
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The transfer or movement of physical-sensuous and mental-rational activity
works in two directions, both from the sensuous to the formal, and, as the powers of
reason become more developed, reciprocally back in the direction of the sense drive,
as the two drives vie for supremacy. The constant process of reciprocal action
develops both drives, and once they are maximally strong and equally balanced,
mankind can fulfil its true potential. However, this would be an ideal condition,
Something infinite, to which in the course of time he can approximate ever 
more closely, but without ever being able to reach it.2
Nevertheless, mankind can develop the drives to provide a stable level of equilibrium 
sufficient to operate as a drive in its own right, known as the play drive. In the course 
of this development points of temporary balance between sense and form drives can 
also occur, creating a weak and transient play drive. Since, metaphorically speaking, 
the two basic drives are greedy, each trying to seize whatever is present in the other, 
while retaining what they already own, the play drive originates in pressure, tension, 
or conflict. Crucially, we therefore need an act of reason, or Will, to relax the senses 
and prevent them from dominating us. Similarly, we need a strong enough sense drive 
to prevent the form drive from blunting our feelings. If these conditions are fulfilled, 
pressures are equal and sustained, creating an experience of harmony and free play,
t
‘play’ being a term borrowed and familiar to us from Lessing’s Laocoon and Kant’s 
Third Critique.4
2 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XIV: §1, p.95.
This idea reappears in the Preface to the penultimate version o f  HOlderlin’s Hyperion, in which man’s 
constant search for the perfection o f Being is described as an ‘endless approximation’. See:
‘ Vorrede der vorletzten Verfassung von Hyperion", in (ed.) Michael Knaupp, Erlduterungen und 
Dokumente: Friedrich Holderlin, ,Hyperion’, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p. 157.
3 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XIV: §6, p.97.
4 Frederick Beiser, Schiller as philosopher: a re-examination, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 
p. 142.
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Following Kant’s theory of the categories,5 Schiller then identifies a 
synthesising concept capable of uniting, containing and absorbing the oppositions that 
the drives represent: matter and form, passivity and activity, feeling and reason, 
without destroying their distinctive roles.6 Since the play drive has been defined as the 
point of harmony between the material content of mankind’s sensuous side (whose 
object is referred to at this point as ‘life’) and his rational, formative side (whose
■7
object is ‘form’), the play drive provides this concept, and is actually ‘living form’,
which has an aesthetic role. The expression ‘living form’ recalls the apparent
autonomy of beautiful objects in the Kallias Letters, which seemed to have given
form to their own content.
...livingform: a concept serving to designate all the aesthetic qualities of 
phenomena and, in a word, what in the widest sense of the term we call 
beauty.8
Despite some ambiguity in Schiller’s description of the sense drive, identified 
sometimes with ‘world’, and sometimes with mental sensation, the main difference 
between the account in the Kallias Letters and living form seems to be that living 
form is also a condition of mankind, not merely of perceived objects.9 The purpose of
Beiser identifies the connection with Lessing. However, he also (p. 143) claims that Ramdohr exercised 
a powerful influence, through his book, Charis. However, although Schiller tells Goethe, in the letter 
referred to by Beiser (letter 9,07.09.1794), that he has found some o f the ideas in Charis useful, he was 
also wary o f  Ramdohr, mainly because o f the fundamental aesthetic role he ascribed to the sex drive, or 
so it seems from Schiller’s further comments to Goethe (see letter 11, 12.09.1794).
5 Immanuel Kant, A Critique o f  Pure Reason, (ed.) trans. F. Max MUller, Garden City NY: Anchor 
Doubleday, 1966, B 110, p.64.
6 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XVIII; § 4, p. 125.
7 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XV: §2, p.101.
8 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XV: §2, p. 101.
9 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XV: §3, p.101:
A block o f  marble, though it is and remains lifeless, can nevertheless, thanks to the architect or the 
sculptor, become living form; and a human being, though he may live and have form, is far from being 
on that account a living form... Only when his form lives in our feeling and his life takes on form in
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social education should therefore be to realise this condition, encouraging individuals 
and society to develop a play drive that is as strong as possible. In that this represents 
the best balance between rationality and feeling, we are also reminded of Anmut und 
Wiirde, where the graceful person, the schone Seele, would thus now seem to be a 
person in whom the sense and formal drives are balanced in perfect harmony,10 ‘since 
in contemplation of the beautiful, the psyche finds itself in a happy medium between 
the realm of law and the sphere of physical exigency.’11
However, like the sense and form drives, the play drive develops and works in 
more than one way. Firstly, it is unavoidable that we must make use of the play drive 
whenever we pass from raw sensation to conceptual thought (an analytical 
explanation), but secondly, there is a sense in which the play drive is superior to the 
other drives, and can flourish only as a later, non-primitive development (an 
anthropological explanation), or after some exceptional effort, among well-rounded,
19fully educated people (a psychological explanation). Murray could not reconcile
our understanding, does he become living form; and this will always be the case whenever we adjudge 
him beautiful.
10 Frederick Beiser, Schiller as Philosopher,' Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 141.
Savile, in Anthony Savile, Aesthetic Reconstructions, Oxford: Blackwell, 1987, p. 198, is not satisfied 
that Schiller really makes or proves his point. Schiller’s position seems to depend on there being an 
identity between play drive, beauty and aesthetic condition. 1 admit that, in my reading o f Schiller, I am 
presuming that Schiller could be regarding them as different ways o f interpreting the same cluster o f  
observations about human nature. He also tells us (see chapter 5 below) that ‘taste’ is equivalent to the 
aesthetic mode o f  perception.
Savile’s specific doubt is that Schiller does not prove that beauty is a necessary condition o f  being 
human. However, perhaps Schiller means that, by failing to appreciate beauty, a person demonstrates 
his low level o f development, and thus his failure to qualify for membership of the human race. His 
anthropological description o f humanity uses delight in ornamentation to illustrate the threshold 
between animal existence and humanity. Admittedly, it would be generous o f us to defend Schiller in 
this way, because this is not a proof as such. It is merely suggestive o f the plausibility o f  what he says. 
Despite his apparent desire to demonstrate his theory through argument, Schiller probably relies also on 
suggestive plausibilities. His method is not entirely Kantian.
11 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XV: §5, p. 105.
12 This seems to be a fair conclusion to draw from XXIII: § 5.
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t ^
these claims, and neither, apparently, could Schiller’s friend Komer. Wilkinson 
suggests Schiller was using ‘chiasmus’,14 alternating pairs of contrasting terms, 
resolved successively into a higher third term.15 This might indicate a model into 
which Schiller’s comments would fit, though it is unfortunately a rhetorical, rather 
than logical form of explanation. It would suggest that the reciprocal action between 
the drives enables our conscious reinforcement of the middle term, the play drive, by 
thinking and behaving in ways that strengthen or restrain both drives. We may do this 
by exposing ourselves to more vivid and varied sensuous experience, which 
strengthens the sense drive, or engaging in more intense intellectual activity, which 
strengthens the form drive. As the drives approach full, equal strength, the flow of 
activity between them slows, but the equilibrium of the play drive has become 
stronger, more lasting and stable. We could thus say that this point of balance is 
occurring at a ‘higher’ level. After this, says Schiller, by a constant process of 
refinement, the more fully and frequently we experience the state of harmony, the 
better equipped we are to operate in the moral realm. Improved moral capacity would 
represent a movement back towards the sphere of the form drive, where the ability to 
make moral judgements is situated, but once again, we would be at a higher level.16
13 Patrick T. Murray, The development o f  German aesthetic theory from  Kant to Schiller: a 
philosophical commentary on Schiller’s 'Aesthetic Education o f  Man ’ (1795), Lewiston N Y ; Lampeter: 
Edwin Mellen, 1994, p.227, fn. 8.
14 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, intro, p.lxxxviii.
‘the progressive refinement, or ennoblement o f human behaviour: a scale ascending stepwise... each 
synthesis open-ended into the one above it’.
15 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, intro, pp. lxviii -  lxxi.
Unfortunately, their defence o f this suggestion does not help us analyse the structure o f  Schiller’s 
argument, as they relate it only to his rhetorical style rather than to content or argument. I shall not use 
their triads o f  terms and their pyramidal diagrams, but believe it is important to retain their imagery o f  
continual, progressive upward change.
16 Even this suggestion raises questions that I have attempted to illustrate, but cannot resolve, in tables 
3 and 4 below. Schiller mentions morality in the context o f both freedom and the form drive. As we 
have said, the form drive is not supposed to represent freedom. Schiller has told us that the Will is free,
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However, perhaps this explanation only adds further to Schiller’s 'speculative
1 n
psychology'. It is only an attempt to add some theoretical justification to the 
suggestion of chiasmus, in the absence of an explicit explanation by Schiller himself.
We now return to Schiller’s earlier association between morality and beauty. 
The idea may have come initially from Kant’s discussion of sublimity, rather than of 
beauty.
In fact, without the development of moral ideas, that which we, prepared by 
culture, call sublime will appear merely repellent to the unrefined person.
Admittedly, Kant is here advocating morality as a preparation for a kind of aesthetic
experience, but perhaps Schiller re-examined this moral / sublime relationship with
the possibility of reciprocity in mind. Since beauty has even a potential link with
morality, encouragement of the right kind of education or cultural experience,
reinforced by means of music, the visual arts and great literature, has an ability to
change the human world. Thus, although
beauty produces no particular result whatsoever, neither for the understanding, 
nor for the will. It accomplishes no particular purpose, neither intellectual nor 
moral.19
beauty has opened an area of mental indeterminacy, where no single side of human
nature dominates, so that the individual faces a new possibility of freedom. If we
!
continue to regard freedom, not simply as Kantian self-determination in conformity
and adjudicates between the drives, thus agreeing with Reinhold. Perhaps Schiller wishes to distinguish 
between knowledge o f or adherence to a moral rule (form drive), and the ability to understand and 
freely accept -  or reject - moral principles (free Will).
17 Patrick T. Murray, The development o f  German aesthetic theory from Kant to Schiller: a 
philosophical commentary on Schiller's ‘Aesthetic Education o f  Man ’ (1795), Lewiston N Y ; Lampeter: 
Edwin Mellen, 1994, p.103.
Murray used the expression ‘speculative psychology’ originally with reference to the way Schiller 
prevaricates in letters XI, XIII and XXVII about whether the sense drive is equivalent to time, which 
makes the worldly existence o f mankind possible by conditioning pure Person, whether it is a 
physiological part o f the human being, or whether it is the mental faculty that interacts (like the 
Kantian sensibility) with rationality during perception.
18 Immanuel Kant, (ed.) Paul Guyer, (trans.) Paul Guyer & Eric Matthews, Critique o f  the Power o f  
Judgement, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, §29, 5:265, p. 148.
19 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XXI; §4, p. 147.
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with the moral law, but also, as Schiller often does, as the condition of not being 
determined, or limited, then the equilibrium between the inner drives is also a point 
at which the human being is undetermined. The play drive is free of all compulsion 
(sense drive) or determination (form drive). Until the development of his aesthetic 
play drive, the individual was always dominated by either the material world or by 
intellectual strivings. Any freedom of will, choice or action he might have thought he 
possessed was illusory.
Before Schiller reached the point of defining the play drive for us, he had 
already introduced us to another way in which we can be free of determination. The
91Person / condition dichotomy, outlined above, becomes relevant to the aesthetic 
condition. As potential, as Person, logically prior to our being situated in condition, 
mankind is pure indeterminacy, an empty infinity. The aesthetic condition represented 
by our experience of the play drive, however, is a real counterpart to this condition, an
99infinity filled with content. Uniquely, in this condition of aesthetic indeterminacy, 
free of domination by his own drives, though filled with them both in their full
9 a
strength, mankind has an infinite and completely free choice as to whether or how to 
act, and thus determine himself.24 He can use the sensuous material at his disposal to
i
carry out some finite rational or practical task; he can make, or refuse to make, a
20 see chapters 1 and 2 above.
21 see chapter 3.
?2 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XXI; §3, p. 145.
23 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XX; §4, p. 141.
24 Jeffrey Bamouw, ‘»Der Trieb, bestimmt zu werden« HOlderlin, Schiller und Schelling als Antwort 
auf Fichte (Aufzug)’, in (ed.) JUrgen Bolten, Schiller Briefe iiber die dsthetische Erziehung, Frankfurt 
am Main: Suhrkamp, 1984, p.261, takes this to be Schiller’s definition o f the imagination, a definition 
formed in response to Fichte’s contrast between the imagination as absolute activity bringing about an 
exchange (ie. Wechsel), and absolute activity itself. Nevertheless, although the Fichtean dimension o f  
this section o f  the Aesthetic Letters is perceptible, Schiller himself does not identify the imagination 
with the aesthetic condition or state o f mind.
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moral decision; he can contemplate or engage with the aesthetic qualities of whatever 
is confronting him. This is how Schiller can claim that aesthetic experience, while not 
moral in itself, prepares us for morality and can develop our moral sense. Thus, 
Schiller has now provided some justification for his much quoted, but slightly cryptic 
tag,
...because it is only through beauty that man makes his way to freedom.25
Letter XIV has already prepared us for the need to decide how to use our play
drive. Full development of mankind's two drives is a task set for us by our reason.
Such reciprocal relation between the two drives is, admittedly, but a task 
enjoined on us by Reason... It is in the most precise sense of the word, the Idea 
o f  his Human Nature,...
And, then, most significantly, consciousness of this task of reason will ‘serve him as a 
manifestation of the infinite’. Schiller means that, as the interaction between the 
drives begins to spark, we apprehend that the sphere of the play drive is itself an 
experience of the undetermined, and reveals the many possibilities open to a complete
25 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, II, p.9.
This is Wilkinson and Willoughby’s translation. The quotation is perhaps better known in its more 
literal translation : ‘It is only through Beauty that we walk to freedom.’
Set into the context o f his own arguments, this belief is also central to the work o f  HOlderlin. (See 
below, chapter 9.) The consequences o f inner indeterminacy will arguably re-emerge also in Schlegel’s 
thought, in a form more adapted to the appreciation o f  literature. He noted with approval the many 
possible ways in which a perceptive reader can read and reinterpret great literary work. (See below, 
chapter 12.)
David Simpson, Irony and Authority in Romantic Poetry, London: Macmillan, 1979, pp. 178, 179, 
suggests that these thoughts o f Schiller provide one o f  the earliest grounds for the Romantic and post- 
Romantic belief in the inadequacy o f any poet’s intention to communicate unerringly with an audience, 
and in the reader’s open-ended ability to re-interpret any text.
26 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson &  L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XIV:2, p.95.
There is a strong tension here within Schiller’s apparently simple explanation, between the reason, a 
competitive, analytic component o f the form drive, and the reason, which can apparently prescribe 
tasks for the application o f  the play drive. The explanation may perhaps lie in a distinction, retained 
from Kantian theory, between the theoretical reason and the transcendental power o f reason. It may 
also be explicable through Reinhold’s influence, as a presumed distinction between the reason, and the 
rationality o f  the neutral Will, ie. that which enables us to make choices, for better or worse. Although 
these are both possibilities, after careful study, I believe this is one o f the tensions in Schiller’s work 
that we have to accept, and cannot explain away.
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and whole sensuous-rational being. The moment of aesthetic judgement, therefore, is 
a moment, not just of the aesthetic appreciation of, for example, an object, but also, a 
moment of full self-knowledge by means of which mankind can metaphorically rise 
above the dryness of the intellectual and the mess of the physical world. Beauty and 
the ability to appreciate it encourage ‘sensuous man’ to see that life is more than the
77mere satisfaction of feeling, and remind ‘spiritual man’ of the world of the senses.
For Schiller these conclusions seemed both philosophically sound and intuitively 
acceptable.28
Although Schiller’s metaphysics is unlike that of Friedrich Holderlin, the idea 
that there is a point of harmony at which a human being can free itself, not just from 
external compulsion but also from slavery to inner determinants was one that endured,
70and has importance in Holderlin’s work. Schiller’s model leaves readers with some 
uncertainties as to how it works, but recognisably sets up a continuing cycle that is not 
inevitable, but one for which we should strive. The move from the appreciation of 
beauty to the improved ability to make moral judgements, in particular, is not 
guaranteed. Possession of a strong play drive is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for moral excellence. It gives man the chance to be what he ought to be. It
i
27 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XVIII; § 1, p. 124.
At this point I gloss over Schiller’s contentious mention o f  relaxing beauty and energetic beauty. 
Relaxing or melting beauty calms sensuous man. Energetic beauty enlivens or tenses spiritual man. At 
the end o f  Letter XVI Schiller states that he will examine each in turn, and from this derive the overall 
definition o f  beauty. Since he does not carry out this intention, we simply have to accept that beauty 
can fulfil both these purposes. He appears to discuss only melting beauty. Miller made the once 
influential suggestion that energetic beauty was actually the sublime. Various objections to this have 
been raised, however, for instance, by both Beiser and Frank.
R.D. Miller, Schiller and the ideal offreedom: a study o f  Schiller's philosophical works with chapters 
on Kant, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970, p .l 15..
28 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XVIII; §§ 2, 3, p. 124.
In these sections, Schiller also writes o f the capacity for beauty to bridge the gap between the two 
human drives and encourage the development o f  whichever is the feebler drive.
29 see chapter 8 below.
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opens possibilities, but what he makes of them depends on how he uses his own 
will.30
A final comparison with Kant
Although we have acknowledged that several thinkers influenced what Schiller wrote, 
and although the account Schiller gives us in the Aesthetic Letters is new, his avowed 
debt to Kant encourages us to continue making comparisons with Kant. The main 
similarities are still the recognition of aesthetic free play, and the belief that aesthetic 
judgement takes place independently of conceptualisation. By equating the play drive 
with the state of mind in which we can appreciate beauty, Schiller shows the 
indeterminateness and ambiguity of aesthetic appreciation, lying somewhere between 
raw nature and intellectual analysis. It is no longer immediately obvious, however, 
how this relates to Kant. Therefore, we shall examine some possible, but ultimately 
false ways of doing this, as we build towards the most likely version.31 First, as a 
point of reference, I shall present some further comments concerning Kant’s views on 
aesthetic judgement in the Third Critique, (see also Diagram 1). Then we can 
compare possible ways in which Schiller might, or might not, still be using Kant’s 
model.
i
Human reason, in Kant, constantly operates on the phenomena or objects of 
which we gain empirical knowledge, as it seeks the unconditioned, hence our constant 
search for more generalised concepts or explanations for our observations and 
experiences. Knowledge of the Categorical Imperative would be an example of the 
kind of self-justifying principle the reason is ultimately trying to find. This is the so- 
called 'regulative' function of pure reason, by means of which the noumenal world of
30 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XIX: §10, p. 135.
31 The in-text references below are to the Appendix, Diagrams 1- 5.
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reason can interact with the phenomenal world of the understanding and sensibility. In 
this sense the transcendental power of reason, or more generally, the noumenal world, 
is constantly active, underlies and is relevant to daily life. Despite this, however, it is 
not directly relevant to aesthetic judgement, according to Kant. Aesthetic judgement 
occurs at a lower level than the practical reason, and in fact also at a slightly lower 
level than the conceptualising activity of the theoretical understanding. There is thus 
no interface between aesthetic judgement and the noumenal, except perhaps in three 
special cases. Firstly, for instance, if we wish to evaluate the value of an aesthetic 
judgement; secondly, in the expression of the ineffable aesthetic ideas of reason, by 
making use of the allegorical abilities of the practical reason; thirdly, when we 
presuppose the purposiveness of nature, and judge it according to this ascribed 
criterion.
In our first possible interpretation of Schiller, we might identify the sense drive 
with the complex made up, in Kant, of the imagination, sensible intuitions, sensibility 
and sensation (Diagram 3). This would leave the formal drive as covering the 
understanding and its concepts, though not, as pointed out already, the schemata.32
Thus, perceptual judgement would take place once the sense drive had handed its
1
sensation over to the formal drive for conceptualisation. This scheme does not allot a 
place to the practical reason (or Will, in Kant’s sense) or the transcendental ego, 
however. There is some initial plausibility in this. We can try to map Kant’s system 
onto Schiller’s drives, as shown in table 3. Note that our previous references to the 
influence of Reinhold’s conception of the will has probably accounted already for the 
ambiguous position of the last three terms.
32 see chapter 3 above.
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Table 3: How Kant’s theory of the mind relates to Schiller’s theory of drives
Kant Schiller
imagination sense drive
sensible intuitions^ work together «
sensibility tt
sensation Ct
theoretical reason form drive
understanding
J
work together ct
concepts C6
■s
practical reason (6
moral judgement
y
work together tt
freedom form drive + ambiguous position
will tt
schemata, produced by imagination [ambiguous position, probably sense drive]
In Kant, the aesthetic reflective judgement takes place in circumstances where 
the imagination has derived some appearance from sensible intuitions, but the 
understanding has not applied any concepts to this material. This represents a 
pleasurable moment of free play among the cognitive powers. We could draw a 
parallel between this process and Schiller’s description of a point of balance between 
the simultaneously reciprocating and competing drives, neither of which succeeds in 
gaining control of either specific sense experience or its conceptualisation. This is the 
moment of tension that constitutes the play drive. P.T. Murray regards the activity of 
free play as evidence that Schiller agreed with Kant's description of where and how 
the appreciation or identification of beauty takes place, though he had simplified
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Kant’s account of the faculties.33 However, in other respects the two theories do not 
match so conveniently. To Kant, the beautiful was 'the effect resulting from the free 
play of our cognitive powers'.34 Schiller, however, involved the practical reason 
alongside the cognitive powers while the drives are interacting, and as raw data (sense 
drive) are transformed (form drive) into experience, objects or reactions.
Remembering what Schiller wrote in the Kallias Letters, it is unlikely that the 
form drive can be equated with either the theoretical reason or understanding. There 
the practical reason directly perceived the perfectly harmonised form and content of 
the beautiful object. The object has a semblance of autonomy to which a truly 
autonomous being can respond. Saying this would support the idea that, in the 
Aesthetic Letters, the play drive, where the aesthetic judgement is made, is different 
from and inferior to, the practical reason (see Diagram 5). Nevertheless, it would be 
an oversimplification to say that, by occupying an intermediate position between the 
sensuous and the formal, the aesthetic is a bridge between the phenomenal and 
noumenal worlds. Firstly, Schiller nowhere suggests that the sense drive alone can 
fulfil all the creative phenomenal tasks of Kantian perception. Secondly, although the 
form drive can impact on the world, in the same way that the practical reason
i
motivates us to try and change the world, if it were to dominate a person or society, it 
would have adverse effects. Therefore, while being identified with the inner life, and 
hence the rational side of a human being, it cannot be relied on alone to produce 
morality.
33 Patrick T. Murray, The development o f  German aesthetic theory from Kant to Schiller: a 
philosophical commentary on Schiller’s ‘Aesthetic Education o f  M an’ (1795), Lewiston NY; Lampeter: 
Edwin Mellen, 1994, pp.l 11,122.
34Frederick C. Copleston, A History o f  Philosophy, Vol. 6, Wolff to Kant, London: Search Press, 1975, 
p. 362.
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Any Kantian analysis is thus not straightforward, especially when we consider 
the other terms that are matched to the drives.
Table 4: Additional terms that Schiller relates to the drives
Sensuous drive Formal drive Play drive
condition person
changeable (time) constant (outside time)
determined undetermined [ambiguous " whether this belongs here]
V
belongs also to the play 
drive
free [ditto] ditto
moral [ditto] ditto
relaxing beauty
energetic beauty
balance / equilibrium
harmony
free play
Taken together with Table 3 above, this shows that some of Schiller’s dichotomies, 
such as freedom, and the Good Will, match, not Kant's imagination / understanding 
distinction, but the phenomenal / noumenal distinction. When using the play drive, the 
human mind is undetermined; it would seem to have attained the condition for which 
Kant said the reason strives, yet the practical reason and morality lie in the form drive, 
and Kant did not envisage the aesthetic reflective judgement as taking place in the 
interface between the noumenal and phenomenal, (see also Diagrams 1 and 4).
Perhaps Schiller has ignored the understanding, as having no role in the free play of 
aesthetic perception. However, Kant identifies two ways in which the aesthetic can be 
regarded as a failure to conceptualise, the second of which involves a link between the
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phenomenal and noumenal, firstly, when the passive perception of sensuous beauty is 
not conceptualised by the understanding, and secondly, when rational ideas are too 
complex or indeterminate to be conceptualised adequately - the ineffable and the 
sublime.33 We have to express aesthetic ideas of this kind as images, by means of 
analogy, allegory and metaphor, making use of the practical reason. ‘Beauty... can in 
general be called the expression of aesthetic ideas.’36 Many such ideas permeate our 
language, and have been absorbed into our everyday discourse,37 but they are also, 
more obviously, expressed artistically, for instance as in Kant’s famous example of
TO
Jupiter’s eagle. Admittedly Kant’s discussion deals here with our inability to 
express ideas conceptually, whereas Schiller seems to be discussing our receptivity to 
beauty, but since the play drive encompasses freedom, moral improvement and 
indeterminability, he may have found this section of the Third Critique useful.39 The 
aesthetic ideas that we try to represent are ‘representations of the imagination’, ‘as a 
cognitive faculty’ but they ‘strive towards something lying beyond the bounds of 
experience, and thus seek to approximate a presentation of concepts of reason (of 
intellectual ideas)’. ‘No concept can be fully adequate to them’, all of which suggests 
that they are transcendentally present simply in our rationality, not specifically in our
35 Immanuel Kant, Critique o f the Power ofJudgement, (ed.) Paul Guyer, (tr.) Paul Guyer & Eric 
Matthews, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, §49, 5: 314, pp. 192, 193.
36 Immanuel Kant, Critique o f  the Power ofJudgement, (ed.) Paul Guyer, (tr.) Paul Guyer & Eric 
Matthews, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, §51, 5: 314, p. 197.
37 Immanuel Kant, Critique o f the Power o f  Judgement, (ed.) Paul Guyer, (tr.) Paul Guyer & Eric 
Matthews, Cambrdge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, §59, 5: 314, p.226.
38 Immanuel Kant, Critique o f  the Power ofJudgement, (ed.) Paul Guyer, (tr.) Paul Guyer & Eric 
Matthews, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, §49, 5: 314, p.193.
39 Treating Kant’s discussions of so-called rational (handmill / despotism analogy) and aesthetic 
(Jupiter’s eagle) ideas as if they were one may be elliptical, but seems reasonable since the imaginative 
ingenuity that produces the thought-provoking imagery that he calls ‘aesthetic’ is called into play only 
in the service of the reason that finds itself without a sufficient conceptual means for expressing an 
abstract, rational idea.
For an opposing view, see:
Kirk Pillow, ‘Jupiter’s Eagle and the Despot’s Hand Mill: Two Views on Metaphor in Kant’, in The 
Journal o f  Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 59, no.2 (Spring 2001), esp. pp.202, 206.
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understanding or practical reason. If we try to express them, we attempt to retrieve
them from the presupposed, noumenal structures of our thought.
So far as a writer like Schiller was concerned, however, the use of imagery to
represent ideas was his raison d'etre. He had to translate ideas into something
accessible to his readers, but which he nevertheless recognised would, as Kant said
occasion much thinking, though without it being possible for any determinate 
thought, ie. concept to be adequate to it, which consequently, no language 
fully attains or can make intelligible40
At the same time, he had to know what it was to experience and judge beauty, a 
human capacity without which his creative work was in vain. From Schiller’s 
correspondence with Komer we know of his dissatisfaction with the idea of a 
Gemeinsinn,41 by means of which Kant thought we could generalise among 
individuals. Acknowledgement of a Gemeinsinn made aesthetic activity too 
subjective, contrary to Kant’s and Schiller’s hopes for a more scientific theory. In the 
Aesthetic Letters, by referring to the interaction of the drives, he has been able to 
avoid postulating its existence, and yet explain the common response among 
observers of beauty, and the ability of an artist to predict an audience response. 
However, it seems he no longer regarded the objective definition of beauty as his
i
primary aim, since he has not pursued his earlier interest in siting beauty in the 
objective world.42
If Schiller’s interpretation of Kant in the Aesthetic Letters at first seemed 
ambiguous, it is thus because he had abandoned Kant, in order to integrate his 
explanation for our relationship to aesthetic ideas, which supposedly originates at the
40 Immanuel Kant, Critique o f  the Power o f  Judgement, (ed.) Paul Guyer, (tr.) Paul Guyer & Eric 
Matthews, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, §49, 5: 314, pp. 192.
41 Frederick C. Beiser, Schiller as Philosopher: a re-examination, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005, p.50.
42 Frederick C. Beiser, Schiller as Philosopher: a re-examination, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005, p.75.
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noumenal level, with an account of our relationship to beautiful objects that Kant 
thought took place at the interface between understanding and imagination. Schiller’s 
solution is to analyse the human mind in his own way. He employs perceptual and 
rational features that Kant had already recognised as constitutive of the human mind, 
but re-groups them. The content remains similar, but the structure has been redrawn, 
sometimes in ways that oblige us to accept a certain lack of clarity. However, if we 
wish temporarily to preserve a Kantian terminology, it ultimately does appear that 
when the sensuous and the formal interact, and when the third drive, the play drive, is 
generated, there is a broad sense in which a move between the phenomenal and 
noumenal has taken place, in that the play drive is a state of undetermined freedom 
that will enable us to progress as moral beings.
Beyond merely changing the structure of Kant’s analysis, Schiller has 
furthermore introduced notions of productive conflict and competition into aesthetics, 
in place of calm, Kantian contemplation, despite the fact that both men identify a calm 
endpoint of free play and pleasurable harmony. Behler goes so far as to regard 
Schiller’s apparent emphasis on harmony and balance, as a mere mask that barely 
conceals the underlying violence of his conception. The aesthetic educational process 
that would bring mankind into harmony with itself is ‘The Theatre of Sublime 
Cruelty’.43 Interesting though Behler’s interpretation is, it conflicts with Schiller’s 
consistent contention in both the Aesthetic Letters and Anmut und Wiirde that 
suppression or external control of the human psyche are unstable and ineffective 
means of developing human potential. Inclination and law must genuinely coincide. 
Form drive and sense drives must do so too. Admittedly, Behler seems to class any 
means, including persuasion, by which a creature could be brought to change its mind
43 Constantin Behler, Nostalgic Teleology: Friedrich Schiller and the Schemata o f  Aesthetic 
Humanism, Bern; Berlin etc: Peter Lang, 1995, ch.3, p. 183.
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or behaviour, as cruelty or violence. Schiller’s ambivalence towards the role of nature 
might possibly encourage this view. He wished to change an existing nature, whether 
it might be the animal-like savage of primitive, tribal society, or the cold intellectual 
of eighteenth century Germany, in the name of an ideal human nature. This means 
that Schiller’s desired manipulation of human nature, however underhand, disguised 
or sugar-coated it may be, is intended nevertheless to be complete. Perhaps Behler 
sees this process as being something akin to brain-washing. In any case he questions, 
possibly, whether the aesthetic education would be completely ethical, and, certainly, 
whether the overall process would be as pleasant and painless as Schiller leads us to 
believe.
Schiller’s attempts to distinguish between actual, possible and ideal human 
natures, between the good and the distorted, between what we might call givens and 
becomings, the real and the potential, are factors that may seem to invite criticisms 
such as Behler’s. They also emerge in both this chapter and the last as significant 
ways in which he came to differ from Kant. However, we have already seen in our 
discussion of the Kallias Letters that Schiller accepted that beauty could be freedom 
in appearance, and that the actor could, in a sense, both be and not be Hamlet.44 It is 
almost an extension of the indeterminate free play characteristic of Kant’s aesthetics 
that permits Schiller to conceive of a human as being at once weak and primitive (in 
fact) and capable of great creative and moral projects (in the right circumstances). As 
we examine the implications of Schiller’s mature aesthetic theory for art and the artist 
in our next chapter, we shall see that, while still using some Kantian concepts,
Schiller provides a fuller account than Kant of what an artist does, and what art
44 see chapter 5 below.
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achieves. In the form of free semblance, and later, the sentimental, we shall also see 
how the ambivalence we have already noted is central to Schiller’s view of art.
I l l
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CHAPTER 5
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR ART OF FRIEDRICH SCHILLER’S
AESTHETIC THEORY
This chapter firstly discusses how the essays already reviewed contribute to 
Schiller’s ideas about the nature and value of artistic creativity. In addition, a fourth 
essay, On the Naive and Sentimental in Literature} is examined. Naive and 
Sentimental completes Schiller’s aesthetic theory and illustrates how he applies his 
ideas. It emphasises how culture influences poetry, and confirms that Schiller worked 
with a perfectible image of human nature, not Kant’s fixed and universal subject. 
Furthermore, from this conception that humanity is still in a state of development 
came an aesthetic position that relates to ideas of Holderlin and Schlegel, that appear 
in our later chapters.
The Kallias Letters defined beauty as a harmony arising from the apparent 
inner composition of any object, expressible by saying that the material content of the 
object matches, harmonises or is in perfect balance with its form, shape, manner of 
expression or appearance. Clearly, an inanimate object would have no choice in this.
It is just so, part of its nature, though it may well appear as if the object had acted 
spontaneously and formed itself. This is true of both naturally occurring objects and
i
of works of art constructed by humans. Humanly created works of art that are not 
beautiful have a forced and awkward appearance. For example, it may look as if their 
content has somehow been damaged or distorted to produce the form in which they
1 Friedrich Schiller, On the Naive and Sentimental in Literature, trans. Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly, 
Manchester: Carcanet New Press Ltd, 1981. Hereafter referred to in text as Naive and Sentimental.
References have been made to this translated English language edition, since it appears to provide a 
good quality reading. The most easily obtainable, reliable German edition is:
Friedrich Schiller, Uber naive und sentimentalische Dichtung, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Stuttgart: 
Philipp Reclam jun., 2005. (based on the Schiller Nationalausgabe, 1962.)
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are presented to the public; or the artist’s physical efforts and supposedly creative 
techniques may be too obvious and distracting to the viewer, reader or listener.
Schiller illustrates this by reference to the stage. The excellent actor’s identity 
is completely forgotten as he immerses himself in his part. For the audience, he has 
become Hamlet, though the spectators cannot for one moment forget they are sitting 
in a theatre. This is the freedom in appearance which has an affinity with deception, 
but by which no one's practical reason is fooled. Content and form blend invisibly. 
Another actor tries his best; his performance has good points; but the audience can see 
him trying. He gives them a good understanding of the play and the character, but 
there is something clumsy in the performance, regardless of its technical excellence. 
Content and form are not in complete agreement. Finally, the weak actor, whatever 
part he plays, is visibly still himself on stage. The content, ie. his words and actions, is 
unformed. No illusion is created. The audience cannot respond to the fictitious 
character he wishes to portray.
In Anmut und Wiirde moral beauty or sublimity in people is explained in an 
analogous way. There is a kind of physical grace {Anmut) and beauty that reflects an 
inner moral harmony, whereby inner inclinations, nature or instincts coincide with the 
theoretical demands of morality. Those who struggle to adapt their inclinations to 
avoid conflict with ethical principles may be worthy and admirable, but do not 
achieve the spontaneous beauty of grace. However, if they truly, against great 
temptation, have compelled their instincts to conform to the moral law, they may 
achieve sublimity. A possible weakness of this essay is that Schiller prevaricates 
between whether these characteristics are moral, aesthetic or physical; and further 
whether they are inner characteristics that are manifested externally, or whether they
2 Friedrich Schiller, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Stuttgart: Philipp 
Reclam jun, 1999, p.61ff., enclosure with letter 28.2.1793.
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exist in being manifested externally.3 This reflects Schiller’s task as a playwright, 
however. He has to think of several aims simultaneously: how to represent people and 
their internal moral dilemmas on the page, how to reflect their inner life in the words 
they speak and the actions they perform, how to signal to an actor that this is the 
‘kind’ of person, and the kind of motivation, emotion, inner conflict, response or 
whatever, that he or she is supposed to convey to the public during a performance. He 
has to create not just externally visible characters, but transparent characters, whose 
subjective experiences are as accessible, credible and thought-provoking to the public 
as their external appearance and behaviour.
Schiller, Anmut und Wurde and the classical past
Schiller opens Anmut und Wurde by using a typical classical device to 
illustrate his understanding of grace and dignity, namely a Greek myth. Through the 
story of the belt of Venus he shows both the objective nature of moral grace and the 
need to distinguish grace from beauty and dignity.4 The myth also reflects Schiller's 
perceptive relationship with his readers, who are introduced to the more abstract 
discussion developed at the heart of the essay through a conventional and possibly 
familiar analogy. It portrays the Greeks as a surprisingly simple people, who, before 
philosophy as such had developed, could perceive emotionally what they could not 
yet express rationally.5 They expressed their understanding through imagery. Schiller 
himself, therefore, like them, adopts an apparently simplistic approach, using myth to 
convey a philosophical message. From this observation Naive and Sentimental went 
on to develop the concept of the naive in poetry.
3 Frederick Beiser, Schiller as Philosopher: a re-examination, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 
pl07.
4 Friedrich Schiller, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Kallias oder iiber die Schonheit und Anmut und Wiirde, 
Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1994, p.71.
5 Friedrich Schiller, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Kallias oder iiber die Schonheit und Anmut und Wiirde, 
Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1994, p.70.
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Schiller was not criticising those who rely on imagery or sensibility. As in the 
Aesthetic Letters, the aim is to redress the contemporary German or European 
tendency to over-value rationality, the use of abstract concepts and the operation of 
the will, and neglect the complexity of insights communicable through sensuous 
imagery, and the good achievable by sound instinct. Pure theory lacks the elegance 
and beauty of much non-rational thought. Hence, the supposedly primitive Greeks 
achieved more than the dry scholars of the eighteenth century could understand, or 
could perhaps only struggle clumsily to express.6 Thus we tend to overlook not only 
that we can apply practical reason to objects, but that appearances can become objects 
of the reason, and be used to express ideas. Indeed, Schiller’s own use of myth 
demonstrates how human beings still respond to the imaginative presentation of 
abstract ideas. Anmut und Wiirde thus increases our respect for the sensuous and 
physical, which must work as integrated elements of the human mind. This is why 
myth can effectively convey philosophical ideas. Later in the decade this idea
o
contributed to Friedrich Holderlin’s view of the importance of poetry, and Friedrich
6 Friedrich Schiller, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Kallias oder iiber die Schonheit und Anmut und Wiirde, 
Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1994, p.70. (
7 Friedrich Schiller, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Kallias oder iiber die Schonheit und Anmut und Wiirde, 
Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1994, p.79.
...dafi es zweierlei Arten gibt, wodurch Erscheinungen Objekte der Vemunft werden und Ideen 
ausdrilcken kOnnen. Es ist nicht immer nOtig, daC die Vemunft diese Ideen aus den Erscheinungen 
herauszieht; sie kann sie auch in dieselben hineinlegen.
...that there are two ways in which representations can become objects o f reason, and express ideas. It 
is not always necessary for the reason to draw these ideas from  representations; it can also p lace  these 
ideas in them.
This is Schiller’s expression o f Kant’s theory o f  the aesthetic ideas.
Immanuel Kant, (ed.) Paul Guyer, (tr.) Paul Guyer & Eric Matthews, Critique o f  the power o f  
judgement, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, §49, 5:314, 5:315, pp. 192, 193.
8 Friedrich HOlderlin, ‘Fragment philosophische Briefe’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, J. Ch. F. Holderlin, 
Theoretischen Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p. 15.
Friedrich Holderlin, ‘Die tragische Ode... (Grund zum Empedocles)’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, J. Ch. F. 
Holderlin, Theoretischen Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.80.
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Schlegel presented the same idea as a plea for the development of a new mythology
for the modem age.9
The Aesthetic Letters
The Aesthetic Letters show how the inner harmonising of the drives that
dominate human nature and the development of the play drive create the ability to
appreciate beauty, and enables the full personal and social development of
humankind.10 The first step from primitive animal savagery towards civilisation
occurred when man developed delight in semblance, and a propensity to
ornamentation and play.11 Schiller illustrates how, for instance, decoration, dance and
polite manners develop as man progresses away from brute submission to the
1 0demands of the sense drive. Eventually, this process allows the realisation of various
human potentialities, including the establishment of social and political harmony. This
harmony will also be present in the artistic works produced in a society whose
members are capable of using the play drive. Every artistic detail will contribute
unobtrusively but essentially to the overall appearance of the whole, while the work’s
• 1 ^overall configuration will give function and significance to every detail.
9 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘GesprSch (lber die Podsie: Rede iiber die Mythologie’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, 
Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische und theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p. 197.
10 See chapter 4 above.
11 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XXVI: §3, p. 193.
12 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XXVII: §§ 6, 7, p.213.
13 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XXII: §6, p. 157.
... he will, even in the most successfully realised whole, attend only to the parts, and in the presence of  
the most beauteous form, respond only to the matter. [He will]... laboriously scratch away until he has 
uncovered all those individual details that the master, with infinite skill, has caused to disappear in the 
harmony o f  the whole.
HOlderlin’s essay, Wenn der Dichter einmal..., develops this suggestion in some detail. See: J. Chr. F. 
Holderlin , ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: Theoretischen 
Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998. See also chapter 9 below.
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Semblance and the earlier writings
What, then, happened to the apparently central aim of the Kallias Letters, to 
establish an objective theory of aesthetics? Even within the Kallias Letters, objectivity 
gave way to ‘freedom in appearance’, whereby beauty became the word for things 
that seem to be free, or to have exercised some kind of inner free will or self­
determining choice. In the Aesthetic Letters this was superseded by Schein, or 
semblance, as a key concept. In semblance, the apparent success of the beautiful 
object in having brought its own content into perfect agreement with its own form is 
reinterpreted as a pleasing balance between reality and illusion that appears to be a 
point of harmony within the art object.14 A work of art is honest and truthful if 
semblance is open and deliberate, not deceptive, and not trying to pass itself off as 
reality.15 Works of art must have concealed functionality if they are to be noble or 
beautiful.16 That is, not that they must be functional, but that any function must be 
concealed. This is
the artistic secret of the master, that he can transform (vertilgen) substance by 
means of form.17
Kivy, writing from the perspective of the philosophy of music, believes that, right up 
to Kant, mimesis was presumed to be the purpose of art. Schiller’s handling of the
i
notion of semblance could represent an important step towards a break with mimesis. 
Art’s value lies in its very artificiality, in knowing it is not reality, not in its success in
14 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XXVI, §7, p. 195.
15 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XXVI: §11, p. 197.
16 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XXIII; fn .l, p. 167.
17 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XXII; §5, p. 156 (my 
translation).
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imitating reality.18 This indicates that Schiller was moving away from classical 
aesthetics. Schiller does not explore the objective dimension of beauty any further. 
Beauty in the arts has now become synonymous with artistic semblance, which 
appeals to both our senses and intellect, strengthens the sense and form drives, 
activates the play drive, and creates better people and a better society.19
Perfect style in art should even overcome and remove the specific limitations 
of any particular art. For example, sculpture and the plastic arts should be capable of
onaffecting us in the same way as a piece of music. The Romantic belief in inter­
disciplinary collaboration was perhaps reinforced by this initial idea. One of the 
problems we face, however, is that although, in theory, engagement with the beauty of
a work of art should enliven our mind, produce a condition of perfectly balanced
01aesthetic experience, and fit us for any kind of task that follows, in practice, most 
actual works nevertheless excite one side of our nature at the expense of the other.
This may leave us unprepared for mundane practical tasks immediately after enjoying, 
for instance, an elevating piece of music. This problem diminishes, however, in 
proportion to the quality, firstly of the work of art and secondly, of our aesthetic 
experience. Thus, failure to appreciate a work of art might be caused by a 
shortcoming in the work of art itself, or by a shortcoming in the audience or viewer. 
Contrary to what Kant thought, aesthetic judgements cannot be presumed to occur as
18 Peter Kivy, New Essays on Musical Understanding, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 19.
19 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XXII; and XXV ff. In these 
letters Schiller explains how primitive mankind comes to enjoy how things appear (der schone Scheiri),
20 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XXII: §4, p. 155.
21 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XXII: §2, p. 151,153.
22 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XXII: §4, p. 153.
23 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XXII; §§ 3, 6, pp.153, 157.
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a result of contemplation or reflection alone.24 From this it follows that any audience 
needs to actively engage with the art work in order to appreciate or judge it fully, once 
again, an idea that will acquire more importance in the work of Holderlin and 
Schlegel.
Schiller has thus established two separate points of balance, one within the self
and the other perceived within the work of art. Using our well developed play drive,
we can make aesthetic judgements, based on a consciousness of autonomous
semblance. Individuals and societies can appreciate this distinction with varying
degrees of success, depending on how well their play drive operates. This still means
that the object's reality is irrelevant to our judgement, just as Kant had said, but,
compared with Kant, Schiller has, as it were, nevertheless demoted disinterestedness
from its prominent role in making aesthetic judgements, and replaced it by semblance.
What Kant regarded as the suppression or withholding of personal or animal interest,
Schiller has reinterpreted as an awareness of concealed functionality. Both are
explanations that acknowledge the existence of some kind of inner tension in the
observer. In Naive and Sentimental this idea of ‘semblance’ is modified further, so
that, effectively, it develops into the notion of sentimentality.
Another new feature introduced by the Aesthetic Letters is that society
influences art and the artist; though the artist must sometimes oppose society,25
because he or she must distinguish passing fashion from genuine good work,
The artist is indeed the child of his age; but woe to him if he is, at the same 
time, its ward, or worse still, its minion.26
24 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XXIV, §2, pp. 171, 173.
25 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XXII: §6, p. 157.
Tt is by no means always a proof o f formlessness in the work o f  art itself if  it makes its effect solely 
through its contents; this may just as often be evidence o f  a lack o f  form in him who judges it.’
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Thus, Schiller’s conservative, classical solution to the artist’s need to cope with
0*7variations in public approbation is that the artist should ignore the false values of his 
own, corrupt age, and aim for something of lasting value. The artist admittedly has no 
option but to take his theme or content from what is presently available to him, but he 
should form it from within his own, absolute being.28 Thus, by attempting to 
distinguish between popularity and quality in art, Schiller actually raises a problem he 
does not resolve. Taste, he tells us, is the ‘aesthetic mode of perception’, and thus, we 
may infer, the condition of being able to exercise the play drive.29 He thus seems to 
retain an absolute and unchanging standard of artistic taste, but nevertheless 
emphasises personal and social change. He believed, therefore, that if human nature 
can be ‘put right,’ artistic taste will follow. However, he has little guidance for the 
artist, who in the meantime has to woo the public, and convince them through beauty 
rather than criticism.30 He must uphold the standard of beauty, unlike weaker 
contemporaries:
26 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, IX: §4, p.55.
27 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, IX: §5, p.57.
‘But how is the artist to protect himself against the corruption o f  the age that besets him on all sides? 
By disdaining its opinion... Let him express... [this ideal union o f  what is possible and what is 
necessary]... and silently project it into the infinity o f  time.’
28 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, IX: §4, p.55.
‘His theme he will take from the present, but his form he will borrow from a nobler time, nay, from 
beyond time altogether, from the absolute, unchanging, unity o f  his being. Here, from the pure aether 
of his genius, the living source o f beauty flows down, untainted by the corrupting o f the generations 
and ages wallowing in the dark eddies below.’
29 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XXVII, §10, p.215.
30 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, IX: §7, p.61.
120
SECTION 1: Friedrich Schiller Chapter 5
Nothing is more common than for... art to pay homage to the spirit of the age, 
or for creative minds to accept the critical standards of prevailing taste.31
The true artist has to re-educate an entire society, but using absolute standards that
perhaps only he knows or is capable of appreciating. Despite any apparent tensions,
‘the pure aether of genius’ will apply absolute rules of artistic form, even to culturally
specific material. Schiller offers some encouragement, however:
It is in the modest sanctuary of your heart that you must rear victorious truth, 
and project it out of yourself in the form of beauty, so that not only thought 
can pay it homage, but sense, too, lay loving hold on its appearance.32
This leaves the audience facing a problem too. We, the public, can develop and gain 
confidence in using the play drive, but there is no simple criterion for distinguishing 
fashion from true beauty. As our moral sensibilities develop, interacting with a lively 
sense drive, and as our play drive strengthens, we are expected to become more 
appreciative of beauty. Each occasion on which we make a judgement about the 
beautiful requires a genuinely active act of judgement, a resolution of the pull 
between nature and form, or sense and reason within us.34 Doing so improves us, but 
also means we might never definitively complete the process of responding to or 
evaluating the aesthetic value of a beautiful object. Thus, for Schiller, mankind is 
necessarily in a state of constant revision towards an ideal, though the process of
I
change is triggered by something in our external life circumstances, not by our moral
31 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, IX: §3, p.55.
32 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, IX: §7, p.59.
33 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XXII, §2, p. 153; XXV, §5,
p. 187.
34 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XVI; § 4, p. 115.
35 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XIV, §1, p.95.
This is the way Schiller describes the possibility o f mankind’s developing the inner drives to their full 
strength.
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sense.36 Earlier writers on aesthetics had sought to resolve uncertainty and 
indeterminacy by rigidly defining beauty and the task of art. Schiller, however, tried 
to preserve the more indeterminate characteristics with which he was used to working 
as a practitioner, but show how they related to a new analysis of humanity itself. The 
human mind is no more fixed or static in its operation than any of the aesthetic acts in 
which it engages. Although we may observe these implications, and recognise both 
semblance and a drive-based human nature as hinting at the possibility of an extensive 
range of irresolvable indeterminacies, Schiller, as we are about to see, did not develop 
this idea of indeterminacy in Naive and Sentimental. Three years later, however, 
Friedrich Schlegel elevated the acceptance of a more fluid conception of human 
nature and perception into an important principle of artistic criticism in his 
Athenaums-Fragmente. He advocated the repeated reading and re-reading of 
literature, since we bring to each reading the changed background of our experience, 
which enriches and modifies our response to the work of art.
On the Naive and Sentimental in Literature
In Naive and Sentimental Schiller went on to consider the questions,4 What is
the best kind of literature?’, ‘What is the mark of great literature?’ Naive and
\
Sentimental assesses the work of a range of ancient and modem writers, sometimes 
using them to exemplify a particular style of writing. In this sense Schiller continued 
Baumgarten’s work from the 1730s.37 However, although it is possible to emphasise 
his continuity with this tradition, his approach to artistic and creative work was very
36 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XXVI, §1, p. 191.
37 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis adpoem a pertinentibus, 
Halle: 1735.
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different, particularly in the way he defined aesthetic perfection, and especially since
o o
his revaluation of Kant.
In one respect, by analysing what classical writers had done, Baumgarten's 
work itself was symptomatic of the distinction Schiller makes in Naive and 
Sentimental. The sentimentalisch tendency of more recent society, says Schiller, made 
people too self-conscious to write in the naive style of antiquity; their artistic 
judgement was, in that sense, tainted. The very desire to equal any given age or style 
in itself precluded success. The Greeks, already praised for their ‘natural humanity’, 
had an innocent, naive relationship with the world around them, and this is the key to 
classical art: its naivety. Baumgarten, like Schiller's contemporaries could only view 
Greek art as outsiders, shaped by the rational and reflective methods in which they 
had been trained, or which they had absorbed from their cultural surroundings. An 
implication of Schiller's position is that the Enlightenment, by encouraging 
independent thought, had damaged our instinctual artistic responses. The artist had 
become too knowing. Schiller’s recognition that he could view and relate to Ancient 
Greek art only as an outsider with different cultural presuppositions is a kind of 
intellectual landmark. It is an idea taken up by younger thinkers, including Holderlin
t
and Schlegel, and it later became an important feature of the German hermeneutic 
tradition.40 Even within the limits of this thesis we shall see that Holderlin later agreed
38Though see: Kai Hammermeister, The German Aesthetic Tradition, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002, p.43.
He points out that Baumgarten was not, strictly speaking, a ‘full-fledged supporter o f the aesthetics of  
perfection’.
39 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, VI: §2, p.32.
‘They were wedded to all the delights o f art and all the dignity o f wisdom, without, however, like us, 
falling prey to their seduction.’ They were superior to us ‘In fullness o f form no less than o f  content, at 
once philosophic and creative, sensitive and energetic, the Greeks combined the first youth o f  
imagination with the manhood o f reason in a glorious manifestation o f humanity.’
40 Zygmunt Bauman, Hermeneutics and Social Science, London: Hutchinson, 1978, p.31.
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with Schiller about the significance of cultural differences when we try to understand 
Greek drama.41 He also seems to have been alluding to Schiller’s warnings against 
trying to relive the naive naturalism of the Greeks, when he writes of our misplaced 
attempts to regain the innocence of childhood.42 Friedrich Schlegel identified the 
benefits of cultural distance for our appreciation of a more recent deceased writer, 
namely, Lessing.43 For Schlegel cultural detachment came to be seen as a strength, 
and in the hermeneutic tradition, as being both unavoidable and essential to a full 
understanding.
Schiller admired Homer, Shakespeare and even, with some qualification, 
Goethe, as naive writers. Their naivety shines through in the way their readers or 
audience feel the life in the characters and events, which speak to them so directly.
We know how strongly he felt this of Goethe’s work from his comments on the 
characters in Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre as he read draft chapters before 
publication.44 Unlike Goethe, Schiller's capacity to concentrate on his writing had 
been seriously disrupted by Kant's Critique o f the Power ofJudgement, until he had 
worked out for himself, and his public, why and how he was able to write, and write 
well. Schiller thus excluded himself from the range of nai've writers. However, just as
i
the man who struggles to become moral can exhibit the sublimity of moral dignity;45
41 Friedrich Holderlin, ‘Die tragische Ode... (Grund zum Empedocles)’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.81.
42See below, chapter 8.
Friedrich Schiller, Uber naive und sentimentalische Dichtung, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Stuttgart: 
Philipp Reclam jun., 2005, p.23.
Friedrich Schiller, On the Naive and Sentimental in Literature, tr. Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly, 
Manchester: Carcanet New Press Ltd, 1981, p.31.
43 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Uber Lessing’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische und 
theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, pp.46-75.
44 (ed.) Philipp Stein, Briefvechsel zwischen Schiller und Goethe in denJahren 1794 bis 1805, Leipzig: 
Philipp Reclam, no date, Letter 32, 09.12.1794, Letter 77, 19.06.1795.
45 see Anmut und Wiirde and chapter 2 above.
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just as the man who eventually struggles to bring his rational and material drives into 
balance can generate a play drive which enables him to produce and fully enjoy 
beautiful artefacts*46 so too, according to Schiller in Naive and Sentimental, the writer 
who either lacks naivety, or has lost it through cultural influences, can produce the 
very best kind of modem work. Thus, Schiller's admiration of Goethe, Shakespeare 
and the ancients does not perpetuate the querelle des anciens et des modernes47 and is 
not a sign of modesty or despair.48 It is an acknowledgement that he and many other 
good modem writers used an approach more appropriate to modem times.49
Although he was conscious of how his own times differed from the ancient 
classical age, Schiller rather underplayed the idea that each historical period was 
unique. He suggested that humanity has not changed very much over the centuries, so 
that individuals will react in similar ways to similar circumstances, whenever they 
occur. Again, this is a point developed further in the hermeneutical theory of 
understanding. Inter-personal and inter-cultural communication and understanding are 
only partial, yet they are possible. Thus, for Schiller, even Horace, Baumgarten's 
frequent point of reference, though an ancient, was not a naive poet.50 He lived in a
46 see The Aesthetic Letters and chapter 4 above.
47This expression was commonly used to refer to the dispute, originating in France, but continued also 
in Germany, between those like Winckelmann, who admired the classical model of art, and those who 
claimed that eighteenth century artists also had merit.
Harrison, Charles, Paul Wood and Jason Gaiger (eds.), Art in Theory 1648 - 1815: An anthology o f  
changing ideas, Malden MA; Oxford; Carlton Vic.: Blackwell, 2000, p. 15.
48 Quotations from Goethe's later memoirs suggest that Goethe possibly exaggerated the significance o f  
this, and the extent to which Schiller regretted his lack o f  creative naivety. See:
Peter-Andrd Alt, ‘Der sentimentalische Leser: Schillers Lektiire’, in (ed.) Heinz Ludwig Arnold, 
Schiller: Text + Kritik, Zeitschriftfiir Literatur: Sonderband 1V/05, Munich: Richard Boorberg Verlag, 
2005, p. 17.
49We have not explored this area o f influence, but for some indication of how Schiller was influenced 
by the more historical and cultural approach o f Herder, see:
T.J. Reed, Schiller, Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1991, pp.52ff.
50Friedrich Schiller, On the Naive and Sentimental in Literature, trans. Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly, 
Manchester: Carcanet New Press Ltd, 1981, p.35.
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corrupt and turbulent time, and was probably the first sentimental poet, aware that 
reality fell short of the ideal of nature. Similarly, Goethe could only have been a truly 
naive writer in another, more naive age.51 As it was, he adapted. In the ancient world 
naive artists simply and successfully responded to the world of the senses, thus 
completely fulfilling their finite goal. Influenced by the complex rationality of 
modem Europe, however, Goethe had to use ideas and imagination as well as instinct, 
which extended his range beyond strict naivety. And Goethe is no less great for being 
the product of a sentimental age. The keynote of Naive and Sentimental is not 
lamentation for the lost classical age. The naive poet depends entirely on his 
experience, and his success is therefore a 'lucky throw', but modem, sentimental 
poets are much more ambitious; they go beyond their own experience, strive for an 
infinite ideal, and lead readers towards more complex ideas. Although admittedly 
unable to fulfil their now infinite aims,54 at their best they exceed the ancient naive 
poets' attainment of a finite goal.55
51Friedrich Schiller, On the Naive and Sentimental in Literature, trans. Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly, 
Manchester: Carcanet New Press Ltd, 1981, Introduction, p. 12. See also the main text, pp.38, 56.
1
Friedrich Schiller, Uber naive und sentimentalische Dichtung, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Stuttgart: 
Philipp Reclam jun., 2005, pp.32, 59.
52 Friedrich Schiller, Uber naive und sentimentalische Dichtung, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Stuttgart: 
Philipp Reclam jun., 2005, p.35.
Friedrich Schiller, On the Naive and Sentimental in Literature, tr. Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly, 
Manchester: Carcanet New Press Ltd, 1981, p.40.
53 Friedrich Schiller, On the Naive and Sentimental in Literature, tr. Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly, 
Manchester: Carcanet New Press Ltd, 1981, p.68.
54 This claim about poets matches Schiller’s comments in the Aesthetic Letters regarding the fulfilment 
of mankind’s full potential. See:
Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XIV: §1, p.95.
Looking ahead, it also agrees with HOlderlin’s view that mankind’s search for the truth is an ‘endless 
approximation’, (see chapter 7 below.)
55 Friedrich Schiller, On the Naive and Sentimental in Literature, tr. Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly, 
Manchester: Carcanet New Press Ltd, 1981, p.40.
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In the naive, nature is victorious over art. This may happen either without the 
knowledge or will of the naive person or writer, or in the full consequence of it.56 
Sentimental writing, however, is 'always concerned simultaneously... with two 
opposing subjects, namely with the ideal and with experience'. Sentimental artists
c o
are either the 'witnesses or the avengers of nature', depending on the extent to which
they long for a golden past or criticise a corrupt present, and on the extent to which
they are able to look forward to or promote improvements. The sentimental can thus
be either nostalgic or utopian in its approach. In all cases the actual is being compared
to an idea. Schiller believed the greatest sentimental writers succeeded in 'leading art
back to nature', incorporating both strands of the dichotomy. Kant himself had argued
that art must seem like nature, and nature like art.
In a product of art one must be aware that it is art, and not nature; yet the 
purposiveness of its form must still seem to be as free from all constraint by 
arbitrary rules as if it were a mere product of nature.... Nature was beautiful, if 
at the same time it looked like art; and art can only be called beautiful if we 
are aware that it is art and yet it looks to us like nature.59
New though the naive / sentimental dichotomy might appear, Kant was still providing 
a key idea.
This is a further example of Schiller’s concern to preserve Kant’s link between 
freedom and artistic beauty, despite having departed already from a strictly Kantian 
definition of freedom. His identification of true freedom with the real or effectively 
real absence of external constraint, but the presence of inner self-determination, has
56 Friedrich Schiller, On the Naive and Sentimental in Literature, tr. Helen Watanabe-O’Kelly, 
Manchester: Carcanet New Press Ltd, 1981, p.24.
57Friedrich Schiller, On the Naive and Sentimental in Literature, tr. Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly, 
Manchester: Carcanet New Press Ltd, 1981, n.59, p. 103.
58 Friedrich Schiller, On the Naive and Sentimental in Literature, tr. Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly, 
Manchester: Carcanet New Press Ltd, 1981, p.35.
59 Immanuel Kant, (ed.) Paul Guyer, (tr.) Paul Guyer & Eric Matthews, Critique o f  the pow er o f  
judgement, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, §45, 5:306, p. 185.
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been noted already.60 Thus, in the Kallias Letters the technical or natural perfection or 
structure of the object appears to be in free, autonomous agreement with its content or 
material appearance.61 In Anmut und Wurde the most morally and physically pleasing 
people find their inclination in free and apparently natural agreement with their moral 
duty. In On the Sublime the very best of such people find themselves in circumstances 
that reveal they would continue to act and think in this way, however extreme the 
challenges presented to them by blind natural forces or by circumstance.62 In the 
Aesthetic Letters aesthetic freedom is experienced in mankind when true human 
nature has come into existence, and the rationality of form and the materials of sense 
are in harmony. We are products of Nature, but Nature can be blind, raw, brutish, 
unthinking, utterly and by definition inhuman. Schiller’s work suggests that we are 
clever enough to find an accommodation with Nature, a way of remaining a natural 
product, while yet fully retaining all those differences that have traditionally caused 
us to contrast ourselves with blind natural forces. In fact, by doing this, we fully 
acknowledge the workings of nature within ourselves, so that Schiller can use the 
term ‘nature’, or ‘natural’ in certain contexts, as a criterion by means of which to 
judge the value of a person, action or, especially, a work of art. As Behler puts it: ‘a
i
f f Xmoralization of nature and naturalization of morality’.
60 R.D. Miller, Schiller and the Ideal o f  Freedom, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970, p.95.
Here Miller is referring to the Kallias Letters, especially letter 23.2.93, p.38.
61 Friedrich Schiller, Kallias oder uber die Schdnheit, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Stuttgart, Philipp 
Reclam jun., 1999, p.35. letter, 19.2.1793.
62Friedrich Schiller, ‘Uber das Erhabene’, in Schillers Sammtliche Werke, vol. 4, Stuttgart: J. G. 
Cotta'sche Buchhandlung, 1879, pp.726-738. Available at:
http://gutenberg.spiegel.de/?id=12&xid=2405&kapitel=l&cHash=f02826dfcf2 [accessed 17.06.08]
No individual page references are given in the online version.
63Constantin Behler, Nostalgic Teleology: Friedrich Schiller and the Schemata o f  Aesthetic Humanity, 
Bern; Berlin,etc: Peter Lang, 1995, p.206.
Though we note this as one o f  Schiller’s more important claims, he does not clarify the relationship 
among his sense o f  freedom as ‘absence o f determination’, freedom as ‘moral self-determination’, and 
nature as a form o f moral validation.
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Despite the greatness of Goethe and Shakespeare, it would be more typical for 
the best modem authors to be sentimental, because of their cultural background. Thus, 
Schiller claims that the literary genre, subject matter, or even the exact use of 
language in any given work was less important than the frame of mind of the writer, 
or rather that these technicalities only derive from the author’s thought. Naivety or 
sentimentality spring from within the creative human being, which leads us back to 
the idea that a well-balanced and fulfilled human being produces the best literary 
work. Such a view is very different from the presumptions underlying the work of 
either Baumgarten or Reynolds, who almost give the impression that the good writer 
or painter could repeatedly apply a tested template. For Schiller, on the contrary, good 
work was the polished public endpoint of a deeply rooted personal process that was 
constantly being developed and refined.
Here the position developed in the Aesthetic Letters reappears. The play drive 
united the sense and form drives harmoniously. It was a hard won unity created from 
diversity and conflict between the two. Similarly, in the best kind of sentimental 
writing the writer has resolved all conflict between the real and the ideal,64 and in this 
state of equilibrium, where the greatest unity and diversity co-exist, the poet gives
I
human nature its full expression.65 For Schiller, the poet should be able to synthesise 
the sensuous and the rational or ideal, and produce literature capable of developing, 
strengthening and harmonising the drives in his individual readers, and thus, in 
society as a whole. The sentimental poet can heal the divide that culture and
64 Friedrich Schiller, On the Naive and Sentimental in Literature, tr. Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly, 
Manchester: Carcanet New Press Ltd, 1981, p.66.
65Friedrich Schiller, On the Naive and Sentimental in Literature, tr. Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly, 
Manchester: Carcanet New Press Ltd, 1981, p.66.
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civilisation have caused in mankind.66 Ultimately, by actually improving the culture 
that surrounds the individual members of humanity, the writer can create a situation in
f \ 7which there is no gap between reality and the ideal, only peace and harmony. The 
fact that sentimentality was an attempt to balance the real and the ideal, both in human 
nature and poetry, shows that it was also an extension of the idea of semblance. 
Readers or audiences hold conceptions of both the real and the ideal in their minds 
simultaneously, while the writer conveys both an ideal capable of educating, and a 
reality that is familiar and entertaining, all at once. This attempt to balance the real 
and ideal, which is one aspect of sentimentality, is something that is also prominent in 
the work of Holderlin, when he identifies the moment of harmonious opposition that 
contributes to the perfect moment in any work of art, and in Schlegel too; it therefore 
appears again in the later chapters of this thesis.
However, although Schiller expects the work of the artist to respond to and 
affect social or cultural conditions, he also seems to expect that standards of taste will 
remain constant,68 and might sometimes need to guide or restrain the artist’s genius,69 
as Kant thought also.70 He did not resolve this equivocation until shortly before his
^Friedrich Schiller, On the Naive and Sentimental in Literature, tr. Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly, 
Manchester: Carcanet New Press Ltd, 1981, p.39.
67Friedrich Schiller, On the Naive and Sentimental in Literature, tr. Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly, 
Manchester: Carcanet New Press Ltd, 1981, p.62.
68 Friedrich Schiller, Kallias oder uber die Schdnheit und Anmut und Wiirde, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, 
StuttgartL Philipp Reclam jun., 1999, ‘Nachwort’, fn .l, p. 167.
69Friedrich Schiller, On the Naive and Sentimental in Literature, tr. Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly, 
Manchester: Carcanet New Press Ltd, 1981, p.28.
Friedrich Schiller, Uber naive und sentimentalische Dichtung, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Stuttgart: 
Philipp Reclam jun., 2005, p. 19.
He says both that ‘...protective nature abandons them, because the power o f example carries them 
away, or the decadent taste o f their time leads them astray.’
and, in the next paragraph, that ‘...the most complex tasks must be solved by genius with 
understanding, simplicity and ease... by triumphing over complex art by means o f  simplicity... not... 
according to known principles but according to sudden impulses and feelings... [which] are 
inspirations from a god... [and] laws for all periods and all races o f peoples.’
70 H.E. Allison, Kant's theory o f  taste, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p.300.
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death, when he rejected the idea of an unchanging standard of taste, stating that
71anachronistic yardsticks could kill art.
Schiller's earlier explanation of how the perception of beauty is one of the 
functions of the practical reason, and a free, typically human, activity of the will, has 
already established a logical, as well as practical, connection between aesthetics and 
ethics. In Naive and Sentimental, Schiller makes some attempt to illustrate how great 
literature is in fact always associated with morality and the decency of social
77convention, while rejecting the judgement of 'frosty decency'. The poetic drive is a 
naive drive, in that it is the way back to nature. 'The moral drive impels him 
increasingly back to it and it is with this drive that the poetic gift stands in the closest
77relationship.' Thus, any poet who portrayed the indulgence of unrestrained animal 
sensuousness in his written works would encourage only the one-sided development 
of human nature, and lead people to be less than they could be. True human nature, as 
opposed to actual, and possibly degenerate, human nature74 is also the balanced, 
moral ideal.
The debate about whether immoral subject matter or images are compatible 
with the work of the artist has continued far beyond the writers referred to byi
7 ^Schiller, and rests on the question of whether human beings are already good and
strong enough to be trusted to know what is good for them. Perhaps there is an irony
here, because, if they could be encouraged to become even better, they would then
71Friedrich Schiller, Kallias oder uber die Schonheit und Anmut und Wiirde, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, 
StuttgartL Philipp Reclam jun., 1999, ‘Nachwort’, fn .l, p. 167.
72Friedrich Schiller, On the Naive and Sentimental in Literature, tr. Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly, 
Manchester: Carcanet New Press Ltd, 1981, p59.
73Friedrich Schiller, On the Naive and Sentimental in Literature, tr. Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly, 
Manchester: Carcanet New Press Ltd, 1981, p.38.
74Friedrich Schiller, On the Naive and Sentimental in Literature, tr. Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly, 
Manchester: Carcanet New Press Ltd, 1981, p.69.
75Friedrich Schiller, On the Naive and Sentimental in Literature, tr. Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly, 
Manchester: Carcanet New Press Ltd, 1981, pp59ff.
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presumably want and enjoy what the artist would really prefer to give them. Once 
again, Schiller’s awareness of the mismatch between man as he tends to be and man 
as he could be comes through. There was no suggestion of such tension in Kant’s 
original conception of humanity. Admittedly, man was capable of immorality, if he 
failed to exercise his Good Will, but a single, rational decision could change that.
Kant did not consider the possible effects of cultural pressures, which Schiller now 
believed could either enhance or damage human nature.
Throughout his period of sustained theoretical writing Schiller wrote as if 
speaking directly to an audience, possibly one well known to him. The Kallias Letters 
were a genuine personal correspondence, though perhaps conducted in the knowledge 
that the letters might be more widely circulated. Anmut und Wiirde was written for 
Schiller’s own periodical, and thus, in a way, for his own audience. The Aesthetic 
Letters were written in epistolary form, their first version as a genuine correspondence 
with the Duke of Augustenberg, and then revised and published in instalments, in the 
same periodical, as also was Naive and Sentimental. Its tenor is also intimate, and 
contains some very personal opinions and evaluations, which might even have been 
insulting, if Schiller had identified the individuals to whom he was referring. Thus 
all these works exhibit a strong authorial voice. The reader knows he or she is gaining 
access to the thoughts of an individual. This is also an important implied difference 
between the naive and the sentimental, as the sentimental writer mediates between the 
content and the audience. Successful sentimental writers, such as Sterne, Peacock and 
Wieland, shared the characteristic Schiller most recommended in the modem 
sentimental author, the ability to step back from one's own culture and reflect upon it.
76 Friedrich Schiller, On the Naive and Sentimental in Literature, tr. Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly, 
Manchester: Carcanet New Press Ltd, 1981, pp.72, 73.
Friedrich Schiller, Uber naive und sentimentalische Dichtung, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Stuttgart: 
Philipp Reclam jun., 2005, pp.84, 85.
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He who is the creature and the caricature of his time has truly the least calling 
to be the portrayer of his time.77
He had clearly not forgotten the advice he gave in the Aesthetic Letters: ‘live with
78your century but do not be its creature.’ The role of the sentimental writer is
to transform the subject rather than that the base material should drag the 
imitator down with it to earth'.79
While the writer is doing this, his reader should be prepared that he
will always put one out of tune with real life for a few moments.80
Schiller is suggesting that the sentimental modem writer can create something
beautiful by consciously exploring the possibilities of semblance, though without
referring directly to or having defined, ‘beauty’. This idea of the writer as someone
sufficiently detached from normality to be able to look at society or events with a
fresh eye and help the public to reinterpret the world around them in a slightly
different way is one that has subsequently gained ground, to the point that by the
twentieth century it had become an almost unattributable truism, accepted as an
orthodox way of judging artistic content. The self-conscious tension between the
activity of the writer and the illusion he is seeking to create developed in the five
years after Schiller’s Naive and Sentimental into Friedrich Schlegel’s idea of
Romantic irony. Schlegel’s work thus came to the fore at a time when beauty had
already been identified with semblance, when it was uncontroversial to identify
semblance with sentimentality, and, on the basis of what we have just said,
reasonable, though not exact, to identify sentimentality with Romantic irony. Schlegel
77Friedrich Schiller, On the Naive and Sentimental in Literature, tr. Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly, 
Manchester: Carcanet New Press Ltd, 1981, p .71.
78 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, IX: §7, p.61.
79Friedrich Schiller, On the Naive and Sentimental in Literature, tr. Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly, 
Manchester: Carcanet New Press Ltd, 1981, p.69.
80Friedrich Schiller, On the Naive and Sentimental in Literature, tr. Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly, 
Manchester: Carcanet New Press Ltd, 1981, p.67.
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is best known for having further identified irony as the key to artistic and literary 
beauty, so we can now say that, in doing so, he effectively completed a circle that 
Schiller had initiated.
Although the naive and the sentimental create distinctive kinds of literature, 
and although Naive and Sentimental completes Schiller’s reflections on aesthetics, 
naivety and sentimentality are, strictly speaking, properties of the writer, not the work. 
In the last pages of the essay Schiller describes how a writer must balance naivety and 
sentimentality and go beyond the pure form of either in order to become a truly 
sentimental writer. It is a familiar Schillerian model, and, although Schiller’s aesthetic 
theory no longer, by the time of Naive and Sentimental, engaged explicitly with Kant, 
late in the essay he acknowledges that this way of resolving dichotomies has been 
generalised from Kant’s analysis of the way the categories resolve themselves within
o 1
each grouping. Thus nature, and the naive that corresponds with it, is opposed to art 
as the suspension of nature through the reason working freely; and finally the two are 
synthesised in the ideal in which a perfected art returns to nature.82 The principle is 
generalised even further in Holderlin’s identification of the 
harmonischentgegengesetzt, which simultaneously resolved several pairs of related
o-i 1
dichotomies.
The writer must achieve a balance between the naive - presenting the lively, 
colourful immediacy of the sensuous world, which entertains and relaxes many 
readers, and the sentimental - offering more thoughtful, contemplative, abstract 
writing, which can educate and improve the reader. At either extreme the inadequate
81 Immanuel Kant, A Critique o f  Pure Reason, (ed.) trans. F. Max Mtiller, Garden City NY: Anchor 
Doubleday, 1966, B 110, p.64.
82Friedrich Schiller, On the Naive and Sentimental in Literature, tr. Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly, 
Manchester: Carcanet New Press Ltd, 1981, n.64, p. 104.
83 See chapters 6 -9  below.
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writer risks emptiness, either because the content is unstructured, purposeless or 
trivial, or because the written word is too high-flown and detached from reality, 
lacking any real content.84 Successfully combining both strands, however, produces 
the very highest quality literature.
Attaining such synthesis is not easy. Mostly the modem writer has perforce 
'fallen away from the simplicity of nature and has been handed over to the dangerous 
guidance of his reason'. It is therefore beneficial for him 'to see again a pure example 
of the laws of nature and to purify himself from the corruptions of art in this faithful 
mirror'.85 We might envisage an author oscillating between nature and reflection in an 
attempt to reach a good point of balance. The corruptions of art, mentioned here, 
provide a darker reference than usual to his view of art as semblance, usually benign, 
but here clearly carrying unpleasant connotations of either deception or excessive 
artificiality. Schiller's ‘faithful mirror’ may be an allusion to Shakespeare's Hamlet, 
Act III sc.ii, a passage which Reynolds also quotes in a similar context. Reynolds 
thought reference to nature would result in a simpler style, that followed the artistic 
subject's form, free of excessive ornament or contemporary prejudice. While this has 
some echoes in Schiller's argument, Reynolds, unlike Schiller, considered that the
i
whole enterprise of explaining or clarifying artistic processes and values provided 
evidence that rationality and some very prescriptive rule-following underlay all art. 
The use of Hamlet as an example, however, is almost emblematic of the aesthetic 
debates of the 1790s. Not only does Schiller allude to the play obliquely in this work 
that reassessed the neo-classical ideal, but, almost simultaneously, Goethe’s Wilhelm
84Friedrich Schiller, On the Naive and Sentimental in Literature, tr. Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly, 
Manchester: Carcanet New Press Ltd, 1981, p.72.
85 Friedrich Schiller, On the Naive and Sentimental in Literature, tr. Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly, 
Manchester: Carcanet New Press Ltd, 1981, p.63.
86 Joshua Reynolds, Seven Discourses on Art, London: Cassell, 1901, accessed as Project Gutenberg 
etext #2176, May, 2000, Discourse 7, p.64.
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Meister portrayed characters who were deeply involved in the performance and 
analysis of the play. Meanwhile, Friedrich Schlegel’s Studium-Aufsatz cited Hamlet as 
an example of the paradox of Shakespeare, who broke so many of the rules of neo- 
classicism, yet somehow, and puzzlingly, remained great. Schiller himself saw no 
puzzle in Shakespeare. Despite having lived in the early modem age, Shakespeare has 
a natural, naive strength that leaves him comparatively free of transitory cultural 
pressures.
Despite his generalisations about ancient and modem times, Schiller’s view is
thus that every good writer must find his own mix of naivety and sentimentality,
within some undefined acceptable range. At either extreme, if the writer fails to
synthesise the dual strands of naivety and sentimentality, he risks vacuity, but there is
nevertheless a wide spread between the extremes, and a gifted writer could work
anywhere within these limits. Schiller and Goethe were writers who found different
points of personal balance. To work at the more naive end of this spectrum, as Goethe
supposedly did, while assailed by the sentimental influences of eighteenth century
civilisation, would require a particular kind of skill.
Poets of this naive type are no longer really in place in an artificial era. Neither 
are they possible any longer ip such an era or at least only possible in so far as 
they fail to conform to their age and are protected by a favourable destiny from 
its mutilating influence. They can never emerge as part of society but 
sometimes they appear outside of it, rather as outsiders whom one wonders at 
and badly brought up sons of nature at whom one is annoyed. Though they are 
refreshing figures for the artist who studies them and for the real connoisseur 
who knows how to appreciate them, yet they do not get on well on the whole 
and with their epoch... They are hated by the critics... as boundary breakers 
who should be suppressed. 7
87 Friedrich Schiller, On the Naive and Sentimental in Literature, tr. Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly, 
Manchester: Carcanet New Press Ltd, 1981, p.38. Schiller's italics.
Friedrich Schiller, Uber naive und sentimentalische Dichtung, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Stuttgart: 
Philipp Reclam jun., 2005, p.32. The italicised words in the quotation are: wild laufen. ‘Run wild’, the 
obvious translation, is, 1 would suggest, more vivid and appropriate than Helen Watanabe-O’Kelly’s 
choice o f words.
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Again, Schiller potentially sets the artist apart from society. This extract might 
foreshadow the cult of the Bohemian artist, separate from and superior to the society 
that fails to acknowledge him, a figure familiar from the plot of various late 
nineteenth century operas. Such a theme was still proving fruitful for Thomas Mann 
in his 1903 novella, Tonio Kroger Once again, it is a suggestion picked up by
O Q
Schlegel as he advocates a new morality for the initiates of Romantic Poesie.
Schiller has moved towards a view of human thought and nature that avoided 
the apparently strict compartmentalisation of the Kantian analysis. He has also been 
looking for a way of encompassing the variations among individuals and the variety 
present in their creative work, to which Kant did not appear to do justice. He perhaps 
not intend the adjustments he made to Kant to instigate an aesthetic revolution.90 In 
fact, however, he lost the structural unity that had been Kant’s strength. Schiller 
modified his arguments in successive essays, and possibly even, as the tables in 
chapters 3 and 4, and the diagrams in the appendix show, from one group of letters to 
the next. Thus, it was important to him to suggest that, even within the diverse literary 
canon inherited from classical time, but still being added to in the present day, some 
of the certainties of Kant’s analysis still held. He did not wish to abandon traditional 
values of beauty and sublimity in art, but merely to explain how cultural factors had 
made it even more difficult but rewarding to attain them. The sentimental mood is the
88 Thomas Mann, Tonio Krdger, Berlin: S. Fischer Verlag, 1964. Available at: 
http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/23313 [accessed 15.06.08].
89Friedrich Schlegel, Athenaums-Fragment, no.414, in Friedrich Schlegel, Kritische und theoretische 
Schriften, (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997.
See chapter 12 below.
90 Schiller did, however, realise that he had significantly modified Kant’s theory. I therefore disagree 
with:
Wolfgang Dtising, ‘Asthetische Form als Darstellung der Subjektivitat: zur Rezeption Kantische 
Begriffe in Schillers Asthetik’, in (ed.) JUrgen Bolten, Schillers Briefe uber die asthetische Erziehung, 
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1984, p.l85ff.
Dtising believes Schiller applies Kant’s ‘Subjective idealism’ to the theory o f poetic composition (ie. to 
Dichtung)
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result of the attempt to restore the substance of naive emotion even under the 
conditions of reflection.91 'Nature makes man one with himself, art separates and 
divides him, through the ideal he returns to that unity.'92 This loss of natural 
wholeness, struggle with lost nature, and ultimate reconciliation with oneness, is 
found not only in Schiller, but it virtually sums up the underlying theme that will 
emerge in our study of Friedrich Holderlin’s thought and work that begins in the next 
chapter. In fact, the opening paragraphs of Naive and Sentimental recall the extracts 
from the early drafts of Holderlin’s Hyperion, that Schiller had already had an 
opportunity of reading. On the basis of what we have been saying here about 
Schiller, however, its main significance is that, innovative though the idea of the 
sentimental is, it is nothing without the naive. We need the simple, solid substance of 
harmonious, balanced, classical beauty to ground our flights of sentimentality.
Schiller used new and fruitful ideas, but nevertheless remained a writer in the classical 
tradition.
9lFriedrich Schiller, On the Naive and Sentimental in Literature, tr. Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly, 
Manchester: Carcanet New Press Ltd, 1981, introduction p. 16.
92Friedrich Schiller, On the Naive and Sentimental in Literature, tr. Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly, 
Manchester: Carcanet New Press Ltd, 1981, p.40
93 Violetta Waibel, ‘Wechselbestimmung: Zum Verhaltnis von Holderlin, Schiller und Fichte in Jena’, 
in Fichtestudien, 1997, vol. 12, p.50.
She compares several quotations from Naive and Sentimental with ideas from Holderlin. Especially 
telling is:
Sie sind, was wir w aren; sie sind, was wir wieder w erd en  s o lle n . Wir waren Natur, wie sie, und 
unsere Kultur soli uns, auf dem Wege der Vemunft und der Freyheit, zur Natur zuriickfiihren.
Friedrich Schiller, Uber naive und sentimentalische Dichtung, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Stuttgart: 
Philipp Reclam jun., 2005, p.8.
This is undeniably very similar in sentiment to her quoted extract from the Preface to HOlderlin’s 
Fragment o f  “Hyperion ”. See:
(ed.) Michael Knaupp, Erlauterungen und Dokumente: Friedrich Holderlin, »Hyperion«, Stuttgart: 
Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p. 102.
Waibel’s claim is that discussion with Holderlin, and reading HOlderlin’s submissions to Schiller’s 
journal modifed and softened Schiller’s view o f nature.
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Thus, the moral task that Schiller set in the Aesthetic Letters, which looked as 
though it might develop into a radical political agenda,94 and indeed, still had that 
potentiality, has been channelled, in this essay, into the work of the artist, the world 
with which Schiller was most familiar. Poetry can give humanity its most complete 
expression possible.95 In summary, from Naive and Sentimental specifically, we gain 
three fresh and important contributions to the further development of German 
aesthetic theory after Kant. Firstly, derived from Kant’s notion of disinterestedness, 
comes the knowing, self-conscious, reflective and detached artist. Secondly, we have 
a revised account of the nature of beauty, derived from Kant’s imagery of free play, 
that provided the possibility for constant change and readjustment, which Schiller has 
combined also with the fact of cultural change. These two contributions establish an 
essential tension in place of the calm contemplation of classical aesthetics. The third 
contribution is Schiller’s use of resolved dichotomies, which, in this thesis, reappears 
in Holderlin, and which Schlegel went on to regard as the irresolvable means through 
which change constantly takes place; it was subsequently formalised as a universal 
dialectical process by Hegel and Marx.
Having written Naive and Sentimental, Schiller could probably be said to have
t
reached a position, which, in effect, resolved the problems that had led him to begin 
his ten years of theoretical writing. He believed that aesthetic judgements are made 
directly by the practical reason, independently of logical conceptualisation. He 
believed that the best people do not have to try to be good; he believed that many of 
the best artists, in a comparable way, produce their work as a direct manifestation of 
the workings of a balanced nature. Furthermore, comparing his own experience with
94 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XXVII, §11, p .217.
95Friedrich Schiller, On the Naive and Sentimental in Literature, tr. Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly, 
Manchester: Carcanet New Press Ltd, 1981, p.39.
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existing theory, he knew that his literary work had not originated in any attempt to 
create the kind of logically perfect writing recommended by Baumgarten; but he also 
knew from the problems he faced in shaping his own materials to his own satisfaction, 
that artistic creativity could not be explained by the wholly subjective processes 
described by Kant. While Schiller’s conclusions in Anmut und Wiirde and Naive and 
Sentimental acknowledge spontaneous and naive genius, his conclusion, having 
analysed artistic creativity more extensively than many of his contemporaries, is that 
the best artists of all are those capable of fusing the artificiality of art with the 
simplicity of nature.
Schiller himself presumably believed this provided an improved, stable 
version of the classical status quo. However, by acknowledging the possibility that 
sentimental art can compete with and excel the naivety of true classical art, he already 
raised doubts about the classical ideal. If we further add his claims that writers 
supposedly have a personal aptitude for either naivety or sentimentality, and that 
social pressures are said to place definite limits on these apparently natural 
tendencies, a rather complicated process of interacting variables is beginning to 
emerge, all of which, it seems, must contribute towards the creation and evaluation of
l
any work of art. If we look at Schiller from a classical perspective, then, he is 
beginning to abandon the search for absolute aesthetic perfection. However, if we 
look back at him from a perspective that we shall later see became established by the 
end of the 1790s, he is upholding classicism against the Romantic approach. By 
championing the conception of naivety, which he regards as a robust, even if less 
current, alternative to the sentimental way of working, he sustains the norms of the 
classical tradition. Romanticism challenged this. We shall later read Holderlin’s
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reasons for regarding Homer as a self-consciously skilled writer,96 and Schlegel’s 
evaluation of Shakespeare as a writer who chooses when to call forth emotional 
empathy in an audience, and when to use the apparently realistic portrayal of carefully
Q7selected characters to convey a philosophical message. In other words, Schiller’s 
examples of naivety did not really stand up to scrutiny. As he himself found with 
Horace, and as Lessing found with the sculptor of the Laocoon, the more closely we 
examine the work of the artist, the more we find ourselves removed from the calm 
contemplation implicit in the classical judgement of taste. The supposed category of 
the naive begins to dissolve in favour of the sentimental, which thus, contrary to 
Schiller’s probable intentions, would eventually whittle the classical ideal away 
completely.
96 see chapter 9 below
97 see chapter 10 below.
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CHAPTER 6
HOLDERLIN’S PANTHEISM AND THE NOTION OF BEING
From Schiller we now turn to examine the work of Friedrich Holderlin, the poet 
who admired Schiller even from his teenage years.1 We have examined Schiller’s work 
chronologically, and seen how his philosophy and aesthetics changed during the decade. 
This method is less appropriate to Holderlin. Instead, the following chapters aim to 
reconstruct his philosophy and closely linked aesthetics by identifying and explaining 
certain key elements and influences in his theoretical and literary work, and showing how 
they can fit together into a coherent whole. The problem with this approach has been to 
decide the best order in which to address these key concepts, since each aspect of 
Holderlin’s thought seems to presuppose at least some of the others. However, footnotes 
may help point the reader towards parts of the thesis where briefly mentioned terms are 
explained more fully. Interestingly, Holderlin’s own view of philosophy, aesthetics and 
reality was that they form a completely integrated, almost organic whole, and it seems 
that his work inter-relates in a comparable way.
Like Schiller, Holderlin’s role in the change from classicism to Romanticism is 
ambiguous, though his aesthetics probably has more affinity with his Romantic 
contemporary, Schlegel, than with Schiller. Holderlin favoured an extremely broad 
definition of beauty. He explored some cultural and semantic aspects of poetry, and he 
saw aesthetic values and life in general as a work in progress, a Heraclitan simultaneity of 
continuous change and unity. This makes him seem like a Romantic. However, he also 
showed some more conservative, classical characteristics. He believed an adapted and
1 David Constantine, Holderlin, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, plO.
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elaborated version of classical genre theory could guide poetic composition; in other 
words, he accepted the usefulness of a rule book, and he also believed in the possibility of 
achieving a point of perfectly balanced and enduring harmony that could be satisfying 
and contemplative.
This section deals with Holderlin’s work in four main chapters. Firstly, in this 
chapter, we try to establish what he meant by ‘Being’, an omnipresent concept in his 
thought. Then we consider how far he believed we can know Being, and what part his 
conception of memory plays in the overall coherence of this philosophy. Then we look 
more closely at the relationship between the Platonic, Spinozan and Fichtean influences 
on his thought, particularly in order to judge how they affect the view of freedom and 
personal autonomy that he seems to have retained from the Kantian tradition. Having 
done this, we shall have situated his aesthetics in a philosophical context to which his 
poetic practice can be referred. The distinction between poetics and philosophy is not as 
clear as it is in Schiller, and we shall be referring to theoretical essays or fragments, and 
to literary works in every chapter.
We begin by tracing the development of Holderlin’s conception of Being, that
1
grounds his general philosophy and aesthetics, and thence, human life and all other 
worldly existence. For humanity, this means that we all run a typical life cycle. Being is 
one and pre-conscious, so that, by coming into existence, and specifically, by becoming 
conscious and self-aware, humans lose their oneness with pure Being. While their 
understanding is incapable of grasping fully what they have lost, their inner drives and 
instincts compel them to seek a reunion with this lost state of perfect Being. Although the 
details and outcome of their searches vary from one individual to another, it is a universal
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pattern, capable of explaining the workings of human nature. Holderlin introduces two 
much-quoted expressions to characterise this pattern. The first is an astronomical 
metaphor, ‘the eccentric path’, likening our confused way through life to the ancient view 
of the unpredictability of the planetary orbits;2 the second is ‘endless approximation’, a 
mathematical metaphor that encourages us to seek full understanding, but rejects the 
possibility of total comprehension.3 This rather myth-like description of the human life 
cycle, in which fate seems to drive us onwards in a possibly fruitless search for Being, is 
actually part of a coherent philosophical position. In practical terms there are two ways in 
which humanity can come close to understanding this all-encompassing truth. One is by 
appreciating the beauty of nature; since nature, including the human species, is a 
manifestation of Being. The second is through art, and especially through poetry. If we 
relate to nature in the right way, we can experience the One in All; if poetry is written in 
the right way, it replicates that same moment of perfect balance in which we can feel the 
wholeness and beauty of everything. Every human, the poet and the poet’s poetic works 
are three elements in an educational and developmental process that is going on within
2 die exzentrische Bahn. 1
Friedrich Holderlin, ‘Vorstufen und spate Fragmente: Fragment von Hyperion’, in (ed.) Michael Knaupp, 
Erlauterungen und Dokumente: Friedrich Holderlin, »Hyperion«, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, 
p.83.
(ed.) Michael Knaupp, Erlauterungen und Dokumente: Friedrich Holderlin, »Hyperion«, Stuttgart: Philipp 
Reclamjun., 1997, p.216.
3 Friedrich Holderlin, ‘Vorstufen und spate Fragmente: vorletzte Fassung’, in (ed.) Michael Knaupp, 
Erlauterungen und Dokumente: Friedrich Holderlin , Hyperion’, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclamjun. 1997, 
p.157.
Knaupp likens this to Kant’s conception of the immortality o f the soul in the Second Critique. See:
(ed.) Michael Knaupp, Erlauterungen und Dokumente: Friedrich Holderlin, »Hyperion«, Stuttgart: Philipp 
Reclamjun., 1997, p.235.
Holderlin also expresses his idea in more obviously mathematical terms. See: J. Chr. F. HQlderlin, 
,Hermocrates an Cephalus’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: Theoretischen Schriften, 
Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.9.
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the overall and ineluctable search for the restoration of lost unity. We begin by 
establishing what he meant by ‘Being’ or the ‘One and All’.
In the early 1790s, Holderlin was influenced by ideas, derived from Spinoza and 
Lessing, of the en kai pan and alles in allem.4 In 1795 {Seyn, Urtheil...) his argument 
against Fichte established the notion of Being.5 In Hyperion vol. 1:11, he mentions 
Heraclitus’s aphorism (das Eine in sich selber unterschiedene).6 In 1800 (fVenn der 
Dichter...) he refers to the absolute lch. Do we have to presume these all refer to the same 
thing? And if so, where does, or how can, Holderlin provide any justification for this? 
Holderlin even encourages us to accept some of these expressions as synonyms. In 
January 1795 he wrote to Hegel about Fichte, blandly saying, ‘His absolute I (=Spinoza’s 
substance) contains all reality... ‘7
Holderlin’s commentators have approached this topic in several ways. Dieter 
Henrich8 presumes that the notion of Being, apprehended immediately by the intellectual 
intuition, and justified by the argument set out in Seyn, Urtheil... stands alone as the 
fundament of Holderlin’s thought, even though he believes that ‘it is in Holderlin that 
Jacobi, Fichte and Schiller converge’.9 He also sees Holderlin’s supposed ability to apply
4 H.S. Harris, Hegel’s Development: Towards the Sunlight, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972, p.97.
5 J. Chr. F. HQlderlin, ‘Seyn, Urtheil...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: Theoretischen 
Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.7.
6 Friedrich HQlderlin, Die Gedichte: Sdmtliche Gedichte und »Hyperion«, (ed.) Jochen Schmidt, Frankfurt 
am Main; Leipzig: Insel Verlag, 2001, p.561.
7 ’sein absolutes lch (=Spinozas Substanz) enthalt alle Realitat...’, quoted in (ed.) Michael Knaupp, 
Erlauterungen und Dokumente: Friedrich Holderlin, »Hyperion«, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclamjun., 1997, 
fn. 157:5-11, p.235.
8 Dieter Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel, (ed.), trans. David S. Pacini, Cambridge MA; London: Harvard 
University Press, 2003.
9 Dieter Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel, (ed.) trans. David S. Pacini, Cambridge MA; London: Harvard 
University Press, 2003, p.80.
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Fichte’s philosophy to aesthetics as a vindication of Fichte.10 Manfred Frank,11 perhaps
1 0showing the post-modernist tendencies identified by Frederick Beiser, refers to more
than one of these strands without obviously attempting to reconcile them. He also
promotes the idea of the ‘mystery of being’, representing the unrepresentable by means of
the aesthetic.13 Similarly, the editors of the most readily available German editions of
Holderlin’s writings inform readers of the origins of the expressions used, but do not
distinguish the possible differences between them.14 They accept that Holderlin refers to
the ultimate basis for all philosophy or existence in more than one way; but do not
attempt to show how or whether this amounts to the same thing. Charles Larmore, too,15
seems content to use references to Seyn, Urtheil... to explain Holderlin’s philosophical
position, and, in the next section, to treat the alternative vocabularies as poetic
expressions of the same idea. Jane Kneller focuses solely on the notions of Being and the
intellectual intuition, and is possibly led astray as a result.16
Why does this matter? Partly because the intellectual intuition, a means by which
we can know directly that Being is logically prior to everything else, in the very widest
However, in Dieter Henrich, ‘HSlderlin on Judgement and Being: A study in the history o f the origins of 
Idealism’ in (ed.) Eckart FSrster, The Course b f Remembrance and other Essays, Stanford CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1997, p.88, Henrich acknowledges more fully the many influences on Holderlin.
10 Dieter Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel, (ed.), trans. David S. Pacini, Cambridge MA; London: Harvard 
University Press, 2003, p.230.
11 Manfred Frank, Philosophical Foundations o f Early German Idealism, trans. Elizabeth Millan-Zaibert, 
Albany: SUNY Press, 2004.
12 Frederick C. Beiser, The Romantic Imperative, Cambridge MA; London: Harvard University Press, 2003.
13 Frederick C. Beiser, The Romantic Imperative, Cambridge MA; London: Harvard University Press, 2003, 
p.65.
14 This is true of Giinter Mieth, Johann Kreuzer and Michael Knaupp, whose editions and commentaries 
have been referred to throughout the thesis.
15 Charles Larmore, ‘HSlderlin and Novalis’, in (ed.) Karl Ameriks, The Cambridge Companion to German 
Idealism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 141.
16 Jane E. Kneller, ‘Romantic Conceptions o f the Self in HSlderlin and Novalis’, in (ed.) David E. Klemm 
and Gunter Zoller, Figuring the Self, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997, p. 134.
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sense, is rarely referred to in the writings that come after Seyn, Urtheil... and seems 
unlikely to be the same as the insight communicated by means of the schone, heilige, 
gottliche Empfmdung. This latter is experienced by the reader if the poet has successfully 
expressed the poetic spirit in a piece of work, and Holderlin contrasts it with the loss of 
consciousness that comes from mere intellectual intuition.17 Secondly, because, since 
Being is prior to consciousness, it is unclear how we can know anything about it. Again, 
Holderlin’s commentators are divided as to whether we can or cannot know anything 
about Being. Seyn, Urtheil..., taken together with the reference quoted above, seem to 
contradict the message conveyed in Hyperion and in many of Holderlin’s poems. It is 
refreshing, therefore, to read Frederick Beiser’s attempt to demonstrate how strands of 
Kantian, Fichtean, Platonic and Spinozan philosophy came together in Early 
Romanticism.18 Scholarly though Beiser’s work is, however, it cannot be applied 
unmodified to Holderlin, who, as a fringe member of the Romantic movement,19 does not 
conform with the general consensus of Romanticism. The following pages are intended to 
explain what some of these terms used by Holderlin meant, what connotations they 
carried, where they originated, and how both he and we can be justified in believing thatl
they express a coherent position capable of underpinning an aesthetic.
Fundamentally, Holderlin came to philosophy through theology and a Protestant 
Christian upbringing. Despite any ways in which his personal religious and metaphysical 
orientation changed during his lifetime, he never lost the core conviction that something
17 J. Ch. F. HOlderlin , ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: 
Theoretischen Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.56.
18 Frederick C. Beiser, The Romantic Imperative, Cambridge MA; London: Harvard University Press, 2003, 
pp.77, 131.
19 Dieter Henrich, (ed. & tr.) David S. Pacini, Between Kant and Hegel, Cambridge MA; London: Harvard 
University Press, 2003, p.227.
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divine, which an individual could relate to as an individual and at a personal level, was 
present in our lives. I believe this is a constant point to bear in mind, even when 
evaluating his most abstract reasonings. His description of the human search for unity, 
recurrent in his work, always retained something reminiscent of a desire for a restoration 
of, or return to, God’s grace, withdrawn as a result of the Fall.20 The notion of Platonic 
anamnesis connected with this element of Holderlin’s thought. He read Plato’s Meno, 
Phaidros and The Symposium, and The Confessions of the neo-Platonist, St. Augustine of
Hippo.21 Thus, according to Plato, the human mind remembers and will eventually return
00to a world of perfect Forms, from which it came.
By 1790, Holderlin was becoming familiar with Jacobi’s views on Spinoza, and 
also directly with the works of Leibniz and Spinoza, and his correspondence refers to 
their influence on his poetry. Beiser’s discussion of the influence of Spinoza on the 
Romantic circle does not regard it as having been significant until after 1795, giving the 
impression that Holderlin, Friedrich Schlegel and Schelling attempted to reconcile a 
newly discovered Spinoza with their basic Fichteanism.24 Holderlin’s early odes, and the 
correspondence referred to by Harris, however, show that he already found the notion ofi
20 Priscilla A. Hayden-Roy, ‘New and Old Histories: The Case o f  Holderlin and Wiirttemberg Pietism’, 
Modern Languages and Literatures, Department o f German Language and Literature Papers, Lincoln NE: 
University o f  Nebraska, 1992.
available at: DigitalCommons@University o f Nebraska - Lincoln, 
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/modlanggerman/23 [accessed 13.07.08].
21 H.S. Harris, Hegel’s Development: Towards the Sunlight, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972, p.98.
22J. Chr. F. HOlderlin, ‘Aphorismen’ in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: Theoretische Schriften, 
Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p. 19 and fn. p. 121.
More detail on the extent to which Plato is relevant can be found in chapter 7 o f this thesis.
23 H.S. Harris, Hegel’s Development: Towards the Sunlight, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972, p.98.
24 Frederick C. Beiser, The Romantic Imperative, Cambridge MA; London: Harvard University Press, 2003, 
ch. 8, p.131.
Frederick Beiser, German Idealism: the struggle against subjectivism, Cambridge MA; London, Harvard 
University Press, 2002, p.384ff.
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the en kaipan, the Greek term for the One and All, as very attractive, and, as a variously 
expressed slogan, it appears repeatedly in his literary and theoretical works from January 
1791 on.25 Partly through Jacobi’s work,26 Holderlin was simultaneously attracted by 
three aspects of Spinozism, as he understood it. The first was the basic unity of the world, 
or universe, and the rejection of mind / body dualism. The second was pantheism, which 
put mankind into intimate and pervasive relationship with God and with the world and 
nature in general. The third was the rejection of the subjective ego as the ultimate
77principle of Being.
However, what was so individual about Holderlin’s reading of Jacobi on Spinoza, 
was his acceptance of Jacobi’s rejection of rationalism. Our identity depends on our 
existence, but not vice versa.28 Jacobi regarded Spinoza’s argument as being 
incompatible with non-rational religious faith, and, thus, unacceptable. However, 
Holderlin combined elements of Spinoza with the Christian and Platonic metaphysics 
with which he was familiar. Effectively, this meant his pantheism was not strictly 
Spinozan, and he did not explore the notion of substance per se. Harris points out that 
Holderlin’s pantheism, and that of his (iero, Lessing, was fairly compatible with orthodox 
Christian doctrines such as ‘the God in whom we move and have our being’. Rather
25 H.S. Harris, Hegel’s Development: Towards the Sunlight, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972, p.97.
26 di Giovanni, George, "Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 
2006 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2006/entries/friedrich-jacobi/ 
[accessed 13.07.08].
27 More detail on Holderlin and Spinozism can be found in chapter 8 below.
28 Das Denken ist nicht die Quelle der Substanz, sondem die Substanz ist die Quelle des Denkens.
quoted in Andreas Josef Lindner, Gefuhl und Begriff: Zum Verhaltnis Jacobi - Kant, ch.2, ‘Zum 
Spinozabuch (1785)’, Dissertation, Freie Universitat Berlin: Philosophie und Geisteswissenschaften, 2005. 
available at:
http://www.diss.fu-berlin.de/diss/receive/FUDlSS thesis 000000001537 [accessed 09.02.07].
29 H.S. Harris, Hegel’s Development: Towards the Sunlight, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972, fn. p. 100.
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than making substance and God identical, Holderlin’s world was pantheistic in a way 
rather analogous to the way in which sensible objects participate in the world of Forms, 
according to Plato. The presence of beauty, truth and freedom in the world around us and 
in ourselves shows us the omnipresence of the One and All. In other words, we prove, or 
demonstrate, the presence of the One and All by direct, sensuous experience, thus neatly 
combining Jacobi’s view of religious experience, and Spinoza’s pantheism. However, as 
well as pointing out that Holderlin took an eclectic range of ideas from various systems, 
we must also investigate whether the various elements can co-exist consistently. In 
Holderlin’s case, the link between non-rational pantheism and religious faith might have 
come from Herder’s influence on Schiller’s poetry during the 1780s, the period in which 
Holderlin’s admiration for Schiller was established.30 Having become familiar with these 
ideas of natural forces, Holderlin was then, from Jacobi’s letters to Mendelssohn, able to 
find a way of using Spinozism to give a more defined and easily expressed form to his 
idea.31
30 Herder believed a force manifested itself in mature. Beiser regards this as a form o f vitalism. See:
Frederick C Beiser, German Idealism: The struggle against subjectivism, Cambridge MA; London,
Harvard University Press, 2002, p.366.
However, Foster’s reading of Herder does not portray Herder as a vital ist. See:
(ed.) Michael N. Foster, Herder: Philosophical Writings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, 
p.xxi.
The contentious issue is whether these thinkers were using an empirical, heuristic principle or a 
metaphysical principle. Herder seems to have taken a strongly empiricist approach. HQlderlin’s thought was 
metaphysical (eg. in its religious and Platonic influences), but it seems rather misleading to claim he used 
the notion o f  a vital force. Although we shall not explore the details o f Holderlin’s views on nature, biology 
and physics any further, I do not think this chapter and the three following suggest he was a vitalist.
31 There were two editions of the Spinoza letters to Mendelssohn, the first in 1785, and the second in 1789. 
They are summarised in:
George di Giovanni, ‘Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi’, in (ed.) Edward N. Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia o f  
Philosophy (Spring 2006 edition), available at:
http://plato.Stanford.edu/archives/spr2006/entries/friedrich-iacobi/ [accessed 07.04.08].
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This, approximately, seems to have been Holderlin’s belief system at the time 
when Kant published the Third Critique. During the early 1790s, Holderlin probably read 
the Third Critique?2 and also learned about Kant because his ideas were a central topic 
for educated discussion in the 1780s and 1790s. There seems to be no evidence that he 
was ever influenced by Reinhold. To Holderlin the second half of the Third Critique 
seemed especially attractive. He had already developed, as he said in his correspondence, 
the habits of critically examining everything he read, and the way in which he devised a 
personal version of pantheism shows that he could confidently adapt and assimilate 
whatever he found useful in a text, without agreeing with the entire argument. Thus, his 
pre-existing metaphysical framework enabled him to take the apparent purposiveness of 
nature, that Kant observed, as further evidence of the en kai pan. It is at this point that the 
philosophical development in Hdlderlin’s thought becomes sharper. As had been the case 
for Schiller too, having read Kant he refined an aesthetic philosophy of his own. This was 
the task in which he engaged, alongside and in his literary output for the rest of the 
1790s.
Apart from the important fact that Kant regarded the purposive appearance of 
natural phenomena as nothing more than a convenient metaphor employed by mankind, 
in order to apply a human structure to a range of phenomena outside his control,
Holderlin was able to accept much of the second half of the Third Critique into his view 
of the cosmos, without drastic revision.33 The first half of the Critique, however, which 
dealt with judgements of taste and the nature of beauty, was less acceptable. The notion
32 Letters to Neuffer, May and July 1794, in (ed.) Michael Knaupp, Erlauterungen und Dokumente: 
Friedrich Holderlin, »Hyperion«, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p.257.
H.S. Harris, Hegel’s Development: Towards the Sunlight, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972, p.98.
33 We shall return to this point below in chapter 8, which discusses Hdlderlin’s view of fate.
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of substance, in Spinoza, and the One and All in Jacobi’s letters rejected the Cartesian 
cogito, or any Kantian equivalent, as the foundation of knowledge and existence, and this 
had been accepted by Holderlin. Existing, as we do, in the One and All, which also exists 
in us, it makes no sense to claim that things in themselves are utterly unknowable, or, as a 
corollary of this, that beauty is only subjectively ascribed, not present, in an object. This 
made him just as doubtful as Schiller about Kant’s attempt to universalise the judgement 
of taste by reference to the sensus communis.
Holderlin did not challenge the specifics of Kant’s analysis of conscious 
perception and moral judgement, but he rejected the apparently dominant role Kant gave 
to both reason and the understanding, at the expense of sensory perception and personal 
feeling. In his own aesthetics Holderlin ignored the first half of the Third Critique. His 
famous, and much quoted, letter to Neuffer,34 in which he stated his intention of going 
beyond Kant, going even further than Schiller had dared to go, tells us, not only that he 
disagreed with Kant’s Analytic of the Beautiful, but that he thought Schiller had already 
disposed of significant aspects of it, and that he must now engage with Schiller. Schiller 
had used a significantly modified model of Kantian perception and of the Kantian view of 
human thought processes, in order to create an aesthetic theory that gave equal weight to 
reason, sensation and appetite in the experience of aesthetic pleasure, and which 
acknowledged that the object of the aesthetic judgement had its own, non-arbitrary and 
distinctive part to play in exciting or attracting that judgement. By agreeing with the
Spinozan / Jacobian rejection of the cogito and subjectivism in general, Holderlin was
34 Beck, Adolf, (ed.), Friedrich Hdlderlin, Sdmtliche Werke, Vol. 6, Part 1 Briefe, Part 2 Lesarten und 
Erlauterungen, Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, J.G. Cottasche BuchhandlungNachfolger, 1954, Letter 
no.88 to Neuffer, January 1794, p. 137.
Referred to in: Frederick C. Beiser, German Idealism: The struggle against subjectivism, Cambridge MA; 
London, Harvard University Press, 2002, p.388.
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rejecting the subjectivist foundations of Kant too. Deprived of a subjectivist underlay, the 
teleological content of the second half of the Third Critique no longer had any 
requirement for an ‘as if. Holderlin still needed some justification for believing nature 
genuinely has a teleological structure, but without subjectivism this nevertheless became 
a possibility. Thus, despite our initial claim that Holderlin did not tamper with the 
epistemological or moral arguments of the Kantian Critiques, he accepted them only 
insofar as was possible in a non-subjectivist context. So far Hcjlderlin’s response to Kant 
has been described in terms strictly personal to himself, someone with a prior bias 
towards a God-centred Christian faith, a Platonic cosmology and a somehow de­
rationalised Spinozism. However, this also put him into a similar position to other critics 
of Kant. In the 1780s and early 1790s Jacobi, Reinhold, Fichte and Niethammer were all 
trying to find some further prior grounding for knowledge, beyond, behind or beneath the 
transcendental ego that was present in the background of Kant’s system.35 A little later in 
the decade Fichte engaged in the same enterprise, seeking a basic axiom that could 
underpin everything valuable in the Kantian system.
This chronological account is now nearing the key date in Holderlin’s career at 
which the independently developing cpmponents of his philosophical thought would 
come together successfully. One of Jacobi’s objections to rationalism was that it inverted 
the purpose of reason.36 Reason is a tool that enables mankind to live in the world; it is 
not a mould into which worldly evidence must be crushed, in order to create an elegantly
argued system. This was the origin of the Jacobian exhortation to perform the salto
35 Dieter Henrich, (ed. & tr.) David S. Pacini, Between Kant and Hegel, Cambridge MA; London: Harvard 
University Press, 2003, pp.117, 125.
36 George di Giovanni, ‘Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi’, in (ed.) Edward N. Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia o f  
Philosophy (Spring 2006 edition), available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2006/entries/friedrich- 
iacobi/ [accessed 07.04.08].
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mortale, which he had urged originally on Lessing, and which was the theme of his 
disagreement with the critical philosophy, in his eyes the inheritor of the rationalist 
tradition.37 Therefore Jacobi not only disagreed with many contemporaries, but 
articulated his own view of the world in a way that included a substantial amount of 
possibly idiosyncratic theology, not susceptible of rational formulation. Up until 1795 
Holderlin’s methodology was proceeding according to ideas gained from Jacobi. Beiser, 
however, tells us that, in the early 1790s, Holderlin rejected the idea of the salto mortale, 
but later rethought his position.381 disagree here with Beiser, in that the early Holderlin 
was not influenced by the dominant rationalistic tradition, unless we include Plato, whose 
philosophy he used selectively. He never tried to reason the world into existence, though 
he was not irrational or inconsistent.
Therefore, contrary to Beiser, I would claim that it was in 1795 that Holderlin 
performed a quite different ‘reverse flip’ of his own, prompted by Kant. Holderlin 
became very interested in current strands in Kantianism. He became one of Fichte’s 
students,39 and, almost experimentally, though perhaps not intentionally so, began to play 
the game of the critical philosophy. Reserving to one side his already extant non­
subjectivist pre-conceptions, he followed and reflected critically on Fichte’s attempts to 
ground the cosmos in the Ich / Nicht-Ich relational term. In addition, he read the draft for 
Schelling’s Vom Ich, and understood the implications of the Ich=Ich statement of
37 The salto mortale (literally ‘deadly jump’, but used to refer to a ‘back somersault’) was the expression 
Jacobi used when he urged Lessing to abandon Spinozan rationalism and take a leap of faith back to belief 
in a personal God, freedom, and common sense.
38 Frederick C. Beiser, German Idealism: The struggle against subjectivism, Cambridge MA; London, 
Harvard University Press, 2002, p.384.
39 Frederick C. Beiser, German Idealism: The struggle against subjectivism, Cambridge MA; London, 
Harvard University Press, 2002, p.386.
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identity.40 In his 1794/95 manuscript fragment, Seyn, Urtheil...,41 that set out his account 
of the priority of Sein he worked out an argument that plausibly identified the 
presupposition that lay behind the critical philosophy. There he exposed the non­
relational presupposition that must subsist as a pre-conceptual axiom, prior to any 
objective / subjective dichotomy. He confirmed his objections to Fichte’s subjectivist 
philosophical foundations in a letter to Hegel, based on Fichte’s lectures on the 
Wissenschaftslehre:
...I am, as such, necessarily limited, even if only in time, and thus not absolutely. 
And so no consciousness in the absolute I is thinkable. As absolute, I have no 
consciousness. And to the extent that I have no consciousness, to that extent I am 
nothing (for myself) - and so the Absolute is nothing (for me).42
Thus, as the early drafts of Hyperion, written either immediately before or during 
Holderlin’s attendance at Fichte’s lectures,43 show, consistently with Seyn, Urtheil..., 
consciousness presupposes opposition, whereas the absolute is unconscious.
40 Manfred Frank, Philosophical Foundations o f Early German Idealism, (tr.) Elizabeth Millan-Zaibert, 
Albany: SUNY Press, 2004, pp.88, 98.
41 J. Chr. F. HOlderlin, ‘Seyn, Urtheil...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Hdlderlin: Theoretische 
Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.7.
42Letter o f  26.01.1795, quoted and translated in Manfred Frank, The Philosophical Foundations o f Early 
German Romanticism, (tr.) Elizabeth Milldn-Zaibert, Albany: State University o f New York, 2004, p.l 14.
These sentiments are confirmed in Friedrich HOlderlin, ‘Vorstufen und spate Fragmente: metrische 
Fassung’, in (ed.) Michael Knaupp, Erlauterungen undDokumente: Friedrich Hdlderlin, .H yperion’, 
Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p.l 14.
43 dating taken from Manfred Frank, Philosophical Foundations o f  Early German Idealism, (tr.) Elizabeth 
Millan-Zaibert, Albany: SUNY Press, 2004, p.l 16.
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Both Henrich, who originally discovered this manuscript,44 and Frank45 regard 
Seyn, Urtheil... as central to Holderlin’s philosophy. Jacobi had already stated that Being 
must be revealed in an immediate feeling, or in ‘unmediated consciousness’; this, to him, 
was the absolute.46 In this text, however, Holderlin’s view of Being as something 
unconditioned has no Jacobian religious connotations. He establishes an ultimate 
axiomatic premiss that could underpin both Fichte’s Ich / Nicht-Ich formula and, also, 
like Reinhold earlier in the decade, Kant’s conception of the transcendental ego and the 
unknowable noumenal world. Hdlderlin explains what, by definition, can only be known 
immediately, unconditioned by knowledge in a Kantian sense. He does so by reference to 
the immediate intellectual intuition, an expression that Schelling and Hdlderlin used, to 
mean something of which the intellect is immediately conscious, without reference to 
concepts or senses.47
^Dieter Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel: Lectures on German Idealism, (ed.) (tr.), David S. Pacini 
Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, 2003, p.292. Henrich discovered this manuscript 
fragment, known as Seyn, Urtheil...
45 see Manfred Frank, Philosophical Foundations o f  Early German Idealism, (tr.) Elizabeth Mill&n-Zaibert, 
Albany: SUNY Press, 2004, p.97.
Dieter Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel: Lectures on German Idealism, (ed.) (tr.) David S. Pacini, 
Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, 2003, lecture 19, p.279.
(ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Hdlderlin: Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, 
‘Einleitung’, p. XIII.
see also: Andrzej Warminski, Readings in Interpretation: Hdlderlin, Hegel, Heidegger, Minneapolis: 
University o f  Minnesota Press, 1987, pp.6, 7.
46 Manfred Frank, Philosophical Foundations o f Early German Idealism, (tr.) Elizabeth Mill&n-Zaibert, 
Albany: SUNY Press, 2004, Lecture 4, pp.77, 78.
47 Manfred Frank, Philosophical Foundations o f Early German Idealism, (tr.) Elizabeth Millan-Zaibert, 
Albany: SUNY Press, 2004, p. 104.
Frederick C. Beiser, German Idealism: The struggle against subjectivism, Cambridge MA; London, 
Harvard University Press, 2002, p.393.
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By intuition Kant too had meant what we are immediately conscious of.48 Thus, 
an intuition was essentially a function of the senses and, as the precursor of perception, 
also of experience, unmediated by the processes of conceptualisation; the intellect is a 
function of reason. For Kant, then, the notion of intellectual intuition demonstrated the 
impossibility of knowing anything about the noumenal self.49 By becoming aware of 
ourselves as reflecting subject, we cast ourselves in the role of object, and raise the 
question of what we, the reflecting subject, might be. Kant took the circularity of this 
argument, always presupposing the existence of the entity we are seeking to identify, to 
show that the noumenal self, ie. the self that is the source of our ability to act as a self­
determining subject, is essentially unknowable.50 However, Holderlin, as we shall go on 
later to claim, firstly did not accept that conceptualisation is the only way of acquiring 
knowledge, and secondly, distinguished Being from the self completely.
Any statement of identity, even the Ich=Ich identity claim that Schelling made 
just weeks before Hdlderlin wrote his fragment,51 makes some kind of mental separation, 
even between an Ich and the same Ich. Consciousness of anything, including self- 
consciousness, presupposes a subject / object dichotomy. ‘If I know the other as myself, a 
pre-objective knowledge must underlie and authenticate this object-knowledge.’ Thus,
48 cf. Manfred Frank, Philosophical Foundations o f Early German Idealism, (tr.) Elizabeth Millan-Zaibert, 
Albany: SUNY Press, 2004, p. 104.
49 Frederick C. Beiser, German Idealism: The struggle against subjectivism, Cambridge MA; London, 
Harvard University Press, 2002, p.299.
50 Frederick C. Beiser, German Idealism: The struggle against subjectivism, Cambridge MA; London, 
Harvard University Press, 2002, p.297.
51 Manfred Frank, Philosophical Foundations o f  Early German Idealism, (tr.) Elizabeth Mill&n-Zaibert, 
Albany: SUNY Press, 2004, p.98.
52 Manfred Frank, Philosophical Foundations o f Early German Idealism, (tr.) Elizabeth Millan-Zaibert, 
Albany: SUNY Press, 2004, p. 107.
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Holderlin was effectively asking, “What could precede consciousness ‘of*?” Answer: 
absolute Being.
Holderlin then turns to the second term of the fragment’s title: Urtheil. This 
means ‘judgement’, and, in English translation, seems superficially to be an unlikely 
choice of concept for him to have opposed to the notion of Being, but both he and 
Fichte53 did so on the basis of a mistaken etymology of the German word. In order to 
become self-conscious, or to distinguish the Ich from the Nicht Ich, (or even Ich=Ich) we 
make a judgement. We judge what is me and what is the rest of the world. We judge the 
extent to which we ourselves are part of the world, and we judge ourselves as if we were 
part of that world. Simultaneously, and in doing so, we make that separation to which 
Holderlin referred. That, then, is the next step that takes us forward into conscious 
knowledge of ourselves and the world around us. It is the Ur- (=original) Theilung 
(=division). Judgement, or Urtheil, is therefore preceded by the pre-conscious condition 
of absolute Being, which can only be known immediately -  if at all - by the intellectual 
intuition. Absolute Being precedes any divisions of form and content, objectivity or 
subjectivity, or any conceptions of self, but it underlies everything. If, for a moment, we 
move away from Holderlin’s quite strictly analytical approach in Seyn, Urtheil.., we can 
compare Urtheil with his reference to 'das grofie Wort... des Heraclif in Hyperion.54 
Division in the world and consciousness in the self nevertheless presuppose an original 
unity. As Frank puts it:
53 Frank quotes an extract from one o f Fichte’s lectures.:
Manfred Frank, Philosophical Foundations o f  Early German Idealism , (tr.) Elizabeth Millan-Zaibert, 
Albany: SUNY Press, 2004, p. 103.
54 We have drawn attention to this elsewhere also. The reference is:
Friedrich Hdlderlin, Die Gedichte: samtliche Gedichte und »Hyperion«, (ed.) Jochen Schmidt, Frankfurt 
am Main / Leipzig, 1999, p.559.
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‘Here, [ie. in Seyn, Urtheil...] even before idealism spread its wings, the self- 
sufficiency of consciousness is contested, in solidarity with Jacobi. ...It is not 
consciousness that determines Being, but Being that determines consciousness. 
...In this sketch of the argument... we have the first consummate expression of 
what I call “early Philosophical Romanticism” - not the dismissal of the theme of 
self-consciousness, but rather, its relegation to a status secondary to that of 
Being.’55
In philosophical terms, by doing this, Hdlderlin has pushed back beyond any ‘first 
principle’, just as any contemporary critic of Kant would have wished. But he has done 
so without tempting us into any potentially infinite regress in search of an even more 
fundamental principle, the problem faced by all philosophies of first principle. He also 
resolved the problem of how a first principle could be different in kind from what 
philosophers might wish to deduce from it. Being transcends consciousness, and leaves 
us, as conscious creatures, unable to describe or explore it adequately, even though we 
continue to use our understanding to pursue this infinite task.56 In fact, we shall see that 
Hdlderlin does not limit humanity only to using the understanding for this purpose. We 
obsessively use every means of thinking and feeling in order to become aware of or 
explore Being. The primary condition of Being precedes and unites subjectivity and 
objectivity. Indeed, it is very hard to separate out discussion of the significance of Being 
from discussion of every other aspect of what Hdlderlin wrote throughout the 1790s.
However, while Seyn, Urtheil... may have exposed an axiomatic pre-supposition, 
it did not in itself demonstrate that Being was anything more than a necessary, logical 
assumption, and it was not a proof of existence. One of the aims of Holderlin’s theory of
55 Manfred Frank, Philosophical Foundations o f  Early German Idealism, (tr.) Elizabeth Mill&n-Zaibert, 
Albany: SUNY Press, 2004, p. 107.
J. Chr. F. Hdlderlin, ‘Seyn, Urtheil...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Hdlderlin: Theoretische 
Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, pp.7,8.
56 Manfred Frank, Philosophical Foundations o f Early German Idealism, (tr.) Elizabeth Millan-Zaibert, 
Albany: SUNY Press, 2004, p. 108.
160
SECTION 2: Friedrich Hdlderlin Chapter 6
poetry is to eliminate the subjective grounding set up by the Kantian aesthetics and its 
theory of nature. A presupposition inherent in our subjective reasoning could not in itself 
achieve this. If we were to try and separate or distinguish Being, or distinguish the 
essence of anything from Being, this would destroy its unity.57 Only immediate, 
unmediated, unconditioned Being meets the criteria of absolute unity, as is also the case 
in intellectual intuition.58 Frank is perturbed by these two statements, especially since 
Holderlin took his terminology from Spinoza and Jacobi who both had a conception of 
Being that was thicker than an ‘intellectual intuition’.59 However, although Seyn,
Urtheil... is itself expressed in analytical terms, for Hdlderlin the logical priority of Sein 
was a presupposition that brought together the critical philosophy and his pantheistic 
background belief in the en kaipan, that he was able to live, and which he saw confirmed 
around him every day, in just the way Jacobi might have wished.60 Thus, without 
Holderlin’s already existing cosmological or metaphysical conception of the nature of the 
world and existence, the presupposition of Being would have been nothing more than 
that, but, since the more theological side of Holderlin’s thought cohered with the 
implications he had newly recognised in the critical philosophy, the two positions 
confirmed each other.
Having reached a synthesis of this kind, Holderlin’s subsequent philosophical 
thought was an amplification of detail. A partial early draft of his novel, Hyperion, was
57 J. Chr. F. Hdlderlin, ‘Seyn, Urtheil...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Hdlderlin: Theoretische 
Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.7.
58 J. Chr. F. Hdlderlin, ‘Seyn, Urtheil...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Hdlderlin: Theoretische 
Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.7.
59 Manfred Frank, Philosophical Foundations o f  Early German Idealism, (tr.) Elizabeth Millan-Zaibert, 
Albany: SUNY Press, 2004, p. 125.
60 Though, o f  course, Jacobi himself was not involved, or even interested in, these intellectual 
developments personally.
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published in Schiller’s periodical, Thalia, in 1794. Frank points out that a passage in the 
introduction, that refers to the resolution of the varied conflicts that drive us through life 
in search of peace, may seem to anticipate the condition of being 
harmonischentgegengesetzt, that Holderlin later described,61 but that, since it pre-dates 
Seyn, Urtheil..., that passage does not reflect Holderlin’s considered conclusion regarding 
the nature of the ultimate unity. However, according to the timescale suggested here, 
Seyn, Urteil... did not change Holderlin’s interpretation of life. The poems and all post- 
‘95 versions of Hyperion fit the same scenario, as also do his analysis of time, and his 
poetology. Seyn, Urtheil... provides a logical justification for ‘pantheism’, but the living, 
moving and omnipresent divine, in which Hdlderlin had long believed, is still, 
nevertheless, like a metaphorical shimmer that occasionally catches the light of thought, 
reason or experience, and reveals the enormity of existence to us. From Kant and from 
Schiller, Hdlderlin gained the notion of the importance of harmony and balance. From 
Kant, Schiller and Fichte he gained the imagery of opposition and productive conflict. He 
adjusted and adapted these factors to construct his own multi-relational notion of 
harmonious opposition, reinforced by the contemporary organic theory of the natural 
sciences.63 Whatever specific doctrines influenced Hdlderlin, however, he situated them 
firmly in the simultaneously pantheistic and logical framework of all-encompassing
61 J. Ch. F. Hdlderlin, ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Hdlderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.43.
This essay was not written until about 1800.
62 Manfred Frank, Philosophical Foundations o f Early German Idealism, (tr.) Elizabeth Millan-Zaibert, 
Albany: SUNY Press, 2004, p.l 16.
63Frederick C Beiser, German Idealism: The struggle against subjectivism, Cambridge MA; London, 
Harvard University Press, 2002, p.366.
See also chapter 9 below.
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Being; a framework acquired before 1795, and which he continued to explore in his 
literary work until his breakdown in 1805.
If Holderlin is to be taken seriously as an aesthetic thinker, it must be possible to 
integrate the several strands of thought that influenced him. Some commentators have 
tended to present him as a man in touch with a supernatural, inexpressible and 
tantalisingly unreachable ‘One and AH’ that merges into the Platonic World of Forms, the 
Christian God and the gods of antiquity.64 On this account he would become an 
appropriate candidate for criticism in the same terms that Kant levelled against 
Schwedenborg, as a pedlar of Schwarmerei,65 much as Kneller does.66 On the other hand, 
commentators from the generation of Henrich and Frank were excited by the discovery of 
the Seyn, Urtheil... manuscript, and have emphasised the logical status of Being and the 
way Holderlin thought this resolved the post-Kantian search for axiomatic foundations. 
They thus elevate Holderlin as a philosophical thinker in the Kantian / idealist tradition. 
While Frank believes that Seyn, Urtheil... provides the missing piece that enables us to 
make sense of ideas hinted at in Holderlin’s creative work, he also emphasises the 
unknowability of Being. In fact, he is not really able to explain how this notion of Being 
relates to Holderlin’s poetry at all. Seyn, Urtheil... sets up a notion of pre-conscious 
Being that,prima facie, has no practical implications for poetry, life, nature or the way
64 Manfred Frank, Philosophical Foundations o f Early German Idealism , (tr.) Elizabeth Millan-Zaibert, 
Albany: SUNY Press, 2004, p. 126.
Stefanie Hdlscher, ‘Schiller and Hdlderlin: from Beauty to Religion’, in Publications o f  the English Goethe 
Society, vol.LXXV, part ii, 2006.
65 Martin Schdnfeld, "Kant's Philosophical Development", in (ed.) Edward N. Zalta, The Stanford 
Encyclopedia o f Philosophy (Spring 2007 Edition). Available at:
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2007/entries/kant-development/ [accessed 15.07.08].
66 Jane E. Kneller, ‘Romantic Conceptions o f the S e lf , in (ed.) David E. Klemm & Gunther Zdller, 
Figuring the Self, Albany NY: State University o f  New York Press, 1997.
163
SECTION 2: Friedrich Hdlderlin Chapter 6
life is lived. Neither does it explain why mankind should wish to return to the state of 
Being - or indeed, why anyone should think we ‘came’ from Being in anything other than 
a logical sense in the first place.
Yet the notions of going forth and returning to are central motifs in Holderlin’s 
oeuvre. Kneller’s article, misguidedly, I believe, claims that Holderlin’s search for 
reconciliation in life is ultimately a search for oblivion, but at least she shows what a 
strange doctrine Hdlderlin would appear to be propounding, if Seyn, Urtheil... were the 
key to everything he wrote. In Holderlin’s poems and Hyperion, however, the One and 
All, which Beiser is inclined to use as an expression interchangeable with Being, and 
which we may presume Frank also thought synonymous with Being, clearly has a 
standing that makes it relevant to our perception of the world, and which pervades the life 
we lead and the nature of the universe, and which, in addition, has some kind of 
normative relevance to the kind of life we should choose to live. We cannot ignore the 
passages in Hdlderlin in which he points to our ability to have experiences of the One and 
All, and to the way in which we come close to knowing it. It is clearly something more 
than a logical presupposition.
When Hdlderlin stated that he wished to go further than Kant, one way in which 
he appears to have intended this statement to be taken, is that he wanted to avoid the ‘as 
if  in the Third Critique. He wanted to show that the two views, firstly that objects 
possess the quality of, for instance, beauty and, secondly, that nature has purpose, are 
more than metaphor, and rest on something more than an argument from analogy. So 
long as aesthetics, whether for audience or creative artist, originates solely in the subject, 
it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to do this. One of the consequences of having
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explained how the pure Being of Seyn, Urtheil... is integrated with the notion of the One 
and All, is that any similarities between the behaviour of mankind (including the 
production of art), and nature (including the beauties of God’s natural creation) become 
structural, rather than analogous, thus fulfilling Holderlin’s intentions. His theory of 
history flows into his theory of poetry and into the lessons for life exemplified in his 
writings. It has to be said that the account of the One and All, abandoning as it does the 
rational tradition within which it was first set out by Spinoza, lacks some logical rigour, 
in just the same way that Seyn, Urtheil... lacks any practical dimension. But, given that 
religious belief of any kind can have an acceptable place in the human world, Holderlin 
has succeeded in fusing the rather disparate elements in his intellectual background into a 
theory of general philosophical and aesthetic unity. The next chapter will consider the 
role of memory within this general philosophy, so that we may then examine the further 
implications arising from Hdlderlin’s rejection of the Kantian ‘as if, and how he dealt 
with them.
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CHAPTER 7 
MEMORY, AND ITS STRUCTURAL ROLE IN HOLDERLIN’S 
PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT
Our discussion of Holderlin’s conception of Being, and its relationship to the One
and All, has already begun to establish the coherence of Holderlin’s general philosophy,
by considering whether Being is a common sense presumption, a logical axiom, a
religious concept, or an entity with some other kind of ontological status. Several
commentators have questioned whether or not Holderlin claimed we could have
knowledge of Being. Frank1 and Larmore2 claim that Being cannot be an object of
knowledge. Larmore notes that, if it were so, this would distinguish it from the knowing
subject, whereas it is supposed to be a condition that cannot be distinguished from
anything in any way. However, as he also says
Precisely the unknowability of Being, however, is what Holderlin wanted to 
establish... Being can only be a presupposition that we adopt to make sense of the 
possibility of reflection... it functions as a ground, not as a principle. We cannot 
begin with an understanding of Being, and deduce the characteristic features of 
our relation to the world.
This quotation contradicts our implicit claim that Holderlin was urging us to find out 
about Being,3 and raises a question about whether it is determinate or indeterminate in 
status. The way in which Holderlin introduces the notion of Being, in Seyn, Urtheil..., 
seems to confirm the unknowability claim set out in the above quotation. The ‘I’ cannot 
create awareness, and cannot create or provide awareness of any absolute, because, by 
definition, we cannot demand conditioned, conscious knowledge of what is
1 Manfred Frank, Philosophical Foundations o f Early German Idealism, (tr.) Elizabeth Millan-Zaibert, 
Albany: SUNY Press, 2004, p. 125.
2 Charles Larmore, .Hdlderlin and Novalis’, in (ed.) Karl Ameriks, The Cambridge Companion to German 
Idealism , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 148.
3 See chapter 6 above.
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unconditioned and pre-conscious, and thus, also, is neither objective nor subjective.4 We 
cannot reflect on the pre-conscious, or it will at once lose its immediacy, and become a 
mediated, conscious, conditioned concept. Frank considers that Holderlin follows both 
Jacobi and Kant in saying that Being is the quintessence of all actuality and is not grasped 
by thought, but is rather like an idea in the Kantian sense, to which all concepts are 
inadequate. According to Frank, Holderlin later used the ‘aesthetic intuition’ to address 
the ‘cognitive gap’ that this left.5
Indeed, Cassirer and Kneller thought Holderlin had unwittingly described a self- 
defeating life cycle such that we perish in oblivion at the very moment of acquaintance 
with Being.6 Beiser, however, thought Hdlderlin was claiming that we could know Being, 
but, nevertheless, not in Kant’s strictly cognitive sense. I think it must be admitted that 
the time and page space Hdlderlin devoted to the topic of humans who see, or somehow 
come to know ‘the gods’,7 ‘Mother Nature’8 or the One and All,9 as revealed in beauty, 
oblige us to agree with Beiser that human beings can know Being. But we could easily 
interpret this special sense that Hdlderlin seems to reserve for our way of knowing Being
4 Manfred Frank, Philosophical Foundations o f Early German Idealism, (tr.) Elizabeth Millan-Zaibert, 
Albany: SUNY Press, 2004, p.80.
5 Manfred Frank, Philosophical Foundations o f  Early German Idealism , (tr.) Elizabeth Millan-Zaibert, 
Albany: SUNY Press, 2004, p. 100.
6 Kneller, Jane E., ‘Romantic Conceptions o f the Self in Hdlderlin and Novalis’, in (ed.) David E. Klemm 
and Gunter Zdller, Figuring the Self, Albany: State University o f  New York Press, 1997, p. 144.
7 See, for instance, ‘Die Unerkannte’ (1796), and ‘An den Ather’ (1797), in Friedrich Hdlderlin, Die 
Gedichte: Sdmtliche Gedichte und »Hyperion«, (ed.) Jochen Schmidt, Frankfurt am Main; Leipzig: Insel 
Verlag, 2001, pp. 170& 182.
8 See, for instance, An die Natur, (‘die Seele der Natur’) (1794/95), and Diotima, (‘Mutter Erde’) (1796), in 
Friedrich Hdlderlin, Die Gedichte: Sdmtliche Gedichte und »Hyperion«, (ed.) Jochen Schmidt, Frankfurt 
am Main; Leipzig: Insel Verlag, 2001, pp. 164 & 173.
9 ‘Was ist der Menschen Leben? - ein Bild der Gottheit...’, in Friedrich Hdlderlin, Die Gedichte: Sdmtliche 
Gedichte und»Hyperion«, (ed.) Jochen Schmidt, Frankfurt am Main; Leipzig: Insel Verlag, 2001, p.384.
This fragment is dated as ‘very uncertain’ but after 1800 by Schmidt, and at about 1807 by Hans JUrgen 
Balmes, in Friedrich Hdlderlin, Gesammelte Werke, (ed.) Hans JUrgen Balmes, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer 
Taschenbuch Verlag, 2008.
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as problematical and even mysterious.10 To resolve these difficulties, first we shall 
discuss Being, in relation to Plato’s theory of Forms, and then we shall show the 
importance of Holderlin’s explanation of change and the passage of time in Das 
untergehende Vaterland, as it relates to the role of memory.11 Doing so will also take us a 
little closer to understanding Holderlin’s aesthetic theory.
Plato has already been acknowledged as one of the sources for Holderlin’s
10philosophical thought. Perhaps we now need to consider whether there is a similarity
that we have so far neglected between the way we come to know about Being, and
Plato’s theory of the Forms.
Aber weder unser Wissen noch unser Handeln gelangt in irgend einer Periode des 
Daseyns dahin, wo aller Widerstreit aufhort, wo Alles Eins ist; die bestimmte 
Linie vereiniget sich mit der unbestimmten nur in unendlicher Annaherung.
Wir hatten auch keine Ahndung von jenem unendlichen Frieden, von jenem Seyn, 
im einzigen Sinne des Worts, wir strebten gar nicht, die Natur mit uns zu 
vereinigen, wir dachten und wir handelten nicht, es ware uberhaupt gar nichts,
(fur uns) wir waren selbst nichts, (fur uns) wenn nicht dennoch jene unendliche 
Vereinigung, jenes Seyn, im einzigen Sinne des Worts vorhanden ware. Es ist 
vorhanden -  als Schonheit; es wartet, um mit Hyperion zu reden, ein neues Reich 
auf uns, wo die Schonheit Konigin ist.
Ich glaube, wir werden am Ende alle sagen: heiliger Plato, vergieb! man hat 
schwer an dir gesundigt.13
10 Frederick C. Beiser, The Romantic Imperative, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p.65.
Here Beiser is quite scathing about Frank who, he says typifies aesthetic experience as a kind o f  
‘suprarationalism’, like an ‘inscrutable awareness o f  “the mystery o f  Being”, which somehow presents the 
unpresentable only by virtue o f the inexhaustible interpretability o f a work o f art.’ Frank thus overlooks the 
influence o f  Plato and Naturphilosophie, and gives an ‘obscurantist view’ derived from Heidegger.
11 J. Chr. F. Hdlderlin, ‘Das untergehende Vaterland’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Hdlderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.33ff.
12Frederick C. Beiser, The Romantic Imperative, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p.77ff.
Beiser even claims Hdlderlin consciously revived Platonism in opposition to Kantianism.
Frederick C. Beiser, German Idealism: the struggle against subjectivism 1781 -1801 , Cambridge MA; 
London: Harvard University Press, 2002, ch. 2, pp. 393ff.
l3Friedrich Hdlderlin, ‘Vorstufe und spate Fragmente: vorletzte Fassung’, in (ed.) Michael Knaupp, 
Erlauterungen undDokumente: Friedrich Hdlderlin, .H yperion’, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, 
p. 157.
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Knaupp’s notes to this extract refer to a letter, in which Holderlin tells Neuffer the 
discussion oiPhaidros in his analytic of beauty and the sublime will simplify Kant in 
some respects, but also add to him.14 This encourages us to think of the condition of 
wholeness and perfection towards which we strive, but never fully attain, and which 
Holderlin identifies with the One and All, as equivalent to the relationship between 
anamnesis and the access our intellect has to Plato’s World of Forms.
However, there are ambiguities in Holderlin’s conception, because, in Seyn, 
Urtheil..., Seyn seemed to be a Kantian or Fichtean precondition of human thought. 
Therefore, if Holderlin indicated that poetry and the other arts could reintroduce us to a 
perfection from which we had originated, this would be like ascribing some kind of 
desirable character to the Kantian transcendental world, and would be a claim to have
But neither our knowledge nor our actions succeed, at any period o f  our existence, in reaching where all 
strife ceases and everything is One; the determinate line only unites itself with the indeterminate in endless 
approximation.
If we also had no awareness [ = memory + presentiment (tr.)] o f  that endless peace, o f that Being, in the 
only sense o f  the word, we would not strive at all to unite nature with ourselves, we would not think and 
act, it [Being] would be absolutely nothing at all (for us), we ourselves would be nothing (for us) unless, 
nevertheless, that endless union, that Being, in the only sense o f  the word, were present. It is present - as 
beauty; a new kingdom, if  we may use Hyperion’s words, is waiting for us, in which Beauty is Queen.
I believe in the end we shall all say: Holy Plato, forgive us! We have sinned against you sorely.
Holderlin wrote to Hegel in early 1794 that his reading at that time consisted o f Kant and the Greeks.
See: Adolf Beck (ed.), Friedrich Hdlderlin, Sdmtliche Werke, Vol. 6, Part 1 Briefe, Part 2 Lesarten und 
Erlauterungen, Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, J.G. Cottasche Buchhandlung Nachfolger, 1954, Letter 
to Hegel, no.84, pp. 127, 683.
14 Friedrich Hdlderlin, ‘Vorstufe und spate Fragmente: vorletzte Fassung’, in (ed.) Michael Knaupp, 
Erlauterungen undDokumente: Friedrich Holderlin, .H yperion’, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, 
editorial note, p.236.
Knaupp believes this is a reference to the myth in Phaidros where the pre-embodied soul rides through the 
heavens as a horse, harnessed to Zeus’s chariot, and there sees true Being as beauty. Therefore wise people 
remember this experience as soon as they encounter something beautiful.
The letter appears in full in: (ed.) Adolf Beck, Friedrich Holderlin, Sdmtliche Werke, Vol. 6, Part 1 Briefe, 
Part 2 Lesarten und Erlduterungen, Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, J.G. Cottasche Buchhandlung 
Nachfolger, 1954, Letter no.84, p. 127.
see also: (ed.) Michael Knaupp, Erlduterungen und Dokumente: Friedrich Hdlderlin, .H yperion’, Stuttgart: 
Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p.216.
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revealed some content in what Kant referred to as the noumenal realm. Contrary to the 
critical philosophy, the transcendental would then have acquired a more developed 
ontological status than Kant thought possible. If Holderlin intended to open up the world 
of Being by means of the intellectual intuition, he would also appear to be negating his 
claim that it was undetermined. By intruding into and exploring it, surely mankind cannot 
avoid making it determinate, even though its full nature remains beyond our capacity to 
understand.
Once we describe the enterprise in this way, Being once again comes closer to 
acquiring the perfection and attractiveness of the World of Forms, and our efforts to 
attain it resemble our intellect’s supposed ability to access Plato’s World of Forms, 
especially since, like Plato, Hdlderlin did not take the ‘I’ as his philosophical starting 
point. Thus, our worldly experience of beauty as a glimpse of the One and All (Being), is 
rather like recognising the presence of Platonic beauty in the world of the senses. Every 
object of sense shares something of the Forms, so we already begin to gain an imperfect 
understanding of true beauty and the world of Forms, by observing the sensible world. 
Beiser points out that, in Plato’s Phaedrus and The Symposium, it is by perceiving beauty 
that we obtain any knowledge of the Forms.15 The World of Forms ‘contains’ 
‘information’ without which we would live a poor and incomplete life, but, despite the 
enrichment and benefit that philosophers gain by seeking the Forms, we and they only 
ever approach to knowledge of them. Holderlin’s image of mankind’s eccentric path 
through life would be just as well suited as a way of explaining our relationship to Plato’s
15 Frederick C. Beiser, The Romantic Imperative, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p.61. For the 
purpose o f  this discussion he includes Hdlderlin among the German Romantics.
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World of Forms - ‘unendliche Annaherung’.16 There would be something paradoxical in 
this, however. Plato confidently tells us what is in the World of Forms, how we should 
access it, and, virtually, that it is our duty to do so. Plato is quite specific that the World 
of Forms is the intelligible realm, where the archetypes of the sensible realm are present. 
However, this was not the way in which Hdlderlin suggests Being can be accessible. We 
do not have to refer to Being continually, in order to verify our concepts or perceptions 
and their relation to the Forms. Beauty, as we perceive it, is Being. The mainstay of 
Holderlin’s thought is that the ‘world’ of Being is not merely non-physical, but also pre- 
conscious, and is not accessed by any method that involves consciousness. If Hyperion is 
typical, we are engaged in a rather unpredictable personal inner struggle or exploration if 
we seek to attain knowledge of it.
Holderlin’s view of Being is therefore unlike Plato’s view of a World of Forms, 
accessed by means of the understanding alone. In fact, following St. Augustine, Hdlderlin
tells us that the understanding, acting alone, far from opening our eyes to beauty, can lead
11us to despair. Thus, our comparison between Being and the World of Forms fails; 
Hdlderlin is not claiming that our understanding accesses the Forms, and there is no 
suggestion that the concepts by means of which we obtain discursive knowledge derive 
from Forms; Being is inaccessible to the understanding. Beiser’s argument, widening
16 ‘Endless approximation’. The term apparently originated in a Neo-platonic commentary on Euclid’s 
geometry. See
Friedrich Hdlderlin, ‘Vorstufe und spate Fragmente: vorletzte Fassung’, in (ed.) Michael Knaupp, 
Erlduterungen und Dokumente: Friedrich Hdlderlin, , H yperion’, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, 
editorial note, p.235.
I7J. Ch. Friedrich Hdlderlin, ‘Aphorismen’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Hdlderlin: Theoretische 
Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p. 19, and editor’s notes, p. 121.
Perhaps this claim is complicated, however, by the fact that Augustine is often referred to as a neo- 
Platonist.
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Plato’s notion of intellect to include the reason as a whole seeks to equate Holderlin’s and 
Schlegel’s view of rational human thought processes with Plato’s intellect.18 However, 
this is not convincing, because, despite his admiration for Plato, Holderlin does not share 
his high regard for the capacities of the intellect, or understanding, working alone and 
without feeling. Admittedly, the beauty of the One and All (Being) is present in and 
becomes knowable in the world around us, just as Plato believed particulars participated 
in the Forms, but Holderlin rejected Platonic dualism. For him, Being is intrinsic in the 
world around us. There is no inferior sensible world; if anything, the entire cosmos is 
elevated through its inclusion in the One and All.
Our world, like Plato’s unreliable sensible realm, is forever changing, but this is 
not a weakness. It is because everything that is done, thought or exists originates in a 
flow of changes, a becoming, shifting from one extreme of ideality or reality to the other. 
All reality is rooted in a set of previous circumstances. Every moment has its origin and 
end in another, in both the next and the previous moments.19 Holderlin tells us that by 
‘untergehencT, which usually means sinking, he also means ‘iibergehencT, ‘crossing’, 
‘transitional’, or ‘passing’.20 Present reality is by definition the transition from future, 
whether real or ideal, to past, whether real or ideal, finite or infinite. Holderlin defines 
human life at any present moment in which we live, as representing a fleeting balance 
between the finite and the infinite, the real and the ideal. We gain reality from the having- 
been-present, ie. the past; and from the about-to-be, ie. the future. Wechselwirken,
18 Frederick C. Beiser, The Romantic Imperative, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p.60.
I9J. Chr. F. HOlderlin, ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.49.
20 J. Chr. F. HOlderlin, ‘Das untergehende Vaterland’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.33fF.
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alternating change, or reciprocity, a term familiar from Schiller, and which Schiller may 
also have borrowed from Fichte,21 establishes the point among these determinants at 
which Holderlin says we are harmonischentgegengesetzt.22 However, unlike the 
reciprocal action between competing drives that Schiller and Fichte imagined, and which 
Schiller sees as being, in certain conditions, within human control, Holderlin’s 
‘reciprocity’ is a more multi-dimensional, or fluid re-adjustment that continually creates 
and re-creates unified harmony from among at least two, but possibly more, opposing and 
irreconcilable components. The present moment is a split second of indeterminacy, an 
interface between Seyn and Nichtseyn, as the ideal possible becomes the future real, then 
the past real, and then the ideal past; it is an experience of both the present and of Being, 
but fortunately, it is always a moment of transition, and not of real resolution. If it were 
real, we would be ‘stuck in the present’ (my expression). The real components would 
annul themselves, cancel themselves out, dissolve themselves (sich aufloseri). It would be 
a real nothingness. It would be a complete cessation; and, for us, would be oblivion, loss 
of consciousness and nothingness, a ‘reales Nichts\ 24 There would be no possibility of 
reference either forwards into future possibility, or back into an experienced or ideal past. 
What we therefore seek is an ideal resolution that does not preclude any of these various 
possibilities. Kreuzer calls this a philosophy of history, the implications of which for the
21 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f Man: In a series o f letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XIII; §2fh., p.85.
See chapter 3 above.
22 J. Chr. F. Hdlderlin, ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.43.
23 J. Chr. F. Holderlin, ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.46.
24 J. Chr. F. Holderlin, ‘Das untergehende Vaterland’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.36.
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free imitation of art, and for poetical practice are developed in Wenn der Dichter
einmal..., 25 since the same process is at work in the writing of a poem.
This seems to be a real departure from Kant’s view of time. In Kant an existing
self structured its perceptions by using the schemata that originated in its own way of
thinking. Holderlin, however, makes time constitutive of activity and of existence. We
can recognise aspects here of the great difference between Fichte and Kant, namely
Fichte’s rejection of the pre-existing self, and his account of the self-creating self.26
the self endeavours to unite the irreconcilable, now attempting to receive the 
infinite in the form of the finite, now, baffled, positing it again outside the latter 
[ie. the finite], and in that very moment seeking once more to entertain it under 
the form of finitude - this is the power of imagination.27
This process, Henrich says, is not an attempt by the self to eliminate the not-self, but a 
self-referring process. Sometimes, Fichte does not portray this process as a serious 
contest, but as playful activity, as schweben, a kind of hovering and wavering within the 
lch. Fichte wished to convey that the determinate Ich exists only in so far as it is active. 
The self, in Fichte, both exists and is known in its activity; and the imagination’s 
continual, flickering transition between Ich and Nicht-Ich is intrisically bound with time 
and therefore has an essential temporal dimension. The flow of time is the same thing as 
the annihilation and immediate restoration of any finite state of mind. No sensation is 
merely momentary, it is continued. The mind therefore always foresees the future and is
25 (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, 
Introduction, p.XXVIIff.
26Dieter Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel, Cambridge MA; London: Harvard University Press, 2002,
p.212.
27 Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, (ed.) Reinhard Lauth and Hans 
Jacob, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstadt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1965, pp. 358-359, quoted in Dieter Henrich, 
Between Kant and Hegel, Cambridge MA; London: Harvard University Press, 2002, p.212.
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related to it. Thus mind, imagination and sensation all have a temporal structure.28 Thus 
also, Holderlin’s attempt to portray a constantly fleeting reality in Das untergehende 
Vaterland... itself subsumes an explanation of time and existence derived from the 
Fichtean philosophy.29
If all the elements in Holderlin’s aesthetics are to be assembled, the next feature 
that must be added to this account of the self in time is Holderlin’s idea of the communal 
soul. The claim that there is in any sense a communal soul originated in Kant’s Third 
Critique, where he states that the existence of a basic sensus communis is demonstrated 
when we, as it were, hold up our judgement to human reason as a whole, in the 
expectation that aesthetic judgements are universal.30 Fichte is more explicit about how 
shared responses are possible, when he explains the way the hovering self-consciousness 
of the mind contributes to a cultural consciousness, by referring to a general human 
mind.31 Holderlin also makes a serious attempt to explain how shared responses and 
reactions could come about. He first refers to this phenomenon when he tells us that the 
social interaction of a shared life makes it possible for each of us to contribute our own
28 Dieter Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel, Cambridge MA; London: Harvard University Press, 2002, 
p.213.
29 Although Hdlderlin does not equate change with instability, Nicholas Saul characterises the Romantic 
subject in a way that has some similarities with these ideas: ‘Fixed in a deeply ironic relation to being and 
reality, it becomes a fundamentally unstable construct, oscillating between something and nothing.’
Nicholas Saul, ‘The pursuit o f the subject: literature as critic and perfecter o f philosophy’, in (ed.) Nicholas 
Saul, Modern German Literature and Philosophy 1700-1990, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2002, p.71.
Holderlin does not treat irony as an important aesthetic concept, but in chapter 11 below, we shall see how 
Friedrich Schlegel emphasised the shifting instabilities o f  such oscillations as a central concept in all 
aspects o f aesthetic evaluation.
30 Immanuel Kant, Critique o f the Power o f Judgement, (ed.) Paul Guyer, (trans.) Paul Guyer and Eric 
Matthews, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 5:293, §40, p. 173.
31 Johann Gottlieb Fichte, ‘Lectures concerning the scholar’s vocation (1784)’, in Early Philosophical 
Writings, (ed.) trans. Daniel Breazeale, Ithaca NY; London, Cornell University Press, 1993, p. 147.
and see above, chapter 6.
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idea or experience of divinity, and thus gain from others a fuller and more adequate idea 
of God. In this way we come to know that there is such a thing as a communal soul; it is 
our ‘feeling for life’.33 For individuals, change comes about as the self hovers between 
the poles of past and future, between Being and Not-Being. If aggregated, this process 
encompasses a whole community’s ‘self, and the temporal activity of the communal 
soul, or society, becomes equivalent to change in general. Reinforcing this explanation 
from another angle, if pure Being is Stillstand, or Ruhepunkt,34 any kind of 
consciousness, feeling or living can be characterised as change. Thus, the communal soul 
is also our feeling for and understanding of the transition between future and past, ideal 
and real, and represents change itself in general.35
Having set out Holderlin’s account of what it is to exist, and thus, what it is to 
experience time, I shall now consider how it is that in our everyday life, and as a result of 
all this, we are able to ‘know’ Being, which can be regarded also as an alternative way of 
conceiving of the One and All.36 The conclusion will be that we do so through the 
operation of memory. Since change is essential to human consciousness and experience, a 
process such as memory has significance, in so far as it captures or makes sense of the 
constant flow of change. Without memory, consciousness of each present moment would 
otherwise provide us only with a disconnected series of infinitely brief experiences,
32 J. Chr. F. Hdlderlin, ‘Fragmente philosophischer Briefe’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p. 10.
33 Selbstgeflihl des lebendigen
(ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, 
Introduction, p.XXVII.
34 Friedrich Holderlin, ‘Fragment Philosophischer Briefe’, ‘Wenn der Dichter einm al...’, in Theoretische 
Schriften, pp. 12, 41.
35 (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Hdlderlin: Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, 
Introduction, p.XXVIII.
36 See chapter 6 above.
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rather like the Atomreihe that Holderlin tells us is typical of unstructured or poorly
17conceived literary work. Indeed, as Kreuzer tells us, for Holderlin memory grounds the
poetic life in time and determines it temporally. In both life and literature it enables us
to recognise the existence of process and continuity. Self-reference itself can take place
only in the context of memory, and this is what happens also when the Ich makes its
connection with the external world, the ‘freie Wahl eines Objekts 39 Anything that is
temporally situated can be whole only if the series of fleeting moments can be held
simultaneously, even if only briefly.
Im Zustande zwischen Seyn und Nichtseyn wird aber liberal 1 das Mogliche real, 
und das wirkliche ideal, und diB ist in der freien Kunstnachahmung ein 
furchtbarer aber gottlicher Traum.40
This is the key extract from Das untergehende Vaterland on which Kreuzer believes 
Wenn der Dichter einmal... builds. It shows that the artist or writer somehow has to 
capture the transition between Being and Not-Being, the essence of every present 
moment. In just the same way that the present disappears at exactly the same moment it 
becomes real, so too the poet treads a perilously close line between success and despair.
The object which poetic individuality chooses in order to make itself perceptible, 
and which makes poetic self-reference possible, is language. Only in the form of
37J. Chr. F. HOIderlin, ‘Wenn der Dichter einm al...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.49.
38 (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, 
Introduction, p.XXIX.
39 (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, 
Introduction, p.XXX.
40J. Ch. F. Hdlderlin, ‘Das untergehende Vaterland’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.34:
In the condition between Being and Not-Being the possible everywhere becomes real, and the real becomes 
ideal; and in free artistic imitation this is a dreadful but divine dream.
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language can we ‘recollect’ what we ‘remember’.41 In other words, because of our shared 
life, language is how we represent an inner memory (ie. erirmerri) sensuously and in 
reality (ie. entsinneri). Thus, if we return briefly to the theories of Kant and Schiller, this 
would be rather like saying that Geist, the interior aspect of an ‘unexpressed, felt 
effect’,42 and Stoff, the externalising means by which this effect is supposed to be 
reproduced, are brought together by the action of memory. Holderlin’s conception, by 
contrast, is that, either both Geist and Stoff exist essentially as activities progressing in 
time, or that they create time through the manner of their existence. Both these 
possibilities mean that memory is in some way a representation of time, and unifies spirit 
and substance whenever we are conscious of them (<ahnen). Thus, for the poet, the 
communal soul has two levels of significance, firstly at a metaphysical level, in 
representing change in general, and secondly as a guarantee of his or her ability to 
communicate, even if only incompletely, with a public, and for the public in turn to 
engage with what he or she has written.
David Pacini, the translator of Henrich, uses the word ‘remembrance’ to represent 
this key concept of Holderlin’s, and particularly Holderlin’s word, Andenken.43 Andenken 
is a kind of pondering or calling things to mind, and can also be used to refer to a public 
act of remembrance or commemoration, or to a memento or souvenir. Holderlin also uses 
erinnern, the usual German word for remembering or reminding; referring, as above, to 
an internal process, as information is absorbed into inner consciousness. He contrasts and
41 (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Hdlderlin: Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, 
Introduction, p.XXX.
42 (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, 
Introduction, p.XXVIII.
43 Dieter Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel, Cambridge MA; London: Harvard University Press, 2002, 
Foreword, p.xxxi.
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complements this in Wenn der Dichter einmal... with ‘entsinnen\ which involves 
expression, extracting the thought from the inner senses, and recalling a memory in 
language. Equally importantly, he uses the word, ‘ahnden’, or ‘ahnen\ which means 
being aware of what has happened, and that there is a future: antizipiertes Erinnern44 
Most of these words occur somewhere in Holderlin’s writings, and help communicate the 
force of his philosophy of change.
Before we consider more specifically how the terminology of remembering 
relates to Seyn, just a brief mention of some ways in which this relationship has been 
characterised might be useful. If we follow Frank, who regards the representative 
inexhaustibility of art as the only way to represent the unknowability of Seyn45 the word 
‘hovering’ seems to take on a new meaning, divorced from its strictly Fichtean use, so 
that, as we hang between future and past, Being and Not-Being, in a condition of being 
harmonischentgegengesetzt, we inhabit a sort of half-world, somewhere between this 
world and the next, somewhere between consciousness and stygian oblivion. The 
transition takes on a dreamlike quality, while at the same time being in some way 
superior to anything an ordinary mortal could experience in everyday life. As in 
Hyperion, only people who have been through the hell-on-earth of blind, unbridled and 
ill-directed striving can finally reconcile themselves calmly to their own life cycle, and 
thereby achieve a state of mind capable of knowing Being, or the One and All. This
44(ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Hdlderlin: Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, 
Introduction, p.XXXII; p.l24n.
45 Manfred Frank, The Philosophical Foundations o f  German Romanticism, (tr.) Elizabeth Millan-Zaibert, 
Albany: State University o f  New York Press, 2004, p. 126.
In this he follows Kant’s conclusions regarding the aesthetic ideas.
Immanuel Kant, Critique o f  the Power o f  Judgement, (ed.) Paul Guyer, (trans.) Paul Guyer and Eric 
Matthews, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 5:314, §49, p. 192.
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seems to be a long way both from the usual, more conscious, sense of ‘remembrance’ in 
English, and from the truism that the present lies between future and past. It is difficult to 
find any word which might describe this almost meditational condition. Words like 
‘awareness’ suggest a self-conscious state that would be too closely related to the already 
divided condition of consciousness to meet Holderlin’s requirements, but alternatives, 
such as ‘apprehend’ tend to be linked to entities so ineffable as to involve us in arguments 
about whether they are in fact completely devoid of content.
However, reference to memory can nevertheless explain how Holderlin thought 
we can know Being, or the One and All. It involves nothing mysterious. It is something 
very familiar, except - as Holderlin pointed out - that we are rarely aware of it. For this 
purpose we need to think about memory in a rather Fichtean performative sense that 
might not usually seem to belong to the family o f ‘memory’ concepts. For instance, I 
remember how to pick up a cup. This is a performative memory, in the sense that it is not 
until someone has had a stroke or bad accident that we would need to say they have 
forgotten how to pick up a cup. They themselves might even realise they have forgotten 
how to do it. This is what tells us that picking up a cup is an act of memory. Examples of 
this kind are connected with our having learned, or having learned how to do something. 
And they merge at a certain point into our state of consciousness, or, less consciously, our 
state of general awareness. Like the physical processes of being hungry and going to 
sleep, they are part of being alive; and like digestion or gaseous exchange in the 
bloodstream, they are at work unnoticed in the background of everything we do. Thus, 
there are processes of mental awareness that can legitimately be grouped together with 
the phenomena of memory, though not perhaps with specific memories, and are
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constantly present, as an integral part of being alive. If we live and experience, we are 
remembering. When Holderlin says that we have an Ahndung of Seyn, he is thus not 
necessarily referring to anything particularly mysterious or supernatural.
Therefore, the full significance of Holderlin’s description in Das untergehende 
Vaterland, of how every transitory present moment lies at the interface between the 
determined and the undetermined as it slips past, is that it shows us how Being, though 
itself pre-logical, pre-conscious and undetermined, is also experienced at every moment. 
The One and All, as we learn from Hyperion, is present in everything, and is everywhere 
in the world around us. It is, then, our unconscious or pre-conscious memory that holds 
all this together, and enables us to engage with both nature and the One and All. It is what 
enables us to recognise beauty and it partly explains why we respond to beauty in such a 
powerful way. I have chosen here to emphasise Holderlin’s philosophy of human life and 
of poetic method mainly as a response to the philosophy of Fichte.46 However, in relation 
to the Platonic elements in Holderlin’s thought, we can add, briefly, that our account of 
memory remains coherent. Our unconscious grasping of the experiences of the fleeting 
moment as they pass by, and our ability to use skills and instincts that we are unaware of 
having learned nevertheless have some similarity to the Platonic theory of anamnesis, or 
‘unforgetting’ of what we knew ante-natally in the World of Forms. Holderlin’s poetry is 
known to many readers for its portrayal of vivid memory, homecoming, and the vain 
search for the lost innocence of childhood. However, many of his apparently nostalgic 
references to the lost innocence of childhood, or the lost security of the childhood home 
and family are intended to draw our thoughts towards a sense of memory, or
46 Frank, Henrich, Beiser and Pinkard, op. cit. also provide more detail about the relationship with 
Schelling.
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remembering that is more deeply situated in the human psyche, ie. the sense of memory 
that enables us to know Being.
Throughout this section Holderlin’s metaphysical position emerges as being 
relatively level-headed and commonsensical, mainly because a fairly close reading of his 
words justifies this. He was a writer for whom it was important to establish a theoretical 
groundwork, however he might subsequently use this groundwork when making practical 
artistic decisions about his preferred figurative means of expression. It has therefore been 
worth rescuing this important area of non-cognitive knowledge, ie. the ability to ‘know’ 
Being, from accusations of Schwarmerei.41 Like other of Holderlin’s ideas, it has a 
multiple line of descent. First, his unquestioning acceptance that aesthetics must be set in 
a context of epistemology and moral philosophy was taken from the Kantian tradition, as 
also his use of the term, ‘communal soul’. Then, more specifically, he has modified a 
version of Fichte’s theory that the internal striving and activity of the Ich drives us on 
through life, and also combined this with Plato’s theory that we long to return to the 
unremembered World of Forms. All these facets of his thought are accommodated within 
the idea of the all-embracing whole, and it is memory that enables us to have a sometimes 
hazy, but at other times ‘beautiful, holy, divine feeling’48 for the nature and magnitude of 
this whole.
47 Kneller, Jane E., ‘Romantic Conceptions o f the Self in Hdlderlin and Novalis’, in (ed.) David E. Klemm 
and GUnter Zdller, Figuring the Self, Albany: State University o f New York Press, 1997, p. 144.
48J. Chr. F. Hdlderlin, ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’ in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Hdlderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.56.
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CHAPTER 8 
SPINOZA, FICHTE, FATE AND FREEDOM
We now return to Holderlin’s rejection of Kant’s claim that our expectation of 
purpose in nature is simply a presumption.1 This is the next element of Holderlin’s 
thought that we shall try to integrate into his overall aesthetic view. Holderlin’s claims 
for the existence of an all-embracing whole relied largely on his adoption of a version 
of the Spinozan philosophy. Doing so, however, conflicted with Kant’s discussion of 
the properties of the beautiful object, the work of art and the purposiveness of nature 
in terms o f an ‘as i f , whereby the human mind projects its judgement onto these 
artefacts. The mind has to use a model that makes its thought processes possible, and 
uses its presumption of purposiveness in nature as a regulative principle for ordering 
its understanding of external nature. Schiller pushed back the boundary of this ‘as i f ,  
by suggesting that the internal constitution of the perceived object’s form and content 
combine to elicit an aesthetic response. However, as Beiser says, he retained his own 
‘as i f ,  which Holderlin, like the Romantics, tried to eliminate. Beauty was only the 
phenomenal appearance of freedom, though it helped us understand freedom.3 In this, 
beauty was somewhat analogous to the Kantian aesthetic idea, in that it could aid our 
insight into the abstract, though it remained in the phenomenal world. The Romantics, 
says Beiser, wanted to show a direct link between the so-called phenomenal and 
noumenal realms that made the noumenal accessible in some way relevant to 
everyday reality. They thought they had identified the aesthetic as that link, thereby
1 See chapter 6 above.
2 Immanuel Kant, Critique o f  the Power o f  Judgement, (ed.) Paul Guyer, (trans.) Paul Guyer and Eric 
Matthews, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 5:578, §67, p.250.
3 Friedrich Schiller, Kallias oder iiber die Schdnheit, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Stuttgart: Philipp 
Reclam jun, 1999, p. 18, 08.02.1793.
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establishing an accessibility that destroyed the problem of the phenomenal / noumenal 
dichotomy. In their terms, the ‘as i f  would become redundant.4
However, one reason Kant refused to allow our presumption of purposiveness 
in nature more than regulative status was that human free will would be impossible, if 
mankind were genuinely part of a teleological, and thus predetermined, system.5 H.S. 
Harris describes Hdlderlin’s belief in autonomy and individuality while a student at 
Tubingen.6 Given Holderlin’s sympathy with the Spinozan philosophy, and the way 
the theme of Fate recurs in his poems and in Hyperion, the problem therefore arises: 
does Holderlin succeed in reconciling Kantian / Fichtean conceptions of autonomy 
and freedom of the will with his Spinozism?7 Holderlin’s answer would be, ‘Yes,’ and 
I think he would be justified in this.
Spinoza’s rationalist realism based all existence and reality, including that of 
the living natural world and human beings, on substance.8 He identified substance 
with God, or, as Lessing said, the One and All. The universe embodies a necessary, 
rational order that is knowable by the human mind, and the true good for humans 
consists in knowledge of this order. Every occurrence in nature can be explained in 
terms of an infinite causal chain, so nothing is contingent. The order and connection 
of ideas is just the same as all other connections among things. Thinking and extended 
substance are the same substance, but with different attributes; so that creatures other
4 Frederick Beiser, German Idealism: the struggle against subjectivism, Cambridge MA; London, 
Harvard University Press, 2002, pp.393, 394. In this instance he appears to be including HOlderlin 
among the Romantics.
5 Frederick C. Beiser, The Romantic Imperative, Cambridge MA; London: Harvard University Press, 
2003, p .170.
6 H.S. Harris, H egel’s Development: Towards the Sunlight, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972, p. 100.
7 Frederick Beiser, German Idealism: the struggle against subjectivism, Cambridge MA; London, 
Harvard University Press, 2002, p.275.
8 This summary o f  Spinoza is mainly based on:
Henry E. Allison, ‘Spinoza’, in (ed.) Edward Craig, Routledge Encyclopaedia o f  Philosophy, Vol. 9, 
Sociology o f  knowledge - Zoroastrianism, London; New York: Routledge, 1998, pp.96 - 107.
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than humans are ‘all animate, though to differing degrees’.9 Mind is thus not a 
separate substance, but the extent to which things can be said to have a mind is a 
function o f physical complexity, so that there are degrees of being ‘alive’, or of being 
composed of substance in its active mode. Spinoza’s references to: ‘The force through 
which things persevere in their being’ also show that, in the most minimal and weak 
sense, everything is alive, even so-called inanimate objects. They lie right at the 
lowest point of his universal scale. Conversely, we are as much subject to universal 
forces of nature as they are, even though, at our end of the scale of powers, we 
possess conscious awareness and rational insight. The love of God is closely bound up 
with rational knowledge, because it enables rational thought and the control of the 
passions. Through rational thought we can find out about the world around us. Since 
God is substance and is everywhere and in everything, adequate knowledge of 
anything involves the love of God as its effective dimension. Thus, a self-reinforcing 
cycle of increased knowledge, increased love of God and pursuit of the good for 
mankind is set up. Although it had an element of ‘speculative bio-physics’, Spinoza 
saw his philosophy as a preferable alternative to Descartes’ mechanistic model. 
Nevertheless, in the context of Hdlderlin, the problem could be that, as well as leaving 
inanimate nature with some vestiges of life, Spinoza also leaves mankind equally 
strictly subject to a logical chain of natural physical and chemical causes.
In Hdlderlin more than one strand of this brief survey of Spinoza comes 
through. However, Spinoza was not the sole influence on Holderlin’s views on unity 
with nature and the significance of fate. Religious pietism may also have played a 
part.10 Despite being controversial, pietism was influential in theological circles at
9 Henry E. Allison, ‘Spinoza’, in (ed.) Edward Craig, Routledge Encyclopaedia o f  Philosophy, Vol. 9, 
Sociology o f  knowledge - Zoroastrianism , London; New York: Routledge, 1998, p.98.
10 Beiser acknowledges that aspects o f  deterministic Protestant theology are compatible with 
Spinozism. See: Frederick C. Beiser, The Romantic Imperative, Cambridge MA; London: Harvard
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Tubingen and had been a thread in the Swabian reformed church since Luther’s and 
Brenz’s time.11 Theologically, quietism was questioned, because it encouraged more 
pantheistic interpretations of the omnipresence of God, and tended to present God in 
such abstract, spiritual terms, that the essentially personal characteristics of the 
Christian God were underplayed. Its moral overtones were that to seek the highest 
good means to seek as close as possible a reconciliation and union with God and his 
will. This in turn placed an emphasis on the extent to which the will of God 
determines our life, though without committing the believer to accepting the logical 
necessity o f worldly processes. Thus, exposure in the Tiibinger Stift to the quietist
University Press, 2003, p. 171. However, orthodox eighteenth century Protestant theologians seem to 
have detected the influence o f both. They seem to have been concerned to avoid both Spinozism and 
determinism, less concerned about the influence o f  Plato. At p.63 Beiser questions whether there are 
any links between the Platonic aspects o f ’Romantic mysticism’ and the Protestant tradition.
11 Pietism is a school o f quietist religious thought, which, while usually thought of, harmlessly enough, 
as advocating contemplation and the development o f  a deeply individual and direct relationship with 
God, made its adherents politically suspect, because their relationship with God risked elevating them, 
in their own eyes, above worldly law and political relationships. Thus, it sometimes had revolutionary 
connotations, though, despite government doubts, this does not seem to have been the case among the 
clergy o f  eighteenth century Wflrttemberg.
There is a literature that discusses the extent to which Hdlderlin was influenced by pietism, particularly 
in the light o f  the reappearance o f motifs in the post-1799 poems and hymns that may well be 
Christian, though Hdlderlin has purposely entwined them with classical allusions, especially with 
imagery associated with Dionysus. See: Jean-Franfois Courtine, ‘Hdlderlin’s Christ’, in (ed.) Aris 
Fioretos, The so lid  letter: readings o f  Friedrich Hdlderlin , Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 
1999, p. 129.
The question is interesting, but complicated, for instance by the example Priscilla Hayden-Roy uses, o f  
a Catholic priest from Mainz, who used the language o f  ‘liberty and equality’ and references to the 
‘freedom tree’ o f  the cross to illustrate his sermon extolling Christianity against republicanism. Use o f  
an ‘ideology’s ’ ideas and vocabulary does not guarantee the speaker’s agreement with its arguments.
The focus often seems to be on the political dimensions o f  quietism. However, its more deterministic 
elements, and, particularly, its emphasis on reconciliation with an ineffable God through love seem to 
be sharply relevant in this context, though I do not propose to pursue them fully here.
See Priscilla A. Hayden-Roy, ‘New and Old Histories: The case o f Hdlderlin and WUrttemberg 
pietism’, in Modern Languages and Literatures, Department o f  German Language and Literature 
Papers, University o f Nebraska - Lincoln, 1992, pp.369-379. available at: 
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/modlanggennan/23 [accessed 21.05.08]
P.H. Gaskill, ‘Hdlderlin and revolution’, in Forum fo r  Modern Language Studies, vol XII, 1976, 
pp.l 18-136.
H.S. Harris, H egel’s Development: Towards the Sunlight, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972, p.
Even today, quietism has a place in the WUrttemberger Reform Church.
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traditions of branches of the Wurttemberger Reformed Church possibly predisposed 
Holderlin to accept Spinozan determinism.
It is not so important here to decide how far Holderlin was or was not, strictly 
speaking, a Spinozan. Most prominent in his work is the idea that coming to 
understand the reality of the cosmos fully through love will lead to a good life. If we 
re-capitulate the way in which Holderlin envisaged this coming about, we shall see, 
firstly, how he took an idea that we also find in Fichte, and applied it to this Spinozan 
end; secondly, how an image of humanity driven by fate emerged from this; and 
thirdly, how the aimed for love and reconciliation comes about only through the 
exercise of autonomy. We have already observed that Fichte saw the Ich as being 
composed of a centrifugal and a centripetal drive. The centripetal drive refers inwards, 
into the structure of the ego, whereas the centrifugal drive creates for itself, or 
discovers, an external world, in the form of resistance. Metaphorically speaking, this 
is a dark and claustrophobic image of reality, as a desperate Ich struggles to escape 
from within itself, and blunders blindly against all kinds of natural resistance, until it 
has formed some conception of an external world and how it works. In Fichte, this is 
the action of the free, autonomous self.
Holderlin upturns the significance of Fichte’s imagery. He recognises the 
presence within the self of Fichte’s drives, not so much as self-relating functions 
within the self, but as functions of the self in relation to the One and All in nature. For 
Hdlderlin the One and All is present in and originates everything. The implication of 
this for his assessment of Fichte is that it is a mistake to confront nature, when we 
should be embracing it. However, Hdlderlin could see some plausibility in what 
Fichte was claiming. There is a sense in which nature thwarts us, and, however 
rationally we try to conduct our lives, apparent acts of God, coincidences, bad habits,
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oversights and bad luck divert us into unexpected and unwished for directions. We 
sometimes feel as if we waste our time choosing and planning, because we are no 
better than inanimate objects, formed and tossed around in the world in accordance 
with ineluctable natural laws. It is as if we have still not quite worked out what is 
going on out there. This is fate. Thus, inanimate objects are subject to fate and, if we 
behave or experience like inanimate objects, we, too, are ruled by fate. By this point, 
we seem to have reinterpreted Fichte’s view of the centrifugal drive completely. It is 
an alternative way of describing fate.
Thus, according to Hdlderlin, interpreting the drives in relation to Being, there 
is in us a powerful drive whose impetus is simply to strive on blindly. It has a close 
affinity with rationality, because it can manifest itself as a desire for independence 
and freedom. It is a drive that develops with self-consciousness. This then brings us to 
the way Hdlderlin typifies mankind’s life cycle. The life cycle Hdlderlin describes 
seems to owe something to a paragraph of Schiller’s Naive and Sentimental, in which 
he uses an extended metaphor to distinguish the natural / naive from the sentimental;12 
Hdlderlin uses this passage as part of his wider philosophy of art and human nature. 
The following phrases, taken from the opening pages of Hyperion, indicate our 
starting point at birth: ‘Ruhe der Kindheit! himmlische Ruhe!\ ‘... ich noch ein stilles
12 Friedrich Schiller, Uber naive undsentimentalische Dichtung, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Stuttgart: 
Philipp Reclam jun., 2005, p.23.
Wir sehen alsdann in der unvemtlnftigen Natur nur eine glUcklichere Schwester, die in den 
mUtterlichen Hause zurilckblieb, aus welchem wir im Ubermut unserer Freyheit heraus in die Fremde 
stiirmten. Mit schmerzlichen Verlangen sehnen wir uns dahin zurtick, sobald wir angefangen, die 
Drangsale der Kultur zu erfahren und hOren im femen Ausland der Kunst der Mutter rilhrende Stimme. 
Solange wir bloBe Naturkinder waren, waren wir glUcklich und vollkommen; wir sind frei geworden, 
und haben beydes verloren. Daraus entspringt eine doppelte und sehr ungleiche Sehnsucht nach der 
Natur...
Thereupon we view non-rational Nature only as we would a more fortunate sister, who stayed behind 
in the maternal home from which we arrogantly stormed out in the exercise o f  our freedom. With 
painful longing we yearn to be back there, as soon as we experience the afflictions o f  culture and hear 
the heartwarming voice o f  our mother in the distant foreign land o f  art. As long as we were children o f  
nature, we were happy and complete; we became free and lost both our happiness and our 
completeness. From this arose a double and very unequal yearning for Nature...
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Kind war, und vor dem allem, was uns umgibt, nichts wufite\ ein gottlich Wesen
ist das K in d , Der Zwang des Gesetzes und des Schicksals betastet es nicht; im
Kind ' ist Freiheit allein; ...In ihm ist Frieden.’13 As children we are free of the
compulsion of the law and of fate, and are thus free, but we also know nothing about
what is going on around us. Because of their innocent closeness to nature, children are
divine beings, close to God. However, they also lack self-sufficiency.14 With age
comes the ability to reason and decide for oneself, and as Hyperion laments:
Ach! war ich nie in eure Schulen gegangen... Ich bin bei euch so recht 
vemunftig geworden, habe griindlich mich zu unterscheiden gelemt von dem, 
was mich umgibt, bin nun so vereinzelt in der schonen Welt...15
He became aware of himself as an independent person, went to study, became rational 
-  and, we may infer - superficially wise. But in doing so, he lost that innocent 
ignorance that kept him close to God. By inference too, he became subject to the laws 
of reason. The next step brings us to Holderlin’s view of Fichte’s theory of resistance. 
The rational man confronts and tries to dominate nature, whether by controlling it 
materially, or by demanding that it should conform to his own way of thinking. He is 
autonomous in the incomplete and wilful sense that he thinks he knows what is best
13 Phrases taken from: Friedrich Hdlderlin, Die Gedichte: Samtliche Gedichte und »Hyperion«, (ed.) 
Jochen Schmidt, Frankfurt am Main; Leipzig: Insel Verlag, 2001, p.485.
The restful condition o f childhood! heavenly rest! ... I was still a silent child, and knew nothing o f  
everything that surrounds us... a child is a divine being ... The compulsion o f  the law and fate does not 
touch him; freedom is found only in the child; peace is in him.
14 But see J. Chr. F. Hdlderlin, ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich  
Holderlin: Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.55.
On that page, Hdlderlin reverts to a more Kantian view o f  freedom, pointing out that the childish, 
ignorant naivety, that unthinkingly accepts our everyday life, precludes the exercise o f  freedom. We 
have to reflect on our condition in order to become free. As this chapter proceeds, it may be possible to 
see that Hdlderlin’s view o f the human condition is that we are dealing throughout with truths and 
illusions, misconceptions and realisations, so that there is almost always one identifiable sense in which 
something is so, but another in which it is not strictly so.
15 Friedrich Hdlderlin, Die Gedichte: Samtliche Gedichte und »Hyperion«, (ed.) Jochen Schmidt, 
Frankfurt am Main; Leipzig: Insel Verlag, 2001, p.485.
Oh, if  only I had never attended your schools! I have become so thoroughly rational with you, have 
learned to distinguish m yself fundamentally from what is around me, and now I am so isolated in the 
beautiful world.
189
SECTION 2: Friedrich Hdlderlin Chapter 8
and is determined to have his own way. Holderlin agrees with Fichte, that this 
outward directed activity dominates a large part of most people’s adult life, though his 
interpretation is more literal and practical than Fichte’s. People continually devise 
personal projects that collapse and have to be re-thought, usually on even more 
ambitious lines, intended to defeat the recurrent interventions of nature or fate.
From his account of the self Fichte drew his view that human life is a constant 
struggle o f reason against nature; education means cultivating our rational skills solely 
in order to subordinate nature and bring experience into conformity with reason.16 
However, Hdlderlin interpreted this life history differently.17 Some people spend a 
lifetime struggling against nature, and simply never give up; which is what their 
centrifugal drive commands. Others eventually realise that humankind is impotent 
against the enormous power of nature. They give up, overwhelmed once they realise 
what a futile task they have attempted, and horrified by the merciless inhumanity of 
the unstoppable forces of fate. However, they cannot prevent their drives from 
striving. They become spiritually dead, hopeless people, who either abandon control 
over their lives and submit to living like inanimate objects, while raging against what 
they think is happening to them; or they become hard, inhuman, grasping people, with 
no ultimate goal or meaning to their life other than activity.18
Interacting with this drive that takes us through life, however, Holderlin’s 
equivalent of the centripetal drive is striving to unite us with nature, or Being. During
16 Johann Gottlieb Fichte, ‘Lectures concerning the scholar’s vocation, 1794’, in (ed.) (tr.) Daniel 
Breazeale, Early Philosophical Writings, Ithaca NY; London, Cornell University Press, 1993, p. 164.
17 Dieter Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel: Lectures on German Idealism , (ed.) (tr.) David S. Pacini, 
Cambridge MA; London: Harvard University Press, 2003, p.230, believes Hdlderlin relied on Fichte’s 
philosophy, attracted to it because it could readily be applied in areas that Fichte had not specifically 
explored. This does not seem to be the case here.
18 An example o f  this would be the fraternity with which Alabanda had previously become associated, 
in Hyperion.
See Friedrich Hdlderlin, Die Gedichte: Samtliche Gedichte und »Hyperion«, (ed.) Jochen Schmidt, 
Frankfurt am Main; Leipzig: Insel Verlag, 2001, p. 109.
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the immature period, such as that in which Hyperion was living at the time from 
which we have taken our quotations, we would experience the workings of this drive 
as a feeling of nostalgia and regret. We would see the pre-conscious period of our 
childhood and youth as a golden age of personal completeness, and we would long for 
the restoration, either of this naive time or of some other happy period or place in our 
life, when we had felt contented and fulfilled. The life of Der Wanderer (1800),19 for 
example, centres on his attempts to return to childhood haunts. Holderlin’s whole 
myth of the human life story is like an attack on subjectivist idealism. The only 
options subjective idealism opens for us are the vain personal battle against nature or 
an obsession with either the happy or the disastrous times in our own lives. It is a 
blinkered, self-absorbed worldview in practical, as well as in metaphysical terms.
Now we need to bring together the implications of this for the notions of fate 
and autonomy. Freedom in Kant was rational obedience to the moral law. Freedom in 
Fichte and in the later Schiller was the state of being either undetermined or self- 
determined. Although we have said that Spinoza had a determinist view, he also had a 
definition of freedom. He believed freedom did not mean being undetermined -  for 
after all, everything was already determined by God -  but it did mean being self- 
determined.20 If we think again of his scale of life, even God acts from the necessity 
of his own nature, so he is entirely self-determined, the freest entity there can be. 
Inanimate objects are the least free. We, however, in accordance with our nature, and 
somewhere between God and objects, are subject partly to necessary natural forces, 
and partly to our own self-determinations. If Hdlderlin is to claim, then, that humans 
enjoy freedom, even though they are ultimately one with Being and all of nature, he
19 Friedrich Hdlderlin, Die Gedichte: Sdmtliche Gedichte und »Hyperion«, (ed.) Jochen Schmidt, 
Frankfurt am Main; Leipzig: Insel Verlag, 2001, p.272.
20 Henry E. Allison, ‘Spinoza’, in (ed.) Edward Craig, Routledge Encyclopaedia o f  Philosophy, Vol. 9, 
Sociology o f  knowledge - Zoroastrianism , London; New York: Routledge, 1998, p.99.
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has some support from Spinoza. In fact, Holderlin believed we break out of a life 
controlled by fate, and at another level, break away from the pernicious implications 
of subjectivism, by exercising whatever ability for self-determination we have. We 
make a choice, and it is a choice that can be based only on experience and knowledge. 
After possibly years of moving onwards erratically, making unproductive digressions 
into the realms of material ambition and sentimental nostalgia, which Holderlin 
famously calls our ‘eccentric path’,21 we understand enough about the natural world to 
realise that Being is in us and all around us; that we and nature have the same source; 
that our life is a natural phenomenon in the same way as everyone else’s life and 
everything in the cosmos; and that it all constitutes a unity from which we not only 
cannot escape, but from which we have no reason to wish to escape.
Arriving at this position in life, which is the end of our myth of what a lifetime 
involves, is not fate in the sense of being inevitable. Many people never reach this 
point; and this, having perceived it as a truth, was Holderlin’s great concern. It is a 
freely chosen position, that satisfies the strivings of both drives. It is a position of 
maturity, in which we knowingly embrace the One and All that we were only 
unconsciously part of in our childhood. It is autonomous, because it is a freely chosen 
acceptance of reality, and of our own limitations. Also, rather paradoxically, and 
contrary to the beliefs of those who think Holderlin’s Spinozism commits him to the
2‘Friedrich Hdlderlin, ‘Preface to a draft fragment o f  “Hyperion”’, in (ed.) Michael Knaupp, 
Erlauterungen undDokumente: Friedrich Hdlderlin .H yperion’, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun. 1997, 
p.83.
J. Chr. F. Hdlderlin, ‘Hermocrates an Cephalus’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Hdlderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.9.
see also: (ed.) Michael Knaupp, Erlauterungen und Dokumente: Friedrich Hdlderlin, »Hyperion«, 
Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p.216:
The eccentric path is not an original metaphor o f Holderlin’s own invention. It is based on a section 
from Plato’s Timaios. There Plato claims that God gave us the ability to recognise the rationality in the 
movement o f  the heavens, and use this as the pattern according to which we could re-order our own 
lawless thoughts, bringing them into agreement with the undeviating order o f  nature.
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surrender of either autonomy or freedom, it is a condition in which we have taken 
responsibility for ourselves and our own actions. We no longer blame fate for our 
life’s path. We are no longer objects controlled by blind forces. Our eyes are open to 
the way in which we and the world form a natural, beautiful unity, and we can now 
run our life in the awareness of this wider, though necessarily incomplete, 
understanding of harmony.
In Wenn der Dichter einmal... Hdlderlin shows that the free choice we have 
described above as our way of evading fate is relevant in poetry too. Although all the 
harmoniously opposed and united elements he discusses can become recognisable, or 
knowable (erkennbar) in pure poetic individuality,22 the conscious self achieves free 
individuality, unity and identity only by freely chosen reference to something external 
to the Ich. Otherwise, the internal aspects of the Ich, the subjektive Natur,23 whether 
real or ideal, will either relate only inwards, towards each other as a harmony so 
complete that the self annuls itself into unconsciousness,24 or, alternatively, man’s 
subjective nature will be compulsively driven into conflict with something outside 
itself, as we have seen happens when we are ruled by fate.
From the dark interiority of Fichte, Hdlderlin seems to have taken us out into a 
beautiful, sunny world of harmony. However, this would be a misleading way of 
summing up his philosophy. Reconciliation with nature is not an escape from the 
unpleasant side of life. Holderlin’s reconciled man shares some characteristics with 
Schiller’s sublime man. He cannot physically overpower the terrifying aspects of life 
or nature, but he has the mental strength to transcend and embrace them willingly for
22J. Chr. F. HOlderlin, ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Hdlderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, fn. p52.
23J. Chr. F. HOlderlin, ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Hdlderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.50.
24J. Chr. F. Holderlin, ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Hdlderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.52.
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what they are. His sublimity is his demonstration that he is more than a mere physical 
object, and thus also demonstrates his superiority.25 With Schiller, too, Holderlin has 
acknowledged the superiority of the conscious, or Sentimental.26 Even though Being 
was introduced to us in Seyn, JJrtheil... as pre-conscious, and thus, unconscious, this is 
not the criterion forjudging a human being. Our self-consciousness is our unique 
strength, and the unity with Being that we knowingly and freely choose exceeds the, 
in any case irrecoverable, lost unity of childhood innocence. Rather like Schiller in the 
Aesthetic Letters, Holderlin believed he had to use art, and especially poetry, as a way 
of educating mankind. Just as Spinoza believed knowledge took us to God, so 
Holderlin believed that any way of communicating the presence of beauty in nature, 
and thus o f showing us the One and All, was a way of guiding us to that point of 
understanding at which we would be capable of apprehending the beautiful unity of 
which we are part. This then provided poetry with its purpose, and with the two levels 
on which Holderlin employed it. He used poetry both to tell us about the One and All 
in his choice of content, and to demonstrate the One and All to us through the beauty 
of his literary work.
If we take this message, we shall choose to free ourselves of the pressures of 
fate, and, in ein[em] Zustand der hochste[n] Bildung,27 no longer hoping for the
25 Friedrich Schiller, ‘Uber das Erhabene’, in Schillers Sammtliche Werke, vol. 4, Stuttgart: J. G. 
Cotta'sche Buchhandlung, 1879, pp.726-738. Available at:
http://gutenberg.spiegel.de/?id= 12&xid=2405&kapitel= 1 &cHash=f02826dfcf2 [accessed 17.06.08]
26 Friedrich Schiller, Uber naive undsentimentalische Dichtung, (ed.) Klaus L. Berghahn, Stuttgart: 
Philipp Reclam jun., 2005, pp.33-35.
Friedrich Schiller, On the Naive and Sentimental in Literature, (ed.) trans. Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly, 
Manchester: Carcanet New Press Ltd, 1981, p.39-40.
27 J. Chr. F. Hblderlin, ‘Hermocrates an Cephalus’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.9:
a condition o f  the highest cultural development
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happy, but blind coincidence that Holderlin discussed in Es giebt ein Natur stand...,2* 
we shall determine our own way through life.29 Despite the evident differences 
between the poles between which Holderlin’s human race oscillates and Schiller’s 
sense / form drive dichotomy, this condition of the highest culture has something in 
common with Schiller’s condition of being able to exercise the play drive. It places us 
in a condition of Ruhe, meaning peace, or rest, that is stable and no longer stressful. 
Though it contains conflicting elements, they are also resolved, or 
harmonischentgegengesetzt.30 The individual can live without conflict or struggle, but 
more freely, effectively and humanly than he or she could otherwise have done.
Holderlin’s account of life, fate and nature seems to have satisfied three 
demands. Firstly, he can still claim that humans have free, rational autonomy, as the 
Enlightenment tradition had always done. Secondly, he demonstrated the limits of 
human freedom and rationality. He shared this aim with Kant and also, although this 
is probably only implicit in his work, with many writers in the Christian tradition. 
Thirdly, however, he also showed how very much tighter these limits are than we like 
to think. Nevertheless, within the area defined by these three perspectives, his writing 
is a celebration of human freedom. Human freedom is hard won and largely 
unappreciated, because humanity is usually seeking it in the wrong places, as we 
move restlessly through life.
28 J. Chr. F. HOlderlin, ‘Es giebt ein Naturstand’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Hdlderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.3.
29 J. Chr. F. Holderlin, ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Hdlderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.55.
In this condition, we at once accept, but are not dependent on an external world. We can reflect on our 
own existence.
30 J. Chr. F. Holderlin, ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Hdlderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.43.
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Love
Earlier in this chapter, we identified the love of God as mankind’s motivation 
to find out more about the world, and to become reconciled with the One and All. 
Frank believes that Hdlderlin gives this conception of love a further philosophical 
role, in that it also unifies the elements of the bi-fold notion of the Absolute31 with 
which he replaced his original monistic, unknowable idea of Being during the late 
1790s. Beiser also identifies this shift, using Holderlin’s reference to Heraclitus and 
the en diapheron heauto (ev Sia<pepov eavrcb) to emphasise the diversity within the 
supposed One. Then Frank takes the ‘semantic inexhaustibility of art to be the 
way Hdlderlin tells us we can gam hints about this articulated Absolute. However, 
this seems to be a mistake on Frank’s part. The drives he thinks Hdlderlin has located 
in this later version of Seyn are not internal structures of the Absolute, but the 
constituents of human consciousness that impel the human subject onwards through 
life, as our discussion of Fate has shown. It would indeed seem strange if Holderlin’s 
later version of the Absolute had a structure per se, not so strange to say, as Hdlderlin 
in fact does, that we know of the Absolute through our relationship with the structures
3‘Manfred Frank, The Philosophical Foundations o f  Early German Romanticism, (tr.) Elizabeth 
Mill&n-Zaibert, Albany: State University o f New York, 2004, p .l 16. Frank mentions the ‘antagonistic 
tendencies within the unconditioned, or love... an exciting thought... with which Holderlin takes his 
leave o f  the Jacobian idea [of] the unconditioned.’
32 See chapter 6 above. The reasonableness o f  Frank’s claim rests on Seyn, Urtheil... and, for example, 
on an extract from Hdlderlin’s letter to Hegel, that Being is unknowable:
Letter o f  26.01.1795, quoted and translated in Manfred Frank, The Philosophical Foundations o f  Early 
German Romanticism , (tr.) Elizabeth Mill&n-Zaibert, Albany: State University o f  New York, 2004, 
p.l 14.
But see also: Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in J. Chr. F. Hdlderlin, ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in (ed.) 
Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Hdlderlin: Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, fn. 
p52. referred to in this section.
33 Beiser, Frederick C., German Idealism: the struggle against subjectivism 1781 - 1801, Cambridge 
MA; London: Harvard University Press, 2002, p.398.
34 Manfred Frank, The Philosophical Foundations o f  Early German Romanticism, (tr.) Elizabeth 
Mill&n-Zaibert, Albany: State University o f New York, 2004, p. 126.
35 Manfred Frank, The Philosophical Foundations o f  Early German Romanticism, (tr.) Elizabeth 
Mill&n-Zaibert, Albany: State University o f New York, 2004, p. 122.
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of nature. However, although Frank is wrong to describe the unity created by love in
quite this way, he is right that, in a sense, love ‘holds everything together’. We can
give a similar reply to Beiser, and will later do so.
We would normally think of love as bringing individual people together, and
Holderlin writes about this kind of love between human beings. The first and most
obvious instances are in the odes and hymns of the early 1790s. The friendship and
sense of brotherhood among his student friends at Tubingen are celebrated, reflecting
not merely personal relationships, but also a serious political dimension, in that
brotherhood is the foundation of political freedom. Other poems and the drafts for
Hyperion also confirm that human love can be an autonomous and equal relationship
between two individuals, in which, however, the two also transcend the boundaries of
personal selfhood and in some sense enter each other’s selfhood:38
... Gotterlust der Geist geniefit,
SuBer, heiliger und freier 
Seel’ in Seele sich ergieBt,39
Ein Gott muB in mir seyn, denn ich ftihl’ auch unsere Trennung kaum. Wie die 
seeligen Schatten am Lethe, lebt jetzt meine Seele mit deiner, in himmlischer 
Freiheit und das Schiksaal waltet iiber unsere Liebe nicht mehr.40
36 See chapter 9 below.
37 See, for example, ‘Kanton Schweiz’ (1791), ,Hymne an die Freundschaft’ (1792), in Friedrich 
Holderlin, D ie Gedichte: sdmtliche Gedichte und »Hyperion«, (ed.) Jochen Schmidt, Frankfurt am 
Main / Leipzig, 1999, p.121 & pp. 138 -141.
38 Manfred Frank, The Philosophical Foundations o f  Early German Romanticism , (tr.) Elizabeth 
Milldn-Zaibert, Albany: State University o f  New York, 2004, p. 122.
Hammermeister, Kai, The German Aesthetic Tradition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, 
p.55.
Hammermeister identifies this conception o f love as an important aspect o f  Schiller’s worldview. He 
refers to H egel’s claim that the Idealists and Romantics took their conception o f love from Schiller, and 
also to Schiller’s early views on the subject (1786). Unfortunately, I have not been able to identify it in 
Schiller’s aesthetic works, only in Hdlderlin. Helpfully, however, Hammermeister tells us that Plotinus 
may have been their common source.
39 ‘Hymne an die Freundschaft’ (1792), in Friedrich HOlderlin, Die Gedichte: sdmtliche Gedichte und 
»Hyperion«, (ed.) Jochen Schmidt, Frankfurt am Main / Leipzig, 1999, p. 141:
... the mind enjoys the pleasure o f the gods,
Sweeter, holier and freer 
Soul pours itself into soul,
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The search for interpersonal unity of this kind is compelling and irresistible. It is what
we desire of all our human relationships. Hyperion comes tantalisingly close to
achieving it with his male friend, Alabanda.
Ich kann den Unterschied nicht leiden, der zwischen uns ist.41 
In love, the self / other distinction disappears, a conception alien to Kant or Fichte.
We can introduce the second way in which love has significance in
Holderlin’s thought, by referring again to Holderlin’s account of the passage of time,
unified by memory. In Das untergehende Vaterland, he showed how a continuous
temporal path is plotted by points of continuously interacting resolution and
readjustment. Another related embedded cyclical process is that of change, decay and
regeneration. Not only is it normal for great civilisations to wane and decay, and for
human culture to re-emerge, rejuvenated, perhaps elsewhere at another time, it is also
part of a natural and inevitable cycle.43 Progress through life is erratic, not linear,
along the metaphorical eccentric path through life that rests ultimately on this analysis
of the passage of time, and its relationship to Being.44 Human life also has a natural
cycle; we search, often misguidedly, along our eccentric path, for an ideal past or
future, but always coloured by our own reality.45 Moments of insight and joy alternate
40 Friedrich HOlderlin, ‘ Vorstufe und spate Fragmente: Entwilrfe zur endgUltigen Fassung’, in (ed.) 
Michael Knaupp, Erlduterungen undDokumente: Friedrich Holderlin »Hyperion«, Stuttgart: Philipp 
Reclam jun. 1997, pp. 190. This quotation is addressed to Hyperion’s female love, Diotima.
A god must be in me, for I hardly feel our separation, either. Like the blessed shades by the Lethe, my 
soul is now living with yours in heavenly freedom, and fate no longer has any power over our love.
41 Friedrich Holderlin, ‘Vorstufe und spate Fragmente: Entwilrfe zur endgflltigen Fassung’, in (ed.) 
Michael Knaupp, Erlduterungen und Dokumente: Friedrich Holderlin, »Hyperion«, Stuttgart: Philipp 
Reclam jun., 1997, p. 191.
42 See chapter 7 above.
43 This is a recurrent theme illustrated in the final, published version o f Hyperion.
44 Friedrich Holderlin, ‘Vorstufe und spate Fragmente: Fragment von Hyperion’, in (ed.) Michael 
Knaupp, Erlduterungen und Dokumente: Friedrich Holderlin, »Hyperion«, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam 
jun., 1997, p.83.
45J. Chr. F. HOlderlin, ‘Der Gesichtspunct aus dem wir das Altertum anzusehen haben’, in (ed.) Johann 
Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.23.
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with periods of routine and, often, despair, as our drive towards progress and change 
alternates with our drive to limitation, interacting with the workings of the natural 
world around us. The cycle of the seasons, the natural organic cycle of life and death, 
and the erosion and decay of inanimate nature are not independent cycles but are only 
further examples of the same process.46 If we accept that cycles on this pattern are 
ubiquitous, we can perhaps, with Holderlin, accept also that notions of degeneracy, 
decay and decline would, if we understood them fully, lose their horror. We would 
accept that this is what constitutes change of any kind, and would thus become aware 
of the wholeness of everything in and around us; we would become reconciled with 
our place in the cosmos, thereby demonstrating our moral strength. Decline, if looked 
at in this way, indeed becomes nothing more than a transition 47
Then, integrating this view with Spinoza’s identification of rationality with the 
love of God, the Christian desire to be one with God’s will, and with Plato’s 
conception of eros,48 Holderlin claims that all the various opposing forces that we see 
at work in ourselves and in these natural cycles are permanently reconcilable, not by 
any one single force overpowering any other, but through love.49 Holderlin 
specifically tells us this is one of the functions of love:
i
Den Widerstreit der Triebe, deren keiner
46 Friedrich Holderlin, ‘Vorstufe und spate Fragmente: metrische Fassung’, in (ed.) Michael Knaupp, 
Erlduterungen und Dokumente: Friedrich Holderlin, »Hyperion«, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, 
p.l 14.
47 J. Chr. F. Holderlin, ‘Das untergehende Vaterland’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.33. ,der Obergang’
48 Frederick Beiser, German Idealism: the struggle against subjectivism , Cambridge MA; London, 
Harvard University Press, 2002, pp.382, 383 & 403.
Eros in the Phaidos was the love that made us long for the World o f Forms where we originated, and in 
the Symposium  was what made us strive for the Good.
49 Manfred Frank, The Philosophical Foundations o f  Early German Romanticism, (tr.) Elizabeth 
Milian-Zaibert, Albany: State University o f  New York, 2004, p. 126.
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Entbehrlich ist, vereiniget die Liebe50 
Love simultaneously permits both wholeness and change. Our attempts to understand
what Holderlin meant by resolution through love are complicated by the fact that, as
English speakers, we have to decide how to translate the word Aufldsung while
Holderlin’s argument is in process. It may mean ‘annihilation’, it may mean
‘cancelling out’, it may mean ‘dissolving’, it may mean ‘resolution’. Even for German
readers, Holderlin needs to clarify the full implications of this kind of resolution.
... so daB die Auflosung des Idealindividuellen nicht als Schwachung und Tod, 
sondem als Aufleben als Wachstum, die Aufldsung des Unendlichneuen nicht 
als vemichtende Gewalt, sondem als Liebe und beedes zusammen als ein 
(transcendentaler) schopferischer Act erscheint, dessen Wesen es ist, 
idealindividuelles und realunendliches zu vereinen...51
Love is like the rediscovery of a lost union; the opposites embrace each other, and the 
differences between them are absorbed into the resulting unity. It is thus a way of 
gaining some insight into the ultimate and absolute condition of oneness, and also 
helps justify the interconnection of the epistemology of Being and Holderlin’s 
aesthetics.
Frank thought all this demanded some further reconciliation with Holderlin’s 
account o f identity, which he goes on to provide; actually, the claim demonstrates 
the place Holderlin thinks love occupies. For anyone with a pantheistic conception of 
reality, it is the inner ambiguity of 'das Eine in sich selber unterschiedene ’, naturally
50 Friedrich Holderlin, ‘Vorstufe und spate Fragmente: Metrische Fassung’, in (ed.) Michael Knaupp, 
Erlduterungen und Dokumente: Friedrich Holderlin, »Hyperion«, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, 
p.l 14.
Love unifies the conflict o f  drives, none o f which we can do without.
51 J. Chr. F. Hdlderlin, ‘Der Untergehende Vaterland’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p. 37. The orthography is Holderlin’s 
own.
... so that the resolution o f all that is ideal-individual does not appear as weakness and death, but as 
enlivenment and growth; the resolution o f the infinitely new not as annihilating violence, but as love; 
and both together as a (transcendental) creative act, whose essence is to unite what is ideal-individual 
with what is infinitely real...
52 Manfred Frank, The Philosophical Foundations o f  early German Romanticism, (tr.) Elizabeth 
Mill^n-Zaibert, Albany: SUNY Press, 2004, p. 123.
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shared by everything that exists. In love, we genuinely feel simultaneously Eins and
Alles. Holderlin believed love enabled us to feel the presence of the whole more
deeply, even if mistakes or faults seem to have disturbed its harmony for an instant.
Therefore, all knowledge must begin with the study of the beautiful, because anyone
who has come to understand life, without grieving, has already achieved a great deal.
Any forced understanding, untempered by love or joy, gives us a skewed
interpretation of life.53
This conception of love thus united not only human beings, but also the 
apparently opposed categories of Determined and Absolute (in Fichtean 
terminology), which is to say, either existent objects or consciousness on one 
hand, and Being on the other.54
In this passage Frank confirms that it is possible to resolve the tension he believed he 
had observed between Holderlin’s claims regarding the unity of Being, and the 
presence of drives within the self that need to be united.55 However, as we have 
already noted, Being remains One, whatever the world, minds, objects or people 
happen to be like. Because Holderlin does not presume we have complete self- 
knowledge, and because the subjective is not primary, the order in which human 
beings discover things may not be the order in which they finally realise they must 
explain them. Thus, it is quite reasonable to say that love enables us to understand that 
there is an underlying unity, while also feeling as if it is bringing conflicting forces 
together. The forces lose their confrontational character once we see that we have 
been misinterpreting the situation.
53 J. Chr. F. Holderlin, ‘Aphorismen’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: Theoretische 
Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p. 19.
see also: Friedrich HOlderlin, ‘Vorstufe und spate Fragmente: vorletzte Fassung von H yperion \ in (ed.) 
Michael Knaupp, Erlduterungen und Dokumente: Friedrich Holderlin, »Hyperion«, Stuttgart: Philipp 
Reclam jun., 1997, p. 157.
54 Manfred Frank, The Philosophical Foundations o f  early German Romanticism, (tr.) Elizabeth 
Milian-Zaibert, Albany: SUNY Press, 2004, p. 122.
55Manfred Frank, The Philosophical Foundations o f  early German Romanticism , (tr.) Elizabeth Million - 
Zaibert, Albany: SUNY Press, 2004, p. 123.
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The Spinozan elements in Holderlin’s thought made it possible for Holderlin
to extend the operation of love into the non-human and inanimate worlds in this way.
Because humans and inanimate objects occupy points on a scale of life, it follows that
there is a sense in which so-called natural objects too, can love. In the Hymne an die
Schdnheit (1791), for example, the love that exists among artefacts of nature has a
hallowing effect on the human observer.56 Love of this kind among inanimate objects
is a notion that persists even in the concluding comments of the final published
version of Hyperion:
Lebendige Tone sind wir, stimmen zusammen in deinem Wohllaut, Natur! wer 
reifit den? wer mag die Liebenden scheiden? -
O Seele! Seele! Schdnheit der Welt! du unzerstorbare!...
Wie der Zwist der Liebenden, sind die Dissonanzen der Welt. Versohnung ist 
mitten im Streit und alles Getrennte findet sich wieder.
Es scheiden und kehren im Herzen die Adem und einiges, ewiges, gluhendes 
Leben ist Alles.57
This quotation shows that, as Hyperion gradually accepted the loss of Diotima, he 
realised it was impossible for him to have lost her, because he, she and all nature, 
whether living or dead, are indissolubly united, regardless of whether things might 
superficially appear to contradict this. For Holderlin, the human who recognises the
56 Friedrich HOlderlin, Die Gedichte: samtliche Gedichte und »Hyperion«, (ed.) Jochen Schmidt, 
Frankfurt am Main /  Leipzig, 1999, p. 132.
57 Friedrich Holderlin, Die Gedichte: samtliche Gedichte und »Hyperion«, (ed.) Jochen Schmidt, 
Frankfurt am Main / Leipzig, 1999, p.640:
We are living notes that sound together in your euphony, oh nature! Who can rip that apart? Who might
separate those who love one another? -
Oh, soul, soul! Beauty o f the world! You who are indestructible!...
The dissonances o f  this world are like lovers’ tiffs, reconciliation is there in the midst o f  conflict, and
everything that was parted is reunited.
In the heart, the veins separate and return and a single, eternal, burning life is everything.
58 Manfred Frank, The Philosophical Foundations o f  early German Romanticism, (tr.) Elizabeth 
Mill&n-Zaibert, Albany: SUNY Press, 2004, p. 122.
Frank explains how Schelling’s philosophy also took up this idea, and developed it into an explicit 
theory o f  science. There seems to have been mutual influence between Schelling and Holderlin.
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cohesive power of love has already taken a considerable step away from a life driven 
by blind, meaningless fate, and is beginning to apprehend the omnipresence of Being.
Love is ubiquitous, and is also the source of the harmony and unity in poetic 
works. We infer from this that poetic art is not a rather aimless free play of the 
faculties, as Kant might have envisaged, but an integral part of the workings of the 
cosmos. And it is unlike the strongly tensioned images of equilibrium between 
competing and equally strong drives favoured by Schiller. Although Holderlin himself 
is not usually classified among the Romantics, we see how the themes of love and 
death, and the sense of a union between mankind and nature, that were taken up by 
the Romantics, have metaphysical significance in some of his own poems too, for 
instance, Der Mensch (1798).59 This poem describes man’s origin in nature, his 
closeness to natural forces and his gradual attempts to assert his own distinctness. 
Hyperion, in a dark moment, muses that we are all drawn onwards to death, even in 
our most worldly strivings. It is where we find rest, where we belong, our home.60 But 
love can reconcile mankind to his place in the natural cycle, and love is what 
reconciles Holderlin’s undeniable belief in nothingness with his claim that we feel joy 
when we apprehend what lies beyond our false, confrontational view of life. Being is 
always evident in our organic relationship with non-human nature. It is this that saves 
us from both horror and nothingness.61 Thus, these three strands, the pre-conscious 
condition of unity, which Holderlin pointed to in Seyn, Urtheil..., and which is always 
present as the One and All, human autonomy, and a conception of love that combines
59 Friedrich Holderlin, Die Gedichte: samtliche Gedichte und »Hyperion«, (ed.) Jochen Schmidt, 
Frankfurt am Main / Leipzig, 1999, p.204.
60 ‘Hyperions Schicksalslied’, in Friedrich Holderlin, Die Gedichte: samtliche Gedichte und 
»Hyperion«, Jochen Schmidt, Frankfurt am Main; Leipzig, Insel Verlag, 2001, Bk.ll: 2, p.623.
6IJ. Chr. F. HOlderlin, ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.36.
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Christian, Spinozan and Platonic elements contribute to our perception of the 
wholeness of mankind, and mankind’s unity with God and the universe.
In relation to Holderlin’s aesthetics, this theory moved on from Kant by way 
of Schiller. Holderlin demanded harmonious balance between imagination and 
understanding, like Kant, and, like Schiller, among all the mental faculties of the 
individual human, and between the real and the ideal. Beyond that, he also demanded 
harmony between mankind and nature in a real world, where art could offer an insight 
into freedom and beauty. However, this realm of freedom and beauty was not 
noumenal in a Kantian sense, even though we had no conscious, cognitive knowledge 
of it. By adopting a pantheistic idealism that acknowledged the primacy of Being, or 
the One and All, Holderlin could say that our mind, thought and feeling were 
structured as they were, because they were tiny exemplars of the structure of reality. 
This means that, whereas Beiser thinks Kant’s successors wished to show that art 
links or provides a bridge between the phenomenal and the noumenal, Holderlin’s 
poetology rests on a holistic theory that does not need any separately identifiable 
links, such as art, or any phenomenal, noumenal distinction. His notion of harmonious 
opposition brought together the real and the ideal, the universal and the particular and 
all the other dualistic oppositions that had dominated philosophical discussion, and 
led Schiller to experiment with more than one possible model for human thought and 
aesthetics. Apparent opposites must not be regarded as excluding each other, whether 
in life or in the composition of poetry. Therefore, Holderlin could agree that art 
reconciles the phenomenal and noumenal, in that art helps us to gain insight into a 
better picture of reality than we could otherwise approximate to. And that this true 
reality is more breathtakingly beautiful than we had imagined.
62J. Chr. F. Holderlin, ‘Aphorismen’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: Theoretische 
Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p. 20.
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CHAPTER 9
HOLDERLIN ON POETIC COMPOSITION AND AESTHETIC
APPRECIATION
We now move on to examine the implications of Holderlin’s thought for the 
role of the poet, and the appreciation of literature. Together with other essays, Wenn 
der Dichter einmal... (1800) sets out much of Holderlin’s poetic methodology, 
describing the poetic spirit, or the processes at work when the poet composes a 
successful poem, and analysing how readers respond to the poetry and judge poetic 
success. Wenn der Dichter einmal... has been taken to show that Holderlin was one of 
the writers who gave primacy to the aesthetic over other modes of perception or 
knowledge.1 We have suggested he thought them equally and interdependently 
important. Henrich believed Holderlin’s continued use in Wenn der Dichter einmal... 
of the model of striving, conflict and resolution originated in Fichte, despite 
recognising the differences between them. Kreuzer sees Wenn der Dichter einmal... 
as the application to aesthetics of the theory of history outlined in Das untergehende 
Vaterland,3 and Constantine thinks it gives theoretical expression to the poetic 
practice Holderlin established while writing Hyperion and the poetry of 1796-8.4 In 
view of the way Holderlin’s poetry and novel help illustrate the theory, both these last 
seem likely.5
"i 1Frederick Beiser, German Idealism: the struggle against subjectivism , Cambridge MA; London,
Harvard University Press, 2002, p.391.
2 Dieter Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel: Lectures on German Idealism , (ed.) David S. Pacini, 
Cambridge MA; London: Harvard University Press, 2003, pp.228, 229.
‘... As is no doubt evident, his theory o f  poetry depends entirely on the philosophical system he 
developed while he was Fichte’s student’.
3(ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 
1998, ‘Einleitung’, p.XXVII.
4 David Constantine, Holderlin, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 107.
5 see also: Friedrich HClderlin, Die Gedichte: samtliche Gedichte und »Hyperion«, (ed.) Jochen 
Schmidt, Frankfurt am Main; Leipzig: Insel Verlag, 2001, author’s preface, p.481.
Readers will be extremely reassured to see Constantine admit that parts o f Wenn der Dichter einmal... 
are almost impossible to understand or summarise. (David Constantine, Holderlin, Oxford: Oxford
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The poet and language6
The relationship Holderlin describes between the ideal and the real, the finite 
and the infinite, the transition between the two, and the way they form a unity of fused 
opposites, occurs not only in the cosmos and in human life, but also in the well- 
written tragedy. In tragedy, infinite reality resolves itself (=Aufldsung) in its union 
with the finite-ideal. Infinite reality is the Spirit (=Geist). The finite-ideal is the sign, 
or language (=Zeichen). In their union the spirit gains material content and the sign
a
gains form. The poet knowingly constructs his work by just occasionally 
manipulating the grammatical conventions of word order, sentence structure and even 
sentence order.9 Language further contributes to balance within the life and spirit of a 
poetic work in that the poet has to recognise and decide between the language of
University Press, 1988, pl23.) The essay was not published, and, as it stands, is a distillation for 
Holderlin’s own benefit o f what he believed or had discovered, rather than being aimed at a readership.
I hope my own readers will appreciate that any insights offered here, therefore, are drawn from the
sections o f  ‘ Wenn der Dichter...' that I feel I have confidently grasped.
6The reader may notice in this section that I do not refer to a well-known text by Heidegger on
Holderlin: Martin Heidegger, Erlduterungen zu Holderlins Dichtung, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio 
Klostermann, 1951.
This is for two reasons. Firstly, Heidegger’s very interesting commentaries on three o f Holderlin’s late 
poems tend to act as ways for him to discuss or develop his own philosophical position, rather than 
following the approach we have tried to adopt here, o f  exploring Holderlin’s thought. Theodor Adorno 
seems to agree with this. See: Theodor Adorno, ‘Parataxis: On Holderlin’s late poetry’, in Notes to 
Literature, vol. 2, New York: Columbia University Press, 1992, pp. 11 Iff.
Secondly, Heidegger -  like Benjamin before him - wrote before the discovery o f  some o f  the Holderlin 
texts now thought to be significant, especially Sein, Urtheil... Although this latter essay is not the key 
to everything Holderlin wrote, it now effectively places some guide or limit on the freedom o f  
interpretation open to more recent writers.
J. Chr. F. HOlderlin, ‘Das untergehende Vaterland’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.36.
8 J. Chr. F. Holderlin, ‘Das untergehende Vaterland’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.37.
9J. Chr. F. Holderlin, ‘Aphorismen’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: Theoretische 
Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p. 17. Once again, a Schillerian awareness o f  the 
mutual benefits o f  sense and reason.
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nature and the language of art, not as his own language, but as the language of art,10 
another element in the harmonischentgegengesetzt whole of the work.
This conscious exercise of skill is illustrated in Holderlin’s own work. Partly 
because of the way he controlled language, the poems reward swift surface reading, 
but, in keeping with the poet’s training in the classics, also make the same kinds of 
linguistic demands on a reader as Latin poetry, immersing the reader in a jig-sawlike 
grammatical reconstruction of his thoughts, which are expressed in a sparse, 
compressed, allusive language. That this is one of Holderlin’s intentions is confirmed 
since he at one time planned to publish Hyperion in metrical form. Direct comparison 
of the same passage, taken from both the prose and metrical versions shows just this 
point.11 The prose version is easy to read, a typical story, containing action, idiomatic 
speech and illuminating description. The poem has a more elevated tone. It 
immediately signals that this poet demands thought that goes beyond the simple 
events recounted, and we therefore reflect on their wider significance. Perhaps 
Holderlin was right to publish the final prose version; like his poetry, it addresses the 
meaning of mankind’s presence in the universe and the nature of our relationship with 
the One and All, but in a fairly accessible way that would appeal to a general 
readership. Finally, we note that Holderlin’s theoretical works are different again. His 
sentences are long, exploiting the potential of the German subordinate clause, and 
demonstrating once more his indebtedness to latinate, or possibly Ancient Greek,
l0J. Chr. F. Holderlin , ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p. 61.
In these thoughts, Holderlin is developing Kant’s comments on the way aesthetic ideas require us to 
combine spirit with the letter o f language. See:
Immanuel Kant, Critique o f  the Power o f  Judgement, (ed.) Paul Guyer, (trans.) Paul Guyer and Eric 
Matthews, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 5:316, §49, p. 194.
11 Friedrich Holderlin, ‘Vorstufe und spate Fragmente: Prosa Entwurf zur metrischen Fassung’, in (ed.) 
Michael Knaupp, Erlduterungen und Dokumente: Friedrich Holderlin, »Hyperion«, Stuttgart: Philipp 
Reclamjun., 1997, pp .!06&  109.
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paragraph structures. The language is abstract, with comparatively few examples or 
illustrations, and, although very different from the language forms used in the poetry, 
it is equally far removed from the spoken idiom or the literary idiom of the novel.
Our discussion so far is not meant as a literary analysis per se, but to show 
how thoroughly ‘sentimental’ Holderlin was as a writer, and how he believed that art 
demanded the full participation of the whole human being. He developed his facility 
in handling the German language to help educate and improve the German people. 
Every way in which we respond to a written message can exercise a different area of 
our faculties. We respond sensuously to the events of a novel; we concentrate our 
intellectual faculties while understanding a theoretical position; and we need both 
faculties to enjoy good poetry. Commentators have lamented the fact that Holderlin
i ^
the poet was not appreciated in his lifetime; and also expressed the suspicion that his 
philosophical contribution to German Idealism was greater than his contemporaries 
acknowledged;13 but, given that he saw himself in part as being an educator, we might 
note that Hyperion, his most accessible work, was also, despite initially mixed 
reviews, his most widely read.14
12 Eg. (ed.) Gerhard Kurz, Interpretationen: Gedichte von Friedrich Holderlin, Stuttgart: Philipp 
Reclam jun., 1996, p.7.
13 Eg. Manfred Frank, Philosophical Foundations o f  Early German Idealism , (tr.) Elizabeth Mill&n- 
Zaibert, Albany: SUNY Press, 2004.
14 Eg. unfavourable: ‘Rezension des ersten Bandes’ von Kaspar Friedrich Manso, in ‘Neue allgemeine 
deutsche Bibliothek’, 1798, reproduced in (ed.) Michael Knaupp, Erlduterungen und Dokumente: 
Friedrich Holderlin, »Hyperion«, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p.263.
Favourable: ,Oberdeutsche, allgemeine Literaturzeitung’ (Berne 1799), reproduced in (ed.) Michael 
Knaupp, Erlduterungen und Dokumente: Friedrich Holderlin, »Hyperion«, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam 
jun., 1997, p.268.
In the Austrian Empire, the imperial censor in Vienna categorised the book as erga schedam, the third 
category (out o f four), (ibid.) This meant that the book could not be advertised, and could be sold only 
by approved suppliers, after obtaining the necessary permit. Harmless though the story may seem to us 
now, the censor’s objections would have been both religious and political.
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Thus, the spirit and sign in tragedy and, as we may presume, in all literary 
works are brought into an optimum relationship.15 Schiller had done this when he 
interrelated the form and content of the beautiful object in The Kallias Letters, but 
Holderlin further interlinks the work of tragic drama reciprocally with the wider cycle 
of time and life in general, so that life and poetic truth have a similar structure.16 
Holderlin’s view of poetic truth is not the same as literal truth. The greatest poetic 
truth includes error, so long as error is used in the right way and in the right place.
The highest poetry can also make use of what is unpoetic. It gains poetic value if used 
in the right way. The poet has to make rapid and bold decisions on how, whether, or 
to what extent he should use certain kinds of content, language or form. Doing so 
successfully, provides the poet with a kind of divine joy. Holderlin concludes that 
feeling, ie. the sensuous, empirical side of mankind, and the understanding are both
1 7needed in this quite analytical type of activity. Part of the joy of the poet’s task is to
15 J. Chr. F. Holderlin, ‘Der untergehende Vaterland’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.37.
l6J. Chr. F. Holderlin, ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.60.
... also wenn diB der Gang und die Bestimmung der Menschen Uberhaupt zu seyn scheint, so ist 
ebendasselbe der Gang und die Bestimmung aller und jeder PoOsie,
...therefore i f  this seems to be the course and disposition o f  people generally, well, the course and 
disposition o f  every kind o f poetry is just the same.
17J. Chr. F. Holderlin, ‘Aphorismen’, in ((ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: Theoretische 
Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p i8.
Nur das ist die wahrste Wahrheit, in der auch der Irrtum, weil sie ihn im ganzen ihres Systems, in seine 
Zeit und seine Stelle setzt, zur Wahrheit wird. Sie ist das Licht, das sich selber und auch die Nacht 
erleuchtet. Difi ist auch die hOchste Poesie, in der auch das unpoOtische, weil es zu rechter Zeit und am 
rechten Orte im Ganzen des Kunstwerks gesagt ist, poOtisch wird. Aber hiezu ist schneller Begriff am 
nOthigsten. Wie kannst du die Sache am rechten Ort brauchen, wenn du noch scheu darilber verweilst, 
und nicht weist, was an ihr ist, wie viel oder wenig daraus zu machen. Das ist ewige Heiterkeit, ist 
Gottesfreude, daB mann alles Einzelne in die Stelle des Ganzen setzt, wohin es gehOrt; deswegen ohne 
Verstand, oder ohne ein durch und durch organisirtes Geflihl keine Vortrefiflichkeit, kein Leben.
The truest truth o f  all can only be something in which even error becomes truth, because in its whole 
system it [ie. truth] situates it [ie. error] into its [ie. error’s] own time and place. It [ie. The truest truth] 
is the light that illuminates both itself and the night. This is also the highest Poesie, in which even the 
unpoetic becomes poetic, because it is spoken at the right time and right place in the whole work o f  art. 
But, for this, rapid conceptualisation is o f  the utmost necessity. How can you use anything in the right 
place, if you are still timidly lingering over it, and don’t know what there is in it, or how much or how 
little to make o f it? That is eternal exhilaration, divine joy, when you know you have put every
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climb up and down the ladder of enthusiasm - Begeisterung - from the most dry, sober 
and constricting frame of mind to the most exalted and self-transcending.18
Thus, we already observe that Holderlin’s analysis of how a work of art is 
created was more complex than Kant’s account of beauty or genius in the Third 
Critique suggested, though Kant too wrote of the way genius thinks quickly in order 
to create its own new laws.19 However, the example Holderlin uses to illustrate the 
most exalted stage of Begeisterung is of the general on the battlefield. This is a 
surprising example, prima facie, because it seems rather naive and immature to think 
that the excitement of war and the mind of the warrior could be equivalent to the more
Oftinward joys of poetry. On second thoughts, however, Holderlin would agree with
this objection. In Hyperion he shows how the hero’s excitement at the prospect of a
war of liberation in Greece is dashed. Holderlin does not in fact praise emotional
enthusiasm and over-excitement. At the height of battle the elevation of the general is
Besonnenheit, his prudence, soberness, deliberateness. He transcends himself in his
ability to mentally step back and regard the heat of human feeling and activity
dispassionately. The example Holderlin has chosen here could equally well be used to
illustrate Kant's or Schiller's conception of sublimity, thus leaving his readers in no
doubt as to how highly we should regard the poet and his creative work. Similarly,
this example shows that the understanding is essential to poetic creativity. Only by
understanding what effects follow from the open range of possibilities available to
individual thing into its place in the whole where it belongs; therefore: without rational understanding, 
or without a thoroughly organised feeling, no excellence, no life.
I8J. Chr. F. HOlderlin, ‘Aphorismen’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: Theoretische 
Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p. 17.
19(ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 
1998, p .l21fn.
Immanuel Kant, Critique o f  the Power o f  Judgement, (ed.) Paul Guyer, (trans.) Paul Guyer and Eric 
Matthews, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 5:317, §49, p.195.
20 This reference seems to have been misunderstood by Kreuzer ( Theoretische Schriften, intro., 
p.XVIII), who calls it ‘disgusting’ {den degoutanten Vergleich).
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him, can the poet make the right decisions. Every step in the creation of a work of art
has to be conscious, but feeling is the poet’s guide. He has to feel, and he has to know
what it is to feel fully, if he is to arouse the feelings of his readers. Feeling is both
‘bridle and spurs’ to his mind, or spirit. It rouses his mind from dull sobriety, but also
tempers and softens its harsh intellectual demands.21 Thus the senses, the mind in
general and, most specifically, the understanding, or theoretical reason, are essential
collaborators in the production of poetry. To some extent, this echoes Kant’s
advocacy of disinterestedness, and his warning about the dangers of encouraging 
00genius without taste, but it also claims taste and genius can do nothing without the 
understanding. According to Holderlin, clear conceptualisation and the ability to 
judge causes and effects are as vital as feelings to the success of a poet, so that for 
him all the faculties are involved in creating a work of art.
Poetic tones
Repeatedly, Holderlin returns to the need to reconcile sets of opposites. The 
way he relates actuality to the past or future ideal, the necessary, and the possible, 
explains a journey, not only through life and time, but also between the various
opposing poles, for example, of ideality and reality, or of form and content, that occur
00in poetry. The danger for the poet, if he fails to achieve the kind of fusion, variation 
and harmonious opposition that suits his meaning and content, is that his enterprise 
might collapse into a kind of succession of discrete atoms.24 The poet uses various
21 J. Chr. F. HOlderlin, ‘Wenn der Dichter einm al...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.43.
22 Immanuel Kant, Critique o f  the Power o f  Judgement, (ed.) Paul Guyer, (trans.) Paul Guyer and Eric 
Matthews, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 5:311, §48, p. 189 and 5:319, §50, p. 196.
23 J. Chr. F. Holderlin, ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.41.
24 J. Chr. F. HOlderlin, ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.48.
...eine Unendlichkeit isolirter Momente (gleichsam eine Atomreihe).
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skills to avoid this. Holderlin’s linguistic scheme o f ‘tones’ (Tone), is one of these.25 
His adoption from music of the word, ‘tone’, reminds us of Schiller’s belief that the 
boundary lines among the separate arts become blurred as we reach the highest levels 
of excellence. The theory of tones used the idea of the harmoniously opposed
77whole to re-cast the traditional classification of poetic genres that had been accepted 
in the classical model of composition. A writer now had to combine tones to create 
or match the mood changes in the work of art. Thus, the genres of heroic and lyric 
were no longer mutually exclusive genres of poetry, but should be introduced into the 
same work. This created opposition, as well as harmony, because the old poetic 
categories would remain distinct, even when blended and balanced to achieve an 
effect on the audience.
But beneath the formal theory, Holderlin’s blended yet opposing tones are 
another way of communicating the metaphysical message of his general philosophy: 
poetry helps us realise that the world of Being is present in everything we think and 
do, and that, in turn, we operate within it. Here Holderlin brings out the parallels 
between tragedy and life:
25 J. Chr. F. HOlderlin, ‘Poetologische Aufzeichnungen^ Die Empfindung spricht im Gedichte...’, in 
(ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 
1998, p.63.
26Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XXII: §4, p. 155.
27 J. Chr. F. Holderlin, ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.43.
28 J. Chr. F. HOlderlin, ‘Poetologische Aufzeichnungen’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, pp.63-67.
If Kant had moved away from classicism by distinguishing art from craft, and valuing art more highly, 
Holderlin’s poetology tended back towards an earlier respect for craft and skill. It is the blending o f  the 
tones, and, in the case o f  his analysis o f  Homer, the overall effect o f Homer’s particular skills that 
creates the aesthetic impact o f the work. Perhaps it is also possible to say that, by writing purely as a 
member o f  the audience, not as an artist, Kant underestimated how heavily the art he admired relied on 
the artist’s craftsmanship.
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Das tragische, in seinem aufieren Scheme, heroische Gedicht ist, seinem 
Grundtone nach, idealised und alien Werken dieser Art muB Eine 
intellectuale Anschauung zum Grunde liegen welche keine andere seyn kann, 
als jene Einigkeit mit allem, was lebt, die zwar von dem beschrankteren 
Gemiithe nicht gefuhlt, die in seinen hochsten Bestrebungen nur geahndet, 
aber vom Geiste [probably referring to the poetic spirit] erkannt werden 
kann...
[Die Einigkeit mit allem, was lebt,]... [geht] aus der Unmoglichkeit einer 
absoluten Trennung und Vereinzelung hervor, [und es spricht sich] uns am 
leichtesten aus, dadurch, daB man sagt, die wirkliche Trennung und mit ihr 
alles wirklich Materielles Vergangliches, so auch die Verbindung und mit ihr 
alles wirklich Geistige Bleibende, das Objective, als solches, so auch das 
subjective als solches, seien nur ein Zustand des urspriinglich einigen, in dem 
es sich befinde...29
Thus, his discussion of the tragic reveals that tragedy is not just heroic, but ideal in
tone, giving the reader a view of what humanity is capable of aiming for, and what
mankind can attempt to make real. This, in turn, shows that tragedy is based on an
intellectual intuition of the ultimate unity of every living thing. Perhaps small-minded
people will not be aware of this, but our minds can grasp it in some way, as we realise
that the apparent separation of everything into parts, and particularly into objective
and subjective, is only one temporary possible condition (Zustand) in which all that is
unified exists (sich befinde).
Die in der intellectualen Anschauung vorhandene Einigkeit versinnlichet sich 
in eben dem MaBe, in welchem sie aus sich herausgehet, in welchem die 
Trennung ihrer Theile stattfindet, die denn auch nur darum sich trennen, weil 
sie sich zu einig fuhlen, wenn sie im Ganzen dem Mittelpuncte naher sind, 
oder weil sie sich nicht einig genug fuhlen der Vollstandigkeit nach, wenn sie 
Nebentheile sind, vom Mittelpuncte entfemter liegen, oder, der Lebhaftigkeit 
nach, wenn sie weder Nebentheile, im genannten Sinne, noch wesentliche
29J. Chr. F. HOlderlin, ‘Das lyrische dem Schein nach’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.70.
The tragic, in its outer appearance, heroic poem, is, according to its basic tone, ideal, and, at the very 
fundament o f  all works o f this kind, there must lie an intellectual intuition, which can be nothing other 
than that unity with everything that lives, which is admittedly not felt by people o f a more limited 
mentality, and which, in its highest striving, is only apprehended, yet can be recognised by the mind 
[(tr.) or spirit].
[The unity with everything that lives...] originates in the impossibility o f an absolute separation and 
individuation, and expresses itself most readily in that we say the real separation, along with everything 
material; and also what connects and along with it everything mental that endures in reality, ie. the 
objective as such, and likewise, the subjective as such, would be nothing but a condition o f  the original 
oneness in which it exists...
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Theile im genannten Sinne sind, sondem weil sie noch nicht gewordene, weil 
sie erst Theilbare Theile sind.30
As Holderlin explicitly states in the course of the next sentence, an Ubermafi des
"X iGeistes drives unity towards separateness, which is to say that the ideal strives to 
appear in reality as something that can be felt or perceived with the senses. Thus it is 
that beauty can become apparent to the whole, physically situated human being. And 
this too is the process the poet is participating in when creating a work of art.
Holderlin demonstrates that the best poets have full and self-conscious control 
of these poetic tones by applying his analysis to Homer.33 For instance, in Achilles, 
Homer created the greatest hero of The Iliad. However, Homer very carefully avoids 
adopting the unmodified heroic tone throughout. He engages the readers’ respect, 
sympathy and affection for Achilles by alternating the lyric, as he describes the hero’s 
surroundings and brings them to life, the naive, as he recounts tales of Achilles’ 
childhood, the tragic, as he shows the fatal imperfections in Achilles’ character, and 
the epic, as he shows the hero’s bravery on the battlefield. As Holderlin observes, one 
of Homer’s most powerful tools is ‘Achilles in his tent’. He keeps Achilles away from
30J. Chr. F. HOlderlin, ‘Das lyrische dem Schein nach’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.71.
The unity that is present in the intellectual intuition becomes sensuous in precisely the degree to which 
it develops from itself, the degree to which the separation o f  its parts takes place, parts which only 
separate themselves insofar as they feel themselves to be too closely united, if they are situated closer 
to the centre o f  the whole, or insofar as they do not feel sufficiently united according to the totality, if  
they are subsidiary parts that lie further away from the centre, or according to liveliness, if  they are 
neither subsidiary parts in the sense we have mentioned, nor essential components in the sense we have 
mentioned, but because they have not even become anything yet, because they are still only potentially 
separable parts.
3IJ. Chr. F. HOlderlin, ‘Das lyrische dem Schein nach’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.71. (Holderlin’s orthography)
32 See also the poem, ‘Rousseau’, (Poems 1800 - 1805), in Friedrich Holderlin: Die Gedichte: 
Samtliche Gedichte und »Hyperion«, (ed.) Jochen Schmidt, Frankfurt am Main; Leipzig: Insel Verlag, 
2001, p.237, where this is referred to as,
‘Des Lebens UberfluB, das Unendliche,’
‘Life’s profusion, the infinite.’
33J. Chr. F. HOlderlin, ‘Das lyrische dem Schein nach’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, pp.68 - 73.
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much of the action and excitement,34 permits the readers to feel they are getting to 
know Achilles the private man, as he and Patroclus listen to music in his tent, and 
then is able to create a more impressive and dramatic effect when Achilles bursts 
upon the scene in full military glory.
If Homer was so skilled, Holderlin must disagree entirely with Schiller on the 
nature of Homer’s merits; his work was far from being naive in Schiller’s sense.35 
Holderlin uses Schiller’s term, ‘naive’, as when Homer describes Achilles’ childhood, 
but Homer used and selected his material with great and probably systematic thought. 
His talent is to blend many technical elements seamlessly, captivating his readers and 
bringing characters, events and places to life for them. Thus, Holderlin reveals the 
successful poet to be engaged in something very calculated. The effect may be ‘art’ in 
Kant’s sense, but the artistic process seems always to include craftsmanlike activity 
also.
Creating and feeling the divine moment
Not just the analysis of Homer, but also Holderlin’s general poetology, relate 
to his epistemological position. As Henrich puts it, poetry has to do more than just 
bring about a harmonious alteration that we can enjoy when we look at its structure. 
There is another unifying element in any poem besides the way the poet uses the 
various tones or chooses words and phrases. By using and responding to Holderlin’s
34 J. Chr. F. HOlderlin, ‘Uber die verschiedene Arten, zu dichten’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich 
Holderlin: Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, pp.30 -32.
35 See chapter 5 above.
36 Dieter Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel: Lectures on German Idealism , (ed.) David S. Pacini, 
Cambridge MA; London: Harvard University Press, 2003, p.229.
and also:
J. Chr. F. HOlderlin, ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.46.
37J. Chr. F. HOlderlin, ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.43.
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method, we should become aware of the common source from which all the
tendencies in a poem spring. The poetry has to build an awareness of the
reconciliation of underlying unity into its own structure, or it could not become, as
poetry in fact does, a general reconstitution of life in its own right.
And since this awareness of the unified structure of the antagonism is 
presumably part of life itself, it has to be built into the poem. Only in this way 
can the poem help to bring this awareness into being.3
In fact only the idea of life itself can unite all the otherwise conflicting forces of 
individuality, generality, ideality, reality, finiteness and infinity that the poet has to 
balance together. Friedrich Schlegel, as we shall see, used the presence or absence of 
life in a literary work as one of his main evaluative criteria.40 Holderlin has confirmed 
quite specific ways in which this could be a plausible basis for judgement. Like the 
Romantics, he saw his activity as, ‘continuous with, and an integral part of, nature as 
a whole,’41 and thus, although attributing to ‘life’ a role somewhat similar to that 
ascribed by Kant to ‘spirit’ in a work of art, unlike Kant, he did more than draw an 
analogy between art and nature.42 The relationship between the objective artistic 
artefact and the subjective human response is no longer like that between a possibly 
random manifold of perception and an inexplicable, but specialised, sensus communis. 
It is a relationship among aspects of a far larger organic whole, situated within the 
omnipresence of Being.
38J. Chr. F. HOlderlin, ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.44.
39 Dieter Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel: Lectures on German Idealism , (ed.) David S. Pacini, 
Cambridge MA; London: Harvard University Press, 2003, p.229.
40 See chapter 11 below.
41 Frederick C. Beiser, The Romantic Imperative, Cambridge MA; London: Harvard University Press, 
2003, p.76.
42 Immanuel Kant, Critique o f  the Power o f  Judgement, (ed.) Paul Guyer, (trans.) Paul Guyer and Eric 
Matthews, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 5:313, §49, p. 191.
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Thus, the aesthetic function of Holderlin’s gemeinschaftliche Seele, that 
enables the artist to communicate and interact with an audience, is grounded in his 
claim that the collective life is also the feeling the living have for themselves and is 
equivalent to change in general,43 since all humans and all nature are essentially 
united in the One and All of Being. Poetically this is expressed in the poem Der 
Archipelagus (1800/1801),44 which speaks o f the strength and joy that comes when 
‘Ein Geist alien gemein se i\45 but tells how fragile and fleeting this condition can be, 
as people are tempted back into unproductive individuality. In the same poem 
Holderlin describes how, if our minds can metaphorically rise above the threatening 
waters, we can come to understand this communal soul, ‘Diese Gottersprache, das 
Wechseln /  und das Werden\ 46 If the poet accepts the import of what Holderlin is 
saying, he will not only have understood the nature of his task and the best method of 
composition, but will also be able to help the reading public gain intimations of their 
own inner make up and potentialities.47 To express this in the most simplistic terms, 
the poet can help his public grasp the meaning of life.
43J. Chr. F. Holderlin, ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.39.
See chapter 7, p. 157 above for references to:
Die gemeinschaftliche Seele, die allem gemein, und jedem eigen ist.
The communal soul that is common to all, and personal to each.
44 Friedrich Holderlin: Die Gedichte: Samtliche Gedichte und »Hyperion«, (ed.) Jochen Schmidt, 
Frankfurt am Main; Leipzig: lnsel Verlag, 2001, p.253.
Referred to also by Kreuzer in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: Theoretische Schriften, 
Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, Introduction, fn. p.XXVlII.
45 Friedrich HOlderlin, Die Gedichte: Sdmtlich Gedichte und »Hyperion«, (ed.) Jochen Schmidt, 
Frankfurt am Main; Leipzig: lnsel Verlag, 2001, p.261.
One spirit is common to all.
46 Friedrich HOlderlin, Die Gedichte: Sdmtlich Gedichte und »Hyperion«, (ed.) Jochen Schmidt, 
Frankfurt am Main; Leipzig: lnsel Verlag, 2001, p.263.
The language o f the gods, change and becoming.
47 J. Chr. F. Holderlin, ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, pp.39—41.
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Because the poet’s relationship with his public is structured in this way, the 
spirit with which he is empowered and over which he has power when he writes well, 
enables him to generate the climactic divine moment, or caesura,48 around which 
every successful work of literature and the response of its readers pivots 49 The poet 
perceives and communicates that moment as an interruption in the harmonious 
sequence of a poem, that is nevertheless required by its harmonious structure, an 
interruption that is harmoniously incorporated into the formal structure of the poem 
itself.50 For readers that moment arises from and means nothing without what has 
gone before, and they realise that a resolution, disaster or some other working through 
of consequences must occur as a result of, or in response to it. This is the point of 
catastrophe in a tragedy, the moment in which ‘spirit in its infinity can be felt’.51 In 
every poem there is a mid-point, a natural centre to which the rest of the poetic work 
refers, through our simultaneous awareness of the rest of the work. There are three 
elements in the divine moment: feeling (on the reader’s part) itself provides poetic 
character that is neither genius nor art; secondly there is a poetic individuality that 
constitutes the identity of inspiration and the perfection of genius (on the artist’s part); 
and finally there is art (perfection in the work). Thus, the reader, the poet, and the 
work of art itself all help create the caesura. As such, it is the manifestation of the
48J. Chr. F. Holderlin, ‘Anmerkungen zur AntigonS’ in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p. 102.
Louth draws attention to the way Holderlin, in his notes to the translations o f  Antigone and Oedipus the 
King, adopts this term from the world o f classical French Alexandrine verse rhythms, (see: Charlie 
Louth, ‘Review o f  (ed.) Aris Fioretos, “The Solid Letter: readings o f Friedrich Holderlin”’, in The 
Modern Language Review, vol.97, no.l, Jan 2002, pp.224 - 225.)
49J. Chr. F. Holderlin, ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.41.
50 Dieter Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel: Lectures on German Idealism, (ed.) David S. Pacini, 
Cambridge MA; London: Harvard University Press, 2003, p.229. The book says, ‘harmony structure’, 
but I presume this is a misprint.
51 Quoted in English in David E. Wellbery, ‘The transformation o f  rhetoric’, in (ed.) Marshall Brown,, 
The Cambridge History o f  Literary Criticism, Vol. 5, Romanticism, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000, p. 198. from Wenn der Dichter... -  though I have not found the original phrase.
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infinite; and an insight for reader and poet into the One and All of Being. The
reader reaches a point of poetic completeness, the ‘transcendental instant’,53
simultaneously aware of the superficially linear and progressive written text.
As is no doubt evident, he derived this idea from Fichte, but deployed it in a 
way that made it a powerful means for an analysis of superb aesthetic 
structure.54
The poet must preserve this temporal unity, so that, at every moment, the thread of the 
reader’s memory of what has passed can still resonate, and all the various moods 
already presented can remain present before him.55 The ability we have to hold the 
thread of a poetic structure in our minds is something we have already encountered - 
Ahndung - that form of memory that can also refer forwards to the future and to future 
expectation.56 Thus the reader feels the backwards and forwards motion of the 
reciprocity involved in the harmonious opposition that is present in all aspects of the
52 J. Chr. F. Holderlin, ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p. 49.
Dieser Sinn ist eigentlich pofitischer Karakter, weder Genie noch Kunst, pofitische Individualist -  und 
dieser allein ist die Identitat der Begeisterung und die Vollendung des Genie und der Kunst, die 
Vergegenwartigung des Unendlichen, der gOttliche Moment gegeben.
This sense [ie. when the thread o f memory holds all the harmonies and contradictions together] is really 
poetic character, neither genius nor art, poetic individuality -  and to this [poetic individuality] alone is 
given identity o f inspiration and the perfection o f genius and art, the realisation o f  the infinite, the 
divine moment.
53 Henrich gives no reference, but see J. Chr. F. Holderlin, ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in 
Theoretische Schriften, (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p. 49.
54 Dieter Henrich, (ed. & tr.) David S. Pacini, Between Kant and Hegel, Cambridge MA; London: 
Harvard University Press, 2003, p.230.
55J. Chr. F. HOlderlin, ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.49.
56 J. Chr. F. Holderlin, ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.58, fh. p. 124.
Henrich also provides a useful quotation from Fichte to which the account o f present time in Das 
untergehende Vaterland... and o f the divine poetic moment are closely related:
Johann Gottlieb Fichte, GgW, pp.350 - 351; English: SK, p. 195. Quoted in Henrich, p.230. cp. F. 
HOlderlin, Das untergehende Vaterland...
The positing self, through the most wondrous o f  its powers,... holds fast the perishing accident long 
enough to compare it with that which supplants it. This power it is - almost always misunderstood - 
which from inveterate opposites knits together a unity; which intervenes between elements that would 
mutually abolish each other, and thereby preserves them both; it is that which alone makes possible life 
and consciousness.
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poem’s unity. A poetic work might typically contain only one caesura, but it is for 
the poet to exercise his skill and decide where and when it will occur; or he might use 
plots and subplots, language, form and structure to develop a series or well-placed 
number of caesurae, to which readers would respond at various levels and in varying 
degrees.
If we consider Hyperion, not only does the structure of the novel move back 
and forth within its own time scale, containing as it does reflections, reminiscences, 
reports, contemporaneous accounts, and hints about an as yet unread future, but the 
lives of Hyperion and his fellow characters reach points of climax, which they 
themselves recognise as divine and inspired; these are always points of precious 
stillness in a recklessly onward moving life. The readers’ view of these characters’ 
bliss, moreover, is always coloured by having already read the author’s veiled hints 
that all may not run onwards quite as smoothly as might temporarily appear likely in 
that divine moment. Thus, Holderlin includes the self-consciousness of art as another 
of the factors that must be balanced, or suspended, in the harmonischentgegengesetzt. 
The artist must know the exact moment at which to rouse the reader from his or her 
fantasy world, in which poetic life has merged with real life, and balance illusion with 
dramatic irony in order to create another dimension or layer of unity. As David 
Wellbery points out, this is a specifically tragic form of irony. As we shall later see, 
it gives a somewhat different dimension to the more playful conception of romantic 
irony employed by Friedrich Schlegel.59
57J. Chr. F. HOlderlin, ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.49.
58 David Wellbery, ‘The transformation o f rhetoric’, in (ed.) Marshall Brown, The Cambridge History 
o f  Literary Criticism, vol. 5, Romanticism, p. 198.
59 See chapter 12 below.
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Unavoidably, given Holderlin’s holistic view of the cosmos, his model also 
applies back again to the everyday world. In Pacini’s translation:
So poetry makes us ‘feel ourselves as equal and one with everything in the
original source of all the works and deeds of man.’60
By analysing the nature of time, and developing the concept of Ahndung, Holderlin 
has revealed that life is lived and experienced in the same way as a poetic work, that 
both conform to the same model. Like the characters in Hyperion, we have those 
moments of significant stillness in which we feel at one with Being. Without 
understanding or being able consciously to control our feeling, we know we are at one 
with ourselves and nature, with the infinite that is in everything and to which we shall 
return. At the most extreme, the end of a life reveals it to have been a complete entity. 
The introduction to the Hyperion fragment tells us that the ensuing pages will 
demonstrate our eccentric path, and the varied individual ways in which humans 
negotiate their way through life, gradually changing their direction as their level of 
education (Bildung) improves.61 However varied our individual cases, the same path, 
ultimately, is followed by everyone, though some individuals perhaps never progress
60J. Chr. F. HOlderlin, ‘Der Gesichtspunct aus dem wir das Altertum anzusehen haben’, in (ed.) Johann 
Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.23.
...so daB wir im Urgunde [sic] aller Werke und Thaten der Menschen uns gleich und einig fuhlen mit 
alien, sie seien so grofi oder so klein, aber in der besondern Richtung die wir nehmen... [Holderlin’s 
emphasis].
Dieter Henrich, (ed. & tr.) David S. Pacini, Between Kant and Hegel, Cambridge MA; London:
Harvard University Press, 2003, p.229, credits the quotation as: Friedrich HOlderlin, Der Gesichtspunct 
aus dem w ir das Altertum anzusehen haben, 1799, (ed.) Friedrich BeiBner, in St A, vol. IV, 1, 1961,
p.222.
Pacini’s translation is taken from: ‘The perspective from which we have to look at antiquity’, in 
Friedrich Holderlin: Essays and Letters on Theory, (ed.) trans. Thomas Pfau, Albany: SUNY Press, 
1988, p.40.
However, the words ‘So poetry makes us’ in the quotation above are Henrich’s, not Holderlin’s.
61 Dieter Henrich, (ed.) David S. Pacini, trans., Between Kant and Hegel, Cambridge MA; London: 
Harvard University Press, 2003, p.228, cites the occurrence o f  the term ‘eccentric path’ in the preface 
to Fragment von Hyperion, as we travel from pure innocence to more or less perfect cultivation.
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as far as others. The various incompatible, simultaneous tendencies of life, that are 
variants on the Fichtean centripetal and centrifugal drives, appear within the life of 
the poetic work as another conflict is resolving itself, in the form of a three-fold 
reciprocal relationship between knowledge or insight (.Erkenntnis) and language, as 
knowledge recalls (Ahnung) language, and language reminds us of our knowledge.
We encounter these three as: 1) Knowledge as the pure, unreflecting feeling of life 
and of the determined infinity that contains it; 2) Knowledge as the attempt to 
reproduce itself and find itself again after the dissonances within its fruitless inner 
reflection and striving; and thus 3) knowledge transcending itself and finding itself 
again in infinity -  that is, through a higher, divine receptivity to its whole inner and 
outer life.64 Although Fichte’s drives and the interactions between knowledge and 
language are found in different areas of life or creativity, they cluster around the same 
difficulty of reconciling self-conscious, active striving; unreflecting, naive calm; and 
the attainment of a conscious but reconciled awareness of larger meaning. Even 
taking this theme of instability and readjustment into account,
62 Friedrich HOlderlin, ‘Fragment von Hyperion’, in (ed.) Michael Knaupp, Erlauterungen und 
Dokumente: Friedrich Hdlderlin, »Hyperion«, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p.83.
63 However, Frank suggested that Fichte’s version m aybe an adaptation o f HOlderlin’s. See:
Manfred Frank, The Philosophical Foundations o f  Early German Romanticism, (tr.) Elizabeth Mill&n- 
Zaibert, Albany: SUNY press, 2004, p. 121.
J. Chr. F. HOlderlin, ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Hdlderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.53.
64J. Chr. F. HOlderlin, ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Hdlderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.58.
...1) noch unreflectirte reine Empfmdung des Lebens war, der bestimmten Unendlichkeit worinn sie 
enthalten ist, 2) nachdem sie sich in den Dissonanzen des innerlichen Reflectirens und Strebens und 
Dichtens wiederhohlt hatte, und nun, nach diesen vergebenen Versuchen, sich innerlich wiederzufinden 
und zu reproduciren, nach diesen verschwiegenen Ahndungen, die auch ihre Zeit haben mUssen, Uber 
sich selbst hinausgeht, und in der ganzen Unendlichkeit sich wiederfindet... d.h... durch diese hOhere 
gOttliche Empf&nglichkeit ihres ganzen innem und auBeren Lebens machtig und inne wird.
[translator’s note: various subordinate clauses and sub-phrases have been omitted from this lengthy 
sentence. They are clauses that have not been used in the English paraphrase given above. I hope these 
ellipses have not distorted what HOlderlin appears to have been saying at this point in his text.]
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the life of human beings points to an end, which is the understanding of the 
essentiality of all that we undergo. ...Once we understand that all these 
antagonistic tendencies and all the attempted compromises in our lives are 
essential, we can attain peace without resignation,65
which is how we begin to grasp the dynamism of life and history in any beautiful
work of art, but especially in poetry. This is because poetry is both successive and
symbolic. Life, that underlies everything, is evoked by the applied symbolism of 
66poetry.
Other works, besides Hyperion, illustrate this theme. The second version of 
Der Wanderer67 exemplifies how the content and structure of a poem reflect both 
Hdlderlin’s methodology and mankind’s path through life. The themes of belonging, 
lost Eden, irretrievable innocence, restlessness, striving and conscious return, though 
never to the exact same starting point, are present in just the way outlined in Wenn der 
Dichter einmal.... The poem pivots on the moment at which the poet’s reflections on 
his past life and hopes for the future encounter the future reality of his return to the
65Dieter Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel: Lectures on German Idealism, (ed.), trans. David S. Pacini, 
Cambridge MA; London: Harvard University Press, 2003, p.228.
In this section he is effectively paraphrasing the following references, in which HOlderlin touches the 
topic o f  the symbolic significance o f poetry:
J. Chr. F. HOlderlin, ‘Fragment philosophischer Briefe’, {alternatively called: ,Uber die Religion’) in 
(ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Hdlderlin: Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 
1998, p . l l .
also: J. Chr. F. HOlderlin, ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Hdlderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.59.
66 J. Chr. F. HOlderlin, ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Hdlderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.61.
...zum Grunde liegende Leben durch diB verwandte Zeichen hervorrufen.
67Friedrich HOlderlin, Die Gedichte: Samtliche Gedichte und »Hyperion«, (ed.) Jochen Schmidt, 
Frankfurt am Main; Leipzig: Insel Verlag, 2001, pp. 184, 272.
The first version was written in 1797. It does not carry through to the moments o f disillusion and 
reconciliation included in the second version in 1800.
68 A very much more detailed discussion o f  this large subject, ie. o f  how HOlderlin’s later poems 
consciously put his theory o f poetics into practice is provided by Cyrus Hamlin, ‘The Philosophy o f  
Poetic Form’, in (ed.) Aris Fioretos, The solid  letter: readings o f  Friedrich Hdlderlin, Stanford CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1999, pp.291-320.
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village of his birth.69 The shock of that moment colours and gives meaning to the 
whole poem, and on a first reading, redirects the reader to reflect ironically on the 
opening stanzas. Moreover, the poem itself hovers between the events remembered 
and reported by the protagonist, the events he is experiencing in the present moment, 
that the poet has artificially created within the lifeworld of the poem, the events he 
dreams of experiencing and then those he suddenly realises are about to take place. 
Opposition, wholeness, the unifying thread provided by the reader’s memory and 
anticipatory understanding, the moment of catastrophe, all are present in the poem, 
just as Holderlin advocates in his essay. The wanderer himself exemplifies the life 
course referred to continually by Holderlin. He is the man who unknowingly and 
innocently lives an idyllic life, but impetuously rejects it as soon as he gains a mature 
level of self-consciousness. His subsequent restlessness is impelled by his desire to 
regain that lost idyll, but his hopes are dashed, as he realises that however free he 
might have felt in his early years, that choice is now closed to him. His final sense of 
reconciliation and acceptance then complete the cycle set up by Holderlin’s poetic 
model and general philosophy. The poetry also enables us to reinterpret our existence 
in general. From such poems we leam, not just that any particular protagonist is 
looking forward to a return home, still less that Holderlin longed to go back to his 
boyhood home, but that humanity is looking for a home, as we try to discover where 
we belong in the shifting whole of the cosmos. This message is conveyed in Der
70Wanderer, Hyperions Schicksalslied and others.
69 For a fuller discussion o f the themes and structure o f  this poem, see Maria Behre, ‘Das Messen der 
Zeit’, in (ed.) Gerhard Kurz, Interpretationen: Gedichte von Friedrich Hdlderlin, Stuttgart: Philipp 
Reclam jun., 1999, pp.l 13-123.
70 Friedrich Hdlderlin, Die Gedichte: samtliche Gedichte und »Hyperion«y (ed.) Jochen Schmidt, 
Frankfurt am Main; Leipzig: Insel Verlag, 2001, p.623.
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Our earlier discussion of the nature and origins of Holderlin’s general 
philosophy has, to a large extent, prepared us for this account of Holderlin’s 
aesthetics. Although restless life and the desire for return resemble some of the terms
71of Fichte’s philosophy, Wenn der Dichter einmal... contradicts Fichte, in both life
and poetry. The essay claims that asserting an exclusive relation between the
conscious self and the Absolute is insufficient to generate anything other than positive
nothingness.72 The subjective self must relate to a freely chosen external object. Now,
admittedly, in the Fichtean philosophy, ‘external objects’ are further defined in terms
of resistance experienced by the self. But, the significant point here is that Holderlin
believes the poet’s choice of external content for his work must be free, if poetry is
not to degenerate into empty mannerism or triviality.
Zwischen dem Ausdruke (der Darstellung) und der freien idealischen 
Behandlung liegt die Begriindung und Bedeutung des Gedichts. Sie ists, die 
dem Gedichte seinen Ernst, seine Vestigkeit, seine Wahrheit giebt, sie sichert 
das Gedicht davor, dafi die freie idealische Behandling nicht zur leeren 
Manier, und Darstellung nicht zu Eitelkeit werde.73
Thus, the choice of external content gives meaning to the poetic work and grounds it. 
Holderlin goes on to say that, in making its own world, the poetic spirit must also 
affirm its own individuality. Since, however, poetic spirit of itself cannot recognise 
individuality, it needs an external object and, in particular, the kind of thing that it can 
accept. Thus, the individuality it has chosen for itself for the time being, and whose
71 Dieter Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel: Lectures on German Idealism, (ed.), trans. David S.
Pacini, Cambridge MA; London: Harvard University Press, 2003, p.228.
Frederick C. Beiser, German Idealism: the struggle against subjectivism 1781 - 1801, Cambridge MA; 
London: Harvard University Press, 2002, p.402.
72 J. Chr. F. Hblderlin, ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Hdlderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.50.
73 J. Chr. F. Holderlin, ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Hdlderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.43.
Between expression (the way o f representing) and free idealistic treatment lies the rationale and 
meaning o f  the poem. That is what gives the poem its seriousness, its firmness, its truth; it secures the 
free, idealistic treatment o f the poem against becoming empty mannerism, and secures its 
representation against mere vanity.
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character is determined by the material it has presently chosen, is recognisable and 
can be grasped freely.74 We must note the wide range of external objects that both 
Holderlin - and his characters - choose as material for the content of his literary work. 
Still onboard ship, the wanderer addresses the mighty ether, the eternal gods, the 
trinity of ether, earth and light, who have been and are with him constantly. Here the 
mixture of mythical, Christian and pantheistic spirituality that preceded and survived 
Holderlin’s interest in Fichtean philosophy reinforces his message. If we turn to other
•7 c  " i f .
poems from the same period, such as Der gefesselte Strom, and Dichterberuf, 
these too demonstrate the reflexive pattern of unified harmony and opposition 
outlined in the methodology, and freely choose from a variety of external sources in 
order to create works of art, using myth or any other appropriate imaginative content 
to provide an insight into life.
Generalising from the specific
Our examination of Holderlin’s theoretical work so far reveals that he has 
chosen his content, knowing its purpose and effect, and the best way to present it. We 
have also touched the question of whose experience Der Wanderer communicates, 
and whether individual experiences and personal relationships are being portrayed. 
This introduces another of the reconciliations among opposites that the poet must 
effect. The poet must use his most intimate thoughts and experiences to create 
something to which the reader can relate as if it were his own experience, while at the 
same time creating something that is generalised and completely free of its original 
associations with the poet as an individual. Poet and reader come together in this
74 J. Chr. F. HOlderlin, ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Hdlderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.50.
75 Friedrich HOlderlin, Die Gedichte: Samtliche Gedichte und »Hyperion«, (ed.) Jochen Schmidt, 
Frankfurt am Main; Leipzig: Insel Verlag, 2001, p.304.
76 Friedrich Holderlin, Die Gedichte: Samtliche Gedichte und »Hyperion«, (ed.) Jochen Schmidt, 
Frankfurt am Main; Leipzig: Insel Verlag, 2001, p.305.
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process of uniting the particular and the general.77 This also means there is never any 
such thing - in life or poetry - as pure poetic life.78 This is the poetical application of 
the claim in Das untergehende Vaterland... that the particular and the universal 
dominate each other reciprocally.79 Abstractly expressed, the creative writer must 
resolve the pressures existing among the pure poetic spirit, the general and the 
particular; in a state of perpetual conflict, each of these attempts to dominate and oust 
the others,80 always combining in some way. As opposites, they are competing moods 
that strive to determine the pure poetic spirit by confronting it and opposing it with 
everything individual and everything general, but all three are bound together and 
unified in the condition of pure harmonious opposition, which is in fact, life as such.81 
The poetic whole that strives onwards is an instance of life itself, dominated by this 
struggle between the material (ie. the individual), the formal (ie. the general) and the
77 J. Chr. F. Hdlderlin, ‘Texte zur Theorie der Tragddie: Die tragische Ode... (Grund zum 
Empedokles)’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix 
Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.80.
J. Chr. F. Hdlderlin, ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Holderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.61.
78 Note that Schiller qualifies his discussion o f  beauty in a similar way, saying that the reality o f human 
existence means that no one has ever had an entirely aesthetic experience, because, in fact, each 
individual person is externally conditioned in a slightly different way, and therefore has a lop-sided 
relationship in the relative strengths o f the drives.
Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XXII: §4, p. 153.
79 J. Chr. F. Hdlderlin, ‘Das untergehende Vaterland’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Hdlderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.37, 38.
80 J. Chr. F. Hdlderlin, ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Hdlderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.46.
81 J. Chr. F. Hdlderlin, ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Hdlderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, pp.44,46.
82 This need to balance the pure, the general and the particular is explained in two texts:
Firstly: J. Chr. F. Hdlderlin, ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich 
Hdlderlin: Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, pp. 61, 62.
...ein bestimmender Act der schdpferischen Reflexion des KUnstlers ...aus der Summe seines SuBem 
und innem Lebens, das mehr oder weniger auch das meinige ist,...
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The poet occupies his own unique position as a human being, in a certain 
landscape, surrounded by certain people, and affected by certain events at a certain 
time. He has found his own ‘eccentric path’ in relation to worldly reality and his 
intuition of Being. Thus, the poet writes very specifically as himself. But what he 
writes, the characters he creates and the things they say and do are not himself. They 
are separate creations through whom he speaks to others. What we know already of 
Holderlin’s thought indicates how his poetry or fictional prose can achieve this. We 
all share an awareness of divinity.84 Through ‘love’ we are capable of knowing, 
empathising and sharing the thoughts and feelings of others. Therefore, we can use 
our experience of others and their experiences to construct a shared understanding. 
The poet’s readers are not consciously aware of this, they simply read the poetry, take 
up the characters and events into their own thoughts and memory, and make them 
their own, in the sense that they relate the creations of the poet to their own time, 
place and experiences and think of them in that context. Thus the successful poet 
creates something very personal and specific that is nevertheless capable of achieving 
the highest level of generality.85 Homer was an example of a writer able to affect an 
eighteenth century public profoundly, even though The Odyssey and The Iliad were 
produced relative to the utterly alien circumstances of Ancient Greece. At the same 
time, however, Holderlin acknowledged that, while we may idealise and generalise
a determining act o f  the artist’s creative reflection ...from the summation o f his outer and inner life, 
which is more or less mine also...
Secondly: J. Chr. F. Hdlderlin, ‘Der tragische Ode (Allgemeine Grund)’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, 
Friedrich Holderlin: Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.80.
83 J. Chr. F. Holderlin, ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Hdlderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.61.
J. Chr. F. HOlderlin, ‘Die tragische Ode (Grund zum Empedocles)', in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich 
Hdlderlin: Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.90.
84J. Chr. F. Holderlin, ‘Fragment philosophischer Briefe’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Hdlderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, pp.l 1, 12.
85 J. Chr. F. HOlderlin, ‘Die tragische Ode (Allgemeine Grund)’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich 
Hdlderlin: Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.80.
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from the Greek dramatists, men like Sophocles were always working in their own
n /
realm and era, and, like any poet, reflected the limitations of their own age. The poet 
is thus especially privileged, in that he holds the power to create harmonious 
opposition between the particular and the general, and to unite them.
Hyperion also illustrates this position. Hyperion is an eighteenth century 
character. He is not Hdlderlin; he is Holderlin’s creation, though based in part, 
unavoidably, on Hdlderlin’s experience of himself, while nevertheless operating 
primarily as a means for illustrating his philosophical position in practice.87 Hdlderlin 
presents his characters so that we identify with their experiences, but each reader has 
to do this on his or her own terms. Hyperion’s experience in the novel is of modem - 
or eighteenth century - Greece, but his experience of modernity is coloured by his 
love of Homer and his intimate knowledge of Greek myth and legend. Thus the reader 
has to empathise somehow with an image of ancient Greece that is constantly 
qualified by the way in which it contrasts with an eighteenth century reality, which is 
yet not reality, because it is the reported experience of Holderlin’s fictional character. 
Educated eighteenth century readers thus brought many personal preconceptions and 
background experiences to their understanding and appreciation of the novel. It shows 
how Hdlderlin implemented his theory of haririonious opposition, and how too he set 
readers contemplating on what might now be called the human condition. Even 
through the novel’s epistolary structure, that was generally becoming either old-
86 J. Chr. F. HOlderlin, ‘Anmerkungen zur Antigona’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Hdlderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p. 109.
87 David Constantine, Holderlin, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, ch.5, pp.83ff.
Constantine has shown in these pages how closely Hyperion can be related to people and events in 
Holderlin’s own life.
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oo
fashioned or unusual by that time, Holderlin informs us, not of events as they 
happen, but of a protagonist’s reflections on them.
Holderlin’s view of the nature of poetry, or of art in general, thus develops 
Schiller’s view of sentimentality even further, by valuing the conscious intervention 
of the writer, a contrast with Kant or earlier aestheticians, such as Reynolds, for 
whom the artist was invisible. At the same time, however, he echoes some of Herder’s 
opinions on the more culturally specific nature of human production, as he warns us
O Q
not to ignore the cultural and historical context of any writer. The writer is always 
both limited and enriched by the influence of his own time, and writes within
Q A
contemporary limitations. Holderlin’s poetry demonstrates this, as he realised. Yet, 
partly based on his experience as the published translator of a number of key classical 
texts, he still admired the great poetry of Greek antiquity. He therefore used myth in 
the way that we may suppose, following Schiller’s account in Naive and Sentimental, 
it was intended to be used. From our engagement with a mythical story we gain its 
philosophical, moral or religious message. Through myth the writer balances and 
fuses reality and the ideal, the physical and the mental. At its best myth enables the 
reader to use both critical and emotional faculties.91 The essay, Der Gesichtspunct aus 
dem wir das Altertum anzusehen haben sums up the way Holderlin saw his 
contemporaries using classical material:
88Marshall Brown, ‘Theory o f the novel’, in (ed.) Marshall Brown, The Cambridge History o f  Literary 
Criticism, vol. 5, Romanticism, Cambridge UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.257.
89John A. McCarthy, ‘Criticism and Experience: Philosophy and Literature in the German 
Enlightenment’, in (ed.) Nicholas Saul, Modern German Literature and Philosophy 1700-1990, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p.46.
See chapter 5 above.
90 J. Chr. F. Holderlin, ‘Anmerkungen zur Antigona’ in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Hdlderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p. 109.
91 See Friedrich HOlderlin, Die Gedichte: Samtliche Gedichte und »Hyperion«, (ed.) Jochen Schmidt, 
Frankfurt am Main; Leipzig: Insel Verlag, 2001, Vorrede von Hyperion, p.481.
230
SECTION 2: Friedrich Hdlderlin Chapter 9
Wir traumen von Bildung, Frommigkeit pp. und haben gar keine, sie ist 
angenommen - wir traumen von Originalitat und Selbststandigkeit, wir 
glauben lauter Neues zu sagen, und alles difi ist doch Reaction, eine milde 
Rache gegen die Knechtschaft, womit wir uns verhalten haben gegen das 
Altertum...92
Therefore, freed of any servile attitude, he consciously made contemporary use of the 
classical legacy. Hyperion, named after the offspring of Apollo, the sun god, loves 
and is continually regenerated by the sun, Plato’s consistent metaphor for goodness, 
while the geography, mythology and philosophy of Ancient Greece often provide 
source material for Holderlin’s poetry. He drew parallels with contemporary Germany
Q'Xand the republican cause, or blurred the distinction between classical myth and 
Christian imagery,94 thus using the classical heritage to guide readers to reflect on 
their conventional view of life and the cosmos.
To Holderlin the continuity of time provided a fine balance between endings, 
decay and fresh beginnings, between the divisible and the indivisible. In terms of 
nature and humanity, his view had practical effects on the way a life is lived,95 and 
encouraged us to achieve a self-reconciled but active life. He saw every lived moment 
as points during which memory both created and participated in a single, historical 
process, so that the continuity and integration of time also suggests a sense in which
92 J. Chr. F. Hfilderlin, ‘Der Gesichtspunkt aus dem wir das Altertum anzusehen haben’, in (ed.) Johann 
Kreuzer, Friedrich Hdlderlin: Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, Hamburg: 
Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.22.
We dream o f  education, piety... and have none, it is accepted -  we dream o f  originality and 
independence, we think we are talking pure novelty, and yet all this is just reaction, a mild revenge 
against the servile relationship we have formed with antiquity.
93 See especially, Hyperion, finally published in finished form in 1797 and 1799, though HOlderlin 
never visited Greece himself.
Friedrich HOlderlin, Samtliche Gedichte und »Hyperion«, (ed.) Jochen Schmidt, Frankfurt am Main; 
Leipzig: Insel Verlag, 2001.
94 For instance in poems, such as Brot und Wein (1800/1801).
Friedrich Holderlin, Sdmtliche Gedichte und »Hyperion«, (ed.) Jochen Schmidt, Frankfurt am Main; 
Leipzig: Insel Verlag, 2001, p.285.
95J. Chr. F. Holderlin, ‘Das untergehende Vaterland’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Hdlderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, pp.33 - 35.
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we are not remote from antiquity. Each individual life or person is whole, and every 
level of existence, extending to the universe itself, is whole. We and Holderlin must 
accept and try to understand the nature of that wholeness, in the resolution of its 
opposing tendencies.96
All the aspects of Holderlin’s poetics discussed so far show how he believed 
the poem’s unified structure is part of life itself, but this is not only important as an 
illustration of how all the strands in Holderlin’s thought draw together into a single 
unity. As Henrich says, it is a way of conceiving of aesthetics that is specific to 
literature. It
upends the misleading analogy from visual perception that prompts the 
aestheticians into thinking we only have to describe structures at which we are 
‘looking’.97
Therefore, it is also an improved aesthetics of literature. Kant, especially, had a rather 
visual, perceptual account of the judgement of taste. Schiller referred to several 
branches o f art, but Holderlin specifically wants us to feel the structure of life or of a 
poem. This aim was probably directed against even older aestheticians than Kant or 
Schiller. He deplored the bare formalism supposedly typical of eighteenth century 
life. He wanted to infuse life, colour and content into the dead, mechanistic methods 
that he thought still predominated. Equally, he wanted to avoid the complete absence 
of form or rule that he believed was tempting some of his contemporaries into bad 
poetry.98
96 J. Chr. F. HOlderlin, ‘Das untergehende Vaterland’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Hdlderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, pp.35.
97 Dieter Henrich, (ed. & tr.) David S. Pacini, Between Kant and Hegel, Cambridge MA; London: 
Harvard University Press, 2003, p.229.
98 David Constantine, Hdlderlin, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, p.l 17.
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The significance of beauty
The final step in our survey of Holderlin’s theory of how the poet, poetry and
the world interrelate is to consider where beauty fits into his scheme. We have
discussed literary success by referring to the use of poetic tones, harmoniously
reconciled opposites and divine caesurae, and also to the essential operation of feeling
as a way of appreciating them; but so far without referring to beauty. Here both Plato
and Heraclitus, and our earlier references to them provide a further way of
characterising the harmonischentgegengesetzt, "  providing ancient credentials for
some ideas we have already identified in Fichte and Schiller.100 The two key
quotations are those we have used already, firstly:
Wir hatten auch keine Ahndung von jenem unendlichen Frieden, von jenem 
Seyn, im einzigen Sinne des Worts, wir strebten gar nicht, die Natur mit uns 
zu vereinigen, wir dachten und wir handelten nicht, es ware iiberhaupt gar 
nichts, (fur uns) wir waren selbst nichts, (fur uns) wenn nicht dennoch jene 
unendliche Vereinigung, jenes Seyn, im einzigen Sinne des Worts vorhanden 
ware. Es ist vorhanden -  als Schonheit; es wartet, um mit Hyperion zu reden, 
ein neues Reich auf uns, wo die Schonheit Konigin ist.101
Here Hdlderlin envisages beauty being present in the world in a way that is rather 
similar to the relationship between Platonic particulars and universals, in that worldly 
beauty can eventually lead the judicious observer to a fuller understanding of beauty 
in its perfection. We do not know where Plato’s World of Forms was, though it was 
accessible to the intellect. Hdlderlin, by contrast, has devoted a considerable amount 
of effort to showing us where the perfection of beauty is. It is in the totality of
"Peter Fenves, ‘Measure for Measure’, in (ed.) Aris Fioretos, The solid  letter: readings o f  Friedrich 
Hdlderlin , Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1999, p.31.
100 see chapter 6 above.
101 Friedrich Hdlderlin, ‘Vorletzte Fassung von H yperion \ in (ed.) Michael Knaupp, Erlduterungen 
undDokumente: Friedrich Holderlin, »Hyperion«, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p. 157.
If we also had no awareness [ = memory + presentiment (tr.)] o f that endless peace, o f that Being, in 
the only sense o f  the word, we would not strive at all to unite nature with ourselves, we would not think 
and act, it [Being] would be absolutely nothing at all (for us), we ourselves would be nothing (for us) 
unless, nevertheless, that endless union, that Being, in the only sense o f the word, were present. It is 
present - as beauty; a new kingdom, if we may use Hyperion’s words, is waiting for us, in which 
Beauty is Queen.
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everything in the workings of ourselves and the world around us. It is the One and 
All. This does not make it any easier to recognise than Plato’s World of Forms was, 
but the implication is that anything that introduces us to the One and All also 
introduces us to beauty. Thus, the divine moment in a literary work, the full 
appreciation of the fleeting moment and reconciliation with nature and ourselves are 
all ways that develop our sensitivity to the ‘truest truth’ of beauty. Holderlin’s 
favoured texts, Plato’s Symposium and Phaedrus are sympathetic in their treatment of
i nothe art of poetry and acknowledgement of the divine madness of the poetic muse.
The second key quotation we have encountered relates to Heraclitus.
Das groBe Wort, das ev Siatpepov eavrco (das Eine in sich selber 
unterschiedene) des Heraklit...[sic] ist das Wesen der Schonheit, und ehe das 
gefunden war, gabs keine Philosophic.103
This quotation seems to confirm the claim that the diversity of the beauty in our world
points us towards a greater unified perfection. Once again we can conclude that the
ways in which we become aware of the One and All, whether in art or nature, also
show us instances of beauty. The reference to Heraclitus is repeated in Hyperion
shortly after the quotation we have already used:
Leuchtet aber das gottliche ev Siatpepov eavrco, das Ideal der Schonheit der 
strebenden Vemunft, so fodert sie nicht blind, und weiB, warum, wozu sie 
fodert.104
102 Hugh Bredin and Liberato Santoro-Brienza, Philosophies o f  Art and Beauty: introducing aesthetics, 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000, p.32.
Frederick C. Beiser, The Romantic Imperative, Cambridge MA; London: Harvard University Press, 
2003, p.61.
103 see Friedrich Hdlderlin, Die Gedichte: Samtliche Gedichte und »Hyperion«, (ed.) Jochen Schmidt, 
Frankfurt am Main; Leipzig: Insel Verlag, 2001,1:2, p.559.
The great saying, the en diapheron heauto (the One that is distinguished into itself / the One that is 
distinguished within itself), o f Heraclitus... is the essence o f beauty, and before that was discovered, 
there was no philosophy.
[translator’s note: I have not really been able to confirm this, but I suspect it would be possible to adopt 
my first alternative translation rather than my second, which would make Hdlderlin’s overall position 
more consistent.]
104 Friedrich Hdlderlin, Die Gedichte: Samtliche Gedichte und »Hyperion«, (ed.) Jochen Schmidt, 
Frankfurt am Main; Leipzig: Insel Verlag, 2001, p.561.
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Once we have begun to appreciate beauty, we have some idea of what we could be 
aiming for. Hdlderlin perhaps expects that contact with both art and nature will 
enhance our ability to recognise natural beauty, and thence, to reach a point of 
reconciliation in our lives. This is also a way of reconciling beauty and sublimity. 
Returning to the way Kant and then Schiller understood beauty and the sublime, we 
see that for Kant sublimity was an often strangely pleasurable condition of the human 
reason, when faced with a power or phenomenon of nature so great that no idea was 
adequate to it;105 beauty was a free play between imagination and understanding 
sparked by a variety of possible objects that we are therefore entitled to call 
beautiful.106 In some ways they were analogous, one relating to reason and the ideas, 
the other to concepts and the imagination. For Schiller, beauty was a condition of 
apparent harmony in the object,107 recognised by a human mind that was also in
i nsharmony with itself. Sublimity was a sense in the human mind that blind natural 
power might be able to dominate or destroy human physicality, but not the superiority
i noof the moral reason. This suggested that beauty and sublimity might be similar in 
kind, though different in some way in their degree and effect.110 Since we have 
already suggested that, for Hdlderlin, the man or woman who frees him or herself
But if  the divine en diapheron heauto, the ideal o f beauty, illuminates the striving reason, then it does 
not demand blindly, and knows why and to what end it is demanding.
105 Immanuel Kant, Critique o f the Power o f  Judgement, (ed.) Paul Guyer, (trans.) Paul Guyer and Eric 
Matthews, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 5:256, §26, p. 139.
106 Immanuel Kant, Critique o f  the Power o f  Judgement, (ed.) Paul Guyer, (trans.) Paul Guyer and Eric 
Matthews, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 5:211, §6, p.96, 5:230, §16, p. 114.
107 See references to The Kallias Letters in chapter 1 above.
l08See references to The Aesthetic Letters in chapter 4 above.
109Slightly more problematically, it was also identified with the definition o f ‘energetic beauty’ that 
Schiller never explored in the Aesthetic Letters.
See: Nicholas Saul, ‘Aesthetic Humanism 1790-1830: Weimar classicism’, in (ed.) Helen Watanabe- 
O’Kelly, The Cambridge History o f  German Literature, Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000, p.219.
110 Friedrich Schiller, ‘Ueber das Erhabene’, in Schillers Sammtliche Werke, vol. 4, Stuttgart: J. G. 
Cotta'sche Buchhandlung, 1879, pp.726-738. Available at:
http://gutenberg.spiegel.de/?id=12&xid=2405&kapitel=l&cHash=f02826dfcf2 [accessed 17.06.08]
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from the pressures of fate, and freely acknowledges the fundamental unity of 
humankind and all creation, acts sublimely, we can establish another relationship 
between beauty and sublimity. The path Hdlderlin recommends leads the human 
being through a gradually increasing appreciation of beauty to a point at which he or 
she both achieves sublimity and demonstrates his or her personal freedom.111 Thus, he 
has almost exactly fleshed out Schiller’s tag, ‘it is through beauty that we walk to 
freedom’.112
Although Schiller wrote with practical intentions, we can see that, by 
comparison with Hdlderlin, he barely scratched the surface of the possible ways in 
which an epistemology can connect with literary theory. He recognised that, in a work 
of art, every detail is essential to the success of the whole, though we must not be 
distracted by focusing on individual details,113 but he did not examine the options 
available to the poet when he seeks to build that whole, or fill in those details. 
Holderlin’s theory of tones, and his identification of the places occupied by language, 
meaning,114 expression, form, content, characterisation, event, show his self-conscious 
articulation of the technical skills required by the poet. Indeed, he was unusual among 
writers of his day, in adapting the traditional genre of rhetorical theory in such 
detail.115 Baumgarten’s was perhaps the most famous previous attempt to do this.116 
Yet Hdlderlin was also able to relate these skills to a wider view of the poet’s place in
111 J. Chr. F. HOlderlin, ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Hdlderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.55.
112 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, II, p.9.
113 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XXII: §6, p. 157.
114 J. Chr. F. Holderlin, ‘Wenn der Dichter einmal...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich Hdlderlin: 
Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.58.
ll5David Wellbery, ‘The Transformation o f Rhetoric’, in (ed.) Marshall Brown, Cambridge History o f  
Literary Criticism, vol. 5: Romanticism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 198.
116 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis adpoemapertinentibus, 
Halle: 1735.
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nature, creation or, perhaps, Being. The universe exists as an organic whole, as a 
macrocosm and as a microcosm, as chaos and as order, as thought and as matter, and 
every perception, thought and event is always experienced and described at some 
specific, chosen point of balance, that both separates or distinguishes, and unifies or 
constructs. We all do this, and most self-consciously, the poet does this, not because, 
as Kant might say, our minds work like this and we cannot avoid trying to impose 
order on what is around us, but because we are part of the far bigger and imperfectly 
comprehended divine order, which we cannot resist, and with which we can only
1 1 7conform. Kant believed that we attributed natural purposes to organisms by analogy 
with our personal inner experience as human beings.118 For Holderlin, however, there 
was no reason for us to be the starting point for knowledge about nature. Since we 
have the same relation to Being as any other natural object, event or process, our 
human intellectual powers have been determined simultaneously with and work in 
harmony with nature.
In general terms, Holderlin’s work confirms that the more dynamic view of 
human nature used by Schiller, in opposition to the Kantian account of the faculties, 
has become accepted. Not simply his view of human nature, but his philosophy as a 
whole expresses notions of change, re-adjustment and points of stable or temporary 
equilibrium, which apply equally to his aesthetic position. Like Kant, Holderlin 
regards the perception of beauty as the main aim of aesthetics. Like Schiller, he has an 
educational aim in promoting the perception of beauty. However, because of the 
degree to which the philosophy and the aesthetics are interdependent and
117 Frederick C. Beiser, German Idealism: the struggle against subjectivism 1781-1801 , Cambridge 
MA; London, Harvard University Press, 2002, p.406.
J. Chr. F. Holderlin, ‘Texte zur Theorie der TragOdie: Die tragische Ode...’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, 
Friedrich Hdlderlin: Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.80.
118 Immanuel Kant, Critique o f  the Power o f  Judgement, (ed.) Paul Guyer, (trans.) Paul Guyer and Eric 
Matthews, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, §61, 5:360, p.234.
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intermingled, to perceive beauty, in Holderlin’s terms, is also to perceive the truth 
about the world and our place in it. Poetic truth, which is to say, the truth we find in 
poetry or literature, does not have to be identical with what we would normally regard 
as literal truth. As we have seen, it could be error, but used in the right way. Added to 
this is the cultural dimension, whereby our personal historical situation affects the 
way in which we respond to the literature of a past age. The total effect of this is to 
suggest that, in, as it were, opening our eyes to beauty, art is offering us a new 
interpretation of the world around us, of which we were previously unaware; it is 
conveying a universal truth to us in language to which we as individuals can relate. 
While Hdlderlin himself may have seen this as the search for beauty, it seems just as 
plausible to see it as a search for meaning. Like the children who cannot help putting 
things in their mouths, who act in Hyperion as an analogy for the rational 
foundationalists’ search for system,119 humans cannot help seeking meaning. This is a 
considerable shift from the classical view of aesthetics as a self-contained area of 
study, mainly relevant to the fine arts enjoyed by a sensitive, leisured elite. It is also a 
view that comes through even more clearly in the following chapters, as we discuss 
the work of Friedrich Schlegel.
119 Friedrich Hdlderlin, ‘Vorstufen und spate Fragmente: Entwtirfe zur endgilltigen Fassung’, in (ed.) 
Michael Knaupp, Erlauterungen und Dokumente: Friedrich Hdlderlin, »Hyperion«, Stuttgart: Philipp 
Reclam jun., 1997, p. 196.
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CHAPTER 10
FRIEDRICH SCHLEGEL, THE ANCIENTS AND THE MODERNS
Uber das Studium der griechischen Poesie} often referred to as the ‘Studium- 
Aufsatz’, is a good starting point for considering Schlegel’s relationship with his 
classicist predecessors, his relationship with Schiller’s work, and his subsequent 
thoughts on aesthetics and literary theory. Schlegel admired Schiller’s work on 
aesthetics, though he was not personally on good terms with him. Hdlderlin and 
Schlegel were acquainted, mainly through their mutual friend, Schelling, but were 
never friendly. Nevertheless, they had a similar philosophical background, beginning 
with Kant, then influenced by and re-evaluating Fichte. Schlegel was also affected in 
the latter half of the decade by the revived interest in Plato and Spinoza. He had two 
main projects during those years. One was to write a theoretical history of classical 
literature; the Studium-Aufsatz, which is discussed in this chapter, was a step towards 
this subsequently revised aim. The second project was to break down the inter­
disciplinary barriers created by the rapid advances in scientific and technical research 
in German academia. In philosophy and literature, for example, he envisaged a union 
between literature and philosophy that he called Symphilosophie. The best literature 
would be philosophical, and the best philosophy would be expressed directly through 
literature and myth. Furthermore, in all disciplines, co-operation and group-authorship 
should become the norm.
Our discussion in chapters 11 and 12, relating to some of the Charakteristiken 
and Fragmente published in the Lyceum and the Athendum between 1797 and 1800,
‘‘Uber das Studium der griechischen Poesie’ (hereafter referred to as Studium-Aufsatz), in (Ed.) Ernst 
Behler, Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe, vol.l: Studien des klassischen Altertums, Paderbom; 
Munich; Vienna: SchOningh, 1979, p.205-367. Abbreviated as KFSA.
The essay was written in 1795 and published after some delay.
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touches on this second project. In our overall assessment of Schlegel’s work, 
however, these two aims, will not seem so important. In aesthetics, Schlegel’s most 
important contribution was his effectively having defined the Romantic movement, 
and given artists and writers a new, non-classical way of approaching and assessing 
their task and their completed product. Despite what he hoped, the ‘Sym... ’ disciplines 
never became established, and academic specialisation probably proceeded even more 
rapidly as the nineteenth century continued. Indeed, his own work led to the rise of 
two new disciplines, which constituted further specialisation in themselves: namely, 
literary criticism and the hermeneutic tradition in philosophy. These can probably be 
regarded as his greatest contributions to academic thought, and also as the natural 
endpoint of the narrative of this thesis.
In the present chapter, we examine the Studium-A ufsatz, an early work, which, 
we shall see, contributes a great deal to our understanding of Schlegel's later writing. 
In chapter 11 we examine the critical essays, especially Uber Lessing, which 
illustrates how Schlegel's view of literature developed. Uber Lessing begins to apply 
the concepts of what came to be regarded as Romantic criticism. Chapter 12 then 
highlights how the journals, Lyceum and Athenaum, expressed and extended these 
concepts in a new terminology. The Studium-Aufsatz has been regarded variously as a 
continuation of the long-running Herder / Winckelmann debate on the importance for 
eighteenth century artists of using classical models, or, by contrast, as a decisive 
break with that inconclusive controversy.3 In relation to the work of Schiller, the 
essay has been viewed variously as a youthful effort, frustratingly upstaged and
2 Hans Eichner, Friedrich Schlegel, New York: Twayne, 1970, p.21.
3 Raimund Belgardt, ‘»Romantische Poesie« in Friedrich Schlegels Aufsatz „Uber das Studium der 
griechische Poesie“’, in The German Quarterly, vo. 40, no.2, Mar. 1967.
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overtaken by Naive and Sentimental,4 or as a piece of work derived from Schiller’s 
essays, despite Schlegel’s best endeavours at independent thought,5 or, finally, as a 
significant, independent work. According to this last view, it went beyond an 
understanding of Kant’s writings, and tried to develop a more Fichtean position6 to 
take literature and the theory of art onwards beyond Schiller, and thus enable the new 
departures associated with Romanticism.
It examines the condition of contemporary literature in relation to the classical 
world, and is interesting and potentially progressive for three reasons. Firstly, 
although it may remind us in some respects, not only of Naive and Sentimental but
o
also of the Aesthetic Letters, it develops and relies more heavily on Fichtean 
arguments than Schiller did; secondly it emphasises historical arguments. Schiller 
only briefly introduced a historical perspective and barely linked it to the main 
philosophical arguments.9 Eichner dismisses this element in Schlegel as merely 
repeating Herder’s historical account of cultural origins.10 However, although he 
appreciated the classical writers enough to assess how far a literary output might 
emerge from, respond to and also affect its particular cultural environment, Schlegel
4 Josef KOmer, Romantiker und Klassiker: Die BriXder Schlegel in ihren Beziehungen zu Schiller und 
Goethe, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1971, p.32.
5 (Ed.) Hans Eichner, Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe, vol.2: Charakteristiken und Kritiken I 
(1796 - 1801), Paderbom; Munich; Vienna: SchOninghausen, 1967, ‘Einleitung’, p.XI.
6 This point is expressed in a quotation from Schlegel’s contemporary, Wilhelm von Humboldt, in 
(Ed.) Ernst Behler, Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe, vol.l: Studien des klassischen Altertums, 
Paderbom; Munich; Vienna: SchOninghausen, 1979, ‘Einleitung’, p.CLXVI.
7 Two examples o f writers who have taken this view:
Andreas Huyssen, ‘Nachwort’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: kritische und 
theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p.234.
A.O. Lovejoy, ‘On the Meaning o f “Romantic” in Early German Romanticism, Part II’, in Modern 
Language Notes, Vol.32, No.2, Feb 1917.
8 Eichner claims that Schlegel’s wording also echoes Goethe, writing on the subject o f ancient poetry. 
Hans Eichner, Friedrich Schlegel, New York: Twayne, 1970, p. 17.
9 See chapter 3 above.
10 Hans Eichner, Friedrich Schlegel, New York: Twayne, 1970, p.25.
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takes some pains to integrate historical analysis with the Fichtean philosophy, thus 
attempting to give a simultaneously empirical and a priori account of cultural and 
literary change. Finally, the opening chapters of the Studium-Aufsatz express the ideas 
that, with some adaptation, became his theory of Romantic literature, as he criticises 
the degenerate state of modem literature. The fact that Schlegel later re-evaluated the 
literary tendency of his age should not be surprising. His version of Early 
Romanticism came to view ambiguity and ambivalence as essential to any artistic and 
creative response.
In the light of these general comments, I shall discuss the first two and the last 
chapters, which seem most relevant both to Schiller and the later development of 
Schlegel’s own work. The essay opens with a discussion of themes familiar from the 
Aesthetic Letters, deploring the sad condition of modem art, describing emptiness, 
lack of education or abuse of education, and the capricious pursuit of novelty in the 
name of fashion.11 Most modem artistic works, he says, are unsatisfying. Rather than 
peaceful enjoyment, they exhibit unsatisfied yearning, and encourage this response in 
an undisceming public.12 Artists, flattered by public attention, are not averse to
1 7keeping pace with the constant shifting of trivial tastes. Schlegel admits some 
talented poets are at work in modem times, but also believes they have abandoned any 
pursuit of the beautiful. Truth or morality often seem to be their goals,14 and if we try 
to analyse either what the public is looking for, or what the best artists are trying to
11 Studium-Aufsatz op. cit. p.218.
12 Studium-Aufsatz op. cit. p.219.
13 Studium-Aufsatz op. cit. p.220.
14 Studium-Aufsatz op. cit. p.218.
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produce, we shall find a variety of criteria, but never that of beauty. Indeed, some of 
their most excellent works are obviously representations of the ugly.15
All this, according to Schlegel, is symptomatic of a general state o f artistic 
anarchy. Traditionally essential distinctions are now disturbingly blurred. The 
boundaries between knowledge and art, truth and beauty, philosophy and literature, 
poetry and history are breaking down. The domination of fashion has reduced notions 
of public morality and taste to a travesty.16 In such circumstances no appeal to public 
standards of taste or morality can be made if we are trying to reach any level of 
aesthetic understanding. Already we see the impossibility of sustaining a classical 
Enlightenment evaluation of art. On one hand, complete submission to a set of foolish 
and arbitrary rules has been demanded; on the other, art has sought an artificial
i nlawlessness, as ‘sie vergdtterte in mystischen Orakelspruchen das Genie...’. Hopes 
of being able to create art on the basis of any fundamental principle have been 
disappointed so often, that neither public nor artist gives any credence to theories of 
art; hence, the popular conclusion that correctness of taste and beauty in art rest on 
coincidence, or chance.18 Anyone who does anything original is immediately and 
relentlessly copied by inferior people, so that even this work eventually becomes 
banal, and is forgotten or rejected. Whereas in other nations the results of this 
disorganised activity are a one-sided masquerade of their national character, equally 
ridiculously, Germany has become a kind of display cabinet for specimens from 
around the world. The Germans are frantic to accumulate content, so folk literature
15 Studium-Aufsatz op. cit. p.219.
16 Studium-Aufsatz op. cit. p.219.
17 It (ie. art) idolised the mystic oracular pronouncements o f  genius.
18 Studium-Aufsatz op. cit. p.221.
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jostles for attention alongside affected, genteel poetic styles.19 Schlegel enumerates 
various other grotesque artistic styles current in Germany, including ‘Nationalpoesie 
fur die Dilettanten der Deutschheif. Yet even from among this plethora of styles, 
nothing satisfactory emerges. The drive to create art is weakening, subsiding into 
slack passivity - just the kind of danger Schiller, too, foresaw for German society in 
general. The public appetite is crude; good taste is gradually dying out, and will soon 
disappear in the unsatisfied yearning and inconsolable despair expressed in poetic 
composition.21
Perhaps this brief English summary of the opening paragraphs of Schlegel’s 
essay captures something of its tone. This is a polemical work. Schlegel expresses 
passion, anger, despair, but, most importantly for his subsequent work, he writes with 
a powerful authorial voice that communicates his dry, ironic humour. The whole 
essay seems intended to mimic a conversation in which Schlegel and the reader are 
complicit. The reader is expected to share Schlegel’s outrage and despair, and also to 
have the good taste to smile knowingly at the ridiculous excesses that he covertly and 
flatteringly implies are only too obvious to everyone. ‘Good taste’ itself, of course, no 
longer exists, according to Schlegel. So here is early evidence of one of his favourite
argumentational techniques. In this essay he will subsequently salvage a conclusion
00from the wreckage, not only of 'die Bruchstiicke der zerschmetterten Kunst\ but
19 Studium-Aufsatz op. cit. p.222.
The comment about accumulating content recalls Schiller’s historical account o f the development o f  
the aesthetic mode o f perception in the Aesthetic Letters. The accumulation o f content was identified as 
the savage’s first step towards the recognition o f beauty. This reinforces our impression that Schlegel 
had a low opinion o f  standards o f taste in contemporary Germany.
20A proud national poetry for dabblers in Germanity.
There are many instances, visible from the footnotes in KFSA that document the textual revisions o f  
this essay, showing how carefully Schlegel decided whether to use terms o f German or French origin. 
He consistently used the French option to underscore his ironical - even sarcastic - intentions.
21 Studium-Aufsatz op. cit. p.223.
22 Studium-Aufsatz op. cit. p.224.
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also from his own apparently iconoclastic starting point; he will show us where art 
should be tending, and, thus, what good taste really requires. The skilful execution of 
the technique we have just described constitutes the ambiguous beauty he identified 
and elevated later in the decade as irony. Whatever the similarities in subject matter, it 
has to be said that Schlegel’s calculated lightness of touch in these opening 
paragraphs exceeds anything in Schiller’s far more earnest, though equally strongly 
felt, theoretical works. It is as if Schlegel is putting Schiller’s advocacy of the 
balanced combination of the drives into action, and exemplifying in his own critique 
the operation of a play drive that works to serious effect.
Schlegel then explains how the current situation developed from the origins of 
European art and art theory, and also applies the interacting forces of Fichtean 
philosophy to the facts of mankind’s history, showing that European art, as he sees it, 
grew from the interaction between the Fichtean model of humanity, and the dominant 
European environment. Eighteenth century European art and other changes and 
upheavals in contemporary European culture then represent a critical point in human 
development, so that, if we can analyse the fundamentals of the situation correctly, we 
shall be able to guide the creative arts through the current difficulties to a foreseeable 
stage of resolution and improvement. The words in which he sums up the current 
condition of art, and prefaces his arguments for regeneration, recall a theme of 
Holderlin’s:
Man konnte sie ein Chaos alles Erhabenen, Schonen und Reizenden nennen, 
welches gleich dem alten Chaos, aus dem sich, wie die Sage lehrt, die Welt 
ordnete, eine Liebe und einen HaB erwartet, um die verschiedenartigen 
Bestandteile zu scheiden, die gleichartigen aber zu vereinigen.23
the fragments o f shattered Art
23Studium-Aufsatz op. cit. p.224.
It could be called a chaos o f everything sublime, beautiful and attractive, which, like the ancient chaos 
from which myth teaches us the world took its order, is awaiting a love and a hatred that would 
separate all the diverse components, but unite those o f  a similar type.
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Schlegel is in general less inclined than Holderlin to draw on mythical imagery to 
illustrate his point, but this example shows how the two writers were exposed to the 
same range of literary, religious and philosophical influences. However, they 
interpreted them slightly differently. There is an irony in this quotation that might 
conceivably not have been lost on Schlegel himself in his later years. Holderlin never 
hesitated to perceive and embrace the beauty of ‘Chaos’, as he called it in his later 
poems.24 However, here Schlegel refers to Chaos negatively, to reinforce his criticism 
of the contemporary art world. The only optimistic note is the presentiment that the 
condition of Chaos is not permanent, but destined to resolve itself into a new era of 
artistic beauty, as it has done before. The slightly later Schlegel, however, achieved 
his own sense of resolution by recognising the beauty supposedly inherent in 
confusion and in discontinuous structures. The future Schlegel did not deny these 
various features and trends, but he re-evaluated them.
The essay’s shift from criticism to reconstruction is based on an expectation of 
‘gliickliche Katastrophe’ and the ‘entscheidende Augenblick’. The western world has 
reached a point of crisis beyond which it must either always continue to sink, or 
necessarily progress, using 'einlen] Leitfaderf - a guiding thread - from the spirit of
24 See: ‘Das SchicksaP (1793/94), ‘Diotim a-m ittlere Fassung’ (1796), ‘Heimkunft: An die 
Verwandten’ (1801), in Friedrich Hfilderlin, Die Gedichte: Samtliche Gedichte und »Hyperion«, (ed.) 
Jochen Schmidt, Frankfurt am Main; Leipzig: Insel Verlag, 2001, pp.157, 177, and 291.
25 By the time of: Friedrich Schlegel, ‘GesprSch tlber die Poesie: Rede iiber die Mythologie’, in (ed.) 
Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische und theoretische Schri/ten, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam 
jun., 1997, p. 191, written in 1800, Schlegel has clearly changed his mind about chaos. He writes:
Aber die hOchste SchOnheit, ja die hOchste Ordnung ist denn doch nur die des Chaos... welches nur auf 
die Berilhrung der Liebe wartet, um sich zu einer harmonischen Welt zu entfalten...
But the highest beauty, indeed the highest degree o f order, is nevertheless that o f chaos... which only 
awaits the touch o f love to unfold into a harmonious world.
The similarity between this sentiment and HOlderlin is quite striking.
Schlegel’s increased interest in discontinuous structures was visible by 1797. His calculated 
development o f the Fragments, published in Lyceum and Athendum illustrate this.
See chapter 12 below.
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its own past history, to lead it forwards. To us as readers this posed dichotomy
might seem to be an entirely open question. Will western art continue to sink? Or will
it progress? Schlegel considers it obvious that matters will progress and improve.
Only later did he elaborate on the faith he expresses here that
schon oft erzeugte ein dringendes Bedurfnis seinen Gegenstand; aus der 
Verzweiflung ging eine neue Ruhe hervor.27
This, then, is probably an early indication that he was beginning to form a notion of
some sort of dialectical process on which he could base a theory of history.
Schon der durchgangige gegenseitige Einflufi der modeme Poesie deutet auf 
innem Zusammenhang.2
reinforces this supposition. Schiller believed that forces united within the will of man 
could produce an artistic synthesis greater than themselves, but thinks only of beauty 
in art and the balanced human being.29 Schlegel, however, suggests more generally 
that, precisely because we can distinguish two opposite tendencies working on each 
other, a covert, unified process must be at work.
Working from this presupposition, he can then discuss European art. There is, 
in fact, a shared European culture, an unusual thought at a time when Europe was 
comparatively unaware of the importance or even the existence of other human 
cultures around the world. In analytical terms, it is also a surprise, of the kind readers 
will come to associate with Schlegel. He has just established that there is 
fragmentation among the artistic practices of the European nations. If, however, any 
perceptive readers were already suspecting that Schlegel would suggest some remedy
26 Studium-Aufsatz op. cit. p.224.
a fortunate catastrophe / turning point and a decisive moment.
27 Studium-Aufsatz op. cit. p.224:
We have often seen how a pressing need has begotten its own object; from despair arose a new calm.
28 The continuous reciprocal influence o f modem poetry already points to inner cohesion. 
Studium-Aufsatz op. cit. p.226.
29 See chapter 4 above.
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for the current situation, they might be expecting any such proposed resolution to
rescue art either absolutely, as art per se, or universally, in a worldwide sense.
Schlegel states, however,
Es ist wahr, bei aller Eigentiimlichkeit und Verschiedenheit der einzelnen 
Nationen verrat das Europaische Volkersystem dennoch durch einen 
auffallend ahnlichen Geist der Sprache, der Verfassung, Gebrauche und 
Einrichtungen, in vielen iibrig gebliebenen Spuren der fhiheren Zeit, den 
gleichartigen und gemeinschaftlichen Ursprung ihrer Kultur.30
He thus dissociates himself from strident nationalistic or factional schools of thought, 
but also abandons any Kantian, universally valid answer to questions about the nature 
or purpose of art, beauty and any associated concepts. Though diverse, the various 
golden ages of the European national ‘Poesieri have inner interconnections that unite 
them.31 He enumerates their shared characteristics: imitation of the ancients; the gulf, 
envy and antagonism between popular and ‘high’ artistic culture; an excess des 
Charakteristischen, Individuellen und Interessanten - egocentric, quirky 
individualism; and the restless, insatiable pursuit of novelty, dem Piquanten (the spicy 
or suggestive) and dem Frappanten (the striking) - which is to say, sensationalism in 
general, expressed tellingly enough, in a French lexis. All the national failings 
combine with these common traits to indicate that what has happened to modem 
Poesie makes sense only if they are aspects of a pan-European whole, and not a
30 Studium-Aufsatz, op. cit. p.225 (Schlegel’s spelling used in quotation):
It is true, in all the peculiarity and variety o f individual nations the system o f  European peoples betrays 
nevertheless the kindred and communal origin o f its culture in many leftover traces o f former times, 
through a strikingly similar spirit in language, constitution, customs and organisation.
31 These ‘golden ages’ are referred to in a more overtly disparaging way in Friedrich Schlegel, 
‘GesprSch tiber die Poesie: Epochen der Dichtkunst’ (1800), in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich 
Schlegel: Kritische und theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p. 183.
The emphasis there is on their derivation from and inferiority to classical Greek Vorbilder and the work 
o f Petrarch and Dante.
32 Studium-Aufsatz op. cit. p.227.
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collection of unrelated national groupings, and that the similarities become more
pronounced once we examine art’s origins and goals.
Fichtean ideas then become more discernible. In humanity, there can be no
such thing as a pure power at work. Mankind is always resident in a particular world,
and even the apparently undetermined concepts associated with the expressions
‘culture’ (Kultur), ‘development’ (Entwicklung) and ‘education’ (Bildung) presuppose
two separate natures - one which is being cultivated, and another that brings about the
cultivation and modifies, advances and limits by means of external conditions and
circumstances. Activity itself unavoidably forms and educates mankind, meaning that
this education, according to Schlegel the very content of human life, is the true object
of history at a higher level. History is the attempt to discover the necessary in the
changeable. The internal duality in mankind also means that, from the first moment of
our existence, we find ourselves involved in a scuffle (handgemeiri) with fate. Life is
a constant life or death battle with this terrifying, unavoidable power.34 This is a rather
more figurative expression of Fichte’s analysis of how the Ich and Nicht-Ich within
the self create and re-create the human self, and furthermore, how human knowledge
of the world, its existence and nature are derived from this constant feeling,
challenging and modification of the resistance experienced during activity. Schlegel
develops the imagery further in the following pages.
...sogar im Mittelpunkte seines eignen Wesens hat sein Feind - die ihm 
entgegengesetzte Natur - noch Wurzel gefafit... eine zweideutige Mischung der 
Gottheit und der Tierheit.35
33 Studium-Aufsatz op. cit. p.228.
34 Studium-Aufsatz op. cit. p.229.
35 Studium-Aufsatz op. cit. p.230.
...even in the very centre o f his own being, his enemy - the natural world that is opposed to him - has 
taken root... an ambiguous mixture o f divinity and animal nature.
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We are engaged in the problem of how to resolve this and reconcile these insoluble
inner contradictions.
Schlegel then offers us his solution to this puzzle. It resembles both Schiller’s
and Holderlin’s solutions. For Schiller the aesthetically educated human being
achieved a balance between sensuous and rational drives. Holderlin urged us to
embrace fate, ie. the physical, resistant aspects of ourselves and the world around us,
and make them our own. What Schlegel writes reminds us of both approaches:
Nur das Gemiit, welches von dem Schicksal hinlanglich durchgearbeitet 
worden ist, erreicht das seltne Gluck, selbststandig sein zu konnen. Die 
Grundlage seiner stolzesten Werke ist oft ein blofies Geschenk der Natur, und 
auch seine beste Taten sind nicht selten kaum zur Halfte sein. Ohne alle 
Freiheit ware es keine Tat: ohne alle ffemde Hiilfe keine menschliche.
Unless we were free, there would be no act, but without outside help, there would be 
no human act. Education is the end result of a reciprocal interaction between freedom 
and nature, and between these two there is a constant reciprocal determination.
Human autonomy is hard won, the result of a struggle with fate and nature. Education 
or freedom are the final result of every reciprocal interaction (Wechselwirkung) 
between freedom and nature.
Schlegel has thus set up a model of mankind. Just as the components of Kant’s 
theory require the application of the schemata in order to be understood as 
knowledge; just as Schiller’s human being can be called such only if the abstract, or 
unconditioned Person exists in time and space, so Schlegel also denies the possibility 
of any pure, unconditioned human being, because the unconditioned aspect of 
humanity must be allied with an inner animal nature, and can operate only as an 
aspect of nature, influenced by its surroundings. Like Schiller, Schlegel accepts also
36Studium-Aufsatz op. cit. p.230.
Only the mind that has been sufficiently worked through by fate can achieve the rare good fortune of  
being capable o f autonomy. The foundation o f its proudest creations is often a mere gift of nature, and 
it is not unusual even for its best deeds to be hardly half its own. Without any freedom there would be 
no deed at all: without any external help no human deed.
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that, united though they are, these aspects of humanity are nevertheless
distinguishable, running like threads or themes through all human activity.
Sometimes, like Schiller, Schlegel even calls them ‘drives’; he writes of the
understanding (Verstand), which he opposes to the ‘blinde Kraft’ (blind force) of
inclination (Neigung). Schlegel, however, presents a slightly more jaded view of
human intentionality, or perhaps, more Humean view.
Dort ist der Verstand auch bei der groBten Ausbildung hochstens nur der 
Handlanger und Dolmetscher der Neigung; der ganze zusammengesetzte Trieb 
aber der unumschrankte Gesetzgeber und Fuhrer der Bildung.37
Thus, although the integrated human being is capable of autonomous thought and 
action, inclination, or the natural animal side of mankind, is the motive force. Schiller 
indeed presumed people had begun as primitive creatures who knew nothing but 
nature, but he did not credit nature with the initiating role in what we do. SchlegeFs 
image is of an understanding that guides, develops and improves a basically natural 
activity. Viewing the relationship between the inner facets of humanity in this way 
makes it easier for Schlegel to explain historical and cultural developments. Thus, 
without reason, mankind would not have remained static, but his behaviour would 
have been random and erratic. Reason and the understanding give shape and direction 
to human activity and, in the case of the arts, enable a more critical handling of the 
material with which the human animal would in any case have engaged in some way. 
Of nature, Schlegel writes: der Trieb ist zwar ein machtiger Beweger, aber ein blinder
O Q
Fuhrer. Thus, historically, concepts directed aesthetic development. They have been 
the guiding principles, even though the strength and content of the process may have
37 Studium-Aufsatz op. cit. p.231.
There the understanding, even in its most highly educated form, is only the dogsbody and interpreter o f  
inclination; the complete composite drive, however, is the unlimited lawgiver and leader of the 
educational process.
38 Studium-Aufsatz op. cit. p.231.
The drive is admittedly a powerful mover, but a blind leader.
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been given by nature. And they have also developed strength and influence in 
response to their environment.
In the following pages Schlegel illustrates how this is so in the history of art and 
literature. The Europeans descended from barbarian invaders, and their culture is 
rooted in this barbarism. They inherited the remnants of classical culture, but lacked 
the intellect necessary for developing and improving the classical model. The 
immature understanding looked urgently for a ready-made given object on which to 
work.40 Hence the ubiquitous and recurrent tendency to imitate the artists of antiquity 
springs from this deep-seated feature in the origins of European culture.41 And, as can 
be imagined, the results during the past one-and-a-half thousand years reflect just 
about every misconception society could have of a past civilisation.42 At this point a 
comment casts light on Schlegel’s later interest in producing literary fragments. 
Criticising the cavalier way in which modem writers throw together profuse 
selections of material and subjects, Schlegel objects, not to diversity of content, but 
that the resulting work lacks inner life or cohesion of its own. The external force of 
the work’s artificial structure holds it together, not the presence of any living 
principle.43 Whereas some of Schlegel’s strictures in this essay may be opinions that 
he later reversed, he adhered to this fundamental principle, even after re-evaluating 
his search for objective beauty. For instance, his ensuing discussion of Shakespeare 
considers how writers and musicians have experimented by blurring the boundaries 
among literary genres. In general, he condemns this, but Shakespeare, both in Romeo
39 Studium-Aufsatz op. cit. p.232.
40 Studium-Aufsatz op. cit. p.237.
41 Studium-Aufsatz op. cit. p.238.
42 Schlegel picks up this idea o f cultural distortion again with reference to the various possible ways of 
reading Lessing. See chapter 11 below.
43 Studium-Aufsatz op. cit. p.238.
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and Juliet and in Hamlet is exculpated, in two different ways, from accusations of 
having created disorganised, disjointed works. Shakespeare achieves unity in Romeo 
and Juliet, an enchanting mix of elegy and lyricism, not by any rationally analysable 
or comprehensible method. We feel its unity. We feel the whole play as an extended 
sigh, sweet anguish, painful enjoyment and interwoven grace and pain.44 By 1798, 
Schlegel was unequivocally praising Shakespeare’s Romantic qualities and the 
systematic skill with which he interweaves so many features into a single, Romantic 
drama. Shakespeare was helping to set standards, and no longer needed any 
exceptional defence 45
Hamlet too relies, not on the crude or forced application of a rule-governed, 
unsuitable structure, but by such a simple expedient, that it often passes unnoticed, 
especially by its imitators. That expedient is the life of Shakespeare’s main character, 
Hamlet, the central point of the play. He generates its events, and is the focus of the 
action 46 Hamlet is not like the old aesthetic tragedies, but is a philosophical drama 
with a didactic purpose, an example of the blurred boundaries between drama and 
philosophy; it has an idealist (idealisch) and philosophically interesting intention. 
Hamlet himself represents disharmony. He exhibits a complete excess of the 
understanding over active, physical power. Overall this tragedy leaves us with an 
impression of the deepest despair. Shakespeare portrays mankind as being forever 
separated from and at odds with fate.
In a long footnote, interposed between his references to Romeo and Juliet and 
his longer discussion of Hamlet, Schlegel suggests how to reconcile these two sets of
44 Studium-Aufsatz op. cit. p.241.
45 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘AthenSums-Fragmente, no.253’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: 
Kritische undtheoretischeSchriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p. 108.
46 Studium-Aufsatz op. cit. p.247.
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observations.47 Artistic representation is unlike scientific representation in that the
subject matter of science is seldom chosen, never formed and never invented. This
means, says Schlegel, that science is not idealisch, thus meaning that it does not
derive from ideas in the writer’s mind, whether as abstract ideas or imaginative
scenarios and characterisations. Similarly, his next sentence implies another contrast
between science and art:
Die darstellende Kunst teilt sich in drei Klassen, je nachdem ihr Ziel das 
Wahre, das Schdne oder das Gute ist.48
Representational art thus represents, not true things, in the manner, for example, of
scientific, botanical illustrations, but the ideas of the truth, beauty and the good. The
aesthetic work exhibits beautiful free play, which sounds very much like an
acceptance of Kant’s theory, unchanged. Schlegel’s view of the moral work, depicting
the good, however, acknowledges a debt to Hemsterhuys, who identified a kind of
philosophy that he called ‘dithyrambic’. The dithyramb was the unstructured, ecstatic
musical and poetical form of ancient Dionysian celebration, and Schlegel sees the
work of some of the most famous German poets as being like this.
Was versteht er [d.h. Hemsterhuys] darunter wohl andres, als den freiesten 
ErguB des sittlichen Gefuhls, eine Mitteilung groBer und guter Gesinnungen?49
To Schlegel this means that the kind of modem Poesie that is moral in its tendency is 
neither didactic, nor dramatic, but dithyrambic in its overall composition.
It might now be useful to insert some comments about the subsequent 
direction taken by Schlegel’s thoughts on artistic merit, that arise because of his view
47 Studium-Aufsatz op. cit. p.244.
48 Studium-Aufsatz op. cit.. p.243
Representational art falls into three classes, according to whether its goal is the true, the beautiful or 
the good.
49 Studium-Aufsatz op. cit. p.244.
What else could he [ie. Hemsterhuys] mean by this, but the freest outpouring of moral feeling, a way o f  
imparting great and good dispositions?
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of Shakespeare in the Studium-Aufsatz. Schiller’s Naive and Sentimental did not 
appear until just after Schlegel had written this essay. Both men held Shakespeare in 
high regard, and clearly intended that any literary aesthetics must be capable of 
recognising Shakespeare’s greatness.50 They treat Shakespeare differently, however. 
For Schiller he was essentially naive, though writing in and influenced by a 
sentimental cultural environment. Shakespeare reflected life realistically and simply, 
as it was. To judge from what the Studium-Aufsatz tells us, however, Schlegel 
disagreed with this. His evaluation of Shakespeare shows him using all kinds of 
features, specially chosen for his specific, and sometimes moral or philosophical 
purposes, that enabled him to establish his own standards of artistic excellence. In the 
language of Naive and Sentimental, this would amount to a claim that Shakespeare 
was a sentimental writer. Thus, although, as some commentators have claimed, Naive 
and Sentimental might have prompted Schlegel to take his ideas on literary aesthetics 
further, and might also have helped determine the direction taken by these ideas to 
some extent, in the case of Shakespeare, reading Naive and Sentimental, perhaps led 
Schlegel to recognise the redundancy of arguing any special case for Shakespeare’s 
greatness, as he had done in the Studium-Aufsatz. Shakespeare fitted the definition of 
a sentimental writer well, on Schlegel’s estimation, regardless of how Schiller had 
classified him.
Despite his criticisms of modem literature and thought, as if they might be 
incapable of being accommodated in any coherent theory, the passages we have 
already discussed from the Studium-Aufsatz suggest that Schlegel is already 
establishing a new framework for assessing the merit of literary work. Works must be 
judged, at least partly, on the basis of their creator’s intentions, insofar as they are
50 For Schiller’s view o f Shakespeare, see chapter 5 above.
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revealed in the work.51 Thus, any attempt to interpret Shakespeare’s plays as things of 
beauty will fail. They are aesthetic, emotional or philosophical in their approach, 
depending on the playwright’s intended end. Romeo and Juliet shares some of the 
characteristics of the moral drama. It is an unconstrained outpouring of feeling that 
tells us how the freshest blooms of life’s Springtime shrivel in the unkind breath of 
fate,52 which surely carries a moral message. Hamlet, however, is not based on 
emotion, and appeals not just to the understanding, but the reason as a whole.53 As 
Schlegel has told us, it relies for its unity almost entirely on the words and thoughts of 
an excessively rational, though disharmonious, central character.
Shakespeare thus exemplifies and is the pinnacle of modem Poesie. He has 
been criticised by mediocre writers for breaking the rules of art. But since, as Schlegel 
believes he has shown already, no objective theory exists as yet, this criticism is 
premature. Both Nature and Shakespeare create a profusion of both the beautiful and 
the ugly.54 He uses ugliness to explore a moral vacuum when necessary. This is how 
he is able to develop his characters and portray a view of life. He is interesting and 
individual, not beautiful, and makes no attempt to present a balanced picture. He is 
prepared to leave both his characters and his audience in a state of confusion at the 
end of a work, if he considers this necessary to his purpose.
Now, whatever Schlegel’s later views on the nature and purpose of art or 
literature, he has already deviated from Kant and Schiller, even at this stage of the 
Studium-Aufsatz. They provided for the possibility of art seeking firstly, either to be 
or to portray the beautiful, or secondly to be or to portray the sublime. Schiller is quite
51 Later, Schlegel doubted whether it was possible to identify an author’s intentions fully, or for an 
author to convey his or her intention fully. See Chapter 11 below.
52 Studium-Aufsatz op. cit. p.241.
53 Studium-Aufsatz op. cit. p.246.
54 Studium-Aufsatz op. cit. p.250.
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explicit in the Aesthetic Letters that the aesthetic drive is a balance between form 
drive and material drive, that the aesthetically capable human being exists in such a 
condition, and that excellent art itself demands a balance between form and material, 
if it is to be appreciated. Schlegel’s conclusion from his survey of modem art 
resembles Schiller’s to the extent that there are indeed various different ways in which 
or levels at which the human and the material, the subjective and the objective factors 
might perhaps be brought into a reciprocal interaction. However, in addition, he 
concludes that these ways are so varied, that they cannot simply be categorised as 
ways of creating artistic beauty. These opening pages of the Studium-Aufsatz broaden 
the possible purposes of art. We have noted that Schlegel specifically mentions truth, 
beauty and morality. He mentions one-sided reliance on either feeling or rationality, 
on character or on other forms of structure. He mentions the futility of expecting a 
recognisable external form to provide a coherent structure for a modem work. The 
key to appreciating the great works of the modem era, he seems to be suggesting, is to 
identify the source of their inner unity. And this unity, it would appear, rests on a 
decision made by the creative artist. The artist chooses a goal, a structural focal point, 
and the work is judged on the terms appropriate to this intention.
In the course of his description of the characteristic, the individual, and the 
interesting, his apparently bewildered survey of the ugly, the shocking and the 
chaotic, Schlegel has actually been establishing a range of means by which artists can 
achieve their chosen ends. These ends might perhaps include the creation of an 
aesthetically pleasing - or beautiful - artefact, but, equally legitimately, they might 
not. The artist might, for instance, want to use imaginative means tell us a truth about 
human nature, however ugly or unpalatable it might be. He might want to create a 
beautifully structured fairytale that offers the reader closure at its end; but, equally, he
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may wish instead to leave the reader with an unresolved moral dilemma to ponder at 
the end of a moral dithyramb. Schlegel opened these possibilities, but had not yet 
devised an acceptable model to accommodate his observations.
In the second chapter,4 Weitere Entgegenstellung des Interessanten mit dem 
Schonen’,55 he identifies the interesting as constituting the aesthetic orientation of 
modem literary art. It is a concept capable of reconciling the apparent conflict 
between the stmggle for individuality and the pressure to imitate. It explains how it is 
that virtuosity seems to be the prevailing means of validation in artistic circles,56 and 
also explains the general atmosphere of inconclusive striving.57 There can be no 
absolute or highest level of the interesting, yet artists nevertheless strive for 
something perfect. Having inherited a cultural awareness of classical beauty, artists 
believe they have to achieve a standard of absolute perfection. Schlegel therefore 
concludes that the pursuit of the interesting is the misguided means by which modem
c o
art hopes to achieve beauty, which can indeed be objective and absolute. And,
having referred to individuals, such as Rembrandt and Goethe in his support,59 he
optimistically concludes that the shift away from this temporary diversion into the
interesting, and back to the beautiful is imminent.
Der Augenblick scheint in der Tat fur eine dsthetischen Revolution reif zu 
sein, durch welche das Objektive [in an earlier edition: Objektive und Schdne] 
in der asthetischen Bildung der Moderhen herrschend werden konnte.60
55Studium-Aufsatz, op. cit. p.252ff.
Further contrasts between the interesting and the beautiful.
56 Studium-Aufsatz, op. cit. p.252fn.
57 Studium-Aufsatz, op. cit. p.253.
58 Studium-Aufsatz, op. cit. p.257.
59 Studium-Aufsatz, op. cit. p.261.
60 Studium-Aufsatz, op. cit. p.269.
In fact, the moment seems to be ripe for an aesthetic revolution by means o f  which an objective 
standard [in an earlier edition: ‘the objective and the beautiful’] could become dominant in the aesthetic 
education o f  the modems.
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His objections to the futile way in which writers and the public are being distracted by
the individual and changeable remind us of Plato, and his scorn for ‘sightseers’, who
love beautiful things, but cannot see beauty itself.61 His advocacy of the universally
valid, the enduring and the necessary - which together constitute ‘the Objective’ -
reminds us of Plato’s exhortations that we should search for knowledge of the Forms.
Only the Objective can fill the gap we feel; only beauty can calm our hectic striving.
Then comes a shift towards Kant.
Das Schdne... ist der allgemeingiiltige Gegenstand eines uninteressierten 
Wohlgefallens, welches von dem Zwange des Bediirfnisses und des Gesetzes 
gleich unabhangig, frei und dennoch notwendig, ganz zwecklos und dennoch 
unbedingt zweckmafiig ist.62
The ellipsis in this quotation contains Schlegel’s admission that the term ‘beauty’ is 
still a problematic concept at this stage in his argument, but the rest of the sentence 
demonstrates the extent to which he accepts Kant’s analysis of beauty. Following 
Schiller, he believes we can actualise or recognise beauty in an objective 
manifestation, but, like Kant, he knows that it must fulfil some almost paradoxical 
requirements that set it apart from other areas of human perception. He also expresses 
some confidence that, ultimately, we shall be able to look back on our past 
blunderings in the sphere of the interesting, and see that they prepared us for the 
correct route to aesthetic perfection. If Schlegel later decided that the indeterminacy, 
constant change and ambivalence of contemporary art was precisely the ‘divine breath
/ • q
of irony’ that constituted its claim to beauty, we can say the Studium-Aufsatz shows
61 Plato, The Republic, trans. Robin Waterfield, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, 476b, p. 196.
62 Studium-Aufsatz, op. cit. p.253.
The beautiful... is the universally valid object o f a disinterested pleasure that is alike independent o f the 
compulsion o f need and o f the law, free and yet necessary, completely without purpose, and yet 
unconditionally purposive.
63‘Lyceums-Fragmente, no.42’, in (ed.) Hans Eichner, Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe, Vol.2, 
Part I: Charakteristiken und Kritiken I (1796 - 1801), Paderbom; Munich; Vienna: Verlag Ferdinand 
SchOningh, Zurich: Thomas-Verlag, 1967, p. 152.
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that this change of heart is a complete rejection of Kant. The undetermined interplay 
between imagination and understanding identified by Kant as creating the judgement 
of taste, the disinterested sense of pleasure, themselves become compatible, in 
Schlegel’s later work, with a view that art and beauty are themselves paradoxical and 
shifting. It would seem fair to claim, in this respect, that, although Kant was seeking 
to ground the stable, classical kind of art, beauty and artistic appreciation he found 
around him, Schlegel later realised that more than one kind of art or beauty could be 
simultaneously free of the law and lawful, purposeful but without purpose. In 1795, 
Schlegel’s presumption was still that he was seeking the same kind of beautiful art 
admired by Kant. Only subsequently did he realise that rapid change and ambiguity 
might be evidence, not of failed classicism, but an alternative and equally valuable 
way of doing things.
The third chapter64 then examines the standard of beauty portrayed in the art 
of Ancient Greece, and the fourth considers objections against Greek poetic art,65 for 
instance, that it is rather indelicate by the standards of eighteenth century taste. Thus, 
even in ancient Greek literature, the perceptive student must distinguish the objective 
- and thus enduring - features of classical poetry and drama from the local - and thus 
contextually specific.66 This leads him into the final chapter of the essay,4 Von der 
Wiedergeburt der neuern Poesie'}57 in which he reaches his conclusion. Modem
Es gibt alte und modeme Gedichte, die durchgangig im Ganzen und tlberall den gOttlichen Hauch der 
Ironie atmen.
There are ancient and modem poems that continuously, in general and everywhere, breathe out the 
divine breath o f irony.
64 Studium-Aufsatz, op. cit. pp.276ff. ‘Ideal des SchOnen in der Griechischen Dichtkunst’. The ideal o f  
beauty in Greek poetry
65 Studium-Aufsatz, op. cit. pp.309ff. ‘Einwendungen gegen die Griechische Poesie’. Objections 
against Greek Poesie [literature].
66 eg. Studium-Aufsatz, op. cit. pp.338.
67 Studium-Aufsatz, op. cit. pp.330ff. O f the rebirth o f more recent Poesie
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Poesie will be reborn, not when it stops imitating the ancients, and not when it returns 
to the tradition of imitating classical models, but when it abandons its pursuit of the 
interesting. Our reading and evaluation of the ancients has been distorted, because we 
have constantly sought our own idea of the interesting within their texts. We return to 
Schlegel’s point, that not imitation per se but the quality of our imitation is at fault.68 
Once we have thoroughly understood the ancients, we shall identify the objective 
property of perfect beauty within their work, and ignore whatever was only of 
relative, passing interest. So long as the interesting is our main criterion for artistic 
effort, we shall over-value the relative and trivial values of antiquity, just as we do in 
the modem age.69 Thus, although Schlegel’s discussion at first seems to perpetuate the 
more traditional elements of the Winckelmann / Herder controversy, he nevertheless 
reaches a radical conclusion. By advocating a return to the search for aesthetic truth 
and beauty, he is not siding with the neo-classical reproducers of classical genres and 
diction. He indicates a range of writers and styles unsuited to simplistic imitation. He 
also identifies good practice, writers who recognise and exploit similarities between 
the rhythms of the Greek and German languages, without forcing German into a 
classical mould.70
*7 1Overall, there have been three periods of modem German literature. Firstly, 
a one-sided national poetry that ignored both aesthetic models and the ancients; 
secondly, the attempted domination of the artistic world by subjective theory and 
imitation of the ancients. Schlegel’s own artistically anarchic age was still in 
transition {die Krise des Ubergangs) between the second and third stages. The third
68 Studium-Aufsatz, op. cit. p.238.
69 Studium-Aufsatz, op. cit. p.333.
70 Studium-Aufsatz, op. cit. p.343.
71 Studium-Aufsatz, op. cit. p.355.
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stage will be characterised by objectivity - objective theory, objective imitation, 
objective art, objective taste. This tendency can be observed, even though we - in the 
late eighteenth century, at any rate - are only at the start of the third stage.72 National 
Poesien still survive and dominate, though partially.
Yet, despite this rather inconclusive trend, Schlegel’s optimism remains 
undimmed. It is the time of the aesthetic revolution; we are ripe for aesthetic
T\education. He says this both by analogy with the French Revolution, and for
philosophical reasons. Authority and dogma have begun to give way to the critical
philosophy (ie. Kantianism), but philosophy is still struggling with scepticism. Kant’s
Third Critique, which Schlegel does not quite refer to by name, marks the beginning
of a third period. Now Fichte has revealed the foundations of the critical philosophy
we can complete the Kantian philosophy, and establish an objective system of
practical and aesthetic science.74 In addition, Schlegel thought the Germans had
reached a decisive point in studying the Greeks, reading them now in the original, not
through the mediation of the Romans. Now artists could apply such knowledge in
their own works. Schlegel then offers a kind of counter-argument, suggesting that
perhaps great artistic talent occurs randomly. If Nature scatters talent by chance
across Europe, familiarity with classical culture is irrelevant. His own reply to this is
that our artistic and political environment is not, in any case, encouraging. Everyone
should receive a liberal education, and then we can judge the results.
Erst wenn die GesetzmaBigkeit der asthetischen Kraft durch eine objektive 
Grundlage und Richtung gesichert sein wird, kann die asthetische Bildung
72 Studium-Aufsatz, op. cit. p.356.
73 Studium-Aufsatz, op. cit. p.356.
74 Studium-Aufsatz, op. cit. p.358.
though an earlier edition o f the essay apparently used the words festbegriindeten Systems der 
Erkenntnis des Schdnen... rather than objektiv.
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durch Freiheit der Kunst und Gemeinschaft des Geschmacks durchgangig 
durchgreifend und offentlich werden.75
Beauty and modem Poesie need to become established before we can re-establish the 
objective generally throughout art. Communication and public discussion among 
artists should be encouraged. Aesthetics is not a mystery. Schlegel has no time for 
prickly, hermit-like artists, whom he presumably views as posturing elitists, not 
generous communicators of beauty. Beauty is not difficult or inaccessible.76 This, 
Schlegel says, was one of the achievements of Burger, who tried to take art out of the 
drawing room and study, and into the living world.77 Goethe, Wieland, Herder,
7ftSchiller are others who have successfully used the Greeks as models. Schlegel’s 
final comments return to Winckelmann, who remarked on the few in Germany who 
still know the Greek poets, but Schlegel expects this number to increase. He therefore
70dedicates his essay to all artists, which is to say, to all who love beauty.
Winckelmann thus effectively has the last word in the Studium-Aufsatz, but,
ftndespite Eichner’s reservations regarding the originality of the essay, and Lovejoy’s 
attribution of it to Schlegel’s ‘classical’ period,81 Winckelmann would hardly 
recognise Schlegel’s overall thesis. The long-standing debate about classical models
75 Studium-Aufsatz, op. cit. p.360.
Only when aesthetic power’s conformity to law is safeguarded by an objective basic principle and 
tendency, can aesthetic education become thoroughly radical and public, by means o f the freedom of  
art and community o f taste
76 Studium-Aufsatz, op. cit. p.361.
He regards them as lein Or den ohne Geheimnis' - a fraternity without any secrets.
Companionability among artists is also recommended in the Fragmente. See chapter 12 below.
77 Studium-Aufsatz, op. cit. p.366.
78 Studium-Aufsatz, op. cit. p.366.
79 Studium-Aufsatz, op. cit. p.367.
80 Hans Eichner, Friedrich Schlegel, New York: Twayne, 1970, p. 17.
As the co-editor o f  the KFSA, Eichner is a very respected commentator on Schlegel. It is, however, 
quite surprising to note how unsympathetic he often is towards SchlegePs efforts.
81 A.O. Lovejoy, ‘On the Meaning o f “Romantic” in Early German Romanticism, Part II’, in Modern 
Language Notes, Vol.32, No.2, Feb 1917, p.66.
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of literature has virtually been dismissed, although Ancient Greece is the starting 
point for a sweeping historical account of the development and decline of European 
culture. Studying history is held up as the best guide to improving contemporary 
artistic life and production; however, we must interpret history in way unlike anything 
suggested by the neo-classical tradition. Walzel and Jakobiec are mistaken in thinking 
Schlegel recommended unconditional imitation of the ancients.82 Ancient works are 
the Vorbild, or Urbild,83 but, even in the Studium-Aufsatz, we are told to reject the 
formalistic inheritance of genre, ignore the superficial contextual features of the 
ancient writers, and in some way, cut through into the heart of what they were 
doing.84 In Kantian terms, he is perhaps urging us not to be distracted by the ‘craft’ 
elements of artistic creativity, but to appreciate the art that the artist’s craft skills only 
serve to create. The worst feature of the ‘interesting’ work of Schlegel’s 
contemporaries was that it had no heart. It is not surprising that Schlegel later 
modified his view of contemporary literature. His criterion of ‘heart’ later comes 
through as being similar to the notion of focusing on the spirit, not the letter of the 
work - an antithesis applied also by Schiller, Fichte and Holderlin. Schlegel evaluates 
Lessing (1797), Shakespeare, Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister (1798), and the topics 
covered in the four sections of the Gesprach iiber die Poesie (1800) in essays that 
point to the living heart of the writer’s work, and value it on that basis. Georg Forster,
82 Quoted in Raimund Belgardt, ,»Romantische Poesie« in Friedrich Schlegels Aufsatz „Uber das 
Studium der griechische Poesie44’, in The German Quarterly, vo. 40, no.2, Mar. 1967, p. 172.
83 the template or model.
84 Schlegel made much the same point in 1800 also. See:
Friedrich Schlegel, 4Gesprach Uber die Poesie: Versuch liber den verschiedenen Styl in Goethes 
frttheren und spSteren Werke’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: kritische und theoretische 
Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p.223.
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for example, is forgiven many specifically identified shortcomings on the basis of the
life that is evident at the heart of what he writes, and which so fully reveals the man.85
Thus, indeed Schlegel later abandoned his opinion about the imminent arrival
of an age of objectivity, and celebrated the interesting, the indeterminate and the
ironic. As Eichner says, the conclusions of the Studium-Aufsatz are drawn at some
cost. Schlegel argues rather ingeniously to include both his praise of Hamlet and his
condemnation of the modem way. It would have been easier to conclude, as he later
did, that Sophocles and Shakespeare had fundamentally different ways of writing,
both of which were equally valid, but that Shakespeare was better suited to modem
times. Noteworthy, however, is the fact that Schlegel’s general historical analysis
survived his revised opinion of the current state of European literature and his
changed predictions about the direction that he expected literature to take. He dropped
the claim that progress towards objectively perfect beauty was the expected and
desired endpoint of historical change, and accepted instead an open-ended
developmental process. Yet the adjustment required was minimal, compared to the
change he had already recommended, namely, that the excellence of the Greeks must
be assessed in the same way as contemporary literary works. Although his colleagues
should emulate the ancients, they do so from a new perspective, abandoning prevalent
neo-classicist structural guidelines. In fact, this is compatible with his statement:
Man sollte sich nie auf den Geist des Altertums berufen, wie auf eine 
Autoritat. Es ist eine eigene Sache mit den Geistem; sie lassen sich nicht mit 
Handen greifen, und dem andem vorhalten. Geister zeigen sich nur Geistem. 
Das Kiirzeste und das Btindigste ware wohl auch hier, den Besitz des 
alleinseligmachenden Glaubens durch gute Werke zu beweisen.87
85 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Georg Forster’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: kritische und 
theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997. p.42.
This point is noted also in Hans Eichner, Friedrich Schlegel, New York: Twayne, 1970, p.34.
86 Hans Eichner, Friedrich Schlegel, New York: Twayne, 1970, p.25.
87Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Lyceums-Fragment no.44 (1797)’, in Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe, 
Erste Abteilung: Kritische Neuausgabe, Band 2, MUnchen, Paderbom, Wien, Zurich 1967, p. 152.
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It is hardly surprising, then, that Schlegel believed the ancients should be evaluated by 
the method applicable to all would-be Poesie.
The Third Critique had prompted Schlegel, like Schiller, to find a theory of 
literary criticism. Schlegel’s objection was that Kant provided no rules for beauty, and 
thus left the judgement of taste impossible of proof.88 At that stage, then, Schlegel 
shared similar aims to Schiller in his search for the objective criterion, and also 
thought Fichte had a more fundamental version of the critical philosophy, capable of 
supporting a theory of history, and thereby justifying Herder. This was what changed. 
Beiser makes a good case that Schlegel was just as conscious as Schiller of the 
interdependence of philosophy and literary theory.89 Once Schlegel rejected Fichtean 
foundationalism, in favour of his own open-ended coherentism, however, he no longer 
expected absolute objectivity in art.90 Indeed, it then became easier to accept the 
apparently chaotic and interesting kinds of literature, and also to account for the 
desirable characteristics he had recognised.
Thus, Eichner’s belief that Schlegel capriciously reversed his position in 
response to Naive and Sentimental are unjustified. So, too, is the older school of 
thought that dated Schlegel’s change of heart to the publication of Goethe’s Wilhelm
No one should ever call on the spirit o f antiquity as if  it were an authority. It is a peculiar thing with 
spirits; they don’t let anyone get hold o f them with their hands and hold them out to other people. 
Spirits only show themselves to spirits. I suppose the shortest and most succinct way here too would be 
to show forth our allhallowing faith through good works.
88 Hans Eichner, Friedrich Schlegel, New York: Twayne, 1970, p.36.
89 Frederick Beiser, The Romantic Imperative, Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, 
2003, p. 123.
He bases his opinion on his study o f Schlegel’s philosophical notebooks, which have not been used for 
this project.
90 Mill&n-Zaibert, Elizabeth, Friedrich Schlegel and the Emergence o f  Romantic Philosophy, Albany: 
SUNY Press, 2007, p. 161.
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Meister?1 Schlegel’s method for analysing modem literature in the Studium-Aufsatz 
was already new, and required only a small later adjustment. The historical ideas in 
the Studium-Aufsatz also had implications. By claiming an interplay between history 
and philosophy, Schlegel suggested history was not a matter of chance. It exhibits 
causal connections, and with these also the germ of a dialectical process. Doing this 
likened history to a science of cultural change, and further, the linkage between 
societal change and artistic or literary change separated aesthetics from the critical 
philosophy and re-sited it in what we would now call a sociological context. Once we 
have established the presence of a sociological force, capable of moulding literature in 
accordance with the conventional, though fluid, norms of a human grouping, we have 
lost some of the rigorous objectivity that, in 1795, Schlegel wished to pursue. The 
Schlegel o f the later 1790s, who celebrated innovation and self-consciousness in art, 
was thus still not in a good position to distinguish between fashion and art. His 
rejection of false, deadening and misunderstood classical rules led him to emphasise 
the value of freedom and difference. However, like Schiller, he was not able to 
replace Kant’s judgement of taste, that vital factor that prevents genius from creating 
original nonsense, with any alternative stable concept or criterion.
By elevating the distinctive identity of European art, comprehensible because
of the shared cultural origins of its creators and audience, therefore, Schlegel’s
account of how and why art has changed or progressed since ancient times led to a
91 Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre was also published in 1795. However, SchlegeFs review o f Wilhelm 
Meister appeared in 1798, and is not the first Charakteristik to apply a more Romantic assessment o f a 
work. It uses criteria that Belgardt, in particular, traces back very successfully to the Studium-Aufsatz.
However, a former orthodox view credited Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister with having changed Schlegel’s 
view o f  the ‘interesting’ in literature. See eg. Rudolf Haym, Die Romantische Schule, Berlin, 1870. 
(Referred to in A.O. Lovejoy, ‘On the Meaning o f  “Romantic” in Early German Romanticism, Part II’, 
in Modern Language Notes, Vol.32, No.2, Feb 1917, p.71, and in Hans Eichner, ‘Friedrich Schlegel’s 
Theory o f  Romantic Poetry’ in Proceedings o f  the Modern Language Association, vol.71, no.5, Dec. 
1956, p. 1018.)
John William Scholl, ‘Friedrich Schlegel and Goethe, 1790 -  1802: a study in Early German 
Romanticism’, in Proceedings o f  the Modern Language Association, vol.21, no.l, 1906, p. 125.
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more relativistic account of aesthetics. In 1795 he may not have appreciated the effect 
this might have on aesthetics, in fact the Platonic influences on his thought might 
have led him to a view rather similar to that of Holderlin, in that, however varied it 
may be, beauty, as we can understand or appreciate it, is the appearance in our world 
of an absolute quality, a cultural manifestation of some aspect of an absolute quality 
or principle.
Schlegel himself was disappointed with the Studium-Aufsatz. Eichner thinks it
QOmerely systematised the prevailing German attitude towards Greek literature, and
Schlegel’s own reactions to the publication of Naive and Sentimental show his
disappointment.93 In 1797 he was still uneasy as he recalled the essay:
Mein Versuch uber das Studium der griechischen Poesie ist ein manierierter 
Hymnus in Prosa auf das Objektive in der Poesie. Das Schlechteste daran 
scheint mir der ganzliche Mangel der unentbehrlichen Ironie; und das Beste, 
die zuversichtliche Voraussetzung, daB die Poesie unendlich viel wert sei; als 
ob dies eine ausgemachte Sache ware.94
However, despite Eichner’s contentions that Schiller’s essay encouraged Schlegel to 
abandon his demand for objective beauty in art,95 the quotation above shows it was 
lack of irony, rather than his inability to second guess Schiller, that troubled Schlegel
92 Hans Eichner, Friedrich Schlegel, New York: Twayne, 1970, p. 17.
93 Josef KOmer, Romantiker und Klassiker: Die Briider Schlegel in ihren Beziehungen zu Schiller und 
Goethe, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1971, p.32.
It is, however, possible that Khmer might have over-stated the degree o f passion that Schlegel wished 
to convey in the words he quotes, and also the extent to which those words must have been concealing 
even deeper strong passions.
94Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Lyceums-Fragment no.7’, in Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe, Erste 
Abteilung: Kritische Neuausgabe, Band 2, MUnchen, Paderbom, Wien, Zurich 1967, p. 147.
My own effort on the study o f Greek poetry is an affected prose hymn to objectivity in literature. The 
worst thing in it seems to me to be its stark lack o f any essential irony; and the best is its confident 
assumption that beautiful literature has infinite value; as if this had already been agreed.
95 Eichner confirms that Schlegel had not seen the essay, Naive and Sentimental, until it was published, 
and was taken aback by its thesis.
Hans Eichner, Friedrich Schlegel, New York: Twayne, 1970, p.27.
In Hans Eichner, ‘Friedrich Schlegel’s Theory o f  Romantic Poetry’ in Proceedings o f  the Modern 
Language Association, vol.71, no.5, Dec. 1956, p. 1039, Eichner gave Naive and Sentimental the 
primary role in causing Schlegel to re-evaluate his position.
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in the longer term. Schlegel’s readers should not dismiss the essay despite Eichner’s 
comments. The essay is virtually a proto-type for his most successful later form of 
writing, the Charakteristik, or critical essay, itself an ironic form of writing.96 I would 
therefore disagree with Schlegel that his Studium-Aufsatz is without irony. Like a 
Charakteristik1 the essay identifies inner life as one of the virtues sometimes absent 
from stilted modem literature. Thus, Schlegel’s assessment of literary history is itself 
an example of irony and capable of contributing to a cultural-historical theory. Some 
of Schlegel’s observations in the Studium-Aufsatz continue to hold in his subsequent 
work, although others were modified or disappeared. We begin to see this in the next 
chapter, where discussion centres on the Charakteristiken.
96 Raimund Belgardt, ,»Romantische Poesie« in Friedrich Schlegels Aufsatz „Uber das Studium der 
griechische Poesie“’, in The German Quarterly, vo. 40, no.2, Mar. 1967, p. 170.
97 In chapter 11 this term will be explained more fully. Schlegel’s Charakteristik, ‘Uber Lessing’, is 
discussed in some detail, and reference is made to others.
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CHAPTER 11
Ob e r  l e s s i n g '-. t h e  l i g h t  t h i s  e s s a y  a n d  o t h e r
CHARAKTERISTIKEN THROW ON SCHLEGEL’S THOUGHT
By the time he wrote Uber Lessing, Schlegel was no longer concerned about 
objective artistic standards. The essay is a Charakteristik, a critical essay that captures 
the interplay between a writer and his work; the writer as the only kind of person 
capable of producing a work of this kind, and the work as a revelation of the man who 
created it. It claims to counterbalance the uncritical adulation accrued around 
Lessing, first and greatest writer of the German Nation.3 Schlegel summarises and 
rejects some of the reasons given for Lessing’s greatness, thus presenting himself as a 
welcome breath of fresh air, re-evaluating Lessing’s work unconstrained by the 
customary inappropriate reverence. Lessing himself always valued independent 
thought and a relentlessly critical stance,4 and the conclusion of Schlegel’s opening 
discussion is that, on the basis of his admirers’ evidence, he is not a poet, and his 
plays are not poetry despite their verse form.5
This was not the only occasion on which Schlegel adopted this tactic in 
assessing a major figure. His Charakteristik o f Georg Forster concluded that Forster 
was not a perfect writer.6 He detailed Forster’s faults, but finally concluded he was 
great. Forster took the wider view; he valued and expressed the spirit, not the letter, of
1 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Ober Lessing’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: kritische und 
theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, pp.46-75. First published in the Lyceum , 
1797.
2 see also Hans Eichner, Friedrich Schlegel, New York: Twayne, 1970, p.39ff.
3 ,der eigentliche Autor der Nation und des Zeitalters...’ Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Uber Lessing’, in (ed.) 
Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische und theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam 
jun., 1997, p.46.
4 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Ober Lessing’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische und 
theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p.58.
5Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Uber Lessing’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische und 
theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p.60.
6 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Georg Forster’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische und 
theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p.21.
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literature, beauty or his material. Forster always aimed for perfection, but openly 
acknowledged the impossibility of complete perfection. Doing so actually elevated his 
literary stature. Therefore Schlegel wanted to reject the methods of past critics, who 
had wrongly identified both the qualities that genuinely made Lessing and Forster 
great, and their faults.7
Uber Lessing eventually concludes that Lessing’s play, Nathan der Weise, is a 
work of poetic genius, using the criteria o f what Schlegel later called Romantic
o
poetry. In fact, the purpose of Uber Lessing may well be to apply Schlegel’s own 
method of critique to Lessing, as a means of illustrating his theory. In other words, he 
wanted, not to clear away the misleading mystique surrounding Lessing the literary 
master, but to validate his personal literary theory by demonstrating its relevance to 
the founder of German literature. Hence, Schlegel is the beneficiary of that mystique, 
not its destroyer. In that case, the spirit, rather than the word, of the essay contradicts 
Schlegel’s claim that to be a blind devotee of Lessing, the master of candour, is to 
desecrate his name.9 This disingenuousness cannot be held against him, however, 
since it illustrates his new literary theory. His thought centres around internal tensions 
and contradictions in the work of art, the ways in which issues and ideas hover 
indecisively among alternative interpretations, and an implicit, knowing, ironic 
interaction between writer and reader. The facts firstly, that this apparent attempt to 
strip Lessing of his iconic status actually confirms it, and secondly that this elevated 
status confirms the methodology by means of which Lessing has been assessed, are
7Contrary to Eichner’s belief, Schlegel’s line is not ultimately self-defeating, though it is ironic. Since 
Schlegel intended to demonstrate that his subjects surpassed the standards set by traditional critics, 
Eichner’s objection has no force.
See Hans Eichner, Friedrich Schlegel, New York: Twayne, 1970, p.37.
8 See chapter 12 below.
9Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Uber Lessing’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische und 
theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p.56.
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just the kinds of delicious circularities that Schlegel relished, and which typified his 
Romanticism.10
From Uber Lessing various quotations that reflect key themes in Schlegel’s 
theoretical and critical writing will be examined. From these we can generalise, thus 
explaining his overall aesthetic and philosophical viewpoint. Before examining them, 
however, one extract is relevant out of sequence. Although Schlegel had a role in the 
development of aesthetic theory from Kant to the end of the eighteenth century, unlike 
Schiller, he rarely uses the word, ‘aesthetic’. Fortunately, Uber Lessing contains a 
useful definition:
...eine sehr genialische Erdichtung, deren Zweck und Geist aber dennoch so 
unpoetisch, oder wie man jetzt in Deutschland sagt, so unasthetisch wie 
moglich ist.11
So, in Schlegel’s vocabulary, poetisch means the same as asthetisch. The quotation 
suggests that he regarded the word ‘aesthetic’ as an unhelpful neologism.12 It 
probably still had strong neo-classical connotations, since Schlegel had seemingly 
approved aesthetic tragedies in the Studium-Aufsatz. Perhaps asthetisch had become 
too firmly identified with self-indulgent, subjective contemplation in a period of 
declining classical art, whereas Schlegel favoured practical engagement in direct 
literary criticism, a kind of poetics, as a better way of establishing the merits of great 
art. The word, poetisch, however, was also new, taken from the word Poesie,
Schlegel’s word for the poetic or aesthetic elements in any art form. Romantische 
Poesie became Schlegel’s term for everything the latest European art should be 
aiming for. From Uber Lessing we learn that the best writers, eg. Lessing, have
10 Frederick C. Beiser, German Idealism: the struggle against subjectivism , Cambridge MA; London: 
Harvard University Press, 2002, ch.4, p.446.
11 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Uber Lessing’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische und 
theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p.72.
12 He seems to confirm this in Lyceums-Fragmente, no. 40.
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already been producing Poesie in the past, despite the criteria by which they were 
judged at the time. Asthetisch was perhaps too abstract, too philosophical in the sense 
of being divorced from practical or sensuous reality, and, furthermore, circumscribed 
by Kant’s usage in the Third Critique. Schlegel makes little, if any, use of Kant’s 
philosophical argument. Schlegel’s focus is on the nature of Lessing’s work and the 
thought that lies behind it. He is less concerned than Kant with the subjective 
experience of the man of taste, though he gives the reader an undeniable role in 
discovering and appreciating Lessing’s abilities. Poetisch was thus presumably a 
more helpful word than asthetisch for Schlegel’s supposedly worthwhile, substantial 
task.
He writes about the many-sided character of, in this case, a great man:
Eine so reiche und umfassende Natur kann nicht vielseitig genug betrachtet 
werden, und ist durchaus unerschopflich. So lange wir noch an Bildung 
wachsen, besteht ja ein Teil, und gewib nicht der unwesentlichste, unsers 
Fortschreitens eben darin, dafl wir immer wieder zu den alten Gegenstanden,
i
die es wert sind, zuriickkehren...
However, Schlegel believed all objects and situations are many-sided, and can be
evaluated in many ways. He believed, for instance, that any proposition could be
proved in an infinite number of ways, and was suspicious of philosophers who
attempted to deduce first principles as foundations for an incontestable philosophical
system.14 In this, he rejected Kant, and the attempts of Reinhold and Fichte to
underpin Kant’s first principles. He advocated piecemeal coherence as the way of
establishing philosophical truth,15 while accepting, as mankind continually explores
13 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Uber Lessing’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische und 
theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p.46.
14 Frederick C. Beiser, German Idealism: the struggle against subjectivism , Cambridge MA; London: 
Harvard University Press, 2002, ch.4, p.444.
15 Frederick C. Beiser, German Idealism: the struggle against subjectivism, Cambridge MA; London: 
Harvard University Press, 2002, ch.4, p.446.
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the diversity of art and the world, that some apparently opposing viewpoints might 
never be reconciled.16
A thinker who accepts the many-faceted nature of reality is better placed to do 
justice to the various perspectives from which any object, person or situation could be 
viewed. The more complex, or perhaps, ‘greater’, the object under investigation, the 
more multi-faceted it will be. And as we assess Lessing, this suggests we should 
supplement our personal, partial access to the truth with the knowledge held by other
17 •people. Hdlderlin’s account of how we can come to know the divine relied on a 
similar approach. Whereas the theme of much of Holderlin’s thought was, however, 
the gradual attainment of wholeness and reconciliation, Schlegel conceived ‘of the 
paradoxical and perspectival nature of human knowledge as an inevitable 
consequence of the structure of human consciousness’.19 Hence he accepted tensions 
and incompleteness. He shared the phrase ‘endless approximation’ with Holderlin, but 
perhaps meaning ‘rough and ready’, or a ‘working brief, rather than Holderlin’s ever
70closer movement towards completion. Clearly, Kant’s analysis of the static, given 
object has been abandoned here. The limited Kantian notion of aesthetic free play has 
been extended to cover all knowledge or perception. We shall later claim that a 
worldview such as Schlegel’s encouraged the development of hermeneutics beyond
16 Fred Rush, ‘Irony and Romantic Subjectivity’, in Nikolas Kompridis, Philosophical Romanticism, 
Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2006, p. 181.
17 Gary Handwerk, ‘Romantic Irony’, in (ed.) Marshall Brown, Cambridge History o f  Literary 
Criticism: Volume V, Romanticism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.212.
18 See chapter 7 above.
19 Gary Handwerk, ‘Romantic Irony’, in (ed.) Marshall Brown, Cambridge History o f  Literary 
Criticism: Volume V, Romanticism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.217.
20(ed.) Michael N. Foster, Introduction, in Herder: Philosophical Writings, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002, p.x. Foster mentions Schlegel as one o f  those who continued the counter­
tradition in German philosophy that Herder had begun. Foster is referring to the rejection o f  
‘systematicity’.
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its narrow, theological field, to become one of the major strains of nineteenth and 
twentieth century European philosophy.
In the quotation on p.255 above, the word, ‘inexhaustible’ appears. We 
rejected Frank’s use of this word in the context of Holderlin,21 but it is an important 
aspect of Schlegel’s view of great art. The conceptual indeterminacy that emerges 
from Kant’s theory of the free play of the faculties during the judgement of taste, and 
the inadequacy of our rational concepts to the aesthetic ideas, is established here as a 
fundamental feature of literary appreciation. Schlegel has picked up Kant’s awareness 
that applying a concept sets limits to the legitimate interpretation of particular 
perceptions. Conversely, therefore, in the absence of any determinate concept, the 
mind has free rein; it can not only suspend conceptual judgement, but also, according 
to Schlegel, explore diverse ways of conceptualising its material, all of which are 
likely, in their own way, to contain a certain amount of truth. Thus, every time we 
think we have understood something true about Lessing, or his work, we subsequently 
see something new that either replaces or supplements our previous thought. The 
possible ways of combining and structuring these perceptions of Lessing, or any great 
art or artist, are inexhaustible, and we can never encompass the whole truth on the 
subject.
This theme develops later in Uber die Unverstandlichkeit}2 where he reflected 
on the problems people had had in understanding the Athenaums-Fragmente and
21 Manfred Frank, The Philosophical Foundations o f  Early German Romanticism, (tr.) Elizabeth 
Mill6n-Zaibert, Albany: State University o f  New York, 2004, Lecture 6, p. 126.
See chapter 7 above.
22 F. Schlegel, ,0ber die UnverstSndlichkeit,, in Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe, vol.II : 
Charakteristiken und Kritiken I (1796 - 1801), (ed.) Hans Eichner, Mtlmchen; Paderbom; Wien: Verlag 
Ferdinand Schdninghausen, 1967, pp. 363 - 372.
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Lucinde. He expected their lack of comprehension to be temporary, because once 
Romantic Poesie became more familiar, the public would read these apparently 
difficult and confusing works with ease and enjoyment. What had once been shocking 
or peculiar would be accepted and appreciated. Thus, it is both desirable and essential 
that a public must struggle to understand or reinterpret a work of art. The struggle 
exemplifies some more extensive psychological and political prerequisites for human 
wellbeing.24 The inability to grasp the whole instantly, with all its implications and 
variations, protects us as individuals from fully apprehending the magnitude of 
cosmic chaos. Our constant search for truth and improvement proceeds piecemeal, so 
that we are never quite aware of the scale of the task in front of us, and therefore do 
not reject or abandon the project completely, or contemplate failure, despite having no 
realistic chance of achieving closure. Thus, though Uber Lessing confines its 
comment to the work of one playwright, Schlegel’s method of reading literature 
reveals itself to be only one aspect of an entire worldview, at which he is only hinting 
here.
Another significant word, Bildung, occurs in the quotation from Uber Lessing 
above. Schiller and Holderlin, as we have seen, desired the development and 
education of mankind. Notice that Schlegel says we return repeatedly to valuable 
things, so long as our Bildung is still taking place. Thus, Bildung is equivalent to 
progress, and takes place only if we are interested enough to revisit the inexhaustibly 
interpretable, and learn more from it. Thus, part of the ongoing process of Bildung is 
the ability to recognise the inexhausibility of a great work, or a great life, and desire to
23 F. Schlegel, ,Ober die UnverstSndlichkeit’, in Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe, vol.II: 
Charakteristiken und Kritiken I (1796 - 1801), (ed.) Hans Eichner, MUmchen; Paderbom; Wien: Verlag 
Ferdinand Schdninghausen, 1967, p. 371.
24 F. Schlegel, ‘Ober die UnverstSndlichkeit’, in Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe, vol. : 
Charakteristiken und Kritiken 1 (1796 - 1801), (ed.) Hans Eichner, MUmchen; Paderbom; Wien: Verlag 
Ferdinand Schdninghausen, 1967, p.370.
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see what more we can gain from it, what new angles on the truth it can give us. 
Although Schlegel assembles them in his own way, these concepts have become 
familiar to us in Schiller and Holderlin.25 Mankind’s education is progressing through 
aesthetic activity and the attempt to make an aesthetic judgement. For Schlegel, 
Bildung is an endless creative activity of free enquiry.26 We can cease to improve 
ourselves, but we cannot reach a point of complete education. In Bildung, ‘I strive 
after unity of knowledge’.27 Striving after unity is characteristic of human thought, but 
after a long process of enquiry, our greatest insight might turn out to be of the 
impossibility of completeness. Recognising this ironic result again extends our 
education, which is why Schlegel also believed in the value of irony as a teaching 
method. This view that humans are incomplete and are driven towards something 
impossible is very different from Kant’s conception of the human subject.
According to the quotation given above, then, the sum total of the need to 
consider as many perspectives as possible, the inexhausibility of Lessing’s art, and the 
ongoing impetus towards Bildung is that we shall return to Lessing’s work again and 
again. In the same year, in Georg Forster, Schlegel suggested that the very mark of
25 There is an interesting relationship in this claim too with Fichte’s comment in the essay, ‘On the 
Spirit and the letter in philosophy’, where he objects that some readers reject out-of-hand material that 
is being presented to them as a result o f  long and careful study. They justify doing so by an appeal to 
the spirit o f  what they have read, dismissing anything with which they cannot immediately or easily 
engage, by claiming it is the mere letter o f  the text. We might expect that Fichte’s remarks would be 
directed at least partially towards critics like Schlegel whose comments might prejudice the public 
reception o f  a serious work after only a superficial reading. Yet Schlegel the critic seems to agree with 
Fichte on this point.
Johan Gottlieb Fichte, ‘On the spirit and the letter in philosophy, 1794’, in (ed.) (tr.) David Simpson, 
German aesthetic and literary criticism: Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Hegel, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984, p.75.
26 Frederick C. Beiser, German Idealism: the struggle against subjectivism, Cambridge MA; London: 
Harvard University Press, 2002, ch.4, p.453.
27Translated and quoted in Frederick C. Beiser, German Idealism: the struggle against subjectivism, 
Cambridge MA; London: Harvard University Press, 2002, ch.4, p.453.
28 Gary Handwerk, ‘Romantic Irony’, in (ed.) Marshall Brown, Cambridge History o f  Literary 
Criticism: Volume V, Romanticism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.214.
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great literature is the fact that readers return to it repeatedly.29 Admittedly, the readers
themselves must be klassische Leser, well-educated and perceptive readers, if they are
to appreciate those emerging as the classic German authors, but given this proviso,
they should be re-reading a work in order to sharpen their impressions and absorb the
best in it. A problem with literature is that we cannot easily revisit it briefly, unlike,
for example, a painting or sculpture, over which we can repeatedly cast a rapid eye.
According to Georg Forster this obstacle even hinders the development of a national,
German tradition of classic writers.
The second quotation from Uber Lessing deals with the role of the author:
Der erste Eindruck literarischer Erscheinungen aber ist nicht bloB unbestimmt: 
er ist auch selten reine Wirkung der Sache selbst, sondem gemeinschaftliches 
Resultat vieler mitwirkender Einfltisse und zusammentreffender Umstande. 
Dennoch pflegt man ihn ganz auf die Rechnung des Autors zu setzen, 
wodurch dieser nicht selten in ein durchaus falsches Licht gestellt wird.30
All kinds of external and internal influences are at work on the reader when he or she 
first encounters a piece of literature or art. The author tends to be praised or blamed 
for our first impressions, but things are more complicated than that, and, if we 
overlook this, the author is often placed in a false light -  for good or bad, because the 
reader’s hopes or expectations will already have been shaped, before he or she begins 
to read. Elsewhere Schlegel agrees with Novalis’s statement31 that the artist or author 
has done his work simply by placing a publication before the public. Now it is the 
reader’s turn to do some hard work, by engaging with the material. Schlegel’s
29 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Georg Forster’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische und 
theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p.22.
30Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Uber Lessing’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische und 
theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p.47.
However, the first impression o f literary phenomena is not merely undetermined; it is also rarely the 
pure effect o f  the item itself, but is the combined result o f  many contributing influences and converging 
circumstances. Nevertheless, we are accustomed to credit it entirely to the account o f the author, which 
means that he is frequently placed in a completely false light.
31 Quoted in Gary Handwerk, ‘Romantic Irony’, in (ed.) Marshall Brown, Cambridge History o f  
Literary Criticism: Volume V, Romanticism , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.214.
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comments here are thus part of a wider view of a partnership between writer and 
reader, as they jointly create the full effects of a work of art. Thus, he has extended 
Schiller’s remarks that an audience’s ability to perceive beauty in a work of art 
depends as much on their own level of aesthetic education, as on the characteristics of 
the work of art itself. He covers every reaction to the work of art, rather than the 
discernment of beauty alone, and acknowledges the mixed range of influences 
affecting an artist’s expectations of the audience, and the audience’s attitudes towards 
art. The recognition of beauty, or of any other quality implicated in the aesthetic 
response, ceases to be the result of appropriately developed observational skills on the 
part of the public, or of adequate communication skills on the part of the artist, and 
instead becomes an inexhaustible, repeatedly re-negotiated outcome, as the reader 
moves from first impression to more thoughtful reading or repeated readings, and as 
new readers, subject to a different range of external influences, encounter a work for 
the first time. Although Schlegel writes as if we can discover something true from 
literature, and, although he also indicates that the best works of art are enduring 
sources for discovering aspects of truth, he does not believe art gives us something 
with solid, objective existence in a Kantian sense. He also, quite clearly, expects us to 
appreciate something more than beauty alone in a work of art. The pleasure, or value 
we derive from art or literature encompasses our entire experience, that is, both our 
own subjective condition, and all kinds of features found in the work of art. This is 
presumably why Schlegel tells us that the work of art will lead us to understand some 
truth, rather than beauty in a more Kantian sense.
32 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: In a series o f  letters, (ed.), (tr.) Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, XXII; §§ 3, 6, pp. 153, 157.
See chapter 5 above.
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Our next quotation concerns the attitude of contemporary critics to the work of
Lessing. Schlegel condemns these unnamed arbiters for their determination to claim
Lessing for the classical tradition, a model exponent of the golden mean, ignoring his
innovative character. The result, Schlegel sees, is that Lessing is lumped together with
writers, such as Addison, whom he is known to have despised. Lessing abhorred
correctness of manner without genius, an opinion which Schlegel has either projected
upon him, or which the two men shared passionately:
DaB trage Diinkel, Plattheit und Vorurteil unter der Sanktion seines Namen 
Schutz suchen und finden! Dafi man ihn und einen Addison, von dessen 
Zahmheit, wie ers nennt, er so verachtlich redet (wie er denn tiberhaupt 
nuchteme Korrektheit ohne Genie beinah noch mehr geringschatzt, als billig 
ist) zusammenpaaren mag und darf, wie man etwa Miss Sara Sampson und 
Emilia Galotti und Nathan der Weise in einem Atem und aus einem Tone 
bewundert, weil es doch samtlich dramatische Werke sind!33
In the final lines of the quotation we see that Schlegel objects even to Lessing’s own 
plays being classified together, merely because they are dramas. We have seen how 
Holderlin questioned the classical genres, but accepted their usefulness, if used 
flexibly. He suggested they should be and were used by poets as compositional tools, 
and that it was partly their selection, blending and contrast within a work that 
produced great poetry.34 In Uber Lessing, however, Schlegel is scathing about 
traditional ways of analysing poetry. He portrays the literary establishment, as hastily 
and summarily categorising and assessing works according to superficial and 
ultimately indefensible criteria. The differences even within Lessing’s own works are 
too great for them to be analysed according to the mere fact of being dramas. Even to
33Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Uber Lessing’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische und 
theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p.49.
To think that lethargic arrogance, banality and prejudice should seek -  and even find - shelter beneath 
the sanction o f his name! That anyone should wish and be permitted to couple him with Addison, o f 
whose tameness, as he called it, he spoke so scornfully, (for, after all, he almost despised any kind of  
dry correctitude lacking in genius as being lower than cheapjack); and how anyone can admire, for 
instance, Miss Sara Sampson, Emilia Galotti and Nathan der Weise in one breath and tone o f  voice, 
just because they are all dramatic works!
34 See chapter 9 above.
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consider doing this illustrates how badly Schlegel’s contemporaries had 
misunderstood Lessing’s genius.
Once again Schlegel is appealing for critics to examine the spirit, rather than 
the letter of Lessing’s oeuvre. He was a genius, and in Kantian terminology, therefore 
set the rule for art. The way he did things, and the content and form of his work 
influenced subsequent German literature, but that should not make him a template for 
all subsequent writers, and it certainly did not mean he had been doing something 
simple or conventional at the time of writing. He had established his reputation by 
dealing with controversial current themes in an original way. His work was fresh and 
always developing. Perhaps it had been enjoyed by a society that was used to 
evaluating literature in accordance with classical traditions of criticism, but that did 
not make this way of reading him the only way, and it did not reflect the way Lessing 
himself had always sought to extend the boundaries of taste in his own age. It is as if 
Schlegel has noticed that the more conservative critics had observed only the rule-like 
element of genius, leading to the rule that others may follow, but had ignored the 
importance of the imaginative struggle that must take place first, if a writer of genius 
is to set such a rule, where none had previously existed or been thought of. For 
Schlegel’s own theory, this shows he has rejected the supposedly simplistic or 
mechanistic approach to criticism identified with classicism. He wants to encourage 
innovation in the literary sphere, to encourage people to appreciate the innovative 
nature of what they have come to accept as a conservative literary canon, and wants 
that canon to be studied with a view to encouraging innovation in a current 
generation. Change is, then, not just accepted, but to be encouraged, a quite different 
view from the static world of Kantian analysis.
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The next quotation is actually SchlegeTs approving quotation of Lessing on
Luther:
Uber Luther redet er so: »Der wahre Lutheraner will nicht bei Luthers 
Schriften, er will bei Luthers Geist geschutzt sein, u.s.w.« (T.V, S. 162) 
Uberhaupt war unbegrenzte Verachtung des Buchstabens ein Hauptzug in 
Lessings Charakter.
We have already referred to the importance of the relationship between spirit and 
letter in SchlegeTs theory, and in this he thinks he follows Lessing. The scorn Lessing 
purportedly showed for the letter, as opposed to the spirit, suited SchlegeTs approach 
to literary criticism and his own work. He thought Romantic Poesie, which included 
all genres, should be as free as possible from prescriptive rule-following: ‘artfully 
ordered confusion’, achievable by moving away from adherence to ‘the letter’. We 
are not initially told how Schlegel identified the ‘spirit’, but his discussion of Lessing 
has a historical dimension to it. He asks us to assess not just the words on Lessing’s 
pages, but to recall the environment in which Lessing worked. He is not a novelty 
now (in the very last years of the eighteenth century) but was a revolutionary thinker 
in his time. Schlegel tries to encourage us to capture the excitement and provocative 
qualities of Lessing in his prime. This helps us understand his spirit, an application of 
the historical perspective introduced in the Studium-Aufsatz.
Schlegel himself claims to read Lessing impartially, because he is not a 
contemporary, and therefore not caught up in the prevailing opinions of Lessing’s
35 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Uber Lessing’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische und 
theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p.56.
36 Ernst B ehler,,Early German Romanticism: Friedrich Schlegel and Novalis’, in (ed.) Simon Critchley 
and William R. Schroeder, A Companion to Continental Philosophy, Maldon MA; Oxford: Blackwell, 
1999, p.81.
Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Gesprdch Uber die Poesie: Rede Uber die Mythologie’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, 
Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische und theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p. 195.
kUnstlich geordnete Verwirrung
This phrase that seems to typify Schlegel’s view o f  Romantic Poesie is also quoted in David Wellbery, 
‘The transformation o f  rhetoric’, in (ed.) Marshall Brown, The Cambridge History o f  Literary 
Criticism, vol. 5, Romanticism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 196.
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day. There is obviously a tension here. Either we need to cast our minds back in
historical time, or we have to remain free of the prejudices of the past, but presumably
not both at once. However, these two positions can be reconciled. SchlegeTs
impartiality was aided by the fortunate circumstance:
...daB mich Lessing erst spat und nicht eher anfing zu interressieren, als bis ich 
fest und selbststandig genug war, um mein Augenmerk auf das Ganze richten, 
um mich mehr fur ihn und den Geist seiner Behandlung als fur die 
behandelten Gegenstande interessieren, und ihn frei betrachten zu konnen. 
Denn so lange man noch an Stoff klebt, so lange man in einer besondem 
Kunst und Wissenschaft, oder in der gesamten Bildung uberhaupt, noch nicht 
durch sich selbst zu einer gewissen Befriedigung gelangt ist, welche dem 
weitem Fortschreiten so wenig hinderlich ist, daB dieses vielmehr erst durch 
sie gesichert wird; so lange man noch rastlos nach einem festen Stand und 
Mittelpunkt umhersucht: so lange ist man noch nicht frei, und noch durchaus 
unfahig einen Schriftsteller zu beurteilen.37
He came to the study of Lessing with a maturity that enabled him to look at Lessing’s 
work as a whole, and at how he handled his material, rather than focusing on the 
detail of his subject matter. Hence he could recognise the spirit of what Lessing was 
writing. Schlegel himself was already comfortable with his own position, no longer 
searching around for his own viewpoint. It is only once a reader achieves this that he 
can assess a writer properly. Thus, if we are to engage effectively with literature, we 
must take a broader, more general view, aware of our own perspective, but not 
entrapped in it. We thereby appreciate the spirit of the writer we are studying, and the 
age in which he lived, not allowing the minutiae of content or history -  the so-called 
letter - to overwhelm our judgement. As a further example of the pitfalls involved, 
Schlegel refers to the common practice of using Lessing’s work, Dramaturgie, as a
37 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Uber Lessing’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische und 
theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p.58.
...that Lessing only began to interest me quite late on, and not sooner, once I was firm and independent 
enough to turn my attention to the whole work, and take more interest in him and the spirit in which he 
handled his material, rather than in the objects he was dealing with, and I could examine him freely. 
For, so long as we stick only to the subject matter, so long as we have not yet reached a certain 
fulfilment, whether in any particular art or science, or even in culture overall, that stands so little in the 
way o f  further progress that we should rather say it guarantees such progress, then we are not yet free, 
and we are still completely incapable o f  judging a writer.
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source for establishing the rules of drama and pure, classical Aristotelean poetics. 
Doing so, he says, completely misses the genius and originality of this highly unusual 
work. Modestly, Schlegel offers us his own rather distorted first impression of 
Laokoon, which he had wrongly been expecting to give him ‘felsenfest\ solid 
knowledge about the plastic arts and their relation to poetry.
Schlegel’s own experience thus illustrates the reader’s situation. He is not just 
writing this piece, he is a reader himself, like us. His own writing, in this case, is 
exhibiting the essence of so-called ‘transcendental poetry’, as Schlegel calls Romantic
"X oliterature in the Athenaums-Fragmente, in that it includes ‘the producer, along with 
the product’.39 Similarly, he now tells us more about the role of the writer, by going 
on to discuss his own experience of writing. Firstly for the writer, there is, as he 
found, the absorbing task of reading and reflecting on the man’s works. But the 
danger is that the writer will stop there. Writing of himself in the first person,
Schlegel has
... vieles fur mich bemerkt und fur mich geschrieben, dariiber aber immer den 
beabsichtigten Druck weiter hinausgeschoben, oft ganzlich vergessen habe. 
Denn das Interesse des Studiums iiberwog hier das Interesse der offentlichen 
Mitteilung, welches immer schwacher ist, so sehr, daB ich, ohne einen 
kategorischen EntschluB wohl immer an einen Aufsatz uber Lessing nur 
gearbeitet haben wiirde, ohne ihn jemals zu vollenden.40
This gives us a small insight into the work of Schlegel as a writer, though telling us 
also something of writing in general. The writer has two motivations, the stronger of
38 See chapter 12 below.
39 Ernst B ehler,,Early German Romanticism: Friedrich Schlegel and Novalis’, in (ed.) Simon Critchley 
and William R. Schroeder, A Companion to Continental Philosophy, Maldon MA; Oxford: Blackwell, 
1999, p.78.
See chapter 9 above for Holderlin’s view o f  the three factors that actively contribute towards creating a 
written work.
40Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Ober Lessing’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische und 
theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p.59.
...noticed and written a lot for myself, but I have always kept postponing the intended printing, and 
have often forgotten it completely. For my interest in study outweighed my interest in public 
communication, which is always weaker, so much so, that, without a categorical decision, I suppose I 
would only have kept working at an essay on Lessing, without ever completing it.
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which, is ‘for himself. This is the writer as researcher, thinker or composer. But what 
really turns him into a writer is the intention to publish. Yet Schlegel says the 
motivation towards communicating his ideas publicly is weaker than the desire to 
enjoy and extend his own thoughts. While this is a very personal admission, it is 
probably also a more realistic assessment of the writer’s task than, for instance, 
Fichte’s, who claimed communication with the reader and a public in general was the 
primary and only purpose of writing.41 Schlegel admits that his notes were really for 
himself, a record and stimulus to thought, not for a public readership. Public 
communication is a separate activity, the result only of a ‘categorical decision’. This 
sounds like a difficult decision, that runs contrary to inclination, redolent of all the 
self-denying concomitants of the Kantian morality. Once again, here is Schlegel’s 
belief that the right explanation is often paradoxical, reflecting the contradictory 
nature of human experience.42 Trivially, a writer is a communicator, and, if he did not 
take that categorical decision to publish, he would not be a writer. But in fact, 
although he may initially wish to get something on a certain topic published, this is 
not what he enjoys most or what motivates him. This is the furthest this thesis has 
brought us so far from Kant’s philosophical approach to aesthetics. Kant wrote critical 
philosophy with little practical knowledge of creative literary work or art, Schiller 
interrupted his artistic career to try and tackle aesthetic issues from a philosophical 
point of view. Schlegel here seems to be concerned only with analysing the 
practicalities of being a good writer, or the functions of writing, and comparatively 
little with the more traditional, philosophical aspects.
41 J.C Fichte, ‘On the Spirit and the Letter in Philosophy’, in (ed.) Daniel Breazeale, Fichte: Early 
Philsophical Writings, New York: Cornell, University Press, 1988.
42Gary Handwerk, ‘Romantic Irony’, in (ed.) Marshall Brown, Cambridge History o f  Literary 
Criticism: Volume V, Romanticism , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.212.
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Stylistically, this interlude in Uber Lessing is an excellent illustration of
Schlegelian irony. He prefaces his comments on the difficulties of writing about
Lessing with the words:
Die Magie dieses eignen Reizes wachst mit dem Gebrauch und ich kann der 
Lockung selten widerstehen. Ja, ich muB uber mich selbst lacheln, wenn ich 
mir vorstelle, wie oft ich ihr.. ,43
On the previous page he had reflected on his own first encounter with Lessing’s 
Laocoon to illustrate his point, but now he intrudes even further into his own text in a 
personal and friendly way, as if sharing confidences with his readers. And yet, the 
confidence he is about to share with us, his closest friends, is that he does not really 
like writing for publication -  ie. for us - and would find it much easier to make 
jottings for his own information. Uber Lessing exhibits an irony that is characteristic 
of Romantic art and of Schlegel’s successful reviews and commentaries, a genre of 
literary criticism that he more or less invented.44 Lessing, and everything we learn 
about him, is set within the frame o f ‘Schlegel-writing-on-Lessing’. However 
absorbed we become in the skills or opinions of Lessing, the form of the essay never 
lets us forget the presence of the actual author, Schlegel. However, Schlegel’s aim, 
given what we have already said about the interaction between writer and reader, is to 
get us thinking about what he says about Lessing, and thence about Lessing himself. 
Thus, readers might forget they are working within a frame, and become totally 
absorbed in their reflections on Lessing. Indeed, at one further level, Schlegel even 
gets us involved in reflecting on 4 Lessing’s-thoughts-about-Luther’, as we have seen 
above. Then, through the example of Laocoon, he suddenly reminds us that we are not
43 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Ober Lessing’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische und 
theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p.59.
The magic o f  its particular charm grows with habit, and I can rarely resist its allure. Indeed, I have to 
smile at myself, when I picture how often I...
44 See the later references to irony in chapter 12.
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reflecting on Lessing directly, but on someone else’s opinions of the man. His bold 
use of the conversational, ‘ Ja, ich mufi uber mich selbst lacheln\ even reminds us in 
an intimate and conversational way, that we are not really just sharing and reflecting 
on Schlegel’s opinions or experiences, but are reading a very artificially and 
specifically planned piece of writing. He has included something about how the essay 
was written, even within the essay itself. But, of course, that little conversation he has 
just had with us is not a real conversation, either. It is an integrated part of the 
artificially planned writing. It is a calculating move that attempts to fool us into 
thinking that he has stripped away every possible layer of artistic illusion. And his 
little piece o f ‘transcendental buffoonery’,45 his apparently private, but in fact very 
public, joke is that, in so doing, he creates another layer of illusion. Perhaps this 
seems like an unnecessarily laboured explanation of what Schlegel has done here, of 
how he thought written communication worked, and the way he thought Romantic 
irony permeates every work of art. However, by spelling out some of these levels of 
artistic illusion, we see in practical terms what Schlegel meant by his well-known 
metaphor of how poetry can multiply self-reflection as if in an endless succession of 
mirrors 46 These many levels reflect each other, creating an infinite regress of irony. 
Schiller’s notion of semblance shares some of these features, in that, we may recall, it 
involves simultaneously accepting an artistic illusion, and recognising that it is 
illusory.
45 Ernst Behler,,Early German Romanticism: Friedrich Schlegel and Novalis’, in (ed.) Simon Critchley 
and William R. Schroeder, A Companion to Continental Philosophy, Maldon MA; Oxford: Blackwell, 
1999, p.80.
46 Ernst Behler,,Early German Romanticism: Friedrich Schlegel and Novalis’, in (ed.) Simon Critchley 
and William R. Schroeder, A Companion to Continental Philosophy, Maldon MA; Oxford: Blackwell, 
1999, p.78.
Athentiums-Fragmente, no.l 16.
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While acknowledging the high quality of Lessing’s prose, Schlegel later
claims that the most fundamental and interesting aspect of Lessing’s writings is the
way he gives only hints and indications of what he means:
Das Interessanteste und das Grundlichste in seinen Schriften sind Winke und 
Andeutungen, das reifste und Vollendetste Bruchstiicke von Bruchstucken. 
Das Beste was Lessing sagt, ist was er, wie erraten und erfunden, in ein paar 
gediegenen (sterling, dignified, solid, genuine) Worten voll Kraft, Geist und 
Salz hinwirft; Worte, in denen, was die diinkelsten Stellen sind im Gebiet des 
menschlichen Geistes, oft wie vom Blitz plotzlich erleuchtet...47
Lessing, then, is the master of the fragment. Well, perhaps this is so; but, more 
famously, Schlegel entertained the greatest hopes for perpetuating the fragment as an 
illuminating philosophical or critical format. Thinking he could recognise the same 
qualities and intentions in Lessing’s work gave Schlegel a source that confirmed the 
wisdom of what he was already doing for himself. In addition:
...stehen seine [d.h. Lessings] Hauptsatze da, wie mathematische Axiome...48 
This is what Schlegel hoped would be the fate of the main clauses in his own 
fragments too. There is obviously also a little word play here, because he hopes not 
only that what he says will acquire the incontestability of a mathematical axiom, but 
that his ‘main clauses’ will thereby be transformed into ‘fundamental theorems’, the 
alternative meaning of ‘Hauptsatze'. However, although the axiomatic character of 
Lessing’s assertions has an imposing and attractive quality in a literary context, 
Schlegel regarded the model of Euclidean geometry, devising logically irreproachable
47Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Uber Lessing’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische und 
theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p.60.
The most interesting and fundamental* things in his texts are hints and indications, the ripest and most 
perfect fragments o f  fragments. The best things Lessing says are what he throws in, as i f  guessed, or 
invented, a few sterling words full o f  strength, spirit and salt; words in which the very darkest recesses 
o f  the human spirit light up, as if  by a flash o f  lightening.
*griindlich could also mean ‘fundamental, basic’ (jgrundsatzlich) at that date.
48Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Ober Lessing’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische und 
theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p.60.
...his main clauses (or fundamental theorems) stand there like mathematical axioms...
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proofs of conclusions, supposedly based on axiomatic self-evident principles, as
another analogy that had misled contemporary foundationalist epistemology. He
accepted its mathematical validity, but regarded it as a poor way of establishing
general truths.49 Not only fragments, but also our knowledge is incomplete and
unsatisfying, a mere illusion of knowledge or certainty. Irony allowed the writer to
create, expose and shatter this illusion. While this approach, if used not only as a
literary device, but also in the field of knowledge, might seem to lead to
insurmountable scepticism, Schlegel was unconcerned by this. He felt it was only the
timidity of professional philosophers that made them fear scepticism. Their fear
impelled a search for a certainty unattainable in any aspect of human life, and
particularly not in scientific research. He believed philosophy should accommodate
scepticism. Beiser assembles a selection of quotations from SchlegeTs essay on
republicanism, showing that Schlegel blamed foundationalism itself for the problem
of infinite regress.50
Reinforcing the importance of producing fragments, and perhaps thinking of
his own Kritische Fragmente (1797), Schlegel observes of Lessing:
... seine biindigsten Rasonnements sind gewohnlich nur eine Kette von 
witzigen Einfallen.51
One of the features of fragments is fluidity in the way they could relate together 
logically. Reflecting on a series of pithy observations might lead the thoughtful reader 
to construct a standpoint or a coherent train of thought on behalf of the writer. Thus 
fragments encourage readers to participate in the writer’s thinking, and re-create the
49 Frederick C. Beiser, German Idealism: the struggle against subjectivism , Cambridge MA; London: 
Harvard University Press, 2002, ch.4, p.436.
50 Frederick C. Beiser, German Idealism: the struggle against subjectivism , Cambridge MA; London: 
Harvard University Press, 2002, pp.436, 439.
5‘Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Uber Lessing’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische und 
theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p.60.
...h is most succinct reasonings are usually only a chain o f  witty ideas...
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writer’s argument; or, if the writer himself had struggled to find coherence among a
gradually assembling range of experiences, thoughts and perceptions, the reader
would effectively be attributing his own insights to the writer, who would be
permitting the reader to develop his or her own moral autonomy, and encouraging
self-reflection. Although Lessing was a great writer, Schlegel’s own excitement
about the new way of working that he was trying to legitimate and popularise might
have led him to over-emphasise these facets of Lessing.
In Uber Lessing, Schlegel not only gives us his own evaluation of Lessing, but
also some brief indications of Lessing’s own thoughts. This leads into the question of
how much weight can be attached to Lessing’s opinions. Unsurprisingly, SchlegeTs
view of the possibility of self-knowledge is more like Holderlin’s than Kant’s:
Ganz und im strengsten Sinn kennt niemand sich selbst. Von dem Standpunkt 
der gegenwartigen Bildungsstufe reflektiert man tiber die zunachst 
vorhergegangne, und ahnet die kommende: aber den Boden, auf dem man 
steht, sieht man nicht.53
The first factor that might affect our ability to know ourselves is our current state of 
Bildung, which we always use as a current viewpoint, looking forward to the 
immediately coming future, or back on the immediate past. We thus do not ever know 
the contemporaneous ego. SchlegeTs reference to the current present moment as ‘Den 
Boden au f dem man steht... ’ makes it sound as if we perhaps have the choice of 
looking down at our feet and seeing what is actually there. However, if we compare 
this with Holderlin’s analysis of the passage of time and the infinity of Being in ‘Das 
untergehende Vaterland...\ for Holderlin there was no ground beneath our feet at the
52 Gary Handwerk, ‘Romantic Irony’, in (ed.) Marshall Brown, Cambridge History o f  Literary 
Criticism: Volume V, Romanticism , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.214.
53 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Ober Lessing’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische und 
theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p.63.
No one can know him self completely and in ther strictest sense. From the standpoint o f  our present 
level o f cultural development we can reflect on what has only just passed, and anticipate what is 
coming: but the ground we are standing on we cannot see.
291
SECTION 3: Friedrich Schlegel Chapter 11
present instant.54 We must not read too much into what Schlegel has written,
admittedly, since he gives us no explicit theory of Being, but he characterises the
world in terms of becoming, accepting the Fichtean phenomenon o f ‘hovering5 and
Wechselerweis.55 Therefore there is perhaps a hovering moment between past and
future, while future becomes past, in which the self has no cognitive knowledge of
itself, since 'Mehr ist dem Menschen nicht gegdnnt\56 Schlegel accepts what is
unresolved, the ‘infinite relativity of knowledge5,57 rather than trying to circumvent or
explain the apparent limitations on human knowledge:
...the most precious thing that human beings possess, their own inner 
satisfaction, finally depends upon some such point that must be left in the 
dark, yet which for that very reason bears and supports the whole, and which 
would lose its force at the very moment we wished to dissolve it intofO
understanding.
This sums up his attitude towards the human search for self-knowledge, and why it is
impossible to attain ‘full5 knowledge.
...we are inconceivable to ourselves, only appear to ourselves as a part of 
ourselves59
Thus, although the independent observer has a good vantage point from which to
judge the work of others, Lessing's thoughts on his own works are not definitive,
54See chapter 7 above.
J. Ch. Friedrich HOlderlin, ‘Das untergehende Vaterland’, in Theoretische Schriften, (ed.) Johann 
Kreuzer, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.34.
The present moment occurs ‘Im Zustande zwischen Seyn und Nichtseyn’, in the condition between 
Being and not-Being.
55 Manfred Frank, The Philosophical Foundations o f  German Romanticism , trans. Elizabeth Mill&n- 
Zaibert, Albany: State University o f New York Press, 2004, p.203.
56 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Uber Lessing’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische und 
theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p.63.
Mankind is not granted anything more than this.
57 Manfred Frank, The Philosophical Foundations o f  German Romanticism, trans. Elizabeth Millan- 
Zaibert, Albany: State University o f New York Press, 2004, p.205.
58Translated and quoted in Gary Handwerk, ‘Romantic Irony’, in (ed.) Marshall Brown, Cambridge 
History o f  Literary Criticism: Volume V, Romanticism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 
p.224.
59Translated and quoted in Gary Handwerk, ‘Romantic Irony’, in (ed.) Marshall Brown, Cambridge 
History o f  Literary Criticism: Volume V, Romanticism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000,
p.220.
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because o f his necessarily limited view of himself; however, in keeping with the tenor
of the whole essay, Schlegel thinks Lessing is more self-aware than most other
writers. Schlegel’s claim about the inadequacy of self-knowledge is a slight
withdrawal from his hints in the Studium-Aufsatz that the writer’s intention helped
establish the critic’s frame of reference,60 but it reinforces the idea that a readership
brings its own valid responses and interpretations to the work that the writer has
published, and thus made public property. He thus also provides some support for the
hermeneuticists’ later view that the author’s interpretation of a text is only one among
many valid possibilities.61
The specific limit that Schlegel identifies on Lessing’s ability to criticise his
own poetry effectively is his lack of any sense of history.
Vielleicht hatte er aber auch noch auBerdem etwas haben mussen, was ihm 
ganz fehlte, namlich historischen Geist, um aus seiner Philosophic klug 
werden zu konnen, und sich seiner Ironie und seines Zynismus bewufit zu 
werden.62
While this may indeed have been one of Lessing’s shortcomings, it is also one of 
Schlegel’s recurrent objections to rationalist philosophy and the Enlightenment in 
general. It is the starting point and motivation for the more historicist theory of poetry 
that carried over from the Studium-Aufsatz. Rationalist philosophy searches for eternal 
certainties independently of cultural context. A corollary of Schlegel’s position that 
the premisses of rationalist-foundationalist Arguments can always be questioned was 
that, in practice, we always have to make decisions about which out of many logical
60 See Chapter 10 above.
61 Zygmunt Bauman, Hermeneutics and Social Science, London: Hutchinson, 1978, p.31.
62 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Uber Lessing’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische und 
theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p.64.
But perhaps he would also have needed something else besides, in which he was completely lacking, 
namely, the historical spirit, in order to make sense o f  his philosophy, and to manifest his own irony 
and cynicism.
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possibilities is correct.63 The effect of this is that ‘Only the historical, constructive 
representation is objective, that which no longer requires any demonstrative form’,64 
Thus, rather than on logical argument, we base our knowledge on experience, culture 
or history. Since Schlegel believed we should use other perspectives besides our own, 
a benefit of history is that it provides us with a wealth of alternative perspectives 
through which we can approximate to the truth, independently of logical 
demonstration.
Great though Lessing was, this means, on closer analysis, that Emilia Galotti, 
one of his masterpieces, lacks the more human, poetic touch.65 In a way, his 
comments on this play hark back to an older debate, questioning Baumgarten’s 
definition of beauty as logical perfection.66 Lessing’s careful application of the 
conventions of drama has produced something excellent of its kind, but the overall 
effect is, Schlegel says, cold. We come to understand the spirit of a work through its 
overall effect. But this play seems so cold and cerebral, the reader cannot engage with 
it, as if it did not grow from Lessing’s own humanity. The comments on Emilia
63Frederick C. Beiser, German Idealism: the struggle against subjectivism, Cambridge MA; London: 
Harvard University Press, 2002, ch.4, p.445.
64 Translated and quoted in Gary Handwerk, ‘Romantic Irony’, in (ed.) Marshall Brown, Cambridge 
History o f  Literary Criticism: Volume V, Romanticism , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000,
p.220.
65 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Uber Lessing’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische und 
theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p.65.
Und was ist denn nun diese bewunderte und gewiB bewundrungswtirdige Emilia G alottil Unstreitig ein 
groBes Exempel der dramatischen Algebra. Man muB es bewundem dieses in SchweiB und Pein 
produzierte Meisterstilck des reinen Verstandes; man muB es frierend bewundem, und bewundemd 
ffieren; denn ins Gemttt dringts nicht und kanns nicht dringen, weil es nicht aus dem GemUt gekommen 
ist. Es ist in der Tat unendlich viel Verstand darin, nSmlich prosaischer,]a  sogar Geist und Witz. ...Es 
fehlt doch an jenem poetischem  Verstande.
Schlegel uses the word Gemut, which is usually more or less synonymous with Geist, both words 
meaning ‘mind’. However, Gemiit can also mean ‘spirit’, and it seems that, in this context, Schlegel is 
thinking o f  Lessing’s distinctive human spirit, not just his mental faculties.
66Rather perversely, Schlegel also tells us in Lyceums-Fragmente, no.42 that irony is logical beauty, but 
it is clear that this does not mean ‘perfection in perception’ in Baumgarten’s sense. Lyceums- 
Fragmente, no.42 seems to mean there is beauty in the unfolding o f  an argument and the resultant 
interplay o f  irony.
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Galotti throw additional light onto the role of irony. Despite Schlegel’s references to
‘the divine breath of irony’ and the ’logical beauty’67 of irony, it is not the only
quality demanded of poetry. A work may exhibit spirit and wit, yet be prose-like, not
poetic. Perhaps Emilia Galotti is ‘prosaic’, too formulaic, rule-bound and run-of-the-
mill. To raise it to the level of Poesie the play needed poetic understanding rather than
pure reason. And, it therefore seems that poetic understanding must be a function of
the Gemut, the warm-hearted humanity of the poet. Witz alone is not enough.
In den genialischen Werken des von diesem poetischen Verstande geleiteten 
Instinkts, enthtillt alles, was beim ersten Blick so wahr aber auch so 
inkonsequent und eigensinnig (= headstrong, hard-headed), wie die Natur 
selbst auffallt, bei gnindlicherem Forschen stets innigere Harmonie und tiefere 
Notwendigkeit.68
By contrast, works led by poetic reason have more to them than first meets the eye. 
However trivial or naturalistic their content may at first appear, deep-seated harmony 
or profound necessity lies at their heart.
This is not the case with Emilia Galotti:
Ich mochte es (= Emilia Galotti) eine prosaische Tragodie nennen. Sonderbar 
aber nicht eben interessant ists, wie die Charaktere zwischen Allgemeinheit 
und Individualist in der Mitte schweben!69
The way the characters hover in the middle ground between generalisation and 
individuality is curious, but not really absorbing. Again we meet schweben, Schlegel’s
adapted Fichtean key term, given a central role in aesthetics. It refers to the hovering,
\
or hesitation, of the mind as it is challenged and defeated in its attempts to apply a
67 Translated and quoted in Ernst Behler, ‘Early German Romanticism: Friedrich Schlegel and 
Novalis’, in (ed.) Simon Critchley and William R. Schroeder, A Companion to Continental Philosophy, 
Maldon MA; Oxford: Blackwell, 1999, p.79.
See also chapter 12 below..
68 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Ober Lessing’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische und 
theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p.65.
In works o f  genius produced by this instinct that is led by poetic understanding, everything that strikes 
us at first sight to be as true, and yet as inconsequential and hard-headed, as nature itself, is revealed on 
more thorough investigation to be inner harmony and deeper necessity.
69 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Uber Lessing’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische und 
theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p.65.
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definite concept to the essentially indefinable work of art. Once again, the presence of 
only a single one of Schlegel’s key concepts is not enough to impart full poetic value 
to the work of art. Emilia Galotti can perhaps be called a work of poetic art, but 
Nathan der Weise is a work of poetic genius.70
Nathan der Weise, Schlegel says, was written from the heart, which we feel as 
we read it. It is perfused with the spirit of God, though this makes it hard to 
categorise. However, this has not deterred traditional critics from attempting to do so, 
and becoming involved in fruitless arguments about whether it is a didactic play or a
71comedy. In the course of these arguments, they lose sight of the play’s spirit. 
According to Schlegel, Lessing wrote Nathan der Weise in the enthusiasm of pure 
reason, a paradoxical condition to be in, and Lessing gave us some idea of how he 
came to write it and what his intentions were in some of his letters.72 This blind 
fervour explains why the play defies categorisation, and contributes to its being a 
work of genius. Lessing has imparted some of his own inspiration to the overall spirit 
of the play itself, and the reader or audience can respond to this. This one
70 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Uber Lessing’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische und 
theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p.66.
71 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Uber Lessing’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische und 
theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p.66.
Nathan kam aber freilich aus dem Gemiit, und dringt wieder hinein; er ist vom schwebendem Geist 
Gottes unverkennbar durchglilht und tiberhaucht. Nur scheint es schwer, ja fast unmdglich, das 
sonderbare Werk zu rubrizieren und unter Dach und Fach zu bringen.... Mehr besorgt um den Namen 
als um den Mann, und um die Registrierung der Werke als um den Geist, hat man die nicht minder 
komischen als didaktischen Frage aufgeworfen: ob Nathan wohl zur didaktischen Dichtart, oder zur 
komischen, oder zu welchem andem; und was er noch haben oder nicht haben miifite, um dies und 
jenes zu sein oder nicht zu sein,
But admittedly, Nathan came from the mind and penetrates back into it. It glows right through and is 
unmistakably enveloped with the hovering spirit o f  God. The only thing that seems difficult, indeed, 
even impossible, is how to bring this work under any rubric, and pin it down... More concerned with 
the name than the man, and with how to index it than with its spirit, people have raised the no less 
comic than didactic question, whether Nathan belongs to the didactic genre, or the comedic, or to what 
other kind; and what it would need to have or not have in order to belong or not to belong to this or that 
genre,
72 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Uber Lessing’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische und 
theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, 67.
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characteristic can override certain technical deficiencies, which would otherwise 
detract from a great work of poetic art:
Nur wenn NATHAN weiter nichts ware, als ein grofies dramatisches
Kunstwerk, so wiirde ich Verse wie den:
»Noch bin ich vollig auf dem trocken nicht;«
im Munde der Fiirstin bei der edelsten Stimmung und im riihrendsten
Verhaltnis schlechthin fehlerhaft, ja  recht sehr lacherlich fmden.73
Thus, some of the words Lessing has chosen for his characters to speak are prima 
facie ridiculous, but are redeemed by the play itself. From what Schlegel has said, we 
have to suppose that genius, writing from the heart and the writer’s rational fervour 
are the three interrelated factors that elevate Nathan der Weise above Emilia Galotti. 
Kant and Schiller were suspicious of Enthusiasmus, Schwarmerei or Begeisterung. 
We have also defended Holderlin against the charge of enthusiasm. Schlegel, 
however, indicated that emotional fervour is essential in artworks of genius, 
consciously rejecting the disparaging associations of these words.74 He wished to 
convey that something in the greatest poetic works touches the feelings of readers or 
audiences. He decided to challenge the word’s pejorative force, and use it in a more 
Platonic sense,75 to accord with his idea that an elusive something is present in the
73 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Ober Lessing’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische und 
theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p.70.
Only if  NATHAN were nothing more than a great dram atic work o f  art, then I would find lines, such 
as:
‘I am still not completely home and dry;’
spoken by the princess in the noblest mood and in relation to the most moving circumstances, plainly 
flawed, indeed, really very ridiculous. (Capitalisation and italics are Schlegel’s own.)
74 Frederick C. Beiser, German Idealism: the struggle against subjectivism, Cambridge MA; London: 
Harvard University Press, 2002, ch.4, p.457.
The reductio ad absurdum o f  any philosophy up until Schlegel’s time would be that it ‘opened the 
gates to enthusiasm’.
75 Frederick C. Beiser, German Idealism: the struggle against subjectivism, Cambridge MA; London: 
Harvard University Press, 2002, ch.4, p.457.
The allusion is to The Phaedrus. There it is ‘the third kind o f  madness’. It comes from the Muses and is 
called poetic inspiration.
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very greatest works of art, besides mere technical skill or ability.76 Thus, his 
introduction of the term Enthusiasmus into the discourse of aesthetics is another 
example of Romantic irony at work.
Lessing, though one of the first writers to be praised by a Romantic critic for 
enthusiasm, was nevertheless able to exercise fine poetic judgement in writing Nathan 
der Weise,
Die hohe philosophische Wiirde des Stiicks hat Lessing selbst ungemein schon 
mit der theatralischen Effektslosigkeit oder Effektwidrigkeit desselben 
kontrastiert; mit dem seinem Ton eignen pikanten Gemisch von ruhiger 
inniger tiefer Begeisterung und nai’ver Kalte.77
Perhaps this is Lessing’s ‘pure reason’, or ‘rational’ fervour. The play is a mixture of 
deep enthusiasm and naive coldness, he tells us, so we can draw from this that 
Lessing was fully, and coldly conscious of the need for a strong naive, or naturalistic 
element in his writing. The play is warmed by enthusiasm, but not out of control. 
Although, unlike Schiller or Holderlin, Schlegel does not use the terms ‘harmony’ or 
‘balance’ at this precise point, we can judge from the various component features 
contributing to the success of Nathan der Weise, that there is some undefined way in 
which the poet has decided how to blend his ‘spicy mixture’ so perfectly. There is a 
correct mix, that only the poetic genius can judge, but which, once discovered, 
communicates itself effectively to the reader or audience. We might suppose that this
no
is how a work is able to exhibit ‘ innigere Harmonie und tiefere Notwendigkeit\
76 In one sense, this upholds the distinction to which Kant had given prominence earlier in the decade, 
ie. the difference between art and mere craft-based skill. However, Schlegel seems to believe more 
generally, that there is more to art than craft alone, not that craft is redundant. The fact that Lessing’s 
‘reason’ necessarily combined with his fervour also suggests this.
77 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Uber Lessing’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische und 
theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p.70.
Lessing him self contrasted the high philosophical dignity o f  the play in an uncommonly beautiful way 
with its lack o f or contrareity to theatrical effect, in that its tone, so particular to him, is a spicy mixture 
o f  peaceful, deep, heartfelt rapture and a nai ve chill.
78 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Ober Lessing’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische und 
theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p.65.
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Man sollte iiberhaupt die Idee aufgeben, den Nathan auf irgendeine Art von 
Einheit bringen, oder ihn in eine der vom Gesetz und Herkommen geheiligten 
Fakultaten des menschlichen Geistes einzaunen und einzunften (= affiliate it 
to a recognised guild) zu konnen; denn bei der gewaltsamen Reduktion und 
Einverleibung (= assimilation) mochte doch wohl immer mehr verloren gehn, 
als die ganze Einheit wert ist. ...denn das Wichtigste und Beste darin reicht 
weit tiber das, was der trockne Beweis allein vermag, mit mathematischer 
Prazision in eine logische Formel zusammenfassen liefi?79
Schlegel thus concludes that the repeated attempts to classify Nathan der Weise, and
thereby give it unity, actually diminish Lessing’s achievement. They reintroduce the
reductive methods of the mathematical analogy that Lessing had successfully shaken
off between writing Emilia Galotti and Nathan der Weise.
Es lebt und schwebt ein gewisses heiliges Etwas in Nathan, wogegen alle 
syllogistischen Figuren, wie alle Reguln der dramatischen Dichtkunst, eine 
wahre Lumperei sind.80
Lessing’s greatness is thus not just inexhaustible, as Schlegel told us in the opening 
pages of the essay, but ultimately elusive and irreducible, mocking the closed critical 
systems of previous critics.
This raises the question of Schlegel’s attitude towards the concept of genre as 
such. On the basis of Uber Lessing he seems unlikely to want to reject it altogether. 
His objection is to unproductive pedantry. Thus, firstly, the identification of genre 
may not be the most important or rewarding thing to establish about a work, unless it 
drew attention to genuinely significant features of any work of art. Secondly, it should 
not be presumed that, once drawn, the boundaries of genre can never be redefined.
His doctrine of the hovering mind shows the importance for perception and 
understanding of fluidity and becoming. His view of language emphasises the 
impossibility of fully communicating the intentions of the speaker, while also
79 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Uber Lessing’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische und 
theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p.71.
There is a certain holy something living and floating in Nathan , by contrast with which every 
syllogistic figure, and all the rules o f  dramatic poetry are a truly are just shabby trickery
80Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Uber Lessing’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische und 
theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p.72. (Schlegel’s spelling)
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communicating a great deal more than the speaker intended.81 Uber Lessing thus 
illustrates Schlegel’s conception of irony, his ability to view paradox in a positive 
light and his constant criticism and evaluation. So-called scepticism should be a 
positive force in the pursuit of knowledge, not a problem.82 Whereas the critical 
philosophy looked for the theoretical limits of knowledge, and the kinds of knowledge 
that could be trusted or justified, Schlegel believed no standard of knowledge could be 
applied, unless we already had some claim to knowledge in mind. Thus, criticism 
belongs with the process of enquiry, and we must criticise our cognitive powers not 
prior to, but while using them. This inextricability of knowledge and criticism 
powers Schlegel’s later explanation of irony.84 No statement stands alone without 
criticism, and no critical faculty can operate without any claim to knowledge. 
Claiming this is not an admission of defeat, but is often what gives the products of 
human thought their aesthetic value, the irony that he also refers to as ‘logical 
beauty’.85
Accompanying Schlegel’s critical methods, however, we find his belief in the 
beneficence of nature:
81Gary Handwerk, ‘Romantic Irony’, in (ed.) Marshall Brown, Cambridge History o f  Literary 
Criticism: Volume V, Romanticism , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.223.
82Frederick C. Beiser, German Idealism: the struggle against subjectivism, Cambridge MA; London: 
Harvard University Press, 2002, ch.4, p.445.
Athenaums-Fragmente, no.400, recognised that true scepticism ‘begins and ends with an infinite 
number o f  contradictions’, but is rarely found.
Es gibt doch gar keinen Skeptizismus, der den Namen verdient. Ein solcher mttOte mit der Behauptung 
und Foderung unendlich vieler WidersprUche anfangen und endigen. ...Respekt vor der Mathematik, 
und Appellieren an den gesunden Menschenverstand sind die diagnostischen Zeichen des halben 
unechten Skeptizismus.
83 Frederick C. Beiser, German Idealism: the struggle against subjectivism , Cambridge MA; London: 
Harvard University Press, 2002, ch.4, p.445.
84 See chapter 12 below.
85 Lyceums-Fragmente, no.42. As its source for the Lyceums-Fragmente, this thesis uses: (ed.) Hans 
Eichner, Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe, Vol.2, Part I: Charakteristiken und Kritiken I (1796 - 
1801), Paderbom; Munich; Vienna: Verlag Ferdinand Schfiningh, Zurich: Thomas-Verlag, 1967. 
Hereafter Lyceums-Fragmente.
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...die sittliche Einheit der biedem (= worthy, unadulterated) Natur.86 
Perhaps his admiration for wit and irony, which seem rather brittle and artificial, sit
awkwardly with a genuine love of nature and the natural. However, the wholeness of
nature embraces many apparent contradictions. Furthermore, as Schlegel asks
rhetorically, surely
...jedes Verhaltnis, wo die ktinstelnde Unnatur ihren Gipfel erreicht, eben 
dadurch sich selbst iiberspringt, und den Weg zur Ruckkehr nach unbedingter 
Natur-Freiheit wieder offnet?
Nathan der Weise thus passes beyond the point of artificial anti-nature, and indicates a 
way back to nature and freedom, a claim reminiscent of Schiller’s idea that beauty can 
lead us to freedom, and his hopes that sentimental literature will take us back into a 
relationship with nature at a higher level.88 We noted, when discussing Schiller, that 
this was itself an idea adapted from Kant, for whom art should imitate nature, and
O Q
nature art. The life in Lessing’s work achieves this. Schlegel’s final words give this
essay the kind of circular form that he believed was typical of every train of thought.
The proper form of a system is not linear, but circular, beginning from any
proposition, and then returning to it again.90
So paradox endigte Lessing auch in der Poesie, wie iiberall! Das erreichte Ziel 
erklart und rechtfertigt die ekzentrische Laufbahn;91
86Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Ober Lessing’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische und 
theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p.73.
87Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Ober Lessing’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische und 
theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p.74.
...every relation in which artificial unnaturalness reaches its peak overleaps itself in doing so, and 
reopens a way for us to return to unconditional natural freedom.
88 Friedrich Schiller, On the Naive and Sentimental in Literature, tr. Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly, 
Manchester: CarcanetNew Press Ltd, 1981, p.63.
89 Immanuel Kant, (ed.) Paul Guyer, (trans.) Paul Guyer & Eric Matthews, Critique o f  the power o f  
judgement, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, §45, 5:306, p. 185.
90 Frederick C. Beiser, German Idealism: the struggle against subjectivism, Cambridge MA; London: 
Harvard University Press, 2002, ch.4, p.446.
91 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Ober Lessing’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische und 
theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p.74.
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Thus, paradoxically, Lessing created a work of poetry in Nathan der Weise. Note 
Schlegel’s reference to the eccentric path, which we met when discussing Holderlin,92 
in this penultimate paragraph of the essay. Lessing’s final achievement justifies his 
method.
This fairly careful reading through a single essay by Friedrich Schlegel has 
provided us with a good picture of his aesthetic theory in 1797. From Kant he has 
retained mainly the belief that art and its ‘beautiful’ qualities cannot be definitively 
categorised or conceptualised, but, more widely, he suggests there are many ways in 
which a great work can be appreciated, and that each new exploration reveals 
something fresh. It is no longer uncontroversial to suggest that the reader should be 
trying to identify beauty, whether subjectively within his or her own responses, or 
objectively as a property of the art object. Schlegel has paid little attention to the 
possibility that Lessing’s work might be beautiful, but a considerable amount of 
attention to the ways in which wiser or more foolish people might interpret its 
meaning, content and structure. Together, these features seem to be contributing to the 
inner life of the work, and this, which possibly reminds us of Kant’s definition of 
artistic ‘spirit’,93 comes through as the defining element in a great work of art. We 
have already suggested that Schlegel’s ideas linked into the developing area of 
philosophical hermeneutics. In the hermeneutics of Schleiermacher, ‘Leben therefore 
comes to replace the Geist as both the central ontological concept and the leading 
methodological principle.’94 Uber Lessing illustrates the fact that, to whatever extent 
Schlegel wished to abandon old ideas of system, his way of working was thorough 
and methodical. The workings, as it were, of his philosophical thought are not fully
92 See chapter 6 above.
93 Immanuel K ant,, Critique o f  the Power o f  Judgement, (ed.) Paul Guyer, (trans.) Paul Guyer and Eric 
Matthews, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, §49, 5:314, p. 192.
94 Zygmunt Bauman, Hermeneutics and Social Science, London: Hutchinson, 1978, p.30.
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visible in this work of literary criticism, but they are hinted at and consistent, and 
have been arrived at as the result of some detailed philosophical study. Some ideas 
from this well-structured essay also appear in an apparently random order in his 
collections of fragments. In the same way that we described Holderlin as being 
primarily a poet, although he had worked out an arguably sound philosophical 
position, so too, Schlegel is not a ‘mere’ literary theorist. He was someone who chose 
to apply his philosophical studies mainly in the field of literary criticism.
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CHAPTER 12
KEY TERMS USED BY FRIEDRICH SCHLEGEL - THE FRAGMENTE1
Ein gutes Ratsel sollte witzig sein, sonst bleibt nichts, sobald das Wort 
gefunden ist.2
Chapters 10 and 11 have considered the way Schlegel’s version of aesthetics 
developed, but one of the puzzles Schlegel presented to his public and to posterity was 
that his terminology, which also became the terminology of Romanticism, did not 
develop at the same pace, and was not defined methodically.3 Words, such as Poesie, 
Ironie, Witz, Roman and romantisch, some of which we have encountered already, all 
recur in the Fragmente. The term ‘fragment’ is a little misleading, because these brief 
texts are carefully designed and self-contained, though sometimes aphoristic and 
enigmatic in their brevity.4 Schlegel was proud of having introduced this literary form
1 These brief and aphoristic pieces were printed in the Schlegel brothers’ periodicals Lyceum  (1797) 
and Athenaum (1798-1800) in Jena.
The source for the Athenaums-Fragmente is: (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische und 
theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997. Hereafter Athenaums-Fragmente.
2 Lyceums-Fragmente, no.96.
A good puzzle (or riddle) must be witty, otherwise there is nothing left once the answer (or word) has 
been found.
This chapter tries to piece together what Schlegel conveyed about Romanticism in the Fragmente. 
Given that this process has some similarities with answering a riddle, it seemed fitting to preface the 
exercise with Schlegel’s own thoughts on riddles. The reader will find that, even if we solve his riddle, 
there is still plenty left.
3 Athenaums-Fragmente, no.53.
Es ist gleich tOdlich fllr den Geist, ein System zu haben, und keins zu haben. Er wird sich also wohl 
entschlieBen milssen, beides zu verbinden.
It is equally fatal to the spirit to have a system, and to have none. The mind therefore has to make a 
decision to combine the two.
4 see Lyceums-Fragmente, nos. 59 & 111 for evidence o f  his admiration for Chamfort, whose 
aphorisms were translated in 1796 by A.W. Schlegel.
Hans Eichner, Friedrich Schlegel, New York: Twayne, 1970, p.46.
The most famous expression o f Schlegel’s aim is the ‘hedgehog’ fragment: Athenaums-Fragmente, 
no.206.
Ein Fragment muB gleich einem Kunstwerke von der umgebenden Welt ganz abgesondert und in sich 
selbst vollendet sein wie ein Igel.
A fragment must be like a work o f  art, totally separate from the surrounding world, and complete in 
itself, like a hedgehog.
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into the German language, and saw it as a way of stimulating philosophical and 
literary thought. They cover a breadth of subject matter, and each throws light on 
Schlegel’s theory of art and the Romantic movement. The selection discussed below 
illustrates Schlegel’s terminology, and thus, his guiding ideas of change and 
becoming, and the constant fusing, unifying, dissolution and reformation of the often 
contradictory strands of human life and the world in general.5 
Poesie
To begin with Poesie. The German word for poetry is Dichtung, which also 
carries the sense of ‘composition’, the process of writing a poem, and hence of writing 
any work of intended literary merit. It is also the result of that creative process, which, 
while it might usually be a poem, could also be some other form of literature. Thus, 
even the straightforward German word for poetry places more emphasis on creativity 
than on genre. Sometimes Schlegel uses dichten or Dichtung; at other times he uses 
the latinate word, Poesie? After the Studium-Aufsatz he used Dichtung in a non- 
evaluative sense, while Poesie had either an aesthetic or emotive function. Thus, for 
Schlegel, Poesie is even less genre-specific than Dichtung. Often there is no reason 
why we should think it has anything to do with poetry as a literary form. It is 
connected with poetry only in the sense that a flowing river can be ‘pure poetry’, or 
we can be seized by a poetic vision, use poetic turns of phrase, or bring out the poetry 
in our soul, whereas Poetry (Dichtung) can be good or bad. Poesie is always the real 
thing; the kind of literary result to which all writers aspire, and from which all readers
benefit. It manifests indifferently as drama, poetry or prose; in the form of an essay,
5 John C. Blankenagel, ‘The dominant characteristics o f  German Romanticism’, in Publications o f  the 
Modern Language Association o f  America’, vol.55, n o .l, Mar. 1940, esp. pp.2-5, provides a rapid 
survey o f  many other fragments and the contribution their content made to the development o f German 
Romanticism.
6 The edition o f Schlegel’s collected works shows that when editing the Studium-Aufsatz he tended to 
replace the word Dichtung with Poesie. Sometimes he retained the word, Dichtung, for instance, as the 
second synonym in a sentence to avoid repetition.
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novel, letter or fragment. Thus, we might translate Poesie as ‘literature’, but
remembering that it is beautiful literature, or literature perfused with the Romantic
spirit. Even claiming that Poesie must be beautiful is misleading, because beauty is
not essential to Poesie, unless beauty also includes sublimity, horror, quirkiness, the
interesting, the bizarre, the ironic. Any of these may combine with the inner life of a
text to elevate it to the level of Poesie. Indeed, Schlegel often reads as if these, rather
than the physical fact of literature, are the constituents of Poesie.
Thus, as well as meaning ‘literature’, Poesie also means something like ‘the
Romantic literary spirit’, or, more universally, ‘whatever it is that both makes art
good, or makes the world into art’.
Es ist nicht notig, dafi irgend jemand sich bestrebe, etwa durch vemunftige 
Reden und Lehren die Poesie zu erhalten und fortzupflanzen, oder gar sie erst 
hervorzubringen, zu erfinden, aufzustellen und ihr strafende Gesetze zu geben, 
wie es die Theorie der Dichtkunst so gem mochte. Wie der Kem der Erde sich 
von selbst mit Gebilden und Gewachsen bekleidete, wie das Leben von selbst 
aus der Tiefe hervorsprang, und alles voll ward von Wesen die sich frohlich 
vermehrten; so bltiht auch Poesie von selbst aus der unsichtbaren Urkraft der 
Menschheit hervor, wenn der erwarmende Strahl der gottlichen Sonne sie 
betrifft und befruchtet.7
As this group of metaphors, also familiar from Holderlin, suggest, we cannot be more 
specific about what makes Poesie. It grows organically, like a plant, like the earth 
itself, and like the growth of life from the sea.8 Schlegel alludes to both the first and 
second parts of Kant’s Third Critique here. Like the free play between imagination
7 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘GesprSch Uber die Poesie’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: 
Kritische und theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p. 166.
It is not necessary for anyone to exert themselves to nourish and propagate poetry by means o f rational 
speeches and teachings, or even to produce it, invent it, assemble it and even to give it punitive laws, as 
the theory o f  poetic art would so much like to do. Just as the earth’s core dressed itself o f  its own 
accord with structures and vegetation, just as life leapt forth o f  itself from the deep, and everywhere 
was full o f  beings that joyously propagated themselves, so too does poetry bloom o f  its own accord out 
o f the invisible elemental power o f  mankind, when the warming rays o f the divine sun fall upon it and 
fertilise it.
8 This was according to the theory o f  Neptunism.
see, eg: Robert J. Richards, The Romantic Conception o f  Life, Chicago; London: University o f  Chicago 
Press, 2002, p.366.
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and understanding, poetry is structured without laws or theories. Rules of poetic
composition are disparaged as despotic laws, punishable if transgressed. In addition,
mechanistic natural laws are rejected in favour of organicism. Thus, spontaneity as
freedom from the conceptual laws of the understanding, and organic growth as
freedom from mechanical laws of nature come together in Poesie, and give expression
to the very innermost essence of humanity.
In fact, the fragments and all Schlegel’s essays can be seen as literary works.
He himself believed the critical works could be classed as literature. He tells us:
Poesie kann nur durch Poesie kritisiert werden. Ein Kunsturteil, welches nicht 
selbst ein Kunstwerk ist, entweder im Stoff, als Darstellung des notwendigen 
Eindrucks in seinem Werden, oder durch eine schone Form, und einen im 
Geist der alten romischen Satire liberalen Ton, hat gar kein Biirgerrecht im 
Reiche der Kunst.9
Admittedly, the second sentence of this quotation merely states that criticism lacking 
literary qualities cannot expect to be regarded as art in its own right, but the first 
sentence implies that criticism should exhibit artistic qualities and be as much a work 
of art as the work it criticises. This belief reappears in the Gesprach uber die Poesie 
(1800),
und so lafit sich auch eigentlich nicht reden von der Poesie als nur in Poesie.10
9 Lyceums-Fragmente no.l 17, in KFSA, Erste Abteilung: Kritische Neuausgabe, Band 2, Munchen, 
Paderbom, Wien, Zflrich 1967, p. 162.
Literature can only be criticised by means o f  literature. An artistic judgement that is not itself a work o f  
art, whether in its content, which is the way it reproduces the way the work gradually creates its 
necessary impression, or by being beautifully structured, using a liberal tone in the spirit o f the ancient 
Roman satire, has no right to dwell in the kingdom o f  art.
see also: Athenaums-Fragmente, no.439.
Jonathan Arac, ‘The impact o f  Shakespeare’, in (ed.) Marshall Brown, The Cambridge H istory o f  
Literary Criticism, Vol. 5, Romanticism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.288, agrees 
that Schlegel’s main contribution to both literary art and criticism were the Fragmente and, especially, 
the Characteristiken.
10 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Gesprach Uber die Poesie’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: 
Kritische und theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p. 166.
Schiller’s early dismissal o f  Schlegel, ‘...er bringt es nicht bis zur Klarheit und eben deswegen auch 
nicht zur Leichtigkeit in der Diktion. Ich finde doch, er hat zum Schriftsteller kein Talent.’ (letter to 
KOmer 4th July 1795), quoted in:
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Indeed, our discussion of irony, below, shows that criticism fulfils most of the 
demands Schlegel makes of irony, that irony comes close to replacing beauty as the 
main aim and characteristic of Romantic literature, and thus, that criticism can 
legitimately be regarded as Poesie. All we have done so far in this chapter is explore a 
single term, but it is already apparent, that, in doing so, we have outlined Schlegel’s 
literary theory in a compact form. The word Poesie encapsulated his new view of art 
and, especially, literature.
Irony
Schlegel’s second key term is irony. During the late 1790s Schlegel regarded
irony as the definitive sign of excellence in literature.
Die Philosophic ist die eigentliche Heimat der Ironie, welche man als logische 
Schonheit definieren mochte: denn liberal 1 wo in mtindlich oder geschriebenen 
Gesprachen, und nur nicht ganz systematisch philosophiert wird, soil man 
Ironie leisten und fordem... 1
Thus, the Romantic Schlegel of 1797 has adapted his comments in the Studium- 
Aufsatz. There he advocated the revival of the aesthetic search for absolute beauty. 
Philosophical drama, that conveyed some message to its audience, one of the 
characteristics identified as ‘sentimental’ by Schiller,12 had merit but did not quite 
meet the criteria for great Poesie. Now the philosophical characteristics have been 
elevated as a kind of beauty, whereas ‘aesthetic’ is a virtually empty concept.13 As we
Josef Kbmer, Romantiker und Klassiker: D ie Briider Schlegel in ihren Beziehungen zu Schiller und 
Goethe, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1971, p.27.
Schiller’s comments show either that Schlegel’s written style improved, or that Schiller misjudged him.
Schlegel, in return, never liked Schiller’s prose style. He compared it unfavourably with Fichte, as, 
‘stilisiertefn] Deklamationstlbungen’ - exercises in stylised declamation, (ibid. p.31.)
11 Lyceums-Fragmente, no.42.
Philosophy is the real home o f  irony, which we might wish to define as logical beauty: for, wherever 
people are philosophising, in spoken or written conversations, but not quite systematically, we should 
be using and demanding irony...
12 Friedrich Schiller, On the Naive and Sentimental in Literature, tr. Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly, 
Manchester: Carcanet New Press Ltd, 1981, p.72.
13 see Lyceums-Fragment, no. 40:
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pointed out in our discussion of Uber Lessing, Schlegel’s rejection of the word 
‘aesthetic’ might indicate his decision to concentrate on literary criticism rather than 
philosophy, but perhaps, too, that the word had degenerated into a contemporary 
‘buzz word’, appealed to by populist writers, trying to defend shallow, pretentious 
texts or thinking.
Various pre-existing strands of meaning come together in Schlegel’s term, 
‘irony’.14 He admired both rhetorical irony, as developed by the Roman writers 
Quintillian and Cicero,15 and ironic, socratic dialogue, that had an educational 
purpose. Rather than assuming that Socrates and Plato already knew the right answer 
well ahead of their students, which made Socratic dialogue a stylistic device, Schlegel 
believed Socrates to be barely one step ahead of his students, valuing their responses 
and genuinely using the dialogues to trigger his own ideas.16 Thus, Schlegel especially 
approved irony in the sense of an author’s making, not a sarcastic negation, but a 
simultaneous dual assertion, to provide readers or an audience with a double
In der Deutschland erfunden und in Deutschland geltenden Bedeutung ist Asthetisch ein Wort, welches 
wie bekannt eine gleich vollendete Unkenntnis der bezeichneten Sache und der bezeichnenden Sprache 
verrat. Warum wird es noch beibehalten?
‘Aesthetic’, in the meaning invented for it and current in Germany, is a word, which, as is well-known, 
betrays a perfect ignorance, equally o f  the matter to which it refers and o f  the language used in making 
that reference. Why do we still retain it?
Footnotes in the edition o f  Schlegel’s collected works reveal that, when editing the Studium-Aufsatz,
‘asthetisch’ was often amended to or used as a variant for ‘ kunstlerisch'.
14 Alford identifies them in some detail, and much o f  the very abbreviated summary that follows in this 
paragraph is taken from:
Steven E. Alford, Irony and the Romantic Imagination , N ew  York: Peter Lang, 1984, p.21ff.
15 Fred Rush, ‘Irony and Romantic subjectivity’, in (ed.) Nikolas Kompridis, Philosophical 
Romanticism , Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2006, p. 193, fh.31.
Rush notes that this position is counter to that expressed by Paul de Man, ‘The Concept o f  Irony’, in 
(ed.) Andrzej Warminski, Aesthetic Ideology, Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press, 1996, 
pp. 163-184.
16 Ernst Behler, ‘Early German Romanticism: Friedrich Schlegel and Novalis’, in (ed.) Simon Critchley 
and William R. Schroeder, A Companion to Continental Philosophy, Maldon MA; Oxford: Blackwell, 
1999, p.80.
There might be a difference between the dialogues, as stylised representations written by Plato, that 
included only mono-syllabic or foolish contributions from Socrates’ students, and the fuller, more 
exploratory conversations that actually took place.
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perspective; that is, not as a criticism, but to introduce a perspective other than the 
protagonist’s own, from which to judge him. This kind of stylistic irony provides ‘the 
Witz and Denkgesetz of Romantic logic’. Together these strands make up Romantic 
irony, which creates or expresses ‘the unity of the heterogeneous moments of a 
paradox’, ‘the simultaneity of the finite and the infinite’,17 drawing attention to or 
hinting at two elements that apparently exist homogeneously, but whose synthesis is 
impossible, and pointing to literature’s capacity to enact the impossibility of any 
human understanding of absolute truth. Irony is Schlegel’s version of reciprocal 
determination.18
Ironie ist die Form des Paradoxen. Paradox ist alles, was zugleich gut und grofi 
ist.19
The irresolvability of the paradox may lead to an infinite regress. Hegel described this
aspect of Schlegel’s thought as ‘infinite, absolute negativity’,20 an unsurprising
opinion, given Schlegel’s interest in the Fichtean philosophy that Hegel rejected. To
Schlegel, however, Romantic irony was both an essential quality of reality, and a sign
of beauty, so no possibility of negativity arose. The regress was the ‘endlose Reihe 
0  1der Spiegel ’ arising from our simultaneous awareness of and alternation among 
different, changing, incomplete views of the world. Irony permits us to acquire 
knowledge and understanding of what is around us, and it allows and generates open-
17 Lyceums-Fragmente, no.108.
Sie enthdlt und erregt ein Geftlhl von dem unauflOslichen Widerstreit des Unbedingten und des 
Bedingten, der UnmOglichkeit und Notwendigkeit einer vollstandigen Mitteilung.
It contains and excites a feeling for the irresolvable conflict between the unconditioned and the 
conditioned, the impossibility and the necessity o f  complete communication.
18 See Chapter 3 above for Schiller’s use o f  this concept, and Chapter 7 above for Holderlin.
19 Lyceums-Fragmente, no.48.
Irony is the Form o f  the paradox. Paradox is everything that is simultaneously great and good.
20 Quoted in Steven E. Alford, Irony and the Romantic Imagination, New York: Peter Lang, 1984, p.21.
21 Athenaums-Fragmente, no.l 16. 
endless succession o f  mirrors.
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ended change and progress. Whereas Schiller gave us an image of two drives that
resolved themselves into a third, the terms of Schlegel’s ironic paradox are never
completely resolved. Each ironic reflection feeds back into a fluid process of change.
Especially in Romantic writing, including Schlegel’s own, irony can be an
extended figure of speech or a complete work. Any text or discourse contains clues
about its ironic nature, for example ‘tone, discontinuity of character and statement,
internal textual contradiction and so forth’... ‘its ironic character is most often a 
• 0 0 ____function of context’. Thus, Schlegel’s terse, allusive fragments derive from copious 
philosophical notebooks, while Plato’s irony manipulated the apparently verbatim 
record of Socrates’ teaching. Even Schlegel’s desire to combine philosophy and
poetic production is ironic, with its claim that the form in which philosophy is
00expressed has philosophical validity in itself. Thus, a work with an ironical form that 
handles its content ironically expresses the paradoxical nature of reality, and suggests 
more to its readers than it could be interpreted as saying literally. Both explicitly and 
implicitly, Schlegelian irony expresses artistically the problematic relationship 
between finite creatures and the infinite, and is not merely a literary device, but is 
mandatory in any work or philosophical position.24
However, as we might expect, remembering the unity and ‘naivety’ so 
admired by Winckelmann, Schiller and other eighteenth century German 
commentators on Greek art, irony was not typical of the ancient world. Individual and 
society supposedly co-existed in a condition of immediate unity, so that writers 
naturally only had one viewpoint. Such unity allowed no distinction between what is
22 Steven E. Alford, Irony and the Romantic Imagination, New York: Peter Lang, 1984, p.21.
23 Fred Rush, ‘Irony and Romantic subjectivity’, in (ed.) Nikolas Kompridis, Philosophical 
Romanticism , Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2006, p. 173.
24 Fred Rush, ‘Irony and Romantic subjectivity’, in (ed.) Nikolas Kompridis, Philosophical 
Romanticism , Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2006, p. 180.
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and what should be.25 By contrast, as Schlegel had shown in the Studium-Aufsatz, 
modem writers were actively and self-consciously committed to forming something 
new and original out of an accumulated heritage of possible forms and contents, and 
were aware of tensions between themselves as individuals and their social context. 
They were thus also aware of the gap between the actual and the ideal. Essentially the 
writer, in Schlegel’s age, was struggling, as Holderlin also believed, to realise and 
reconcile these contrasts.26 Modem writers inevitably operate from at least two 
viewpoints, that of the individual and that of their culture. Thus, although the 
terminology of irony is most typical of the Lyceum (1797) and Athenaum (1798), 
Schlegel’s comments about the ‘philosophical’ nature of modem writing, and, 
especially, his discussions of ‘philosophical’ tragedy in the Studium-Aufsatz and Uber 
Lessing, reveal the ironic tendencies in all modem literature.
Modem irony has two components, and their very co-existence has a 
paradoxical, ironical quality. The first is that every work has content and expresses a 
position. Content and position may be vague or in some ways indeterminate, 
depending on the work, but to a greater or lesser extent the work expresses insights, 
feelings, beliefs or philosophical propositions to which it is committed, just in the 
sense that they constitute its themes or content. Thus, one component of irony,
25 Fred Rush, ‘Irony and Romantic subjectivity’, in (ed.) Nikolas Kompridis, Philosophical 
Romanticism , Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2006, p. 180.
26 eg. Athenaums-Fragmente, no.22.
Ein Projekt ist der subjektive Keim eines werdenden Objekts. Ein vollkommnes Projekt mUBte zugleich 
ganz subjektiv und ganz objektiv, ein unteilbares und lebendiges Individuum sein... Das Wesentliche 
ist die Fahigkeit, GegenstSnde unmittelbar zugleich zu idealisieren, und zu realisieren, zu ergSnzen, 
und teilweise in sich auszuftlhren. Da nur transzendental eben das ist, was auf die Verbindung oder 
Trennung des Idealen und des Realen Bezug hat; so kOnnte man wohl sagen, der Sinn fiir Fragmente 
und Projekte sei der transzendentale Bestandteil des historischen Geistes.
A project is the subjective seed o f an object that is coming into being. A perfect project would have to 
be simultaneously completely subjective and completely objective - an indivisible and living 
individual... The essential thing is the ability, immediately and all at once, to idealise, to realise, to 
amend, and partially achieve one’s purposes. Since, then, it is precisely whatever has reference to the 
connection or separation between the ideal and the real that is transcendental, we could presumably say 
that the feeling for fragments and projects is the transcendental component o f  the historical spirit.
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according to Schlegel, is that the work affirms the point of view expressed in it.27 But 
the human condition has no single perspective on the absolute, and, through 
reflection, we can acknowledge how different the world may seem to other people. 
Every such perspective expresses something of the absolute. Once a writer is 
conscious of this, he registers within the work of art that in having a point of view, the 
work represents only one point of view among many attempts to express the 
absolute.28 Hence Schlegel identified the second element in irony: a critical distance 
from the work is present within it. The totality of irony, therefore, is the co-existence 
within every single work of both critical distance and affirmation. This amounts also 
to a recognition that each work is only partial. It tells only part of the truth, and is 
biased towards a particular view. At the same time, we can relate this explanation to 
Kant’s position. Schlegel has reinterpreted disinterested observation, the Kantian 
presumption that everyone will agree with the judgement of taste, as the ability to 
acknowledge viewpoints other than one’s own, despite one’s in-built, tacitly asserted 
bias.
We also can see here how closely Schlegel associates the terms ‘irony’ and 
‘philosophical’. Schlegel’s Fichtean references to reflection and hovering, and his
27 Fred Rush, ‘Irony and Romantic subjectivity’, in (ed.) Nikolas Kompridis, Philosophical 
Romanticism , Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2006, p. 181.
28 Elizabeth Mill&n-Zaibert, Friedrich Schlegel and the Emergence o f  Romantic Philosophy, Albany: 
SUNY, 2007, p. 170.
She identifies the way the chaos o f irony and wit can provide an approximation o f  the Absolute as the 
main difference between Schlegel and idealist colleagues, who were ‘hoping to get a transparent look at 
the Absolute’. I presume she is mainly referring to the differences between Schlegel and his friend, 
Schelling.
29 Fred Rush, ‘Irony and Romantic subjectivity’, in (ed.) Nikolas Kompridis, Philosophical 
Romanticism, Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2006, p. 181.
Although, following Rush, I have used the word ‘perspective’ in this discussion, Rush also admits that 
Schlegel does not ever appear to have used that word himself. I agree with him that ‘point o f  view’ and 
‘perspective’ can nevertheless effectively be regarded as synonymous.
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references to the necessity for and difficulties of complete communication30 gain their 
coherence from this definition of irony. Schlegel, unlike Schiller or later writers, such 
as Hegel, never expected to be able to synthesise the opposing or various terms that 
characterised art into a stable equilibrium. However, as seen in the Studium-Aufsatz, 
he did believe that clashes and differences created change and even progress. The 
theory of irony is part of a gradually articulated dialectical theory. The definite 
content of the work of art constantly conflicts and co-exists with the fact that its 
content is not definitive, and thus irony and life both form significant features of the 
work of art. From unavoidable ironic clash springs the ‘life’ of the work of art, and 
from this comes the impetus towards further attempts to represent the absolute, and 
from this again comes open-ended literary change and development. Schlegel’s 1800- 
1801 Philosophy lecture notes confirmed that he had developed a theory of dialectical 
progress in history. There he stated that irony is the synthesis of all the antitheses in 
which the individual character of both constituents - ie. the definite content and the 
fact that it is not definitive - is preserved and enhanced. We are forever striving to 
comprehend an unspecifiable total context - which would presumably be capable of 
resolving all the perceived inconsistencies of our many points of view - that remains
T 1forever beyond our reach.
Irony is not just an obvious feature of the texts of modem literature. It is vital 
also to the reader’s engagement with these texts, as he or she brings his or her own 
many experiences and points of view to every reading of a work. By extension, it also 
explains Schlegel’s exhortations that we should read and re-read works - chew the cud
30Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Uber die Unverstandlichkeit’, in Eichner, Hans, (ed.), Kritische Friedrich- 
Schlegel-Ausgabe, Vol.2, Part I: Charakteristiken und Kritiken I (1796 - 1801), Paderbom; Munich; 
Vienna: Verlag Ferdinand SchOningh, Zilrich: Thomas-Verlag, 1967, p.370.
31 Referred to in Fred Rush, ‘Irony and Romantic subjectivity’, in (ed.) Nikolas Kompridis, 
Philosophical Romanticism, Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2006, p. 189.
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32(wiederkauen) - so that we can reflect repeatedly on the writer’s layers of awareness 
and irony, and bring fresh points of view to each subsequent reading. Our ability to do 
this effectively would naturally seem to depend partly on our own level of sensitivity 
to the possibilities in the text or, in Schiller’s terms,33 to our mind’s being 
undetermined, yet full of possibility and content.34 The theory of irony thus justifies 
Schlegel’s creation of Charakteristiken as carefully structured, perceptive and 
illuminating readers’ guides, supplementing our appreciation of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the works we read, and giving him and us the opportunity to put the 
ironic self-awareness he advocated and observed into practice. Indeed, Schlegel’s 
criticism was more successful than his imaginative works, such as Lucinde or the 
poetry. Lucinde is supremely ironic, full o f reflection, temporal discontinuities and 
narrative changes.35 It contains relatively little action and does not achieve closure. 
However, it is debatable whether it hangs together as a whole, or whether readers 
would be able to enjoy it as a work of art, rather than as a step-by-step experiment to 
be studied.
A recurrent objection to Romanticism has been its egocentrism. Romantic 
works have a generalised reputation for focusing either on the author or artist as 
autobiographical subject, or on an excessively self-reflecting or egocentric 
protagonist.36 Irony as such, however, need not entail a self-centred approach. Ironic
32 Lyceums-Fragmente, no. 27.
33 see chapter 4 above.
34 David Simpson, Irony and Authority in Romantic Poetry, London: Macmillan, 1979, pp.178, 179.
35 Friedrich Schlegel, Lucinde, (ed.) Karl Konrad Polheim, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1999. 
Originally published 1799.
36 For instance, John William Scholl, ‘Schlegel and Goethe, 1792 -  1801: A Study in Early German 
Romanticism’, in Proceedings o f  the Modern Language Association, vol.21, no.l, 1906, p. 148, 
believed that, for Goethe’s ‘das Subjekt scheint Recht haben’, Schlegel substituted, ‘Das Subjekt hat 
Recht’.
Wordsworth’s ‘lonely as a cloud’ musings, de Quincy’s Confessions, Schlegel’s Julius in Lucinde, 
Wackenroder’s Ergiefiungen, and even HOlderlin’s Hyperion and Goethe’s own Werther, fall foul o f
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layers of composition are present, whatever the subject matter. For instance,
Schlegel’s authorial interjections in his Charakteristiken serve both to focus the 
reader’s attention on the works or writers under discussion, and to remind him or her 
that a Charakteristik imparts only a second hand appreciation of the work; it 
encourages the reader to move on, and read or re-read the work for him or herself. 
Tristram Shandy, also admired by Schlegel as a modem, ironic novel, although not a 
product of Romanticism, is not egocentric. While the novel is self-aware, its 
characters are not excessively self-analytical, and it is packed with action. Indeed, if 
we follow Belgardt, lively action is a vital element in the inner life of Romantic
7^literature.
Nevertheless, Schlegel’s encouragement of visible authorial intervention, and 
his emphasis on an explicit consciousness of ambiguity and ambivalence permitted 
egocentrism. In practical terms, constant reflection on and hovering (schweben)
-ift
between two or more aspects of reality involved introspection. However, Schlegel’s
this observation. Prompted by SchlegePs admiration for Hamlet, we might even include Shakespeare 
among the guilty parties.
37 Raimond Belgardt, ‘’’Romantische Poesie” in Friedrich Schlegels Aufsatz Uber das Studium der 
griechischen Poesie’, in The German Quarterly, vol.40, no.2, March 1967, p. 176.
38 Perhaps we may even detect this fear in Schiller and Goethe’s reference to Fichte as ''das grofie Ich \ 
(letter Schiller to Goethe, 06.07.1795).
(ed.) Philipp Stein, Briefwechsel zwischen Schiller und Goethe in den Jahren 1794 bis 1805, Leipzig: 
Philipp Reclam, no date.
This was not just a comment on how closely the man matched his metaphysics, but on the further 
possibility that the new Idealism would do more than analyse the nature o f knowledge and perception; 
it might also change the way people thought o f  the world and their experience o f  it. To use a late 
twentieth century expression, it might create a ‘me generation’ (Jean M. Twenge, Generation Me: Why 
today's young Americans are more confident, assertive, entitled - and more miserable than ever before, 
New York: Simon and Shuster Free Press, 2006.).
see also Letter Schiller to Goethe 28.10.1794,
‘Die Welt ist nur ein Ball, den das Ich geworfen hat und den es bey der Reflexion wieder f&ngt!! 
Sonach hatte er seine Gottheit wirklich declariert, wie wir neulich erwarteten.’
The world is only a ball that the I has thrown and then catches again by means o f  reflection!! So, 
according to this, he really seems to have announced his own divinity, as we were expecting recently.
Schiller’s summary o f the Fichtean philosophy is completely unfair, but the quotation gives a good 
insight into Schiller’s and Goethe’s malicious assessment o f  Fichte’s personal egoism.
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continued allusions to Plato and his return near the end of the century to an earlier 
interest in Spinoza,39 make it unlikely that his own philosophy remained subjectivist, 
or grounded in the metaphysical Ich /  Nicht-Ich of Fichte.40 He acknowledged the 
danger of self-absorbed works,41 as a source of ‘coarse, egotistical titillation’ 42 He 
questioned the motivations behind autobiography,43 but also noted that Romantic 
Poesie was the best way of expressing the writer’s inner thoughts completely. Some 
writers, he believed, though merely intending to write a novel, instead created a 
representation of themselves.44
39 Frederick C. Beiser, The Romantic Imperative, Cambridge MA; London: Harvard University Press, 
2003, p.77.
40 Frederick C. Beiser, German Idealism: the struggle against subjectivism, Cambridge MA; London: 
Harvard University Press, 2002, p. 12.
Beiser agrees that Schlegel’s absolute did not originate from the Ich, even though the Ich was the 
highest form in which the absolute is expressed.
41 Athenaums-Fragmente, no. 116.
42 Athenaums-Fragmente, no. 118.
Es ist nicht einmal ein feiner, sondem eigentlich ein recht grober Kitzel des Egoismus, wenn alle 
Personen in einem Roman sich um Einen bewegen wie Planeten um die Sonne, der dann gewOhnlich 
des Verfassers unartiges SchoBkind ist...
It is not even a fine, but actually a really coarse egotistical titillation, if all the people in a novel circle 
like planets round the sun round one individual, who is then usually the author’s naughty spoilt child...
43 Athenaums-Fragmente, no. 196.
44 Athenaums-Fragmente, no.l 16.
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Witz
Besides irony, Poesie has Witz. In the Fragmente Schlegel provides some 
tantalising partial definitions of the concept, which do not all fit together easily. In 
general, Witz seems closer to the English word ‘wit’, a kind of humorous irony, than 
to the modem German word, a joke.45 Usually it seems to mean any kind of quick­
wittedness that draws creative inferences and makes useful and illuminating mental 
connections. This could occur during literary creativity, but was also valuable in 
science and philosophy, where the ability to interpret fresh data or formulate a 
hypothesis does not always depend on painstaking, mechanical or logical activity, but 
emerges as a bright idea or sudden understanding. It is, he said, as if the ideas linked 
by Witz are two old friends who have a surprise reunion after a long separation.46 
Schlegel gives a metaphorical analysis of how a witzige Einfall (a witty idea) comes 
about. The thinker is suddenly able to separate out mental content that was previously 
intermingled, but his imagination must already have become completely stuffed (bis 
zur Sattigung) with all kinds of lively thoughts. Then, at the right moment, the 
imagination is electrified by the friction of social interaction, and the slightest friendly 
or hostile contact elicits sparks of lightening and glowing rays, or, on the other hand, 
shattering blows.47 It is an explosion of the confined psyche,48 again emphasising the 
prerequisite of a mind so full of ideas and information that connections begin to form 
involuntarily. However, the power of Witz must not be abused, or it becomes 
unsociable, capable of silencing any conversation with its cmshing strength.49 Using it
451 propose to use the English word ‘wit’ or the German word Witz interchangeably in this context, but 
bearing in mind that this is permissible only if  discussing Schlegel. In Schlegel, Witz is undeniably a 
piece o f technical terminology.
46 Athenaums-Fragmente, no. 37.
47 Lyceums-Fragmente, no.34.
48 Lyceums-Fragmente, no.90.
49 Athenaums-Fragmente, no.394.
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as a tool for revenge, especially, is disgraceful, comparable to using art to prurient 
ends.50
Schlegel provides many other brief insights into his use of the word Witz, but 
we shall discuss only a few, to give an impression of what he valued in Romantic 
literature. Schlegel unsurprisingly warns us against trying to be witzig. The result 
would be false and wooden, Witzelei, like the classical French alexandrine, probably 
his most detested style of artificial formalism.51 It must be spontaneous, and risks 
being extinguished immediately by a single analytical word, however well meant.52 
Thus, the content expressed wittily could be presented in a more lengthy, mundane 
way after intense intellectual labour, but it would not be grasped so immediately. 
Indeed, Schlegel describes reason (Vernunft), as we usually think of it, as being only 
thin and watery. There is a special thick, fiery kind of reason that makes wit what it is, 
and gives genuine style its elasticity and electricity.54 When Schlegel said of Lessing 
that he wrote:
Worte, in denen, was die dunkelsten Stellen sind im Gebiet des menschlichen
Geistes, oft wie vom Blitz plotzlich erleuchtet.. .55
it is therefore surprising that he did not use the word Witz.
50 Lyceums-Fragmente, no.51.
51 Athenaums-Fragmente, no. 32.
52 Lyceums-Fragmente, no.22.
Ein einziges analytisches Wort, auch zum Lobe, kann den vortrefflichsten witzigen Einfall, dessen 
Flamme nun erst warmen sollte, nachdem sie geglSnzt hat, unmittelbar lSschen.
53 See also Schlegel’s comments on the contrast Bodmer made between Homer (ie. lengthy) and 
Aristophanes (ie. witty), in Lyceums-Fragment, no. 13.
54Lyceums-Fragmente, no. 104.
Was man gewbhnlich Vemunft nennt, ist nur eine Gattung derselben; namlich die diinne und wafirige. 
Es gibt auch eine dicke, feurige Vemunft, welche den Witz eigentlich zum Witz macht, und dem 
gediegenen Styl das Elastische gibt und das Elektrische.
55Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Uber Lessing’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische und 
theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p.60.
Words by which the darkest places in the territory o f  the human mind are illuminated, often as if by 
lightening...
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From this we gain some idea of how Schlegel also thought Witz linked with 
urbanity,56 prima facie a superficial form of sociability to be approved by a 
philosopher, but relevant to the apparent lack of detailed philosophical discussion in 
Schlegel’s works. He states that the One and All of historical philosophy, and Plato’s 
highest form of music, are the wit of harmonious universality. This amounts to a rare 
public showing of Schlegel’s Spinozan worldview in the last years of the eighteenth 
century.57 Apart from his use of the word Witz, the sentiment in this fragment might 
have been written by Holderlin. Yet it also illustrates how differently Holderlin and 
Schlegel handled similar philosophical sources and material. The very word, Witz, is 
part of this contrast. Holderlin’s work exhibits earnestness and intensity. He struggles 
to express what he believes to be inexpressible, and turns to the simultaneously vivid 
yet partially veiled medium of poetry in order to both resolve and acknowledge the 
difficulty. Schlegel, however, devoted himself to avoiding earnestness, despite his 
diligent re-reading and annotation of the literary and philosophical canon. He 
presented a polished, flippant face to the world. Writing is an ironic activity 
underpinned by layers of other activity, such as intentionality, form, content, editing
58and research. The writer presents his world selectively, as he chooses. To use a 
mechanical metaphor, his readership does not need to hear all the wheels of his 
creative machinery grinding, however marvellous the technology. Alternatively, to 
use a chemical metaphor, all the reader needs to see is a puff of smoke, and a 
sparkling crystal - a fragment. Socially the urbane man is the sparkling crystal, the
56 Athenaums-Fragmente, no.438.
57 Frederick C. Beiser, The Romantic Imperative, Cambridge MA; London: Harvard University Press, 
2003, pp.77, 131.
58 Though HOlderlin also emphasised the rapid, knowing choices made by the skilled writer. See:
J. Chr. F. Holderlin, ‘Uber die verschiedene Arten zu dichten’, in (ed.) Johann Kreuzer, Friedrich 
Holderlin: Theoretische Schriften, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, p.31.
See chapter 9 above.
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counterpart of the literary fragment, and thus, the most developed example of the Witz 
of harmonious universality, as Schlegel says.59 At the same time, we cannot ignore the 
fact that both urbanity and harmony are a fragile, beautiful, but brittle crust on a 
seething and basically incomprehensible reality.60
The chemical metaphor is Schlegel’s own. A later, epigrammatic fragment 
uses a scientific metaphor to hint at the relationship of Witz to the human faculties:
Verstand ist mechanischer, Witz ist chemischer, Geist ist organischer Geist.61 
Thus, we can study the creaking, mechanical workings of the understanding, but we 
cannot at base explain why two distinct elements give rise to the particular compound 
we call Witz. We know only that they infallibly do so. The mind as a whole, 
meanwhile, is like a changing, living thing. Also described as being chemical and 
witty are the French, the novel, and a list of recent phenomena that Schlegel found 
exciting.62 These connotations of explosiveness and revolution combine to 
characterise contemporary Europe. Like Fichte, Schlegel thought the scholar was 
engaged in a creative process. Each new academic insight was comparable with the 
work of an artist.
591 would suspect that sociability occupies the same place in Schlegel’s thought as the communal soul 
does in HOlderlin’s. It is an acknowledgement that by making a small, imperfect personal contribution, 
we build up and benefit from a larger, fuller understanding.
60 Perhaps Schlegel’s approval o f  urbanity should not really be surprising. He alludes to its being a 
stoic virtue in Lyceums-Fragmente, no 42:
... und sogar die Stoiker hielten die Urbanitat fiir eine Tugend.
61 Athenaums-Fragmente, no.366.
62 Athenaums-Fragmente, no.426.
Dieter Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel, Cambridge MA; London: Harvard University Press, 2002, 
p.88. Henrich discusses the influence the Stoic philosophers had on the development o f  post-Kantian 
idealism. It is therefore possible that Schlegel may be alluding in this fragment to the Stoic theory o f  
chemical mixtures, important in the make up o f conscious beings, and in the union o f hen panta - as the 
Stoics called the One. [cf. HOlderlin’s en kaipan.]
63 Johann Gottlieb Fichte, ‘Vocation o f a scholar’, in Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre and other 
writings, 1797-1800, (ed.) (tr.) Daniel Breazeale, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994.
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Witz fulfils spontaneously the analytical and synthetical functions of logical 
and scientific argument.64 A definition must always be witty, and, if it requires 
explanation, is self-defeating and obscure. Yet it cannot be made up on the spur of the 
moment, since scientific definition cannot take place until a great deal of other work 
has been carried out. Presumably, this means that enough factual information must be 
amassed before making any rash statements. In art theory the many laboured attempts 
at tabulation and categorisation have their uses, as tests of virtuosity, for example, but, 
Schlegel suggests, unless they can be seen immediately to be true, they explain 
nothing. For him the important thing is to know something, and then to say it. All 
other attempts to explain or elaborate are superfluous, lacking the simultaneous 
simplicity and profoundness of Witz, rich in content, simple in form.
This brings us to Schlegel’s view of Kant. Witz is the difference between 
representation according to the rule, and simply acting.65 The one is apparently so 
much more facile than the other, but, not only do both achieve the same end, but 
spontaneous action, like wit or rapid mental arithmetic, is a kind of short cut that 
avoids superfluous theorising. Leibnitz especially, but even Kant, were witzig. Their 
ability to combine ideas together meant that their most important discoveries came 
together in a surprisingly coincidental way. The content of what they said was indeed 
greater than anything that could be conveyed in the ephemeral terms of poetic wit, but 
Leibnitz’s whole philosophy is made up originally of a collection of witty fragments 
and projects. Philosophy then progresses by applying a sound method to these 
insights.66 Content and ideas precede witty connections; then methodical structure,
64 Athenaums-Fragmente, no.82.
65 This reminds us o f the theme o f  Anmut und Wiirde, where spontaneous conformity to duty is so 
much more attractive than a protracted effort to fulfil one’s duty. See chapter 2 above.
66 Athenaums-Fragmente, no.220.
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important though it is, follows -  even in Kant.67 Schlegel has undoubtedly written 
these words intending to rouse controversy. As the master of methodical structure, 
Kant is the last writer one would expect to call witty.
Since wit brings out surprising connections, metaphors and analogies would 
seem to be a likely source of wit. Kant’s two most famous uses of imagery occur in 
the Third Critique, in his analogies, firstly, in his emblematic representation of Juno 
by the peacock, and Jupiter by the thunderbolt of majesty;68 and secondly, between 
despotic government and a hand-mill, and a constitutional government and an organic 
body.69 Neither example points to Kant’s having had a lively, literary way of thinking, 
capable of illuminating our understanding in a fresh way. Similarly, in the First 
Critique Kant refers to the ‘country of truth... surrounded by a wide and stormy 
ocean...’,70 probably adapted from a familiar eighteenth century metaphor,71 but, once 
again, an isolated example rather than evidence of a misjudged reputation. However, I 
would suggest Schlegel did not find Kant witty in any amusing or allusive sense.
More plausibly, Kant’s flash of wit lay in his ability to conceive for the first time of 
analysing the human mind in the way that has become accepted as a basic model, 
even if often revised since then. It took Kant many years and volumes to explain his 
philosophical conception exactly, and to show that other areas of thought - for 
example, aesthetics - were consistent with this original insight; but the insight itself
67 By implication, this gives us an insight into the Fragmente. For years Schlegel kept meticulous 
philosophical notebooks that cannot be summarised or assessed in the space available here, but the 
Fragments would never have been produced without them.
68 Immanuel Kant, Critique o f  the Power o f  Judgement, (ed.) Paul Guyer, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric 
Matthews, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 5:315, p. 193.
69 Immanuel Kant, Critique o f  the Power o f  Judgement, (ed.) Paul Guyer, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric 
Matthews, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 5:352, p.226.
70 Immanuel Kant, Critique o f  Pure Reason, (ed.) trans. F. Max Mttller, Garden City NY: Anchor 
Doubleday Inc., 1966, A236, B295, p. 187.
71 Rebecca Kukla, ‘Introduction’, in (ed.) Rebecca Kukla, Aesthetics and Cognition in Kant's Critical 
Philosophy, Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p .l.
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was, nevertheless, unique and illuminating, and thus in Schlegel’s terms, witty. 
Presumably, too, we may surmise that Schlegel thought Kant had handled his 
analytical comments skilfully enough not to have destroyed his wittiness.72
Yet there is some tension here in the way Schlegel typifies Witz as an aesthetic 
(ie. poetic) concept. Whereas his usual theme is apparently the need to be aware of, 
and even to unpeel the layers of irony present in any artistic work, Witz appears to 
arise in either the absence or the complete concealment of technique and analysis. If it 
is indeed an unanalysable and finished result, then Witz shares some characteristics 
with the perfect, classical model, whose beauty and completeness is contemplated and 
appreciated without conceptualisation. The effect of this could be to set up a further 
set of tensions within the work of the artist and in his or her relationship with a public. 
We can imagine the artist, using the kinds of balancing skills outlined by Holderlin, 
deciding when to reveal and when to conceal the working of the poetic imagination. 
Thus, sometimes the enigmatic or illuminating flash of Witz, and at other times the 
spell-breaking effects achieved by revealing the ironic structure of a work will make 
equally important contributions to the Poesie of Romantic art, and it would be the 
reader’s job to detect them. It would be almost as if the value of the work of art arose 
from this additional, knowing series of counter-plays between writer and reader. 
Whether Schlegel’s ingenuity genuinely extended so far as to have intended this 
implication of his definition of Witz, it is hard to say, but it shows how even he was 
unable to eliminate the Kantian element of immediate and non-conceptual perception 
from the apparently self-conscious diversity of the best Poesie.
72 As Schlegel had warned in Lyceums-Fragmente, 22, referred to above.
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Romantisch and Roman
The terms examined so far are features of Schlegel’s Romanticism. Yet, 
although Schlegel praises romantische Poesie above all other kinds of art, there has 
even been uncertainty about what he meant by Romantic. By 1797, having established 
the method of criticism used in the Charakteristiken, he needed a critical vocabulary 
to discuss the works he and his associates valued.73 His own Studium-Aufsatz may 
have complicated his choice, by contributing to the pejorative force associated with 
words like, ‘characteristic’, ‘interesting’ and ‘didactic’.74 The term ‘modem’ was 
rejected as a term of approbation, since it included many falsche Tendenzen, (false 
starts), and a large amount of inferior modem work that he hoped would turn out to be 
a false start. However, once Schlegel had chosen the terms Roman and romantisch, he 
used them without any sustained public discussion of their usage. Some 
contemporaries were confused, objected to them or misused them, a failure of
7 Scommunication that affected his reputation as a professional writer. For instance,
one of the connotations of the word, ‘romantic’ familiar in our own times is the notion
of over-sentimentality, or, colloquially, slushiness, which Schlegel too was aware of:
Die Romane endigen gem, wie das Vaterunser anfangt; mit dem Reich Gottes 
auf Erden.76
He thus sometimes uses the word Roman, as here, in a disparaging sense, despite also 
identifying it with the epitome of Romantic Poesie?1
73 Hans Eichner, Friedrich Schlegel, New York: Twayne, 1970, p.49.
74 A.O. Lovejoy, ‘On the Meaning o f “Romantic” in Early German Romanticism, Part II’, in Modern 
Language Notes, Vol.32, No.2, Feb 1917, p.76.
75 Hans Eichner, Friedrich Schlegel, New York: Twayne, 1970, p.50.
76 Lyceums-Fragmente, no. 18.
Novels like to end like the beginning o f  the Lord’s Prayer - with the Kingdom o f  God upon earth.
Or more familiarly and in secular terminology: cheap, popular novels end with a ‘happily ever after’.
77 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, The Literary Absolute: The theory o f  literature in 
German Romanticism, (ed.) (tr.) Philip Barnard and Cheryl Lester, Albany NY: State University o f  
New York Press, 1988, Preface, p.4.
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More generally, by Romantisch, Schlegel distinguished good modem 
literature. His choice of word was influenced by other existing meanings, some of 
which he had partially exempted from criticism, in the Studium-Aufsatz, for instance, 
those relating to Old French and other romances of wandering knights or troubadours; 
vernacular writings in rhyme rather than classical metre, and the kinds of exotic, 
improbable and (more disparagingly) absurd events that might occur in mediaeval 
romance or folk tale.78 Thus, for him the word already called up a lively tradition that 
contrasted with the formalism of classical French literature.79 Indeed, before coining 
his new usage, he commented on how Hamlet combined all the charming bloom of 
romantic fantasy.80 The term ‘romantic fantasy’, had been his final editorial decision. 
A previous version had read, ‘era of knights and heroes’.81 What gave cohesion to this
O'}
former romantic age was its rich mythology. Significantly, Schlegel returns to this 
notion in the Gesprach iiber die Poesie, where Ludovico advocates, unchallenged, the 
development of a new mythology for the modem age.
Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Gesprach Uber die Poesie: Brief tiber den Roman’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, 
Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische und theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p.206.
78 Hans Eichner, Friedrich Schlegel, New York: Twayne, 1970, p.52.
79 Studium-Aufsatz, p.226.
Raimund Belgardt, ‘’’Romantische Poesie” in Friedrich Schlegels Aufsatz “Uber das Studium der 
griechischen Poesie41’, in The German Quarterly, vol.40, No.2, Mar. 1967, p. 169.
80 Studium-Aufsatz, p.249.
...vereinigen sich die reizenden Bliiten der Romantischen Phantasie...
81 Studium-Aufsatz, fn. p.249.
‘Helden und Ritterzeit’
82This aspect of the era o f knights and heroes was referred to in: Studium-Aufsatz, p.226.
Elizabeth Milian-Zaibert, Friedrich Schlegel and the Emergence o f  Romantic Philosophy, Albany: 
SUNY, 2007, p. 165. She repeats Schlegel’s point about myth and social cohesion, in order to defend 
Schlegel against claims that by advocating myth he also promoted mysticism.
Interestingly, she also points out the way this view o f  myth sets a limit on Schlegel’s supposed 
preference for discontinuity and lack o f  resolution. While he accepted clash and paradox in belief 
systems, Schlegel advocated cohesion in the social world, and promoted mythology as a means o f  
achieving this.
83 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Gesprach Uber die Poesie: Rede Uber die Mythologie’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, 
Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische und theoretische Schriften, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p. 192.
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Developing the conception of the Romantic simplified Schlegel’s response to 
some of the writers he had always admired, but for whom he constructed excuses in 
the Studium-Aufsatz, and gave us a critical standard forjudging past writers. Petrarch 
now became a Romantic poet, not a lyrical poet, ranked with Dante, Shakespeare and 
Cervantes as one of the greatest Romantic poets.84 Lyricism, as Schlegel had already 
pointed out, was the Poesie of ancient Greece, its culturally best-suited form. We infer 
that, although we may unscrupulously imitate past genres, only the work that grows 
from its surrounding culture has integrity. The organic metaphor of growth is an 
indication of Schlegel’s approval.85 Hence, the ancient writers who have an enduring 
appeal are the most Romantic. Aristophanes was one of Schlegel’s favourite
£7classical writers, and it was his bantering tone {Persiflage), his humour and irony 
that he admired most. Modem Romanticism is like a single filament from Athena’s
O O  O Q
gauzy fabric, spun out so that it reaches down to us. Thus, self-analysis is only
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, The Literary Absolute: The theory o f literature in 
German Romanticism, (ed.) (tr.) Philip Barnard and Cheryl Lester, Albany NY: State University o f  
New York Press, 1988, p.89.
The authors explain how closely the protagonists in the Gesprach can be identified with the members 
o f the Jena circle. Ludovico, for example, is Schelling. However, they also acknowledge Ayrault’s 
contention that it is misleading to regard the characters as members o f  the Athenaum group.
Ludovico believes idealism is the central core from which a shared story o f  the nature and meaning o f  
reality will grow, capable o f embracing activities as diverse as Poesie and physics. It is understandable 
that he has been identified with Schelling.
84 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Gesprach Uber die Poesie: Epochen der Dichtkunst’, in (ed.) Andreas Huyssen, 
Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische und theoretische Schriften , Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1997, p. 178.
85 Lyceums-Fragmente, no. 119.
In this fragment Schlegel also remarks on the emotional exhibitionism o f poets who affect to be lyrical, 
counter to their cultural background,; this makes an interesting counterfoil to our previous comments 
about self-indulgent Romantic heroes.
86 Athenaums-Fragmente, no. 153.
87 Schlegel uses apparently dismissive words, such as Persiflage and Buffonerie even when writing o f  
work that he admires. He was well aware o f  the flippant and even facetious dimensions o f Romantic 
irony.
88 Leichtigkeit, a synonym for Persiflage, was the word used to refer to indecently diaphanous fabrics. 
Another layer of Schlegelian irony.
89 Athendums-Fragmente, no. 154.
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artistically effective if unaffected and coming genuinely from the heart, not from the
calculations of opportunistic career poets applying a self-aggrandising formula.90
Athenaums-Fragment 116 appears to define '‘romantische Poesie*. However, it
is best understood in conjunction with Schlegel’s other critical works. The first
sentence is the most famous:
Die romantische Poesie ist eine progressive Universalpoesie.91 
Romantic Poesie is progressive, in that it is indeterminate in the manner first
introduced to us in the Studium-Aufsatz, namely, in that it grows from its society,
helps define that society, and, also, contributes towards changes in society. The
constant feedback between art and life is an aspect of change and part of the means by
which change takes place. Schlegel did not expect a position of final closure to be
reached, for, as he says later in this fragment, the true essence of romantic poetry is
that it is eternally in a process of becoming, and can never be completed.92 The
Romantic condition of constant becoming is the evidence of the ‘inner life’ that we
saw above was essential to all true Poesie. Again, the implied meaning of this
fragment refers back to the Studium-Aufsatz. According to A.O. Lovejoy’s influential
suggestion, in this Fragment Schlegel reversed the opinions expressed in the Studium-
Aufsatz, rejected neo-classicism and contemplative aesthetic beauty, and applied the
designation ‘Romantic Poesie’ to work of which he had previously disapproved.93
90 Lyceums-Fragmente, no. 49, 67.
English writers, motivated by Guineen (guineas), come out o f  this comparison especially poorly.
91 This long fragment is referred to repeatedly in the work o f  Schlegel’s commentators. This opening 
sentence is a good illustration o f Witz at work. It is a pithy definition that makes no sense unless the 
reader has already done some groundwork to find out what Schlegel had written already. Once we 
understand what he means, it is quite a neat definition. This is either clever or self-defeating. Certainly 
ironic.
92 Athenaums-Fragmente, 116.
Die romantische Dichtart ist noch im Werden; ja das ist ihr eigentliches Wesen, daB sie ewig nur 
werden, nie vollendet kann.
93 A.O. Lovejoy, ‘On the Meaning o f “Romantic” in Early German Romanticism, Part II’, in Modern 
Language Notes, Vol.32, No.2, Feb 1917, p. 72.
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Although Lovejoy highlights the similarities between Romantic Poesie and ideas 
Schlegel had rejected in the Studium-Aufsatz, more telling is Schlegel’s comment in 
the Studium-Aufsatz'. ‘Das Romantische bleibt ewig neu - das Moderne wechselt mit 
der Mode. ’ Even in 1795 Schlegel had discerned good and bad in both ancient and 
modem. Thus, taken with Fragment 116, if it is eternally new, then, equally, it is 
progressing universally. The term ‘Romantic’ brought this out more clearly.94
However, Schlegel had changed in other ways since the Studium-Aufsatz.
There the cultural origins of art made it local or relative in character. Romanticism, by 
contrast, has escaped from these limitations. The fragmentation of modem cultural life 
has multiplied the possibilities open to the creative artist, to such an infinite degree 
that its very individuality, its independence from the constraints of genre, its ability to 
explore the endless realms of the interesting and the bizarre, have freed art from its 
particularities. It has become universal in the sense of being timeless, and quite 
possibly also, in the sense of having been able to abandon specific cultural 
determinations. When Schlegel later uses the term ‘transcendental poetry’,95 this is 
perhaps what we should take him to mean. Poesie has risen above or gone beyond the 
particular, and made itself universal. This is a sense in which Romantic Poesie is 
‘Poesie der Poesie’.96 It is a distillation of all that is essentially poetic, the poetry of 
whatever is poetic. Furthermore, we hear an echo of the Platonic Forms in this way of 
describing the achievements of Early Romanticism. The Romantics believed they had 
explored the limitations of the hitherto earthly manifestations of Poesie, and, through 
the operation of feeling, imagination, reason, which all go to make up Witz, had 
grasped the Form of art, and learned to recognise the intrinsic beauty of both human
94 Raimund Belgardt, "’Romantische Poesie” in Friedrich Schlegels Aufsatz “Uber das Studium der 
griechischen Poesie“’, in The German Quarterly, vol.40, No.2, Mar. 1967, p.180.
95 Athenaums-Fragmente, 247.
96 Athenaums-Fragmente, 247.
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art and the created world. It is important that we have established a likely meaning for 
universal in this context, because it rescues Schlegel from the charge of inconsistency. 
In the Studium-Aufsatz, Schlegel was advocating an ideal, in the old sense, unsullied 
by the irregularities of particularity. Thus, when we refer to the Studium-Aufsatz, we 
can also use Platonic terms, and say he was valuing the universal over the particular. 
Fragment 116 would exhibit a strong tension between his admiration for the variety of 
Romantic Poesie and his continued claim of universality, if he had not revised his 
view of what constitutes universality. Therefore by considering what he meant by 
Universalpoesie we also grasp his revised view of what can legitimately be regarded - 
in the widest and most inclusive sense - as beautiful.
The rest of Fragment 116 expands on these ideas of beauty as variety. We find 
out that romantic Poesie does not just combine all the poetic genres and join with 
philosophy and rhetoric, but mixes and melds brilliance, criticism, literary poetry and 
folk poetry. While it includes all the various systems and sub-systems of poetic 
composition, it also includes the artless song that a child has made up. Romantic 
Poesie works like a mirror held up to the world around us or to our own age. It thus 
has a powerful mimetic function, but either of the same naive kind as Schiller thought 
he observed in Shakespeare, or as in the successfully reconciled work of Schiller’s 
great sentimental writer, who has been led back to nature.97 Romantic Poesie also can 
hold back from mirroring the world, and be completely indeterminate and non­
specific, as one might expect from Universalpoesie.
Und doch kann sie am meisten zwischen dem Dargestellten und dem 
Darstellenden, frei von allem realen und idealen Interesse auf den Fliigeln der 
poetischen Reflexion in der Mitte schweben, diese Reflexion immer mehr 
potenzieren und wie in einer endlosen Reihe von Spiegeln vervielfachen.98
97 Friedrich Schiller, On the Naive and Sentimental in Literature, tr. Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly, 
Manchester: CarcanetNew Press Ltd, 1981, p.63.
98 Athenaums-Fragmente, 116.
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This extract, especially the phrase ‘endless succession of mirrors’, is a commonly
quoted phrase from Schlegel’s work, a vivid and suggestive image, worth quoting
again, because of its context. Schlegel is indeed praising Romantic Poesie for its
capacity to set an endless train of indeterminate ironical thought in motion, but he is
specifically not presenting this as its entire purpose or nature. As we have just seen, he
is setting up an antithesis between the mimetic and reflective aspects of art, and
claiming that Romantic art can and does embrace them both.
Sie ist der hochsten und der allseitigsten Bildung fahig; nicht bloB von innen 
heraus, sondem auch von auBen hinein."
This is the sentence that follows the previous quotation, and it could effectively be 
taken to confirm that Schlegel saw art as capable of being simultaneously, and equally 
legitimately, conscious, structured, expressive, representational, instinctual, social and 
personal. All these characteristics are hinted at or named at some point in this 
fragment. Fragment 116 is enormously ambitious in the claims it makes for Romantic 
Poesie. No theory can ever do it justice; it is the only kind of Poesie that is truly 
endless and free; its primary law is that the whim of the poet, with a power far beyond 
that of Kantian genius, tolerates no superior law. Then the final sentence brings us to 
our almost outrageous destination: Only the Romantic literary genre is more than a 
genre and is also literary art itself, so that in a certain sense, all Poesie either is or 
ought to be Romantic.100 Unsurprisingly, therefore, even eccentric or monstrous
And yet it can in the highest degree hover on the wings o f  poetic reflection in the middle, between the 
represented thing and the way it is being represented, free o f  all actual or idealised involvement. It can 
raise this reflection to a higher and higher power, and multiply it in an endless succession o f mirrors.
(Note that Schlegel is using a mathematical metaphor here. Potenzieren suggests raising a number to a 
higher power, vervielfachen is to multiply, and Reihe is also the word for a mathematical series or, in 
this case, a regression.)
99 Athenaums-Fragmente, 116.
It is capable of the highest and most multi-faceted cultivation, not only from the inside out, but also 
from the outside inwards.
100 Athenaums-Fragmente, 116.
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literary anomalies have value, so long as they are original.101 Schlegel’s comments 
about the desirability of unity among the arts, sciences and philosophy, and their 
complementary roles,102 also make sense in the context of these views on the 
Romantic.103
In a later fragment, Schlegel hints at a relationship between art and morality. 
Kant gave art an identifiable position with regard to the understanding, the 
imagination and the moral sense; Schiller adapted this structure to suggest that, 
although there was no need for art to be moralistic, or to tackle ethical issues, the 
practice and enjoyment of art helped us develop the ability to make moral judgements. 
Holderlin wrapped a worldview, his poetry and life’s moral imperatives into a single, 
organic, coherent whole. However, Schlegel’s published writings in general lack this 
earnestness of purpose. The ambivalence of irony is rarely related specifically to the 
moral potential of mankind. Athenaums-Fragmente 414, however, extends Schlegel’s 
theme of rejecting the conventions of traditional literary genre in favour of a superior, 
freer, Romantic method, and applies it to conventional morality. He describes a kind 
of secret church that exists among the eccentric few who represent a silent opposition 
to the ubiquitous immorality that passes for morality in contemporary society. Their 
mystical manner of expression, Romantic fantasy and particular way of writing often 
act as a shared symbol of their beautiful secrets. Schlegel does not elaborate on this 
fragment, but we may surmise that the passage should be read in conjunction with
Die romantisch Dichtart ist die einzige, die mehr als Art, und gleichsam die Dichtkunst selbst ist: denn 
in einem gewissen Sinn ist oder soli alle Poesie romantisch sein.
101 Athendums-Fragmente, 139.
102 Patricia Waugh, ‘Introduction’ in (ed.) Patricia Waugh, Literary Theory and Criticism , Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006, p.27.
103 Lyceums-Fragment, 115.
Alle Kunst soli Wissenschaft, und alle Wissenschaft soli Kunst werden; Poesie und Philosophic sollen 
vereinigt sein.
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Fragment 116, where the writer or artist sets his own law for Poesie. In Kant’s 
heyday, exercising the judgement of taste led to the appreciation and creation of 
artefacts of classical beauty. Setting the moral law for oneself kept one obedient to the 
Categorical Imperative. While we do not know Schlegel’s exact position with regard 
to the Categorical Imperative, we know he has rejected conventional norms of 
classical beauty. Fragment 414 suggests he thinks morality too has moved into a more 
changeable, diverse and also superior epoch. Perhaps a gap that Schiller did not 
foresee has opened between the effects of aesthetic education, and convention.104 
Fragment 414 supports the popular view of the Romantic artist, as someone above the 
norms expected of other members of society, thus leading indirectly into the portrayal 
in literature and opera of the artist as an unconventional and almost wilfully shocking 
Bohemian, whose excesses cannot be understood by the small-minded bourgeois.
One final Schlegelian key term remains to be defined, clearly related in 
Schlegel’s usage to his ideas of the romantisch: Roman, literally, ‘the novel’. Romane 
are the socratic dialogue of our age.105 In a Roman the socratic dialogue and the active 
hero combine to create ‘eine Enzyclopadie des ganzen, geistigen Lebens eines
104 Robert J. Richards, The Romantic conception o f  life: Science and philosophy in the age o f  Goethe, 
Chicago; London: University o f Chicago Press, 2002, pp.43-45, 92-93.
Not only Schlegel’s personal relationships, but also Athendums-Fragmente, no.34, with its description 
o f  most modem marriages as concubinage, and its advocacy o f  mariage a quatre, combined with some 
scenes in Lucinde to excite public scandal. His suggestion, therefore, that the Romantic poet can cut 
through the unnecessary accretions of conventional behaviour, in order to value truly decent ways o f  
behaving, may have been arrived at by reference to some personal experience.
105 Lyceums-Fragmente, no. 26.
Jean-Baptiste Louvet de Couvray’s Faublas, i f  we want an example o f what Schlegel is talking about, 
is the ‘champagne o f the genre’, a Bildungsroman that was written in instalments spanning the years 
before, after and during the French revo\ution.(Lyceums-Fragmente, no. 41.)
An enticing review o f this forgotten work can be read at:
http://www.ciao.fr/Amours du chevalier de Faublas Les Jean Baptiste Louvet de Couvrav Avis 
765869 [accessed 01.02.08].
The review was posted in 2004, but appears to be an ephemeral entry that has survived on the internet.
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genialischen Individuums,106 A Roman fulfils these criteria, regardless of its form, and 
therefore is not synonymous with what we call ‘a novel’. Lessing’s Nathan der Weise, 
Schlegel says, acquires the complexion (Anstrich) of a Roman. Perhaps, too, it is from 
Fragment 78 that we derive the well-worn claim that everyone has a novel in them.107 
This is almost literally what Schlegel goes on to infer. However, as with many 
popularised quotations, it is most unlikely Schlegel intended us to take the quotation 
in the way in which it is now used. The Roman we have within us is the sum of the 
inner freshness, vitality and movement found in any brilliant individual, since a 
Roman is essentially these qualities; it is not merely, or even, a published prose text.
A variation on these comments about novel-writing is that no one should need to write 
more than one Roman, unless he or she has actually become a new person.108 From 
this he concludes both that not all the novels written by a single author necessarily 
belong together, and also, alternatively, that the many writings of any one author 
actually make up one single work. As Eichner claimed,109 Romantic literature exhibits 
all the seething sensuous, imaginative, spiritual and rational life that characterises the 
Roman. Taken with Lyceums-Fragment 89, we can thus claim that, by Roman, he 
means, not a book, but all the actually existing characteristic features of life. Roman, 
and all the terminological examples we have discussed in this chapter, further 
extended the critical work Schlegel had begun in the Studium-Aufsatz and the 
Charakteristiken.
106 Lyceums-Fragmente, no. 78.
...an encyclopaedia o f the entire mental life o f  a brilliant individual.
107 Auch enthait jeder Mensch, der gebildet ist, und sich bildet, in seinem Innem ein Roman. Dafi er ihn 
aber Sufire und schreibe, ist nicht ndtig.
108 Lyceums-Fragmente, no. 89.
109 Hans Eichner, ‘Friedrich Schlegel’s Theory o f  Romantic Poetry’ in Proceedings o f  the Modern 
Language Association, vol.71, no.5, Dec. 1956, p. 1033.
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Schlegel’s achievement
Schlegel made a key statement on how he believed his work should be judged: 
a writer should ‘show forth... through good works’.110 He believed his fictional and 
poetic writing should be giving us a philosophical message, just as the philosophical 
tragedies of Shakespeare and Cervantes had been acknowledged as doing in the 
Studium-Aufsatz. Likewise, his philosophy should be showing the literary qualities 
that he admired. An irony of the sentiment expressed here is that it runs contrary to 
the Protestant tradition in which Schlegel had been raised; that is, against the Lutheran 
belief in justification by faith, or grace.111 Thus, Schlegel’s contention that a writer 
must win his place in the literary-philosophical canon on the basis of his production, 
not by flaunting his ‘faith’, ie. the bare bones of his philosophical argument, but 
demonstrating its benefits and living out its meaning, is expressed in a religious 
analogy that also takes our thoughts forward to his later conversion to the Catholic 
faith. The significance of his chosen analogy is presumably that Fragment 44 is itself 
an item of literary faith for Schlegel. It is not enough for an author or scholar to be 
part of a literary or philosophical movement, or to apply a certain theory of aesthetics. 
The ultimate aesthetic test is whether the finished work has ‘life’. In Schlegel’s own 
case the result of applying this faith was the best of his own writing, the 
Charakteristiken, essays and Fragments that we would now call literary criticism, a 
discipline whose terms he has continued to define.
In reaching this point, although Schlegel used ideas also found in Schiller and 
Holderlin, and although aspects of Fichtean Wechselwirkung appear in his notions of 
hovering and irony, he rarely alludes directly to Kant. Art and literature emerge in 
Schlegel, not as phenomena primarily to be analysed and understood philosophically,
1 l0Lyceums-Fragment no.44. This Fragment is also referred to in chapter 10 above.
111 Justification by works had been one o f  the decisive sticking points in Luther’s debate with Rome.
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but largely as the product of a cultural environment. He thus represents the point in 
our discussion furthest removed from the detail and method of the Third Critique. The 
comparatively few points of contact we have found between him and Kant are 
interesting, however, because Schlegel seems sometimes to be giving his own 
solutions to problems Kant had noticed. For instance, he has touched on questions of 
how to reconcile the uniquely personal individual aesthetic response with our 
expectation of being able to share and confirm that response in a social context; how it 
happens that the same art object seems so different if we return to it after a long 
absence; how to distinguish desire from artistic pleasure; how to account for the 
appeal of the monstrous; the value of originality. Irony, the process of constant 
becoming and the search for meaning seem, by 1800, to have replaced the carefully 
structured philosophy of the Third Critique and its attempts to integrate judgements of 
beauty or taste into strict theories of rationality and imagination. In giving a 
prominent role to meaning, however, Schlegel did not focus primarily on the 
linguistic aspects of literature, or on the possible meanings of the terms in which texts 
were expressed, despite his interest in the possibilities of how we might use or read 
language.112 He looked for meaning in the sense of ‘significance’, or ‘importance’, or 
‘the main message conveyed’. His work thus not only contributed towards the later 
formulation of challenges to more Lockean, empiricist theories of meaning as the 
naming of ideas,113 but also remained relevant to other branches of the arts. Painting, 
dance and sculpture can also be judged in terms of ambivalence and meaning.114
112 Elsewhere, Schlegel also contributed to the more technical discussions o f  linguistic meaning, 
drawing on his experience as a translator.
See Kurt Mueller-Vollmer, ‘Language theory and the art o f  understanding’, in (ed.) Marshall Brown, 
The Cambridge History o f  Literary Criticism, Vol. 5, Romanticism, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000, pp. 177-179.
113 Quentin Skinner, ‘Meaning and understanding in the history o f ideas’, in (ed.) James Tully,
Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his critics, Cambridge; Oxford: Polity Press Blackwell, 
1988, p.70. Skinner distinguishes among the various kinds o f ‘meaning’.
336
SECTION 3: Friedrich Schlegel Chapter 12
Schlegel has been credited, along with Schleiermacher and Novalis, of having 
initiated the establishment of ‘literature’ as a respectable subject for philosophical 
investigation.115 Indeed, the definition of ‘literature’ on which Bowie tentatively 
settles, ‘texts which retain a productive ambiguity in thoroughly differing contexts 
over long periods’,116 is virtually a re-statement of Schlegel’s belief in the capacity for 
true Poesie to be re-read repeatedly.117 However, Ruthven puts an ironical twist on the 
supposed validity of returning inexhaustibly to great works of art, by saying that 
‘comucopian’ texts, such as Shakespeare’s, ‘create the illusion of trans-historical 
permanence’, as they survive changes in critical fashion.118 A further feature of 
Schlegel’s work that conforms with definitions of literary criticism is his suggestion 
of criteria forjudging the quality or value of literature. Ruthven mentions both vague 
and formalistic criteria that literary critics have used; Schlegel and our other
Kurt Mueller-Vollmer, ‘Language theory and the art o f  understanding’, in (ed.) Marshall Brown, The 
Cambridge History o f  Literary Criticism, Vol. 5, Romanticism, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000, pp. 167.
114 Schlegel’s slightly later essay, ‘Description o f  paintings in Paris and the Netherlands in the years 
1802 -04’, emphasises the expression o f the artist’s feeling, but also the meaning -  usually religious -  
that painting, as a ‘hieroglyph’, is capable o f  conveying in symbolic form.
Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Description o f  paintings in Paris and the Netherlands in the years 1802 -  1804’, in 
(ed.) Charles Harrison, Paul Wood and Jason Gaiger, Art in Theory 1648 - 1815: An anthology o f  
changing ideas, Malden MA; Oxford; Carlton Vic.: Blackwell, 2000, pp. 925-934.
115 Andrew Bowie, From Romanticism to Critical Theory: the Philosophy o f  German Literary Theory, 
New York: Routledge, 1997, p.4.
Bowie traces the development o f  twentieth century critical theory back to the work o f  the ‘Romantic’ 
writers, a development o f which he believes many French and Anglophone critical theorists have been 
unaware. His powerful account draws strongly on an analysis o f  changing attitudes towards the nature 
o f language, that is, on the impact that changes in philology had on Schlegel’s work.
116 Andrew Bowie, From Romanticism to Critical Theory: the Philosophy o f  German Literary Theory, 
New York: Routledge, 1997, p.7.
117 See chapter 11 above.
118 K.K. Ruthven, ‘Literary criticism’, in (ed.) Michael Payne, Dictionary o f  Cultural and Critical 
Theory, Oxford: Blackwell, 1997.
available at: Blackwell reference online,
http://www.blackwellreference.com/subscriber/tocnode?id=:g9780631207535 chunk g9780631207535 
15 ssl-21 [accessed 08.10.08].
His point is that their extensive variety o f  form and content permits each literary perspective to select a 
different theme, and claim it as the writer’s greatest achievement.
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protagonists use both kinds of criteria. The criteria of ‘inner life’ and Witz are vague,
while ‘making strange’, from Ruthven’s formalist category, reminds us of both
Schlegel and Schiller. Literary criticism since Schlegel has undergone various
changes and served various ideological purposes, but all seem to owe something to
criteria referred to by Schlegel. He offered a form of reader’s guide that exposed
readers to additional viewpoints, encouraging ‘any discourse on literature’.119 Yet
despite Schlegel’s efforts to encourage readers to explore a text and discover its
meaning in as many ways as possible, by applying their own critical abilities and
varying cultural experiences,120 distinct schools of criticism have emerged, that
apparently promote particular perspectives on literature.
Schlegel’s literary criticism has been a lasting achievement, but probably did
not match his own aspirations, and did not make him a great philosopher. For Beiser,
101Schlegel was ‘mysterious’, because, although he took philosophy seriously, he
1 00concealed his philosophical argument from a public readership. He wanted 
something that he perhaps demonstrated was not possible, Symphilosophie and 
Sympoesie, an amalgam of sensuously speaking philosophy and cerebral poetic 
literature to which a variety of thinkers from various intellectual backgrounds had 
contributed. The fact that the Charakteristiken were probably intended as a 
contribution to the development of these disciplines is demonstrated by the use we
119 Wellek, 1986, p.xvii, quoted in K.K. Ruthven, ‘Literary criticism’, in (ed.) Michael Payne, 
Dictionary o f  Cultural and Critical Theory, Oxford: Blackwell, 1997.
120 Jon Klancher, ‘Criticism and the crisis o f  the republic o f  letters’, in (ed.) Marshall Brown, The 
Cambridge History o f  Literary Criticism, Vol. 5, Romanticism, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000, p.309.
121 Frederick C. Beiser, The Romantic Imperative, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p .l06ff.
122 Frederick C. Beiser, The Romantic Imperative, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p.454.
Schlegel’s notebooks can be studied, and his philosophical position reconstructed from the student 
notes surviving from his philosophy lectures at the University o f  Jena in 1801, but he did not appear 
concerned to present them in published form.
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have been able to make in this thesis of, for example, the essay Uber Lessing}23 We 
have found evidence of Schlegel’s more general philosophical theory of aesthetics by 
examining quotations that ostensibly refer only to specific aspects of Lessing’s 
dramas. Literary criticism is the surviving result of Schlegel’s experiment, an 
invaluable and productive academic and popular tool, but not the synthesising catch­
all for which he had hoped.
123 See chapter 10 above. Goethes Meister and Gesprach uber die Poesie could be analysed in a similar 
way.
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CONCLUSION
The conclusions we can draw from having studied these three thinkers of the 
1790s naturally repeat some of the introductory comments made, and some of the 
points highlighted in the course of the thesis. The work of Schiller, Holderlin and 
Friedrich Schlegel has been discussed to illustrate changes in aesthetics during the 
cultural move from Enlightenment classicism to Romanticism, but, furthermore, it can 
equally well be said that their work itself represents that shift.1 They exemplify so 
well the features mentioned in our general introduction that they typify and have 
helped define the decline of classicism and rise of the Romantic movement in the 
cultural life of the German states. The author hopes, however, that by crediting them 
with such a transformational role we do more than reveal a historical curiosity. Most 
generally, this is not so much because of their intended aims, but because of some 
significant side effects of their work that we shall identify.
The main starting point for this thesis and for aesthetics in the 1790s was 
Kant’s aesthetic theory, as set out in the Third Critique. Our three subjects modified 
Kantian theory, believing they could improve on his philosophical analyses of 
mankind and of the processes of artistic production and artistic appreciation. 
Implicitly, we have agreed that they provided a fuller account of what happens both 
when the creative artist is at work, and when his or her audience engages with the 
results. On the other hand, we have also taken it to be relatively uncontentious that 
they did not equal Kant’s comprehensive and systematic analytical structure. Both
1 This seems to be why J.M. Bernstein, too, chose them, along with Lessing, as the main figures 
discussed in the introductory essay to his anthology.
see (ed.) J.M. Bernstein, Classical and Romantic German Aesthetics, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003, Introduction, p.viii.
See also Andrew Bowie, From Romanticism to Critical Theory: the Philosophy o f German Literary 
Theory, New York: Routledge, 1997, p. 136, ‘...the historical continuity o f  the story which has taken us 
in a fairly direct line from the Pantheism controversy and Kant to Romantic hermeneutics...’
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Holderlin and Schlegel thought the foundationalist architectural metaphor for 
philosophical system-building, used by most philosophers including Kant, was 
mistaken, and we have seen already that this methodological conviction even led 
Schlegel to evaluate Kant as witty, thus dismissing the carefully argued system within 
which his insights are situated.
The side effects to which we referred above are that, by trying to account for 
all that is going on in the minds of creator and audience, and in the work of art or 
nature that is being appreciated, these three thinkers progressively widened the scope 
of the aesthetic. The endpoint by about 1800 was that the whole human mind was 
thought to be involved in appreciating art or nature, and that this act of aesthetic 
appreciation was not an isolated, occasional or incidental interplay between the 
understanding and the imagination, but a continual and possibly constant, though not 
always conscious activity, that involves all our sensuous and rational abilities, and our 
powers of knowing or feeling. In this sense aesthetics and engagement with art came 
to be seen as a way of ensuring that humanity was exercising all its natural and 
acquired capacities, and became a force for personal improvement and inner unity, 
and, in Holderlin’s case, for unity with the natural universe as well.
In relation to the artistic artefacts themselves, our three thinkers lost interest in 
what Kant had said about subjective and objective qualities, and considerably 
broadened the kinds of features that could be counted as aesthetic qualities in any 
aesthetic judgement. Admittedly, they retained something that we might claim was 
akin to or derived from the main Kantian claim of subjectivity, that is, that we derive 
pleasure from internally observing the free play of our faculties. It is possible to trace 
the changing way in which they interpreted the phenomenon that Kant had been 
trying to address in this explanation. Thus, Schiller devised his conception of a
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balance between the sensuous and form drives that make up the human being, and 
manifests itself in a play drive. He also characterised our rather ambiguous 
relationship with the work of art in his notion of der schone Schein, that he 
subsequently developed into the notion of the sentimental in art. Something of this 
survived in Holderlin as the balance or harmonious opposition between the 
determined and the undetermined, one of the several dimensions of the divine 
moment for which all poets aim; and finally Kant’s ideas of free play and harmonious 
balance are discernible in Schlegel’s notion of infinitely regressive Romantic irony. 
Although the relationship between Kant’s stable, fixed judgement of taste and the 
shifting dynamism of Romantic irony may seem distant, both were ways of 
addressing the persistent thought that art is somehow recreational (ie. play), hard to 
define and not logically determined.
However, in addition to modified similarities with Kant, we have also seen 
significant differences, possibly the greatest of which was the move away from a 
search for beauty, and towards a search for meaning. The original subjective / 
objective debate may have encouraged this development, because it seemed at first 
sight so unlikely that our artistic pleasure might be quite independent of the 
constituent characteristics of the observed art object or natural phenomenon. An 
immediate implication of the revised and growing list of features that could be 
expected to excite an aesthetic response was that the exercise of what Kant would 
have called our aesthetic judgement now became part of the general attempt to relate 
to and understand the world around us. Beauty may be discoverable by contemplation, 
as Kant had suggested, but it might also be discovered gradually as a result of 
changing experiences and priorities, and as a result of close observation, or discussion 
with others, or under the guidance of a mentor, or in a witty flash of life-changing
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inspiration, or in many other ways that merge imperceptibly with the list of ways in 
which we perceive, learn, work out or discover anything at all about the world. It is 
then on the basis of these immediately observable differences between the beginning 
and the end of the 1790s that we come to the wider legacy of the change from 
Enlightenment classicism to Romanticism, as seen in the work of Schiller, Holderlin 
and Schlegel. The interpretative demands placed on the reader or audience by 
Romantic aesthetics, and the requirements it believed art made of the creative artist’s 
powers of communication, encouraged the development of hermeneutics as an area of 
study. None of our three thinkers seems to have realised that this change was taking 
place, but it was of lasting importance nevertheless.
If we may sum up, writer by writer, what happened in this decade of change, 
we can elaborate on some of these general changes a little. Schiller’s Kallias Letters 
remained closest to Kant, accepting the Kantian model of human thought and 
perception from the First Critique, then accepting that ‘beauty’ is not a concept 
applied by the understanding; though going on to account for this, not as Kant did, but 
through the involvement of the practical reason in the perceptual process. Kant’s 
suggestion that beauty is a sensuous analogy for the rationality of freedom perhaps 
prompted aspects of Schiller’s revised explanation, and also encouraged him to look 
more carefully at the extent to which identifiable features in the beautiful object 
provoked our subjective experience of beauty. Although he failed to show that beauty 
is an objective property, and was thus obliged to accept that his theory was, strictly 
speaking, subjectivist, he integrated the operation of senses, imagination, 
understanding and practical reason into the perception of the beautiful object. By 
doing this he broke down some of the mental compartmentalisation of which he 
suspected Kant. Once he went on to write Anmut und Wiirde, which brought out the
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importance of moral beauty in humanity, as a counterpart to the apparent autonomy 
that the Kallias Letters had identified in beautiful objects, he had gone a little further 
to providing a holistic account of human perfection, that required both rational moral 
thought and sensuous feeling or instinct.
Taken together, Schiller’s next important publications, the Aesthetic Letters 
and Naive and Sentimental further emphasise the extent to which all Kantian faculties 
are involved in the appreciation of beauty. The involvement of all the faculties is so 
complete that, by this stage, Schiller has abandoned almost all attempts to distinguish 
among them. He speaks only in terms of sensuousness and rationality in the human 
being, content and form in the beautiful object, and of being determined or 
undetermined in general. The important Kantian aspect that remains is not the nature 
of the elements involved in the mental free play that constitutes the perception of 
beauty, but the very fact that beauty is a point of free play, harmony and balance, 
whether within the self or, depending on whatever it is we are capable of perceiving, 
within the beautiful object. Far less mention is made of beautiful objects as such, and 
more emphasis is laid on beauty as a quality or general idea, and on the artist’s ability 
to call forth an aesthetic response from an audience.
The pleasure Kant associated with the perception of beauty was a pleasure 
derived from our inner awareness of the free play within our own mind. Although 
Schiller side-steps the question of whereabouts in our minds and why we might feel 
this pleasure, he still makes use of Kant’s idea that we virtually observe ourselves 
enjoying beauty; and he develops from it, firstly, his idea of semblance, and then, his 
idea of the sentimental. Semblance is the way in which we simultaneously think a 
beautiful object is perfectly balanced and autonomously determined from within, yet 
know that it cannot possibly have chosen to do this for itself. Taken one step further
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semblance becomes sentimentality, or artistic self-consciousness. Aspects of 
sentimentality are, on one hand, the author’s awareness that there is a gap between the 
real world and the ideal world he depicts in an art work; and on the other, the 
audience or reader’s awareness that a work of art is both true-to-life and imaginary, 
the product of someone else’s imagination.
In Holderlin’s theory of tragedy this element of self-consciousness holds an 
important place. Like Schiller he sees beauty as a point of balance. The writer 
balances a whole range of factors: personal, particular and universal, every possible 
identifiable genre of poetry or drama, every point in the unifying temporal thread 
running backwards and forwards through a literary work, the rational and the 
sensuous, the form and the content, the real and the ideal, reason and feeling, the 
defined and the indeterminate. All these factors and more must be perfectly balanced 
at the divine moment that constitutes the beauty of the work of art and the audience’s 
appreciation of it. However, this point of balance is also a point of crisis or 
contradiction. The very fact that the many elements are so diverse, and still 
discernible as being so, makes their harmonious unity all the more remarkable, and is 
also constitutive of its beauty. As regards mankind, like Schiller, Holderlin accepts 
that we are simultaneously rational and sensuous, and is even less concerned with the 
structural analysis of thought, but he allows the senses more importance than Schiller, 
because, although the understanding is involved in the creation and recognition of 
works of art, the divine moment of harmonious contradiction that we have mentioned 
above is actually felt, which is to say, known sensuously and independently of 
cognition. Both writer and audience feel the perfect beauty of the piece, even if, as 
Kant and Schiller agreed, they cannot fully conceptualise it.
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Holderlin also addresses the problem of objectivity that had troubled Schiller 
when he first began to write on aesthetics. Holderlin does not do this explicitly, but 
we have shown in our earlier chapters how he arrived at a form of non-subjective 
idealism, in which all that is, including the human mind and its working, alongside 
and in parallel with the natural world, coheres with or is grounded in Being. The 
result of this metaphysical position is to permit us to say that all nature conforms to 
the same patterns, and that there is no philosophical need to set up any strict 
dichotomy between external, or in-itself, world, and internal, or subjective, experience 
of a phenomenal world. Thus, increased knowledge and understanding of the world is 
just that -  a direct and improved comprehension of the world as it really is. Therefore 
beauty does not just show us appearance, and is not just an analogy for freedom, but 
genuinely gives us an insight into the world.
Holderlin’s very broad conception of beauty, telling us, in effect, that life and 
the world are beauty, provided we take them in the right way, together with my use at 
the end of the previous paragraph of the word ‘insight’, leads us into the changes in 
aesthetics that came about with Friedrich Schlegel. Schlegel began, in his Studium- 
Aufsatz, by apparently trying to draw the boundaries of the beautiful more tightly than 
was becoming customary at the time. His comments on philosophical tragedy, that 
tries to convey a message to its public, seem at first like a direct attack on Schiller’s 
recognition that the modem writer is unavoidably sentimental, and has a message for 
his public, rather than simply reproducing the truth of what he knows from the social 
world around him for us to contemplate calmly in the manner of Winckelmann’s 
classical artist. At the same time, however, Schlegel praises the liveliness of Romance 
literature, Renaissance Italy and, especially, Shakespeare, who are capable of using
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bizarre, unpleasant, ugly or unexpected material to further a carefully conceived and 
successful end.
Two strands from the way Schlegel subsequently developed the points he 
makes in the Studium-Aufsatz have lasting academic importance. The first arises from 
Schlegel’s own practice, namely, the production of what are effectively readers’ 
guides to selected texts or authors. In these works Schlegel applies his own critical 
and theoretical position to a reading of the work in question, and provides other 
readers or would-be readers with a fresh or enriched perspective, and without 
concerning himself with analysing the structure of the reader’s thought processes. A 
presumed whole person responds to Poesie, even though that response may itself 
hover or oscillate indeterminately. This was a great contribution to the growth of 
literary criticism and its establishment as a discipline at various levels, whether in the 
form of a book review for the general reader, or as an academic discipline. We have 
pointed out already that this result probably fell short of Schlegel’s own ambition, 
since he intended a magnificent fusion of philosophy, myth and fiction, but his failure 
to achieve this perhaps shows only that he had not realised how rich the results of a 
critical approach to literature could be.
The second key feature in the way the Studium-Aufsatz values the best work of 
both ancient and more modem times, as we have seen Schlegel confirm in his essays 
On Lessing, and Gesprach uber die Poesie, and in his Fragments, is the inner life of 
these works. By this he meant something slightly different from Holderlin’s view of 
life and the world, and more like Kant’s conception of spirit. He meant that the beauty 
in a work of art lies in an audience’s ability to discern that it has a life of its own, that 
life flows through it, that it coheres and contradicts, stops and starts, progresses and 
digresses within itself, just as the life of an animate creature would do. Alongside the
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recognition of this apparently independent, autonomous artistic life runs the 
audience’s equally confident knowledge that the work of art is the inanimate creation 
of a self-conscious artist. These are the insights that go to make up beauty, and 
constitute Romantic irony, according to Schlegel. Irony and the beauty of literature 
are the constant oscillation between the audience’s belief and disbelief in the layers of 
truth and illusion presented by the work of art.
However, despite his metaphor of the regress created by the series of mirrors, 
Schlegel also writes as if we could discover the truth about a work of art. By 
frequently re-reading a piece of literature in the light of greater wisdom, experience or 
breadth of vision, we can progress towards a full understanding, and eventually 
appreciate it properly. In other words, it would appear that he is advising us on the 
best way in which to determine its meaning, in the broadest sense. The most 
immediate demonstration of the usefulness of this approach is before us now -  this 
thesis. It exists in its current form at the end of a long process o f reading, annotating, 
evaluating and then re-reading the primary and secondary texts on which the thesis 
draws, having considered the possible value of the task in hand and the most suitable 
methodology. In this sense, it records the results of Schlegel’s own suggested 
method.2 If the author were now to re-visit each of the primary texts, they would 
surely present a slightly different face, viewed in the light of her current knowledge. 
This is also the point at which we see how plausible it would be to claim that 
Schlegel’s view of literary aesthetics also opens a connection between the strictly 
biblical disciplines of hermeneutic interpretation current at that time, and aesthetics in
2 In case a reference to Schlegel is not enough to vindicate the methodology described, we should note 
that it is also an attempt to avoid the distortions and excesses discussed by Skinner:
Quentin Skinner, ‘Meaning and understanding in the history o f  ideas’, in (ed.) James Tully, Meaning 
and Context: Quentin Skinner and his critics, Cambridge; Oxford: Polity Press Blackwell, 1988.
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general.3 The aesthetic work of Schiller, Holderlin and Schlegel thus provides a link 
and some continuity between classical aesthetics and the philosophical hermeneutics 
of Ast and Schleiermacher in the early 1800s.
This is confirmed, as we have mentioned, in Bauman, who acknowledges the 
Romantic roots of hermeneutics, though also its growth from an idealist philosophical 
position. Hermeneutics became a way of studying history, and then of studying 
understanding in general, by the application of a method in some ways similar to that 
advocated by both Holderlin and Schlegel in the appreciation or evaluation of works 
of poetic art. In common, the two disciplines presume that there is some core 
experience, knowledge or emotion shared by the reader (or evaluator) and creative 
artist (or situated historical personage / events). From this springs an instant, but 
partial, communication and understanding. However, the particularities of time, place, 
or personal experience, combined, in the case of art, with the level of technical artistic 
skill or audience education, or, in the case, for example, of history, with the amount or 
type of evidence that has survived into our own time, prevent this immediate 
understanding from being anything more than partial. The repeated re-reading 
advocated by Schlegel, the ever closer appreciation of the spirit or inner life of the 
work of art, and the questions he raised about comprehension, are paralleled in 
hermeneutics by the working of the hermeneutic circle, the continual process of 
reinterpretation and fresh understanding achieved by the culturally aware historian or 
scientist. Thus, in hermeneutics, possibly beginning with Schlegel’s friend, 
Schleiermacher,4 our understanding comes from a constant oscillation between the
3 Andrew Bowie, From Romanticism to Critical Theory: the Philosophy o f  German Literary Theory, 
New York: Routledge, 1997, p.94.
4 Nicholas Saul, ‘The pursuit o f the subject: Literature as critic and perfecter’, in (ed.) Nicholas Saul, 
Modern German Literature and Philosophy 1700-1990 , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2002, p.74. Saul confirms that Schleiermacher’s first work was written in 1805, in response to his time 
with the Jena circle, although not published until 1830.
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particular and the total, and then again from the total to the particular.5 Originally 
hermeneuticists seem to have agreed with Schlegel’s suggestion that the resultant 
accumulation of perspectives leads to an ultimate point of bias-free truth. However, 
there came a later acceptance that the cultural bias, as originally recognised by 
Schiller, is essentially present, each cultural perspective possessing its own validity.6
This thesis thus leads us finally to the suggestion that hermeneutics, a 
dominant and independent branch of nineteenth century philosophy, grew at least 
partly from the aesthetics of the 1790s, and, especially from the very literary 
application of aesthetics developed by Friedrich Schlegel. Schelling, the ‘pure’ 
philosopher, whom we rejected in the introduction as a candidate for discussion 
precisely because of his commitment to the development of a structured, idealist 
philosophy, was arguably the thinker who carried the more logically systematic 
tradition of the critical philosophy forwards in the form of the mainstream of German 
Idealism that then continued with Hegel and Schopenhauer.7
If we consider the possible after-effects of these post-Kantian changes in 
aesthetics only in relation to the philosophy o f art, we find that several lines of 
thought that appear originally to have become distinct during the 1790s have 
continued into twentieth and twenty-first century thinking. Indeed, the extent to which 
they have developed as separate and independent theories in the mean time has 
confounded Schiller’s possible hope that he was clarifying the Kantian philosophy.8
5 Zygmunt Bauman, Hermeneutics and Social Science, London: Hutchinson, 1978, p.28.
6 Zygmunt Bauman, Hermeneutics and Social Science, London: Hutchinson, 1978, p.46.
7Andrew Bowie, From Romanticism to Critical Theory: the Philosophy o f  German Literary Theory, 
New York: Routledge, 1997. One o f the main theses in the first four chapters o f Bowie’s book is that 
modem analytical and linguistic philosophy tends to overlooks the extent to which it shares Romantic 
roots with literary theory, while literary theory, (a ‘poor man’s philosophy’), often overlooks its debt to 
post-Romantic hermeneutics. See his Preface, p.vii. 1 take Bow ie’s view as partial confirmation o f  this 
bifurcation.
8For an excellent overview o f  the most important directions in which late twentieth and early twenty- 
first century aesthetics has extended, see:
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While the notion of Kantian disinterest and Schiller’s being ‘out of tune’ have 
survived vigorously in the continued belief that we must step back from our 
acceptance of the everyday, and approach the art object with an unbiased perception, 
even with naivety, the range of possible objects to which an aesthetic response might 
now seem appropriate has widened; as too has the range of permissible responses to 
art.
Thus, the apparent movement in the history of ideas set out in this thesis, that 
relies on evidence collected from various works by Friedrich Schiller, Friedrich 
Holderlin and Friedrich Schlegel, is a metaphorical journey from the more analytical 
Enlightenment view of aesthetics as an attempt to capture a fixed and stable picture of 
perfect, classical beauty towards a Romantic conception of beauty as something 
almost without definable limits, that is constantly re-adjusting itself and being re­
evaluated in the light of an endless succession of personal, cultural and physical 
changes. We have looked only at the thoughts of three men with a literary 
background, but, as our discussion has shown, the implications of what they wrote 
were relevant more widely than in the literary sphere alone. Aesthetics in the 1790s 
emerge as having lived out Schlegel’s description of the history of philosophy in a 
nutshell: ‘from the Socratic dialogue to the novel’,9 from pure, abstract philosophical 
aesthetic analysis, as exemplified by Kant, to the teeming richness of life itself, as 
exemplified by Schlegel’s view of the identity between life and the Romantic novel.
Jerrold Levison, ‘Philosophical Aesthetics: an overview’, in (ed.) Jerrold Levison, The Oxford  
Handbook o f  Aesthetics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp.3ff.
His contents page itself illustrates the extent to which themes that our three thinkers were holding 
together in a single aesthetic theory have since developed separately -  for example: Representation in 
art; Expression in art; Creativity in art; Beauty; Art and em otion... and so on.
9 1 feel very pleased to be able to end the thesis with this flash o f  Schlegelian Witz, for which I am 
indebted, as in so much else, to my supervisor, Dr Andrew Edgar.
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Diagram 2)
T he Kallias Letters
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Diagram 1) KANT (1)
sensibility 
(manifold of 
perception)
1
imagination
beauty
understanding
concepts withhel
No involvem ent o f practical reason. 
No conceptually  form ed object.
Diagram 3) SCHILLER (2)
Possible interpretation of Aesthetic Letters
sense drive 
(cf. imagination)
play drive, 
harmony, 
beauty
form drive 
(cf. understanding)
physical world, 
matter, content
No place for the equivalent of practical reason.
Problems:
1. Abandons Kallias Letters model -  no place for practical reason.
2. Where are the schemata? In sense drive, or form drive?
3. How can this model prepare us for morality?
GO
cn
Diagram 4) SCHILLER (3)
Possible interpretation of Aesthetic Letters
physical world, 
matter, content
imagination
together are 
equivalent to 
underetandinl
balance bel
/  play drive, \
  1 I harmony, )
/V  beautv y .
practical reason 
& noumenal 
realm, ie. 
freedom
 /
Problems:
4. Sense drive should include physical matter. In this model, sense drive is far 
removed from world.
5. Form drive said to be concerned with morality as well as reason. Why are the 
practical reason and freedom elevated above the combined drives?
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Diagram 5) SCHILLER (4)
Likely intended model in Aesthetic Letters.
accumula
physical world / 
objects of sense 
(not 
distinguishable 
from sense drive)
expanding
FORM DRIVE 
{active processes: 
thought, reason, 
analysis, 
conceptualisation 
understanding, 
imposition of 
standards, 
practical reason 
[ie. Good Will], 
wareness of self, 
Person)
PLAY DRIVE 
(harmony, 
beauty, grace 
aesthetic 
appreciation)
SENSE DRIVE 
(passive processes: 
raw perception, 
physical needs & 
limitations, feelings, 
appetite, interests, 
desires, instinctive 
responses, condition, 
time & spac
No exact Kantian equivalents.
♦ WILL operates a s  a power  
vis-a-v is both drives.
OO
CD
- P
REALM OF FREEDOM & 
THE WILL AS ARBITRATOR 
(reflection & evaluation)
♦ The form drive com b in es the functions of the theoretical and 
practical reason.
♦ R einhold’s  co n cep tio n s  of the se lfish  drive and unselfish  
drive a s  su b d iv is io n s of the will are not equivalent to form & 
s e n s e  drives - they relate only to morality or amorality, but 
lead to notion of conflict within the self.
♦ Will a s  free faculty able to  adjudicate betw een  the drives, in 
Schiller as in Reinhold.
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A NOTE ON THE EDITIONS AND TRANSLATIONS USED IN THE THESIS
The primary sources used in this thesis for Kant, Schiller, Holderlin and Schlegel 
were chosen on the basis of being accessible and reputable. Sometimes, if one was 
readily available, I have chosen to back up my use of German editions with a good, 
professionally published translation. In other cases, as indicated below, I have 
provided my own translations.
Kant
Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, (ed.) Heine F. Klemme and Piero Giordanetti, 
Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2001
Immanuel Kant, Critique o f  the Power ofJudgement, (ed.) Paul Guyer, trans. Paul 
Guyer and Eric Matthews, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000
Quotations and page references throughout the thesis are taken from the English 
translation by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews. The German and English editions 
include marginal references to the standard German edition of Kant’s works.
Schiller
Friedrich Schiller, Kallias oder uber die Schdnheit and Uber Anmut und Wiirde, (ed.) 
Klaus L. Berghahn, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1999.
All references and quotations are from this edition. Translations are my own.
Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man: in a series o f  letters, (ed.) (tr.) 
Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L.A. Willoughby, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982 
(parallel text English / German edition).
Since this is a parallel text edition, I have taken my quotations from and given page 
references to the Wilkinson and Willoughby’s English translation.
Friedrich Schiller, Uber naive und sentimentalische Dichtung, (ed.) Klaus L. 
Berghahn, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 2005.
Friedrich Schiller, On the Naive and Sentimental in Literature, (tr.) Helen Watanabe- 
O'Kelly, Manchester: CarcanetNew Press Ltd, 1981.
I have used Helen Watanabe-O’Kelly’s translation and referred to her edition. In 
some instances I have cross-referenced with the Berghahn edition, and have very 
occasionally also mentioned my own alternative translation.
Any references to other works by Schiller use my own translations.
Holderlin
All translations are my own.
Schlegel
All translations are my own.
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